Hi Jon, List, Thanks for clarifying the qualifications attached to your assertion. I should have assumed you were making the more limited claim. The conclusion you draw does seem to assume more, but I’ll turn to other questions.
I hear what you are saying, but I remained unconvinced that it conforms to the way Peirce is explaining the nature of a sign. That doesn’t mean I am saying you are wrong and I am right, just that nothing I’ve heard so far seems convincing to me. On the face of things, I think the classification of signs according to their matter suggests symbolic legisigns have the character of a thoroughly genuine triadic relation. In terms of the nature of the assurance the premisses of an argument provides with respect to the conclusion that is its interpretant, the premisses stand in a triadic relationship that mediates the relationship between the object and the interpretant. In my interpretation, the inherently triadic character of the matter of the sign and its mode of presentation is essential to explaining how it is possible for a symbolic legisign to serve this mediating function. I agree that the process of representation is a continuous process. When it is functioning properly, it is a process of growth. Again, the triadic character of the matter of the sign helps to explain why such a process of growth of meaning is essentially continuous and not discrete. You might try to explain it in other ways, but I think this is how Peirce is setting up such explanations in “The Logic of Mathematics, an attempt to develop my categories from within.” There, he uses the distinction between matter and form in a manner that reflects the tradition in philosophical logic. The history of this distinction between matter and form is, in the Modern period, somewhat tortured, but Peirce tries to clarify where he stands with respect to how such conceptions can profitably be employed in semiotics. I think it is proper to say that a symbolic legisign is, with respect to its matter, a triadic relation that is itself formed of combinations of monadic, dyadic and triadic relations. In fact, I think any general concept you might consider is formed of a potential infinitude of such combinations—and this is the reason Peirce suggests he has never exhaustively analyzed the matter of any general concept. The question, I assume, is whether or not it is reasonable to say (i.e., to suggest that Peirce describes and explains things this way) that a sign is a triadic relation because its matter, internally considered, essentially involves a potential infinitude of triadic combinations of uncountably many monadic, dyadic and triadic relations. So far, I don’t know if much turns on the question. We may be caught in a terminological squabble, and it may turn out that digging into the explanations further would show that one or both of us is being pedantic about the way the terms “sign”, “is”, “triadic” and “relation” should or shouldn’t be used to form sentences that describe Peirce’s view. --Jeff From: [email protected] <[email protected]> on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> Date: Thursday, September 12, 2024 at 3:37 PM To: Peirce-L <[email protected]> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Semiosic Synechism: A Peircean Argumentation Jeff, List: I did not assert #1 without qualification--"In all those quoted definitions, he never says that a sign is a triadic relation." The very first one in the post<https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-09/msg00048.html> to which I was referring does state, "A sign, or representamen, involves a plural relation" (R 16, c. 1895, emphasis mine), but that is still not the same as saying that a sign is a relation or is composed of relations. In both Robert Marty's article<https://cspeirce.com/rsources/76defs/76defs.htm>, "76 Definitions of the Sign by C. S. Peirce," and the Commens Dictionary entry<http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/sign> for "sign," not one of the listed quotations states or implies that the sign is a relation or is composed of relations. I understand the hesitancy to say "never" in an absolute sense, but the weight of this evidence is such that the burden of proof is squarely on anyone who claims that Peirce did somewhere use "sign" to refer to the triadic relation, not strictly its first correlate. Accordingly, I disagree that "both (a) premisses and (b) whole arguments internally are composed of triadic relations." Again, they involve other signs, which are in triadic relations with their own objects and interpretants as identified by further analysis, but they are not built up from those other signs nor their triadic relations. The real and continuous inferential process as a whole is ontologically prior to its artificial and discrete parts--"propositions are either roughly described states of Thought-motion, or are artificial creations intended to render the description of Thought-motion possible; and Names are creations of a second order serving to render the representation of propositions possible" (LF 3/1:235, 1906). We use names to formulate propositions that together describe arguments retrospectively (see CP 2.27, 1902). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Thu, Sep 12, 2024 at 1:29 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: Hi Jon, List, You say: 1. Peirce never says that a sign is a triadic relation. 2. instead, he repeatedly says that a sign is in a triadic relation 3. An argument is not "made up of a full triad of correlates." It is a sign (first correlate) that is determined by its object (second correlate) to determine its interpretant (third correlate). As an argument, it involves other signs, namely, propositions and names; and as a symbol, it involves other signs, namely, indices and icons; and each of those other signs likewise has its own object and interpretant As Peirce points out, we can use the term argument to refer only to the premisses of a reason, or we can use it to refer to the premisses and the conclusion. In my view, either can function as a sign in relationship to some further interpretant. That is, the premisses of an argument can function as a sign in relationship to a conclusion, which is the interpretant of the premisses. Or, an entire argument, such as an abductive inference, can function as a sign in relationship to a further argument in the cycle of inquiry, such as deductive inference about the possible tests that might be run and predicted consequences that are expected if the hypothesis is true. On my interpretation of the relations that are involved in such symbolic signs, both (a) premisses and (b) whole arguments internally are composed of triadic relations. As such, symbolic signs involve these types of relations. As such, I tend to draw the conclusion that some signs are, in part, triadic relations because these signs internally are composed of such relations. So, it appears we disagree on (1) above. For my part, I try to avoid making claims about what Peirce never said. He said a lot of things he didn’t write down, and I wasn’t there to hear them. What is more, there are a lot of things that he did write down that I’ve not yet read. Those that I have read, I’ve often misunderstood or forgotten. Furthermore, a number of things he wrote down have been lost. My hope is that we recover some of them. I’ll leave it at that. --Jeff
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