Jerry, Thanks for that note. The following sentence shows why we need to relate Peirce's writings to the latest and greatest work that is being done today:
>From the abstract: "C.S. Peirce, however, is not generally considered a >canonical figure in the history of philosophy of science." I have attended a few APA conferences where I gave a talk in a Peirce session and attended other talks in more general sessions. And I have not heard anybody mention Peirce (except me in the discussions after a talk). The logicians are constantly talking about Frege, despite the fact that nobody else had ever used his notation for logic. But they don't mention Peirce, despite the fact that every logician uses his algebra of logic (with minor notational changes by Peano). In fact, the reason why Peano changed the notation was for ease of publication. Peirce used the Greek letters, sigma and pi, for the quantifiers, which were rarely available in those days. But any typesetter could easily turn letters upside down and backwards. So instead of mentioning Peirce, they give credit to Peano for the algebraic notation. It's essential for Peirce scholars to relate his writings to the big, wide, modern world. Susan Haack does that very well. Some others do that. And it's essential for Peirce scholars to do much, much more to relate Peirce's work to the hot topics of the 21st century. Peirce himself expected his writings to be hot issues for 400 years. We're almost halfway there, and we need to heat up the discussions. John ---------------------------------------- From: "Jerry LR Chandler" <jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science (U Pitt) FYI JLRC Friday, April 12th @ 12:00 pm - 1:30 pm EDT This talk will also be available live streamed on: Zoom at https://pitt.zoom.us/j/94576817686 Title: Peirce Disappears: C.S. Peirce and Early Logical Empiricism Abstract: Scholars of the history of philosophy of science read and hear a lot about Duhem, Mach, Poincaré, and the members of the Vienna Circle. C.S. Peirce, however, is not generally considered a canonical figure in the history of philosophy of science. But in the early years of the logical empiricist movement in the United States, Peirce received a warm reception from prominent representatives, proponents, and sympathizers of logical empiricism including Charles Morris, Ernst Nagel, Herbert Feigl, Phillip Frank, and W.V.O. Quine. This reception was short-lived though and Peirce gradually disappeared from the mainstream philosophy of science while logical empiricism turned into a formidable movement. In this talk, I begin by discussing examples of the early reception of Peirce’s philosophy in the works of Morris, Nagel (and his student Justus Buchler), Feigl, and Frank. I show the variety of topics (including logic, probability theory, theories of truth and meaning, and social dimensions of science) in which Peirce received a warm (though not uncritical) reception. We see that the engagements with his works are persistent from the late 1920s to the 1950s and get more refined over time. I then provide some explanations for the eventual marginalization of Peirce in mainstream philosophy of science.
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