Jon, Gary F, List, Jon says: “If (classical) theism is true, then God transcends our existing universe”.
Let me try this on for size: if Peirce’s metaphysical realism is true, then the laws of nature are real things that transcend the existing universe. And this too: If Peirce’s metaphysical idealism is true, then the laws of nature are themselves evolving and growing. These living and growing laws have the nature of thoughts in an infinite mind, and these divine thoughts transcend the existing universe. I tend to agree with Gary that it may not much matter—for the purposes of philosophical metaphysics—whether we call this infinite and divine mind the “mind of Nature” or whether we call it the “mind of God”. It might matter for the sake of theology and the interpretation of various texts that different traditions hold to be sacred, but I tend to think it won’t matter much for the purposes of making metaphysics exact as a science. For the sake of explaining the origins of the cosmos, for instance, I tend to think that it is the Law of Mind that is doing the explanatory work when Peirce tries to give an account of the growth of order from a cosmos that did not, in some sense, yet have governance from an ordered law of time or an ordered law of space or ordered laws of energy. The explanation Peirce offers is designed to show how such physical laws might possibly have evolved from what was, at its origins, remarkably indeterminate and random in its character. Making reference to a conception of God that is infinite in power, goodness, knowledge and transcends the existing universe doesn’t, at this stage of the game, add much--if anything—that is scientific, exact and rigorous to the explanation. Rather, it tends to lead us into confusions because it drags so many conflicting meanings about the purported power, goodness and knowledge of God--such as those found in different theological traditions--into the philosophical discussion. Another reason it causes confusion is that such assertions tend to obscure the logical character of the modal claims in the competing explanations. Attempting to sort out what is being claimed about what does or does not exist, or what is or is not possible, or what is or is not real or really governing is difficult—especially when we turn to metaphysical questions about the origins of the cosmos. If our aim as philosophers is to sort out the modal character of different assertions and explanations in scientific metaphysics, then the gamma graphs do appear to be useful tool for the job at hand. Yours, Jeff From: [email protected] <[email protected]> on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> Date: Thursday, September 12, 2024 at 3:17 PM To: Peirce-L <[email protected]> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Semiosic Synechism: A Peircean Argumentation Gary F., List: I agree that Peirce's focus in the paragraphs that we are discussing is on the composition of concepts as helpfully diagrammed by Existential Graphs. Of course, only a proposition can be represented by an EG, no matter how large and complex; an argument can only be represented by a series of EGs being transformed in accordance with the permissions corresponding to the necessary inference from premiss to conclusion. However, for Peirce, the entire universe as an argument is not strictly deductive--"I have not succeeded in persuading my contemporaries to believe that Nature also makes inductions and retroductions" (NEM 4:344, 1898). I disagree that classical theism and panentheism are properly characterized as "varieties of theism," except in the trivial sense that both affirm the reality of God; and I strongly disagree that the differences between them are merely "verbal ... without logical or metaphysical substance." If (classical) theism is true, then God transcends our existing universe; but if panentheism is true, then our existing universe is somehow contained within God. If (classical) theism is true, then God's attributes include simplicity and impassability, such that God has no parts and is unaffected by our existing universe; but if panentheism is true, then our existing universe is an organic part of God such that God is affected by everything that happens in it. I trust that the logical and metaphysical incompatibility of these basic tenets is obvious without scribing the corresponding EGs and deriving "not both (classical) theism and panentheism" from them. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Thu, Sep 12, 2024 at 7:13 AM <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: Jon, list, It’s true that what Peirce characterizes as "Indefinite as to its Object" is the consequent of a conditional proposition, not the conclusion of an argument. But the context of that sentence is an exposition of what Peirce’s study of Existential Graphs tells him about the “Composition of Concepts.” In his words, “It thus appears that the difference between the Term, the Proposition, and the Argument, is by no means a difference of complexity, and does not so much consist in structure as in the services they are severally intended to perform.” What I am suggesting is that the theological discrepancy between varieties of theism is one example of a verbal difference (a “logomachy” as Peirce might say) without logical or metaphysical substance. I see this as one of many profound implications of what Peirce is saying in the concluding part of the “Prolegomena”<https://gnusystems.ca/ProlegomPrag.htm#4572%22>. Rather than try to give a formal “proof” of this, I will just suggest that you try to express either or both brands of theism using existential graphs, bearing in mind that “the essence of the Proposition is that it intends, as it were, to be regarded as in an existential relation to its Object, as an Index is, so that its assertion shall be regarded as evidence of the fact”; and that an “existential relation” is represented in the graphs by a line of identity. I don’t expect to convince you (Jon) of what I’ve said above, and I probably shouldn’t have mentioned the theism dispute at all, as it’s insignificant compared to what Peirce says about the mutual determination of Antecedent and Consequent: “the Method of Existential Graphs solves this riddle instantly by showing that, as far as propositions go, and it must evidently be the same with Terms and Arguments, there is but one general way in which their Composition can possibly take place; namely, each component must be indeterminate in some respect or another; and in their composition each determines the other.” All I wanted to accomplish with my post was to reconsider Peirce’s assertion(?) that the Universe is an Argument in the light of this mutual determination as Peirce explains it at the end of the “Prolegomena.” I’m not finished reconsidering it myself, so I won’t even try to draw any verbal “conclusions” from it. Love, gary f. Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg
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