Edwina, List, As I see it, Jon often paraphrases something Peirce wrote (or offers a comment which functions somewhat like a paraphrase) and then gives an exact quotation that supports that paraphrase. If you don't agree with his paraphrase or restatement, not only can you again check Peirce's words in the quotation offered then and there, but, if that doesn't convince you, you can look for that quotation within the context in which it appeared. And you can even look for other quotations by Peirce which take up the matter to compare with the original quote.
(This is not to say that at places Peirce doesn't seemingly contradict himself or his views on a matter, or that his views haven't changed, often, as I see it, evolved -- but that is another subject altogether.) What Jon does is not the same as "interpretation," so that anyone who thinks the paraphrase, etc. does not follow from the quotation, can check it and argue that Jon -- or anyone who occasionally takes this approach, as I most certainly sometimes do -- has* not* paraphrased the quotation properly and, so, has distorted its meaning: has not understood it correctly. Take this example from Jon's post where I said that his views were 'definitive' on the semeiotic matters under consideration,* but 'definitive' only in the sense of mirroring Peirce's own views as clearly stated in the quotation*. JAS: As I observed before, Peirce also never states nor implies that a sign has *three *objects. The key to understanding his different references to objects in CP 8.314 (EP 2:498, 1909 Mar 14) is in its very first sentence. CSP: We must distinguish between the Immediate Object,--i.e. the Object as represented in the sign,--and the Real (no, because perhaps the Object is altogether fictive, I must choose a different term, therefore), say rather the Dynamical Object, which, from the nature of things, the Sign *cannot *express, which it can only *indicate *and leave the interpreter to find out by *collateral experience*. The question here is: how many objects of a sign does Peirce distinguish in explicating his semeiotic? This quotation says only two (and not three). And the truth is that Jon or I, or any interested scholar could find and quote many other passages where Peirce says the equivalent thing. So, in this matter as in myriad others regarding how Peirce himself saw something -- and said so numerous times in various ways, but always arriving at the same view --n o "interpretation" is required or, really, needed. In such matters I always turn to Peirce's own words and not to some 'interpretation' by you, Jon, me, or anyone. Of course, that doesn't mean that I always agree with one or another of Peirce's views, only that I can be reasonably certain that* that is what he himself thought and wrote*. A good portion, perhaps even the most of Jon's work is to 'get at' what Peirce himself said. Peirce repeatedly said that the Sign had two Objects, not three. I don't see how the latter could even be properly called an 'interpretation'. And it is patently false. Jon wrote earlier in this thread: I do not ascribe my beliefs to Peirce, I scrupulously quote *his own* statements. It is standard practice to put any words added within a quotation in square brackets, which *signals *that they are not in the original text. And I have no hesitation in saying from what I've read of Jon's work that this is true as much for speculative grammar -- and semeiotic generally -- as for cosmology, synechism, etc. Please try to offer a counter-example to prove me wrong. (However, this is not to suggest that he hasn't done original work in semeiotic and metaphysics, for example, but only that when the thinking is his own -- even when springboarding from some Peircean idea or another -- that he makes that clear.) So, to conclude this single thought regarding your rather superheated response to me, Edwina: It is clear to anyone who reads Jon's posts or his papers (except, apparently you) that he does *not* ascribe his own views to Peirce but, rather expounds Peirce's own views by offering quotations from Peirce's work (and, having just glanced at Jeff's excellent post, I would tend to agree with Jeff that there are questions regarding, for example, the weight one should put on Peirce's personal views as expressed in, for example, personal letters as opposed to his more formal writings). Having read myriad posts and more than a few papers by both you and Jon over many years, I would say that it appears to me that you are committing the very error of scholarship which you accuse Jon of, namely, that of ascribing *your *views to Peirce. Further, you seem to be saying that all 'interpretations' are 'just that' --interpretations. That may well be. But be that as it may, when the question is a matter of what Peirce actually said (that is, wrote and thought), that is simply *not* true. For example, it is not true that Peirce wrote or thought that the Sign had three Objects: that's *at best* a misinterpretation if ever there was one. Or, if I'm wrong about this, offer a quotation or two from his work that holds that there are three Objects. Best, Gary R On Sun, Sep 8, 2024 at 10:46 AM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary R, List > > I’m not sure of the point of your post which seems to be that you support > JAS’s posts [without argumentation] as definitive and correct replications > of Peirce’s views. I haven’t seen anyone else post either in favour of or > rejecting JAS’s views - ie - that HIS views are also *exactly* those of > Peirce. Is it the case that all others who post to this list are also > correct - or are they incorrect? > > You write: "You and I may argue that there are, within Peirce's > trichotomic semeiotic and cosmology, passages and argumentations, etc. that > support cosmological and religious views (perhaps even non-religious and > scientific views and interpretations) far different from Peirce’s.” > > I disagree - the passages and arguments that Peirce writes are not “far > different from Peirce’s’! Peirce wrote them!! > > You also write that ‘Jon is prone to supporting Peirce’s views > with incontovertible text”! Well- me too! Same with others! But what you > are ignoring is that no-one is iconic to Peirce’s texts! Each person who > reads Peirce’s texts is* interpreting* it - and it is not up to any one > of us to declare: Aha - that person is exactly repeating, incontrovertibly, > what Peirce meant!. That is for the community of scholars - over time. I > don’t think that you alone can declare that his view is ’the truth of what > Peirce saw’ while….others..are not doing so. > > And I disagree with JAS. I disagree that, for instance, he sees the > universe as ‘a sign’ [ ONLY the mediate process and only ONE?]…and inserts > God as the outside-the-universe Dynamic Object of determination. Peirce > actually wrote > > “The entire universe - not merely the universe of existents, but all that > wider universe, embracing the universe of existents as a part, the universe > which we are all accustomed to refer to as ’the truth’- that all this > universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of > signs”. > I repeat: that the universe is ‘composed exclusively of signs’. [5.488f. > Note; signs - is plural. ]. > > So- this is a Quote directly from Peirce. It HAS to be interpreted - by > anyone who reads it, since any one of us is NOT Peirce but is engaged, > ourselves, in a semiotic interaction with the text - and as a triadic > semiosic interaction, this means that the result is AN INTERPRETATION of > the text. Is this interpretation iconic, indexical, symbolic? > > So- does this text mean what JAS interprets - as only the mediate relation > and only one? And did Peirce mean by these plural signs the triad or only > the mediate relation??? Just because JAS posts his interpretation of a text > does not automatically mean that he, alone, has direct and Truthful access > to ‘how Peirce saw things’. I - and others - have, over this list, > rejected such a conclusion. > > As for using non-Peircean terminology to interpret Peirce’s arguments - as > Peirce wrote, “How concepts are named makes little difference’ [4.4]- and I > am puzzled by JAS’s shock when I use such terms as ‘information’, data, > nodes….I feel as if I should , when writing, provide brandy to calm the > nerves of shocked readers who tell me that ‘Peirce never used such > words!!’. Again - none of us has the ‘hubris’ to feel that we alone have > direct and truthful access to Peirce’s meaning. .We are, each of us, > operating within a semiotic process and that means - we interpret Peirce’s > text. > > All that can be done, in my view, is that we can discuss our different > views; support them with text AND analysis - and leave it at that. I don’t > think that anyone should then decide - ah- X person is ‘more truthful to > Peirce’ than Y person. I don’t think the small number of postings on this > list has the power to do that. The community of scholars has to be broader > and over a longer time. > > Edwina > > > > > > > > > On Sep 8, 2024, at 1:35 AM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > > Edwina, Jon, List, > > While Jon and I have had serious disagreements on many topics over the > years, none more so than in our discussions of religious metaphysics (and > especially of late, of religious beliefs which, as I see it, are > problematic when they are exclusionary; but Jon never discusses these on > List), it is my very measured opinion that he is *quite correct* in his > analysis and conclusions (which are *not* mere idiosyncratic > interpretations) of *Peirce's views* regarding synechism, the categories, > early/proto-cosmology, and his (Peirce's) argument regarding God as Ens > Necessarium. > > You and I, Edwina, most certainly do disagree with some of those views of > Peirce. Still, Jon has well supported his argumentation that *these are > indeed Peirce's views*. He has shown this, not *rather* definitively, but > *quite* definitively with more than ample textual support. Truth is, that > Jon himself doesn't agree with all of Peirce's cosmological-religious views > (of course with the major exception of his *irrefutable theism*). > > One might argue, as I have occasionally done, that theism was the *only > real option* for Peirce in the interest of bringing his contemporaries to > a sense that the universe was not 'mechanical', nothing-but-accident, etc., > and that to contribute scientifically to a sense that the universe is alive > with meaning was more than a desideratum, but a (quasi-?) scientific truth > that it was his moral duty to support and promote. Promoting a religious > sense of the cosmos was for Peirce a desideratum. > > As for my religious beliefs, they are most certainly currently in flux as > regards Christianity. For me, instructed first in the Episcopal Church, > that one ought see Christ (God) in the person facing you, your neighbor, > your brother or sister, Jon's rejection of my admittedly unorthodox > understanding of Christianity, was profoundly unsettling, especially as I > saw Peirce himself as standing far apart from the traditional and orthodox > Christian views. > > But all that discussion was off-List, and Jon has not discussed his > orthodox Lutheran views in this forum at all nor ever. That I now bring > this up is entirely my doing, and not his. Does Jon's research and > philosophical thinking mean to support his theistic views? Well, perhaps. > But the truth is, that there is much in Peirce to support, at very least, > theism. > > You and I may argue that there are, within Peirce's trichotomic semeiotic > and cosmology, passages and argumentations, etc. that support cosmological > and religious views (perhaps even non-religious and scientific views and > interpretations) far different from Peirce's. Jon has not denied that there > is that in Peirce's writing. So, there's disagreement to go all around! As > long as there is mutual respect, I'd say that that's a good thing! > > So, while Jon is prone to supporting Peirce's views with > incontrovertible textual support, and while this seems to irritate some > members of this forum (occasionally me, included), his having done so > regarding many facets of Peirce's philosophy has been of really inestimable > value for those who are truly interested in *how Peirce saw things*, > whether one agrees with Peirce or not. Jon has made it clear that *that* > is all that he's attempting to do. And, I have always -- and always will -- > support his right to do that on this forum. > > Gary R > > Best, > > Gary R > > > > On Sat, Sep 7, 2024 at 10:48 PM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> List, JAS >> >> 1] Not everyone knows ’standard practice’ ; therefore, I consider it >> courteous to let the ignorant and uneducated reader of your post know >> that it is YOU who have inserted the word… and even, to further explain >> WHY. Why would you add such a word [‘merely] without explaining your >> intention? >> >> 2] So what if Peirce doesn’t use the words of ‘information sites where >> information is processed’. Is it heretical to explain his concepts using >> different terms?? Are you suggesting that this action of information >> processing doesn’t happen? >> >> What do you think analysis actually does? Just quote texts without >> examination of their meaning? What’s the point of that? The function of >> analysis is to understand the texts - and usually, this means explaining >> them in other ways..- multiple ways - using different terms and examples - >> and in different disciplines. Just robotically repeating the terms is not >> an analysis. >> >> 23 I have outlined Peirce’s analytic process - where as he pointed out in >> his reference to the semiotic process in his determining the weather >> [8.314] - he does indeed refer to ’the Object as expressed, is the weather >> at that time’ - and is quite different from the Dynamic Object. He also >> frequently refers to the Real Object - which is *outside of the semiotic >> process. * So- despite your claim - Peirce himself does often refer to >> an object outside of the semiosic process. >> >> 3] WITHIN the semiosic process, in its basic format, it is an >> irreducible triad of Object-Representamen/Sign- Interpretant…and in its >> more detailed format: …the full semiosic process is: Dynamic Object- >> ImmediateObject - Representamen/Sign - Immediate Interpretant- Dynamic >> Interpretant-Final Interpretant. >> >> I note again that the Real Object is outside of the semiosic process - >> but - it exists. >> >> 4]The above irreducible format of Object-Representamen/Sign-Interpretant >> is a key reason why I also reject your claim that the Dynamic Object is >> outside of the ’sign’. You stated that “every [dynamical] object stands >> outside of every sign that it determines . Therefore, if the entire >> universe is one immense sign, then its ‘[dynamical] object must >> nevertheless be external to it, independent of it, and unaffected by it”. >> >> I disagree with the above - because NONE of the three correlates of the >> semiotic triad and NONE of the six correlates of the semiosic process stand >> alone and independently . There is no such thing as a singular >> sign/representamen on its own. No such thing as a Dynamic Object on its own >> - independent of the other correlates. Peirce's outline of the semiosic >> process is that the Sign is a TRIAD; and is irreducible. [See for example, >> 1.480..where “representation necessarily involves a genuine triad. For it >> involves a sign, or representamen, of some kind, outward or inward >> mediating between an object and an interpreting thought” . And all Peirce’s >> definitions off the sign refer to its triadic nature..eg, “A representamen, >> or sign is anything [ not necessarily real] which stands at once in a >> relation of correspondence to a second third, its object and to another >> possible representamen, its interpretant….” 1901. R 1147. . >> >> Are you really saying that the Universe is ONLY the mediate relation >> [S/R] in the triad? Is ONLY the middle term of the triad of O-S-I?? And >> that the Dynamic Object, which Peirce himself defines as “the reality which >> by some means contrives to determine the Sign to its Representation” >> 4.536…”the dynamical object does not mean something out of the mind. It >> means something forced upon the mind in perception" SS 197. That is - the >> Dynamic Object is already taking part in the semiotic triadic process of >> determining meaning. Therefore - it is not, in my understanding, >> “standing outside of every sign that it determines’. The Dynamic Object, >> in my understanding, functions only within the semiosic process. >> >> And the same with the mediative term, the Representamen/Sign- it >> functions only within a triadic process. I simply cannot understand a >> universe understood as ONLY the singular mediative term…without the >> correlates of the Object and Interpretant - and don’t see how or why you >> break up the triad into independent parts.. >> >> Edwina >> >> >> >> On Sep 7, 2024, at 8:39 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >> List: >> >> I do not ascribe my beliefs to Peirce, I scrupulously quote *his own* >> statements. >> >> It is standard practice to put any words added within a quotation in >> square brackets, which *signals *that they are not in the original text. >> >> In Peirce's speculative grammar, the sign, object, and interpretant are *not >> *"informational sites where information is processed." He *never *describes >> them that way. >> >> As I observed before, Peirce also never states nor implies that a sign >> has *three *objects. The key to understanding his different references >> to objects in CP 8.314 (EP 2:498, 1909 Mar 14) is in its very first >> sentence. >> >> CSP: We must distinguish between the Immediate Object,--i.e. the Object >> as represented in the sign,--and the Real (no, because perhaps the Object >> is altogether fictive, I must choose a different term, therefore), say >> rather the Dynamical Object, which, from the nature of things, the Sign >> *cannot >> *express, which it can only *indicate *and leave the interpreter to find >> out by *collateral experience*. >> >> >> As Peirce repeatedly confirms elsewhere, a sign has only these *two *objects, >> immediate and dynamical. Accordingly, in his first example later in the >> same paragraph, the "Object, as expressed" is not some third object, it is >> the *immediate *object. Likewise, for any sign that has a real (not >> fictive) object, it is not some third object, it is the *dynamical *object. >> Peirce confirms all this in his second example later in the same paragraph. >> >> CSP: I reply, let us suppose: "It is a stormy day." Here is another sign. >> Its *Immediate Object* is the notion of the present weather so far as >> this is common to her mind and mine,--not the *character *of it, but the >> *identity >> *of it. The *Dynamical Object* is the *identity *of the actual and *Real >> *meteorological conditions at the moment. >> >> >> Again, there is no third object. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt >> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> On Sat, Sep 7, 2024 at 2:21 PM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> List, JAS >>> >>> I’ll continue to disagree with you - I do think that you post your own >>> beliefs -[ and I don’t see what is wrong with this!] for example, where >>> you ascribe to god, ‘creating and writing on the blackboard. My only >>> complaint is when you ascribe your beliefs to Peirce. >>> >>> And you ignore the definition of Peirce that God means ‘Mind’. [6.502] >>> Indeed, you tried to denigrate this quotation by adding your* own term *of >>> [merely] ..in brackets, before the word ‘mind’ - without informing us that >>> this addition was your own. Peirce didn’t write ‘[merely] mind’. He said - >>> ’the analogue of a mind..is what he means by “God”. And, “the >>> pragmaticistic definition of *ens necessariium* would require many >>> pages; but some hints toward it may be given. A disembodied spirit or* >>> pure mind”* [6.490 my emphasis]. >>> >>> So what if I use the term of* nodes* to describe the informational >>> sites where information is processed? That’s a red herring tactic. What’s >>> your problem with that? I didn’t declare their use as Peirce’s! But- these >>> terms do, in my view, help to clarify what is going on within the semiosic >>> triad. ..which is an active processing of hard data from an external site >>> into an interpretation. >>> >>> And most certainly, there is a basis for Peirce explaining that there >>> are three objects!! He specifically details them in 8.314 - which quotation >>> I already gave, where he refers to the “This is a sign, whose Object, as >>> expressed, is the weather at that time, but whose Dynamical Object is the >>> impression which I have presumably derived from peeping between the window >>> curtains”. See the difference? >>> >>> This third Object, which is external and not necessarily sensed - is >>> “There are Real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our >>> opinions about them; …5.384. The Real Object [the weather] only became the >>> Dynamic Object when Peirce looked at it. >>> >>> That is, I consider that you err in assigning the term of ‘Dynamic >>> Object to these external ‘Real things’ with which we are not, at the time, >>> semeosically interacting. . I consider that the term of Dynamic Object is, >>> as Peirce outlines, that first *contact *of external stimuli into the >>> senses. …which the semiosic triad will ‘indicate [8.314] …via the actual >>> *acceptance* of stimuli. The actual acceptance of stimuli is The >>> Immediate Object - “the Object as represented in the sign” 8.314. >>> >>> To give an example - if a dog is running around in he woods - there are >>> lots of ‘Real Objects’..which the dog doesn’t interact with. But they are >>> real! BUT - if it stops and sniffs the air, then - it has interacted with >>> a Real Object, by ‘connecting, semiotically, with it - and thus, accepting >>> the external stimuli which is coming from that Real Object. That Real >>> Object is now, a Dynamic Object..because it is *connected *to the dog’s >>> senses. BUT - not all the data of that external object can be sensed by the >>> dog..so..what IS sensed and semiotically worked on, is the Immediate >>> Object. It is this internal data - just a part of the full informational >>> content of the Dynamic Object and just a part of the full informational >>> content of the Real Object - that forms the Immediate Object, and it is >>> this IO data that is transformed by the mediative laws of the Representamen >>> into the various Interpretants. >>> >>> Edwina >>> >> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ >> ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at >> https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at >> https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all >> the links! >> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . >> ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to >> [email protected] with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the >> message and nothing in the body. More at >> https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . >> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; >> and co-managed by him and Ben Udell. >> >> >> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ >> ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at >> https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at >> https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all >> the links! >> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . >> ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to >> [email protected] with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the >> message and nothing in the body. More at >> https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . >> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; >> and co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > > >
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
