Gary F, John S, all, List,
I meant to restrict the question to Peirce's phenomenology. The aim was to clarify the business of philosophers who are doing phenomenology as part of their inquiry in logic, ethics, metaphysics, or what have you. The points you make about the vagueness of our conception of consciousness and the continuity in the degrees of conscious awareness with respect to various phenomena are points I accept--both as an understanding of Peirce's position and as starting points in my own inquiries. I'd go further an add another points Peirce makes, which is that it is probably a mistake to focus too much on the conception of consciousness in one's philosophical theory of cognition because the conception is so vague. Rather, we would do better to focus on the clearer conception what is and is not under self-control. One of the points I was trying to make in asking the question was to put pressure on those who seem to think Peirce's main aim in developing a phenomenological theory is to provide a grounding for a philosophical theory of consciousness. As I indicated earlier, I believe the main business of doing Peircean phenomenology is to provide the resources and techniques needed to make more exacting analyses of scientific observations. Careful phenomenological analysis of the phenomena that have been observed puts scientists in a better position to develop models, make measurements, frame hypotheses, etc. Having offered this general account of the business of the Peircean phenomenologist, I'd like to add the central goals of identifying possible sources of observational error and correcting for those errors. In the hopes of clarifying my own understanding of the aims of Peircean phenomenology, let me borrow a distinction. Mathematicians make a distinction between inquiry in pure mathematics and the application of formal systems to real world problems in applied mathematics. In a similar vein, I think it might be helpful to make an analogous distinction between the aims of developing a pure theory of phenomenology as compared to the business of applying such a theory to problems in the normative sciences, metaphysics, or the special sciences--or to our common sense experience and understanding. For my part, I'd like to get clearer on how the pure phenomenological theory is supposed to support and guide the applied activities--such as the activities of identifying possible sources of observational error, correcting for those errors, framing productive questions, exploring informal diagrammatic representations of the problems, measuring the phenomena, formulating plausible hypotheses, and generating formal mathematical models of the hypothetical explanations. --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 ________________________________ From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> on behalf of g...@gnusystems.ca <g...@gnusystems.ca> Sent: Saturday, August 28, 2021 7:06:52 AM To: 'Peirce-L' Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34 Jeff, Helmut, John, List, Your question, Jeff, is about phenomenology in general, and not specifically about what Peirce called “phenomenology.” I think different schools of phenomenology would give different answers to your question. Part of the reason for this is the inherent vagueness of the concept of “consciousness.” If I learned anything during my years of writing reviews for the Journal of Consciousness Studies, it is that different disciplines, and even different writers within the same discipline, use the word with different references or different theoretical assumptions, so that you have to be familiar with their particular viewpoint and idiom in order to understand their arguments involving that word. Peirce’s own usage of “consciousness” reflects that vagueness, especially in CP 7.553, where he compares it to “bottomless lake.” In other words, consciousness is graded, and there is no definite boundary between conscious and unconscious experience. I think Peirce would also agree with Helmut that where there is life, there is some grade of consciousness or mentality. I’ve argued for that myself in my book, citing a number of neuropsychologists, so I won’t repeat all that here. When it comes to human consciousness, many virtually identify it with self-awareness, but I think that violates the principle of continuity between the various grades of biological consciousness. We can however say that self-awareness evolves, just as we can say that Homo sapiens has evolved even though there’s no consensus on exactly where or when or how the step was made from proto-human to human. I think the closest Peirce comes to making a firm distinction between conscious and unconscious mentality is where he argues that perceptual judgments are not under our conscious control, but reasoning must be under conscious control, otherwise there is no basis for judging it to be good or bad. The perceptual judgment thus serves as a kind of boundary marker between direct experience and reasoning, or between perception and conception. But if we take this as a boundary between unconscious and conscious mind, it is arbitrary in the sense that (according to synechism) there is no real discontinuity between the two. I’m not sure whether I’m answering your question or explaining why I don’t see a clear answer to it. But that’s all I can say in response to it. Gary f. From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> On Behalf Of Jeffrey Brian Downard Sent: 27-Aug-21 18:45 Cc: 'Peirce-L' <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34 Gary F, Helmut, John, Jon, List, Some have suggested that the aim of phenomenology is to provide an analysis and account of human consciousness. I have a question about the focus on consciousness. The business of the phenomenology, I believe, is to provide the resources and techniques needed to make more exacting analysis of scientific observations. Careful phenomenological analysis puts scientists in a better position to develop models, make measurements and frame hypotheses. Take inquiry in logic as an example. Phenomenological analysis of surprising observations about arguments that we hold to be valid or invalid will put the logician in a better position to frame hypotheses about the principles of logic. Assuming this is on the right track, what should we say about unconscious forms of bias and prejudice that might effect the validity of reasoning? Does phenomenology supply us with the resources needed to analyze such forms of bias and prejudice? If the sole object of inquiry in phenomenology is conscious experience, unconscious forms of bias and prejudice would appear to be outside of the scope of phenomenological inquiry. Here is my question: is phenomenological analysis restricted to conscious experience, or are we capable of making analyses of unconscious forms of bias and prejudice that might shape our experience? --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 ________________________________
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