Jeff, List: I am puzzled by the mention of classifying signs "according to their matter" since that was not Peirce's preferred approach.
CSP: We may classify objects according to their matter; as wooden things, iron things, silver things, ivory things, etc. But classification according to structure is generally more important. And it is the same with ideas. (CP 8.213, 1905) CSP: We are to consider what *forms *are possible, rather than what *kinds *are possible, because it is universally admitted, in all sorts of inquiries, that the most important divisions are divisions according to *form*, and not according to qualities of *matter*, in case division according to form is possible at all. Indeed, this necessarily results from the very idea of the distinction between *form *and *matter*. (EP 2:362, 1905) In fact, it is not clear to me what specific distinction is being drawn below between the matter and form of a sign, specifically a symbolic legisign. "The Logic of Mathematics: An Attempt to Develop My Categories from Within" is dated c. 1896 by Robin, and Peirce did not even introduce the qualisign/sinsign/legisign trichotomy until 1903. On the other hand, in "New Elements," dated c. 1903 by Robin and 1904 by The Peirce Edition Project but now believed to be written in late 1901, he uses "Matter" for the object that a sign *denotes *and "Form" for the characters or qualities that a sign *signifies *(EP 2:304). In any case, not surprisingly, I continue to disagree that "symbolic legisigns have the character of a thoroughly genuine triadic relation" and that "a symbolic legisign is ... a triadic relation." Instead, I maintain (with Peirce) that a symbolic legisign, like any other sign, *stands in* a genuine triadic relation with its (dynamical) object and its (final) interpretant. In other words, I agree that symbolic legisigns, like any other signs, "serve this mediating function"; but no sign *is *the genuine triadic relation of mediating *itself*. It baffles me that anyone argues otherwise, especially while claiming to be explicating *Peirce's *views; and if that is pedantic on my part, then so be it. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Sep 12, 2024 at 7:05 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard < [email protected]> wrote: > Hi Jon, List, > > > > Thanks for clarifying the qualifications attached to your assertion. I > should have assumed you were making the more limited claim. The conclusion > you draw does seem to assume more, but I’ll turn to other questions. > > > > I hear what you are saying, but I remained unconvinced that it conforms to > the way Peirce is explaining the nature of a sign. That doesn’t mean I am > saying you are wrong and I am right, just that nothing I’ve heard so far > seems convincing to me. > > > > On the face of things, I think the classification of signs according to > their matter suggests symbolic legisigns have the character of a thoroughly > genuine triadic relation. In terms of the nature of the assurance the > premisses of an argument provides with respect to the conclusion that is > its interpretant, the premisses stand in a triadic relationship that > mediates the relationship between the object and the interpretant. In my > interpretation, the inherently triadic character of the matter of the sign > and its mode of presentation is essential to explaining how it is possible > for a symbolic legisign to serve this mediating function. > > > > I agree that the process of representation is a continuous process. When > it is functioning properly, it is a process of growth. Again, the triadic > character of the matter of the sign helps to explain why such a process of > growth of meaning is essentially continuous and not discrete. > > > > You might try to explain it in other ways, but I think this is how Peirce > is setting up such explanations in “The Logic of Mathematics, an attempt to > develop my categories from within.” There, he uses the distinction between > matter and form in a manner that reflects the tradition in philosophical > logic. The history of this distinction between matter and form is, in the > Modern period, somewhat tortured, but Peirce tries to clarify where he > stands with respect to how such conceptions can profitably be employed in > semiotics. I think it is proper to say that a symbolic legisign is, with > respect to its matter, a triadic relation that is itself formed of > combinations of monadic, dyadic and triadic relations. In fact, I think any > general concept you might consider is formed of a potential infinitude of > such combinations—and this is the reason Peirce suggests he has never > exhaustively analyzed the matter of any general concept. > > > > The question, I assume, is whether or not it is reasonable to say (i.e., > to suggest that Peirce describes and explains things this way) that a sign > is a triadic relation because its matter, internally considered, > essentially involves a potential infinitude of triadic combinations of > uncountably many monadic, dyadic and triadic relations. > > > > So far, I don’t know if much turns on the question. We may be caught in a > terminological squabble, and it may turn out that digging into the > explanations further would show that one or both of us is being pedantic > about the way the terms “sign”, “is”, “triadic” and “relation” should or > shouldn’t be used to form sentences that describe Peirce’s view. > > > > --Jeff > >
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