Gary, Gary, Peter, Stefan, List: Thank you all for the productive discussion. It was valuable to me. I would only add a footnote or two, based on the Stoic notion of logic as antecedent and consequence as well as the material causality implicit within the mathematics of the chemical / biosemiotic sciences.
I believe that the sense of Popper's assertion about the singular and the universal is widely abused in the philosophy of science, particularly in the evaluation of biosemiotics and the role of identity of the individual. If one asserts a universal and a single counterexample is true, then this asserted universal is not a true. Simple enough. But, 'universals' are of the mind. I consider "Universals" as nominialistic. CSP was a realist. I consider "universals" to be metaphysical objects, not real objects. I recall from an ancient source a phrase about the meaning of an utterance - when I speak the word 'horse' a horse does not come out of my mouth. :-) The role of universals (variables?) in mathematics is profound, perhaps being most profound in category theory and the widely acclaimed universal diagrams that S. Mac Lane exposes so forcefully and beautifully. Peirce's diagrammatic logic (exhibited on 'sheets of assertion') are singulars. Thus, the meaning of CSP diagrams is open, at least in my mind. Clearly, CSP's logical diagrams are semiotic in character. Indeed, he uses the chemical concept of valence in creating the assertions and in expressing the grammar of the diagrams. (see Gary F. essay for details). The modern understanding of (co)valence is as a particular relation between two parts of a molecule. A valence, as a graph edge (or line in CSPs diagram) is not a universal. The consequence of these sentences is a deep tension between Popper's view of falsification of hypotheses and chemical / biosemiotic practice. Popper's logic of falsification depends on an inductive universal; logically, it is possibility that a (physical?) universal is falsified. Chemical inductive logic (wrt logical diagrams) is never a universal, it is always about two particular adjacent particles. Furthermore, it is always about antecedent and consequence within a context of material causality. This local inductive argument of biosemiotics is mathematically necessary as a consequence of the the chemical table of elements and Dalton's hypothesis of ratio of small whole numbers. It is the deepest source of biological identity / individuality in that it emerges from the encoding of genetic symbols, the semiotics of DNA and molecular biology. There are several conundrums buried in this text - I have just sketched the surfaces that are easily translated into expressions that may carry some meaning for this group (I hope that my comments are not too technical, but fear the worst!). I have intentionally not addressed the problems of the community as the source of our symbolic expressions, such as this series of email exchanges. For example, a modern community uses multiple sign systems to communicate - alphabets, mathematics, music, dance, chemistry, etc, each with a particular diagrammatic logic. Does falsification in one symbol system infer falsification in another symbol system? In short, what is the role of category theory in semiotics or in Jesper Hoffmeyer's 'semethic'? This line of thought moves us into the multiple roles of logics in human communication - a topic dear to Tori Alexander's writings. At least to me, closure on the concept of falsification remains remote - obscured by the different usages of signs and the different "sign" languages used by different disciplines. Cheers Jerry Jerry LR Chandler Research Professor Krasnow Institute for Advanced Study On Aug 5, 2011, at 5:08 PM, Stefan Berwing wrote: > Peter, List, > > this distinction is relevant as long singulars and individuals are the same. > But when the individual is a universal in time and the singular is the > content of a perceptual judgement, then this distinction is not possible in > that form. (Peirce writes about singular/individual somewhere in the first > part of W2). > > > Best > Stefan > > > There is still a distinction, though. Perceptual judgements are hypotheses > and hence testable, but they are not universal statements, which are the > subjects of falsificationism. But I may be splitting hairs here... > > Peter > ________________________________________ > From: C S Peirce discussion list [[email protected]] on behalf of > Gary Richmond [[email protected]] > Sent: Friday, August 05, 2011 3:41 PM > To: [email protected] > Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the > Semiosis Process" > > Ben, list, > > I knew it (consensus) was too good to be true! But I think you make at least > two important points here, Ben, and I'll be interested in others' responses > (presently, I would tend to agree with you that fallibilism re: our > perceptual judgments prefigures falsification and that fallibilism can > be--I'd say, is--more basic than falsification). > > Best, > > Gary > >>>> >>> Benjamin Udell <[email protected]> 8/5/2011 2:53 PM >>> > List, Steven, Peter, > > It may be a little more complicated. Peirce in his "cotary" propositions said > that perceptual judgments amount to compelling abductions, which is very > close to saying, compelling explanatory hypotheses. So fallibilism about > one's perceptual judgments (at least in retrospect if not at the time of the > compulsive judgment) already prefigures falsificationism. > > But it should be added that the fact that B _entails_ C does not mean that B > is in fact a premiss or postulate for C. "A is A" is an axiom, but it entails > very little. Rather, everything entails "A is A." Thus we often say > "presupposes" in the sense of "entails." Thus fallibililism can be more basic > than scientific falsificationism, yet the latter arguably entails the former, > i.e., scientifice falsificationism entails/presupposes fallibilism. > > Jaime Nubiola treated of another angle on Peirce's fallibilism in "C. S. > Peirce and G. M. Searle: The Hoax of Infallibilism." > http://www.unav.es/users/PeirceSearle.html Peirce at times wrote of allowing > of practical certainty as opposed to theoretical certainty. > > Note to list: remember to delete the automatic text added by the server to > posts' ends, when replying to a post. > > Best, Ben > --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to [email protected] with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of the message. 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