Singularity and singular (existentially) is just not existing really and one of insanities of sensemaking and communication
> Ben, List: > > You write: > > "I mean singular existentially; and chemistry in general is not just > about _this_ or _that_ molecule." > > I respond simply: > > Your DNA is about "YOUR" DNA molecule and the encoding of YOUR life. It > is an Identity, it is singular. > It is also about your individuality. This is the very heart and sole of > molecular biology, biosemiotics, and Jesper's semethic. > > This modern conceptualization of the logic of chemistry and the unique > genetic molecules of every individual was not inductively constructed > until several decades after CSP died. > > Cheers > > Jerry > > > > > On Aug 5, 2011, at 8:06 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > >> Jerry, list, >> >> Peirce's diagrams are of two kinds in terms of logical quantity: (1) >> general icons (iconic legisigns), which are general diagrams or >> diagrammatic generals, instantiated by (2) individual icons (iconic >> sinsigns) which are individual diagrams, or diagrammatic individuals. >> Peirce would call general many of the things which you call singular - >> including molecules in general and their adjacent parts in general. When >> he calls something singular he means, for example, just _this_ actual >> individual hydrogen molecule and no other actual individual hydrogen >> molecule, a molecule kept perhaps it in a certain place where people >> could come view at least its container, a molecule singular like you, >> me, or the Parthenon - I don't mean singular or unique in quality, I >> mean singular existentially; and chemistry in general is not just about >> _this_ or _that_ molecule. >> >> For my part I've said in the past that I regard the idioscopic a.k.a. >> special sciences as taking for their subject matter actual individuals >> in a way that more abstract fields do not; the observable universe, for >> example, is an actual individual; but what we want to learn about such >> subject matter is not just its individualities but its kinds, its >> totalities and parameters, and its laws, such as could not be learned >> purely from more general or mathematical considerations, and such that >> we would come to have good reason for confidence in our opinions as to >> those kinds, totalities, and laws, as pertaining to indefinitely many >> actual individuals that we would not have the actual opportunity to >> single out or observe. >> >> The idea of a real general is simply the idea of a general that is >> independent of particular persons' or groups' opinions yet is >> discoverable such that investigators would come to agree about it if >> they were to push investigation about it far enough. So we suppose that >> intelligent life elsewhere in the galaxy might announce its presence by >> broadcasting the first score or so prime numbers, because we figure that >> prime numbers are _real_ or, as many prefer to say, _objective_. Peirce >> also allows of generals that are not real but are instead figments, >> e.g., the objects of false universal propositions. >> >> Best, Ben >> >> ----- Original Message ----- >> From: Jerry LR Chandler >> To: [email protected] >> Sent: Friday, August 05, 2011 7:13 PM >> Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the >> Semiosis Process" >> >> Gary, Gary, Peter, Stefan, List: >> >> Thank you all for the productive discussion. It was valuable to me. >> I would only add a footnote or two, based on the Stoic notion of logic >> as antecedent and consequence as well as the material causality implicit >> within the mathematics of the chemical / biosemiotic sciences. >> >> >> I believe that the sense of Popper's assertion about the singular and >> the universal is widely abused in the philosophy of science, >> particularly in the evaluation of biosemiotics and the role of identity >> of the individual. >> >> If one asserts a universal and a single counterexample is true, then >> this asserted universal is not a true. Simple enough. >> >> But, 'universals' are of the mind. I consider "Universals" as >> nominialistic. CSP was a realist. I consider "universals" to be >> metaphysical objects, not real objects. I recall from an ancient source >> a phrase about the meaning of an utterance - when I speak the word >> 'horse' a horse does not come out of my mouth. :-) >> >> The role of universals (variables?) in mathematics is profound, perhaps >> being most profound in category theory and the widely acclaimed >> universal diagrams that S. Mac Lane exposes so forcefully and >> beautifully. >> >> Peirce's diagrammatic logic (exhibited on 'sheets of assertion') are >> singulars. Thus, the meaning of CSP diagrams is open, at least in my >> mind. Clearly, CSP's logical diagrams are semiotic in character. >> Indeed, he uses the chemical concept of valence in creating the >> assertions and in expressing the grammar of the diagrams. (see Gary F. >> essay for details). The modern understanding of (co)valence is as a >> particular relation between two parts of a molecule. A valence, as a >> graph edge (or line in CSPs diagram) is not a universal. >> >> The consequence of these sentences is a deep tension between Popper's >> view of falsification of hypotheses and chemical / biosemiotic practice. >> >> Popper's logic of falsification depends on an inductive universal; >> logically, it is possibility that a (physical?) universal is falsified. >> Chemical inductive logic (wrt logical diagrams) is never a universal, it >> is always about two particular adjacent particles. Furthermore, it is >> always about antecedent and consequence within a context of material >> causality. >> >> This local inductive argument of biosemiotics is mathematically >> necessary as a consequence of the the chemical table of elements and >> Dalton's hypothesis of ratio of small whole numbers. It is the deepest >> source of biological identity / individuality in that it emerges from >> the encoding of genetic symbols, the semiotics of DNA and molecular >> biology. >> >> There are several conundrums buried in this text - I have just sketched >> the surfaces that are easily translated into expressions that may carry >> some meaning for this group (I hope that my comments are not too >> technical, but fear the worst!). I have intentionally not addressed the >> problems of the community as the source of our symbolic expressions, >> such as this series of email exchanges. For example, a modern community >> uses multiple sign systems to communicate - alphabets, mathematics, >> music, dance, chemistry, etc, each with a particular diagrammatic logic. >> Does falsification in one symbol system infer falsification in another >> symbol system? In short, what is the role of category theory in >> semiotics or in Jesper Hoffmeyer's 'semethic'? This line of thought >> moves us into the multiple roles of logics in human communication - a >> topic dear to Tori Alexander's writings. >> >> At least to me, closure on the concept of falsification remains remote - >> obscured by the different usages of signs and the different "sign" >> languages used by different disciplines. >> >> Cheers >> >> Jerry >> >> >> Jerry LR Chandler >> Research Professor >> Krasnow Institute for Advanced Study >> >> >> On Aug 5, 2011, at 5:08 PM, Stefan Berwing wrote: >> >>> Peter, List, >>> >>> this distinction is relevant as long singulars and individuals are the >>> same. But when the individual is a universal in time and the singular >>> is the content of a perceptual judgement, then this distinction is not >>> possible in that form. (Peirce writes about singular/individual >>> somewhere in the first part of W2). >>> >>> >>> Best >>> Stefan >>> >>> >>> There is still a distinction, though. Perceptual judgements are >>> hypotheses and hence testable, but they are not universal statements, >>> which are the subjects of falsificationism. But I may be splitting >>> hairs here... >>> >>> Peter >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: C S Peirce discussion list [[email protected]] on >>> behalf of Gary Richmond [[email protected]] >>> Sent: Friday, August 05, 2011 3:41 PM >>> To: [email protected] >>> Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the >>> Semiosis Process" >>> >>> Ben, list, >>> >>> I knew it (consensus) was too good to be true! But I think you make at >>> least two important points here, Ben, and I'll be interested in others' >>> responses (presently, I would tend to agree with you that fallibilism >>> re: our perceptual judgments prefigures falsification and that >>> fallibilism can be--I'd say, is--more basic than falsification). >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Gary >>> >>>>>> >>> Benjamin Udell <[email protected]> 8/5/2011 2:53 PM >>> >>> List, Steven, Peter, >>> >>> It may be a little more complicated. Peirce in his "cotary" >>> propositions said that perceptual judgments amount to compelling >>> abductions, which is very close to saying, compelling explanatory >>> hypotheses. So fallibilism about one's perceptual judgments (at least >>> in retrospect if not at the time of the compulsive judgment) already >>> prefigures falsificationism. >>> >>> But it should be added that the fact that B _entails_ C does not mean >>> that B is in fact a premiss or postulate for C. "A is A" is an axiom, >>> but it entails very little. Rather, everything entails "A is A." Thus >>> we often say "presupposes" in the sense of "entails." Thus >>> fallibililism can be more basic than scientific falsificationism, yet >>> the latter arguably entails the former, i.e., scientifice >>> falsificationism entails/presupposes fallibilism. >>> >>> Jaime Nubiola treated of another angle on Peirce's fallibilism in "C. >>> S. Peirce and G. M. Searle: The Hoax of Infallibilism." >>> http://www.unav.es/users/PeirceSearle.html Peirce at times wrote of >>> allowing of practical certainty as opposed to theoretical certainty. >>> >>> Note to list: remember to delete the automatic text added by the server >>> to posts' ends, when replying to a post. >>> >>> Best, Ben >>> >> >> --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- >> You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the >> PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to >> [email protected] with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body >> of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to >> [email protected] >> --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- >> You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the >> PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to >> [email protected] with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body >> of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to >> [email protected] > > > --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L > listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to > [email protected] with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body > of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to > [email protected] > --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to [email protected] with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to [email protected]
