Jon, list, It’s true that what Peirce characterizes as "Indefinite as to its Object" is the consequent of a conditional proposition, not the conclusion of an argument. But the context of that sentence is an exposition of what Peirce’s study of Existential Graphs tells him about the “Composition of Concepts.” In his words, “It thus appears that the difference between the Term, the Proposition, and the Argument, is by no means a difference of complexity, and does not so much consist in structure as in the services they are severally intended to perform.”
What I am suggesting is that the theological discrepancy between varieties of theism is one example of a verbal difference (a “logomachy” as Peirce might say) without logical or metaphysical substance. I see this as one of many profound implications of what Peirce is saying in the concluding part of the “Prolegomena” <https://gnusystems.ca/ProlegomPrag.htm#4572> . Rather than try to give a formal “proof” of this, I will just suggest that you try to express either or both brands of theism using existential graphs, bearing in mind that “the essence of the Proposition is that it intends, as it were, to be regarded as in an existential relation to its Object, as an Index is, so that its assertion shall be regarded as evidence of the fact”; and that an “existential relation” is represented in the graphs by a line of identity. I don’t expect to convince you (Jon) of what I’ve said above, and I probably shouldn’t have mentioned the theism dispute at all, as it’s insignificant compared to what Peirce says about the mutual determination of Antecedent and Consequent: “the Method of Existential Graphs solves this riddle instantly by showing that, as far as propositions go, and it must evidently be the same with Terms and Arguments, there is but one general way in which their Composition can possibly take place; namely, each component must be indeterminate in some respect or another; and in their composition each determines the other.” All I wanted to accomplish with my post was to reconsider Peirce’s assertion(?) that the Universe is an Argument in the light of this mutual determination as Peirce explains it at the end of the “Prolegomena.” I’m not finished reconsidering it myself, so I won’t even try to draw any verbal “conclusions” from it. Love, gary f. Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg From: [email protected] <[email protected]> On Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: 11-Sep-24 19:13 To: Peirce-L <[email protected]> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Semiosic Synechism: A Peircean Argumentation Gary F., List: Thanks for the link to that passage near the end of "Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism." Quotation 4.3.3 of my "Semoisic Synechism" paper is from a manuscript draft of the same paragraph and elaborates further on the assertion that an argument cannot be built up from propositions any more than a motion can be built up from positions; instead, propositions serve to describe arguments, just as positions serve to describe motions. As quoted below, what Peirce characterizes as "Indefinite as to its Object" is the consequent of a conditional proposition, not the conclusion of an argument. There is a sense in which these are equivalent, at least in the case of a valid deductive argumentation--if the premisses are true, then the conclusion is true--but surely that is not what he has in mind in classifying the entire universe as an argument. That being the case, exactly what "logical resolution of the cosmological/theological question" do you perceive that passage to be suggesting? It seems impossible to me to bridge the gap between classical theism and panentheism because they involve contradictory and thus mutually exclusive conceptions of God and God's relationship to our existing universe. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Wed, Sep 11, 2024 at 11:12 AM <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> > wrote: Jon, list, I hope we can indeed leave the discussion about the triadicity of semiosis behind us (except for Edwina who will probably “continue to disagree”), but I think Peirce’s 1903 remark about “the Universe being precisely an argument” bears another look in the light of his 1906 remarks about the “Process of Transformation, which is evidently the kernel of the matter” of Argument. The complete text of those remarks in included here <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/xlp.htm#precisarg> , and it suggests a logical resolution of the cosmological/theological question that seems to bridge whatever gap there is between classical theism and panentheism — especially if the “Consequent [of the Universe as Argument] is a Sign which is Indefinite as to its Object.” (The text linked to here contains several links within itself, which makes it quite impractical to transcribe in a list post.) Love, gary Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg } The universe is a communion of subjects, not a collection of objects. [Thomas Berry] { <https://gnusystems.ca/wp/> https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/> Turning Signs
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