Edwina, Jon, List,

It would be helpful, Edwina, if you would add a quotation in support of
each of your points 1 and 2.

But as you wrote (emphasis added by me). . .

1] Peirce *constantly* refers to the sign/representamen as a relation and
as an action of mediation.

2] Peirce *often* refers to the triadic relations as a Sign.

. . . on further reflection, I think it would be immensely helpful if you
quoted Peirce more than once for each of these points.

List: I have found using the search function (Control + F) of the online CP
very helpful and time saving in looking for particular quotations,
especially when I'm pressed for time.

https://colorysemiotica.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/peirce-collectedpapers.pdf

I hope, and I supposed that I have for long assumed that List members knew
of this source (and several others now online, such as volume 2 of *The
Essential Peirce*)

Best,

Gary R

On Mon, Sep 9, 2024 at 7:01 PM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]>
wrote:

> JAS, list
>
> As usual, we’ll have to continue to disagree.
>
> 1] Peirce constantly refers to the sign/representamen as a relation and as
> an action of mediation.
>
> 2] Peirce often refers to the triadic relations as a Sign.
>
> 3] As for his comment that terminology can make little difference - I
> disagree with you that this refers only to the three categories.
>
> 4] I have never said that the Real Object is connected to the sign. I
> never said that this Real Object was ‘the object of a sign. ..and would
> appreciate your not declaring that I said this.
>
> I specifically said, several times,  that this Real object is OUTSIDE of
> the semiosic process. “There are real things, whose characters are
> entirely independent of our opinions about them, 5.384. When these Reals
> are moved into a semiotic interaction, they then can be understood as
> Dynamic Objects. See Peirce’s explanation of the weather - where he
> differentiates between this object..and the dynamic object. ...which
> reference I have previously provided. 8.314.
>
> Our disagreements continue.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> On Sep 9, 2024, at 6:25 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]>
> wrote:
>
> List:
>
> There was no *ad hominem* in my previous post--I made no argument
> directed against a person instead of a position. Sarcasm is difficult to
> convey in written communication, and I honestly did not detect it in the
> original reference to "the ignorant and uneducated reader"; in fact, I
> still do not see it.
>
> Context is always important for interpreting and applying any quotation,
> whether of Peirce or of someone else.
>
> CSP: Even without Kant's categories, the recurrence of triads in logic was
> quite marked, and must be the croppings out of some fundamental
> conceptions. I now undertook to ascertain what the conceptions were. This
> search resulted in what I call my categories. I then [in 1867] named them
> Quality, Relation, and Representation. But I was not then aware that
> undecomposable relations may necessarily require more subjects than two;
> for this reason *Reaction *is a better term. Moreover, I did not then
> know enough about language to see that to attempt to make the word 
> *representation
> *serve for an idea so much more general than any it habitually carried,
> was injudicious. The word *mediation *would be better. Quality, reaction,
> and mediation will do. But for scientific terms, 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns, are to
> be preferred as being entirely new words without any false associations
> whatever. How the conceptions are *named *makes, however, little
> difference. (CP 4.3 [not 4.4], 1898)
>
>
> Peirce does not say that how *conceptions in general* are named makes
> little difference, he says that how *his three categories* are named
> makes little difference--despite having just recounted why he ultimately
> preferred 1ns/2ns/3ns over quality/reaction/mediation, and why he came to
> prefer these names over quality/relation/representation. Moreover, only
> five years later, he apparently changes his mind and reaffirms, "When you
> strive to get the purest conceptions you can of 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns, thinking
> of quality, reaction, and mediation ..." (CP 1.530, 1903). He also spells
> out a rigorous ethics of terminology (CP 2.219-226, EP 2:263-266, 1903) in
> which he asserts that maintaining *consistent *names for *philosophical 
> *conceptions
> is *extremely *important.
>
> Again, the sign *itself* is not a "triad" nor a "mediating relation," and
> Peirce never refers to it using either of these terms--not in *any *of
> the 76 definitions that Robert Marty collected (
> https://cspeirce.com/rsources/76defs/76defs.htm), with which I am quite
> familiar. Instead, the genuine triadic relation is *representing *or
> (more generally) *mediating*--the sign (first correlate) represents its
> object (second correlate) for its interpretant (third correlate); the sign
> (first correlate) mediates between its object (second correlate) and its
> interpretant (third correlate).
>
> Again, the "real object" of a sign that has one is its *dynamical *object,
> not some third object. Any other "real object" is not an object *of the
> sign* being analyzed *at all*.
>
> I will address the questions below about the universe as a sign in the
> thread about my paper.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Sun, Sep 8, 2024 at 8:57 PM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]>
> wrote:
>
>> JAs, list
>>
>> I don’t think it’s the time to move into ad hominem. My comment about
>> ‘ignorance and uneducted’ was sarcastic - and I’m sure you know that. And I
>> certainly don’t assume that everyone in academia knows the function of
>> ’square brackets’ [ I use them all the time because they are easier to use
>> on the keyboard].  But- even so - one should explain wHY one added a term
>> in ’squad brackets’. That’s the real issue.
>>
>> I don’t agree that using different terms from Peirce tends to ’signify
>> different concepts from Peirce’s own’. That would assume that a concept can
>> only be expressed in ONE term and that term alone.I don’t think this is a
>> valid conclusion. As Peirce himself said ‘How the conceptions are named
>> makes, however, little difference [ 4.4].  After all - Peirce’s semiosis IS
>> about information processing! What do you think is going on when a dog
>> smells a scent, and interprets it - other than ‘information processing?
>> As for ’node - I consider it a valid interpretation of the correlates; a
>> ’node’ is a site for a network connection; it is a connection site in a
>> communication network.- and in my view, that is exactly what is going on
>> within the various correlates/elations.
>>
>> Peirce himself refers to the sign as other the full triad or the
>> mediating relation. And he certainly refers to the ‘mediating relation’ as
>> just that. ..and NOT just ’the first correlate’. [ Read Robert Marty’s 76
>> definitions of the Sign].
>>
>> As for the Dynamic and Immediate Objects - these are both operative
>> within the semiotic process. I am referring to the Real Object [ and I
>> provided quotations from peirce] both in his comments about the weather and
>> elsewhere, as to the reality of this ’Third object’ = which is outside of
>> ones own semiotic interaction..but.. ‘real objects exist in the world..
>>
>> I disagree with your view of the Peirean universe.  I do see an
>> inconsistency with the universe as only the mediate sign/representamen [
>> but can certainly see it as, Peirce concluded in that section, as an
>> Argument, which is triadic, and operative as multiple triadic signs. . My
>> concern is that, with your view that the Universe as a Sign, has its
>> Dynamic Object external to it - you have set up the Universe as spatially
>> finite, with boundaries. I see no mention of a bounded universe in Peirce.
>> And, that would also mean that the Dynamic Interpretant would also be
>> ‘outside of theUniverse.  Again - is there any reference to this in Peirce?
>>
>> Edwina
>>
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