My work in non-verbal inferencing patterns stems from the arts considered in light of Peirce's phenomenology. So, while I agree with you that not much is written about the arts from a Peircean perspective, it is a rich source for such study.
On Fri, Nov 5, 2021, 3:09 PM Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote: > Phyllis, Jon, Gary F, List, > > PC: What about a thought expressed without language as, say, a piece of > music, a modern dance or an abstract piece of art? > > In my view it depends on whether the piece of music or dance or art object > was 'reproduced' internally from something already 'composed', in which > case I'd say it is a *token*; or if it is, shall we say, a 'spur of the > moment' creation, then it is the original *sign *which may have > tokens. But in both linguistic and art creation, I am still unsettled on > what the *object* of that original sign is. > > And a related question: since there is obvious 'structure' even in, say, > jazz improvisation (e.g., John Coltrans), or interpretive dance (Isadora > Duncan), or 'action painting' (Jackson Pollock), structure that in almost > all cases has its roots in previous study in the art form even if/when it > diverges radically from its historically more conservative or established > forms. > > I'm glad you've introduced the arts into this discussion, Phyllis, as > there is a tendency among many -- if not most -- philosophers, > semioticians, logicians, mathematicians, etc. -- to work and write as if > *only* linguistic and mathematical signs were of interest and importance. > And I've yet to be much impressed by what I've seen of work in semiotics in > the arts (with a few notable exceptions, such as Martin Lefebvre) most of > which is not grounded in Peircean but, rather, other schools of semiotics > (again, then are exceptions, such as Claudio Guerri). But there may be work > in these areas that I'm not aware of, especially as I've pretty much > stopped looking for it. > > Best, > > Gary R > > > > “Let everything happen to you > Beauty and terror > Just keep going > No feeling is final” > ― Rainer Maria Rilke > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > > > > > > > > On Fri, Nov 5, 2021 at 5:18 PM Phyllis Chiasson < > phyllis.marie.chias...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> What about a thought expressed without language as, say, a piece of >> music, a modern dance or an abstract piece of art? >> >> On Fri, Nov 5, 2021, 12:17 PM Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >>> Gary F, Jon, List, >>> >>> GF: "A thought I am hosting at the moment is certainly *embodied* here >>> and now in a pattern of neural activity, whether I *utter* it or not, >>> just as a spoken or written text is *embodied* in a pattern of sound >>> waves or marks on a page. The only difference is that it is an >>> *internal* sign, invisible to others. Does that disqualify it as a >>> *token*? I would certainly hesitate to call it a *type*." >>> >>> >>> That's an interesting question which I'm finding it somewhat difficult >>> to answer. At first blush it seemed to me that the situation of that >>> internal sign of your thought wouldn't be much different from, say, a >>> subway token which was dropped and buried in the earth, not to be seen (or, >>> for your thought, expressed} until/if ever uncovered (or, for you thought, >>> expressed in language written or spoken). >>> >>> But on further reflection, it is quite clear what the 'type' of the >>> subway token is; but what is the 'type' (and object) of your unexpressed >>> thought? >>> >>> Or is the first unexpressed thought more like a dream? The fact of the >>> dream is real, but the content of it isn't (quite; but surely more so than >>> the dream, I would expect). I suppose if you were, say, to convey the dream >>> to another, that would be a token of if. Is your internal thought something >>> like that until it is written out or spoken of? If so, the original thought >>> before being expressed in language doesn't seem exactly like a token. >>> >>> A similar question would follow, I think, if rather than being written >>> or spoken by you that the thought were repeated only in another internal >>> expression of the original thought, maybe in a somewhat more >>> developed way.. >>> >>> Jon wrote: >>> >>> JAS: I would say that [your internal thought] is indeed a token, because >>> it is an *individual* embodiment of the sign. After all. . . an >>> internal thought is a hypothetically discrete constituent--with boundaries >>> that are marked off somewhat arbitrarily--of an ongoing continuous dialogue >>> in which the utterer and interpreter are temporally sequential stages of >>> the same (quasi-)mind. the pattern of neural activity that embodies a >>> thought-sign is an *actual *utterance just as much as the pattern of >>> sound waves or marks on a page that embodies a spoken or written text. >>> >>> >>> But I remain unclear as to what the 'sign' is which that original >>> thought is an alleged 'token' of? And what is its object? What if it were a >>> random, yet highly original thought? A thought come "out of the blue" as >>> the expression has it. Certainly I agree with Jon that "the pattern of >>> neural activity that embodies a thought-sign is an *actual *utterance >>> just as much as the pattern of sound waves or marks on a page that embodies >>> a spoken or written text," and so the same questions just above might >>> be put to, especially, the verbal expression of that "highly original >>> thought." >>> >>> Perhaps this is the sort of matter which can make one feel that it might >>> be better *to focus on the process of semiosis* rather than on the >>> terminology forged in semeiotic grammar. On the other hand, it would seem >>> that for the purposes of developing a scientific semeiotic that we require >>> such terminology to even speak about semiosis with other semioticians, to >>> discuss semiosis generally, or individual examples of semiosis, etc. The >>> danger, as I'm beginning to see it, is the possibility of getting 'lost' in >>> the terminology, to see individual trees rather than the forest, so to >>> speak. In addition, the terminology can become so complicated as to -- at >>> least at this stage of the development of Peirce's semeiotic -- to become a >>> possible impediment to considerations of acts of semiosis. I doubt that few >>> would say that there aren't major challenges in dealing with Peirce's >>> semeiotic terminology as it develops over the course of his logical life. >>> >>> I am only today grappling with the intriguing question you posed, Gary >>> F, and just a few minutes ago read Jon's post, so all of this is still >>> quite unsettled in my thinking. I'm eager to explore it further. >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Gary R >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> “Let everything happen to you >>> Beauty and terror >>> Just keep going >>> No feeling is final” >>> ― Rainer Maria Rilke >>> >>> *Gary Richmond* >>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >>> *Communication Studies* >>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Fri, Nov 5, 2021 at 9:16 AM <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: >>> >>>> Jon, Gary R, List, >>>> >>>> Thanks for correcting my mistake about tokens, which somehow slipped by >>>> my internal editor. >>>> >>>> JAS: the three words in different languages are only tokens where they >>>> are *actually* written or spoken, and each of those *individual *instances >>>> is governed by the *general *type to which it conforms. However, >>>> individual *humans *are not tokens of the type "man" as a *word *in >>>> English, the type "homo" as a *word *in Latin, or the type "ἄνθρωπος" >>>> as a *word *in Greek; instead, they are the *dynamical objects* of >>>> those signs. >>>> >>>> GF: As Gary R confirmed, it is the written or spoken *word* that is a >>>> token. It would follow that the three words in the different languages are >>>> *subtypes*, not tokens, of the more general type which Peirce referred >>>> to as “the same sign.” This implies a hierarchy of *types* but not of >>>> *tokens*. >>>> >>>> I wonder, though, whether the term “token” can only apply to *external >>>> *signs. In his October 1995 *Monist* article, Peirce referred to “A >>>> sign (under which designation I place every kind of thought, and not alone >>>> external signs)” (CP 5.447, EP2:350). A thought I am hosting at the moment >>>> is certainly *embodied* here and now in a pattern of neural activity, >>>> whether I *utter* it or not, just as a spoken or written text is >>>> *embodied* in a pattern of sound waves or marks on a page. The only >>>> difference is that it is an *internal* sign, invisible to others. Does >>>> that disqualify it as a *token*? I would certainly hesitate to call it >>>> a *type*. >>>> >>>> Gary f. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu < >>>> peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> *On Behalf Of *Jon Alan Schmidt >>>> *Sent:* 4-Nov-21 18:24 >>>> *To:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> >>>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, and Tokens >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Gary F., List: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Again, my understanding of the terminology within the context of >>>> speculative grammar is that only an *individual *embodiment of a sign >>>> is a token. Accordingly, in biological classification, it seems to me that >>>> only an *individual *organism is properly called a token. Genus and >>>> species are both types, which correspond to different levels of generality >>>> that are at least somewhat arbitrary. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Likewise, the three words in different languages are only tokens where >>>> they are *actually* written or spoken, and each of those *individual >>>> *instances >>>> is governed by the *general *type to which it conforms. However, >>>> individual *humans *are not tokens of the type "man" as a *word *in >>>> English, the type "homo" as a *word *in Latin, or the type "ἄνθρωπος" >>>> as a *word *in Greek; instead, they are the *dynamical objects* of >>>> those signs. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Finally, it seems to me that the "top type in the holarchy of signs" is >>>> simply "sign," the one type that encompasses all other types, which is why >>>> the ambiguity associated with "sign" might be unavoidable. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Regards, >>>> >>>> >>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>>> >>>> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian >>>> >>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>>> >>>> >>>> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ >>>> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY >>>> ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . >>>> ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to >>>> l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of >>>> the message and nothing in the body. More at >>>> https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . >>>> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; >>>> and co-managed by him and Ben Udell. >>>> >>> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ >>> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . >>> ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to >>> l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of >>> the message and nothing in the body. More at >>> https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . >>> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; >>> and co-managed by him and Ben Udell. >>> >>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
