Gary F., List: GF: So when you refer to the three interpretants of the *one sign*, you are thinking of “type” and “token” as *aspects of the one sign*, not as different signs ...
Although I would not call them "aspects," this is basically where I landed after wrestling for a while with the ambiguity of "sign" throughout Peirce's writings on semeiotic. However, I would not be surprised to discover that there are problematic elements of my resulting speculative grammar that I have not yet fully recognized. In summary, every *sign *has one *final *interpretant that is common to all its types and all their tokens, every *type *has one *immediate *interpretant that is common to all its tokens, and every *token *has one *dynamical *interpretant for each distinct effect of it. The underlying diagrammatic conception is that the sign itself is a continuum of three dimensions for an argument, two dimensions for a proposition, or one dimension for a name. Its types are portions of the same dimensionality, and its tokens are discrete points within those portions where different spaces, surfaces, and lines intersect. GF: ... so the proposition and its embodiment (sinsign) are one sign, not two. Each *actual *expression of the proposition is one token of one sign in accordance with one type. Another expression of the proposition in the same language is a different token of the same sign in accordance with the same type. An expression of the proposition in a different language is a different token of the same sign in accordance with a different type. GF: Does the presumable tone aspect of a sign not get interpreted at all? I understand a tone to be a quality *of a token* that affects its *dynamical *interpretants. Two tokens of the same type, but with different tones, can thus have different dynamical interpretants. Examples of tones in this sense include voice inflections, punctuation marks, and font changes for emphasis such as bold, italics, or underline. As you probably know, Marc Champagne takes a very different approach in his 2018 book, *Consciousness and the Philosophy of Signs*. He employs "tone" for the qualitative presentation of a sign and "type" for each different meaning that it can have. In his example, "Because of his long *fast*, he was too weak to stand *fast *or hold *fast* or even to run *fast*," he thus counts one tone, four tokens, and three types. While this seems like a potentially useful distinction, I do not see how it is at all compatible with Peirce's explicit definitions of a type as "a *definitely *significant Form" and a tone as "[a]n *indefinite *significant character such as a tone of voice" (CP 4.537, 1906; emphasis mine). GF: Do *all *signs have both type and token aspects, or only legisigns? My understanding of Peirce's different sign taxonomies is that qualisign/sinsign/legisign in 1903 is virtually synonymous with tone/token/type in 1906, such that the latter terminology effectively replaces the former. That is why, as you might have noticed, I generally avoid the earlier terms and stick with the later ones. In any case, I do lean toward all signs having both types and tokens, including natural signs as well as uttered signs. For example, ripples on the surface of a lake are a type of a natural sign that indicates the direction of the wind, which is embodied in a token wherever there are *actual *ripples on the surface of an *actual *lake. GF: So in that sense a dynamical interpretant is a translation, not a mere replica or copy of the sign. That is what I expected you to say, and I agree. However, it seems inconsistent with your previous statement--"A printed, written or uttered text is only replicable, not translatable." A printed, written, or uttered text is *translated *every single time it is read or heard, thus producing another dynamical interpretant, and therefore is obviously *translatable* as well as replicable. What am I missing? Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, Oct 31, 2021 at 9:40 AM <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > Jon AS, > > JAS: Again, I tend to think of an immediate interpretant as an > interpretant of a type, each dynamical interpretant as an interpretant of a > token, and the final interpretant as the interpretant of the sign. Any > given proposition (sign) has a certain final interpretant, formulations of > it in different languages and other systems of signs such as EGs (types) > have somewhat different immediate interpretants, and each utterance of it > (token) can have very different dynamical interpretants in the minds of > different interpreters. > > GF: OK, I missed that somehow. So when you refer to the three > interpretants of the *one sign*, you are thinking of “type” and “token” > as *aspects of the one sign*, not as different signs; so the proposition > and its embodiment (sinsign) are one sign, not two. I’ve never thought of > it that way, and I’m not sure I want to … but it raises some questions: > Does the presumable *tone* aspect of a sign not get interpreted at all? > Do *all* signs have both type and token aspects, or only legisigns? > > GF: A proposition as defined by Peirce is *translatable *as well as > replicable. A printed, written or uttered text is only replicable, not > translatable, and an interpretant is a kind of translation, in my view. > > JAS: How are you (and Peirce) defining "translatable" and "replicable" > here? When someone reads or hears a printed, written, or uttered text, is > the resulting dynamical interpretant in that person's mind a translation or > a replication? > > GF: As for Peirce, I’m relying on the definition of *proposition* that I > quoted earlier in this thread from CP 8.313. By a *replica* I mean simply > a copy, in the sense that all printed copies of a published book are copies > of the one book, all essentially identical except in numerical identity. > (Peirce of course used “replica” as a technical term in his 1903 lectures > and writings about both signs and graphs.) A *translation* of a text is > embodied *differently* from the text, e.g. it’s in a different language, > but is more or less recognizable to anyone who knows both languages *as *a > translation, i.e. as a rendering of the same symbol that determined the > embodiment of the original text. (And the more recognizable it is, the > more we judge it to be a *good* translation.) So in that sense a > dynamical interpretant is a translation, not a mere replica or copy of the > sign. I don’t consider a copy of a written, printed or vocally uttered text > to be an interpretant of it. > > This thread is reminding me of the parenthetical remark Peirce made in R > 1476: > > CSP: It is by a patient examination of the various modes (some of them > quite disparate) of interpretations of signs and of the connections between > these (an exploration in which one ought, if possible, to provide himself > with a guide, or, if that cannot be, to prepare his courage to see one > conception that will have to be mastered peering over the head of another, > and soon another peering over that, and so on, until he shall begin to > think there is to be no end of it, or that life will not be long enough to > complete the study) that … > > GF: That’s a replica, not an interpretant. > > Gary f. >
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