Jon, GF: So in that sense a dynamical interpretant is a translation, not a mere replica or copy of the sign.
JAS: That is what I expected you to say, and I agree. However, it seems inconsistent with your previous statement--"A printed, written or uttered text is only replicable, not translatable." A printed, written, or uttered text is translated every single time it is read or heard, thus producing another dynamical interpretant, and therefore is obviously translatable as well as replicable. What am I missing? GF: My previous statement assumes that the type is one sign and its embodiment (the token, the existing “text”) is another. Your perception of inconsistency is based on the assumption that type and token are not two “signs” but one. Both assumptions are arbitrary <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/rlb.htm#bsrv> . That’s all. Gary f. From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> On Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: 31-Oct-21 21:05 To: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts Gary F., List: GF: So when you refer to the three interpretants of the one sign, you are thinking of “type” and “token” as aspects of the one sign, not as different signs ... Although I would not call them "aspects," this is basically where I landed after wrestling for a while with the ambiguity of "sign" throughout Peirce's writings on semeiotic. However, I would not be surprised to discover that there are problematic elements of my resulting speculative grammar that I have not yet fully recognized. In summary, every sign has one final interpretant that is common to all its types and all their tokens, every type has one immediate interpretant that is common to all its tokens, and every token has one dynamical interpretant for each distinct effect of it. The underlying diagrammatic conception is that the sign itself is a continuum of three dimensions for an argument, two dimensions for a proposition, or one dimension for a name. Its types are portions of the same dimensionality, and its tokens are discrete points within those portions where different spaces, surfaces, and lines intersect. GF: ... so the proposition and its embodiment (sinsign) are one sign, not two. Each actual expression of the proposition is one token of one sign in accordance with one type. Another expression of the proposition in the same language is a different token of the same sign in accordance with the same type. An expression of the proposition in a different language is a different token of the same sign in accordance with a different type. GF: Does the presumable tone aspect of a sign not get interpreted at all? I understand a tone to be a quality of a token that affects its dynamical interpretants. Two tokens of the same type, but with different tones, can thus have different dynamical interpretants. Examples of tones in this sense include voice inflections, punctuation marks, and font changes for emphasis such as bold, italics, or underline. As you probably know, Marc Champagne takes a very different approach in his 2018 book, Consciousness and the Philosophy of Signs. He employs "tone" for the qualitative presentation of a sign and "type" for each different meaning that it can have. In his example, "Because of his long fast, he was too weak to stand fast or hold fast or even to run fast," he thus counts one tone, four tokens, and three types. While this seems like a potentially useful distinction, I do not see how it is at all compatible with Peirce's explicit definitions of a type as "a definitely significant Form" and a tone as "[a]n indefinite significant character such as a tone of voice" (CP 4.537, 1906; emphasis mine). GF: Do all signs have both type and token aspects, or only legisigns? My understanding of Peirce's different sign taxonomies is that qualisign/sinsign/legisign in 1903 is virtually synonymous with tone/token/type in 1906, such that the latter terminology effectively replaces the former. That is why, as you might have noticed, I generally avoid the earlier terms and stick with the later ones. In any case, I do lean toward all signs having both types and tokens, including natural signs as well as uttered signs. For example, ripples on the surface of a lake are a type of a natural sign that indicates the direction of the wind, which is embodied in a token wherever there are actual ripples on the surface of an actual lake. GF: So in that sense a dynamical interpretant is a translation, not a mere replica or copy of the sign. That is what I expected you to say, and I agree. However, it seems inconsistent with your previous statement--"A printed, written or uttered text is only replicable, not translatable." A printed, written, or uttered text is translated every single time it is read or heard, thus producing another dynamical interpretant, and therefore is obviously translatable as well as replicable. What am I missing? Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
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