Ben: Your message is too cryptic for me to understand exactly what it is that your presupposing, asserting and and concluding. Are you referring to biosemiotics? DNA? diagrammatic logic? categories? identity? the distinction between predicate logic and antecedent / consequent? universals? All of these terms bear on the meaning of such terms as identity/singularity/individuality/uniqueness.
Can you point to the particular sentence in my post that you are referring to? BTW, nearly a century of enquiry since Peirce past means that new interpretations of CSP writings are essential, at least to me, if I am to give a coherent account of biosemiotics as the origin or source of communicating signs used by humans and other living organisms. More specifically, my text presupposes that the logic of biosemiotics is functionally different from the logic of information theory. Cheers Jerry On Aug 5, 2011, at 8:46 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > Jerry, > > That can all be the case without contradicting anything that Peirce said. > Peirce never, so far as I know, denied that there could be a unique character > to something or denied that it could matter - but it's just not what he was > mainly discussing when he used words like "singular" and individual." He > meant the stubborn _this_, not the _uniquely such_, even when many an actual > individual is unique in important or essential characters. > > Best, Ben > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: Jerry LR Chandler > To: [email protected] > Cc: Benjamin Udell > Sent: Friday, August 05, 2011 8:22 PM > Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the > Semiosis Process" > > Ben, List: > > You write: > > "I mean singular existentially; and chemistry in general is not just about > _this_ or _that_ molecule." > > I respond simply: > > Your DNA is about "YOUR" DNA molecule and the encoding of YOUR life. It is > an Identity, it is singular. > It is also about your individuality. This is the very heart and sole of > molecular biology, biosemiotics, and Jesper's semethic. > > This modern conceptualization of the logic of chemistry and the unique > genetic molecules of every individual was not inductively constructed until > several decades after CSP died. > > Cheers > > Jerry > > > > > On Aug 5, 2011, at 8:06 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > >> Jerry, list, >> >> Peirce's diagrams are of two kinds in terms of logical quantity: (1) general >> icons (iconic legisigns), which are general diagrams or diagrammatic >> generals, instantiated by (2) individual icons (iconic sinsigns) which are >> individual diagrams, or diagrammatic individuals. Peirce would call general >> many of the things which you call singular - including molecules in general >> and their adjacent parts in general. When he calls something singular he >> means, for example, just _this_ actual individual hydrogen molecule and no >> other actual individual hydrogen molecule, a molecule kept perhaps it in a >> certain place where people could come view at least its container, a >> molecule singular like you, me, or the Parthenon - I don't mean singular or >> unique in quality, I mean singular existentially; and chemistry in general >> is not just about _this_ or _that_ molecule. >> >> For my part I've said in the past that I regard the idioscopic a.k.a. >> special sciences as taking for their subject matter actual individuals in a >> way that more abstract fields do not; the observable universe, for example, >> is an actual individual; but what we want to learn about such subject matter >> is not just its individualities but its kinds, its totalities and >> parameters, and its laws, such as could not be learned purely from more >> general or mathematical considerations, and such that we would come to have >> good reason for confidence in our opinions as to those kinds, totalities, >> and laws, as pertaining to indefinitely many actual individuals that we >> would not have the actual opportunity to single out or observe. >> >> The idea of a real general is simply the idea of a general that is >> independent of particular persons' or groups' opinions yet is discoverable >> such that investigators would come to agree about it if they were to push >> investigation about it far enough. So we suppose that intelligent life >> elsewhere in the galaxy might announce its presence by broadcasting the >> first score or so prime numbers, because we figure that prime numbers are >> _real_ or, as many prefer to say, _objective_. Peirce also allows of >> generals that are not real but are instead figments, e.g., the objects of >> false universal propositions. >> >> Best, Ben >> >> ----- Original Message ----- >> From: Jerry LR Chandler >> To: [email protected] >> Sent: Friday, August 05, 2011 7:13 PM >> Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the >> Semiosis Process" >> >> Gary, Gary, Peter, Stefan, List: >> >> Thank you all for the productive discussion. It was valuable to me. >> I would only add a footnote or two, based on the Stoic notion of logic as >> antecedent and consequence as well as the material causality implicit within >> the mathematics of the chemical / biosemiotic sciences. >> >> >> I believe that the sense of Popper's assertion about the singular and the >> universal is widely abused in the philosophy of science, particularly in the >> evaluation of biosemiotics and the role of identity of the individual. >> >> If one asserts a universal and a single counterexample is true, then this >> asserted universal is not a true. Simple enough. >> >> But, 'universals' are of the mind. I consider "Universals" as nominialistic. >> CSP was a realist. I consider "universals" to be metaphysical objects, not >> real objects. I recall from an ancient source a phrase about the meaning of >> an utterance - when I speak the word 'horse' a horse does not come out of my >> mouth. :-) >> >> The role of universals (variables?) in mathematics is profound, perhaps >> being most profound in category theory and the widely acclaimed universal >> diagrams that S. Mac Lane exposes so forcefully and beautifully. >> >> Peirce's diagrammatic logic (exhibited on 'sheets of assertion') are >> singulars. Thus, the meaning of CSP diagrams is open, at least in my mind. >> Clearly, CSP's logical diagrams are semiotic in character. Indeed, he uses >> the chemical concept of valence in creating the assertions and in expressing >> the grammar of the diagrams. (see Gary F. essay for details). The modern >> understanding of (co)valence is as a particular relation between two parts >> of a molecule. A valence, as a graph edge (or line in CSPs diagram) is not a >> universal. >> >> The consequence of these sentences is a deep tension between Popper's view >> of falsification of hypotheses and chemical / biosemiotic practice. >> >> Popper's logic of falsification depends on an inductive universal; >> logically, it is possibility that a (physical?) universal is falsified. >> Chemical inductive logic (wrt logical diagrams) is never a universal, it is >> always about two particular adjacent particles. Furthermore, it is always >> about antecedent and consequence within a context of material causality. >> >> This local inductive argument of biosemiotics is mathematically necessary as >> a consequence of the the chemical table of elements and Dalton's hypothesis >> of ratio of small whole numbers. It is the deepest source of biological >> identity / individuality in that it emerges from the encoding of genetic >> symbols, the semiotics of DNA and molecular biology. >> >> There are several conundrums buried in this text - I have just sketched the >> surfaces that are easily translated into expressions that may carry some >> meaning for this group (I hope that my comments are not too technical, but >> fear the worst!). I have intentionally not addressed the problems of the >> community as the source of our symbolic expressions, such as this series of >> email exchanges. For example, a modern community uses multiple sign systems >> to communicate - alphabets, mathematics, music, dance, chemistry, etc, each >> with a particular diagrammatic logic. Does falsification in one symbol >> system infer falsification in another symbol system? In short, what is the >> role of category theory in semiotics or in Jesper Hoffmeyer's 'semethic'? >> This line of thought moves us into the multiple roles of logics in human >> communication - a topic dear to Tori Alexander's writings. >> >> At least to me, closure on the concept of falsification remains remote - >> obscured by the different usages of signs and the different "sign" languages >> used by different disciplines. >> >> Cheers >> >> Jerry >> >> >> Jerry LR Chandler >> Research Professor >> Krasnow Institute for Advanced Study >> >> >> On Aug 5, 2011, at 5:08 PM, Stefan Berwing wrote: >> >>> Peter, List, >>> >>> this distinction is relevant as long singulars and individuals are the >>> same. But when the individual is a universal in time and the singular is >>> the content of a perceptual judgement, then this distinction is not >>> possible in that form. (Peirce writes about singular/individual somewhere >>> in the first part of W2). >>> >>> >>> Best >>> Stefan >>> >>> >>> There is still a distinction, though. Perceptual judgements are hypotheses >>> and hence testable, but they are not universal statements, which are the >>> subjects of falsificationism. But I may be splitting hairs here... >>> >>> Peter >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: C S Peirce discussion list [[email protected]] on behalf of >>> Gary Richmond [[email protected]] >>> Sent: Friday, August 05, 2011 3:41 PM >>> To: [email protected] >>> Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the >>> Semiosis Process" >>> >>> Ben, list, >>> >>> I knew it (consensus) was too good to be true! But I think you make at >>> least two important points here, Ben, and I'll be interested in others' >>> responses (presently, I would tend to agree with you that fallibilism re: >>> our perceptual judgments prefigures falsification and that fallibilism can >>> be--I'd say, is--more basic than falsification). >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Gary >>> >>>>>> >>> Benjamin Udell <[email protected]> 8/5/2011 2:53 PM >>> >>> List, Steven, Peter, >>> >>> It may be a little more complicated. Peirce in his "cotary" propositions >>> said that perceptual judgments amount to compelling abductions, which is >>> very close to saying, compelling explanatory hypotheses. So fallibilism >>> about one's perceptual judgments (at least in retrospect if not at the time >>> of the compulsive judgment) already prefigures falsificationism. >>> >>> But it should be added that the fact that B _entails_ C does not mean that >>> B is in fact a premiss or postulate for C. "A is A" is an axiom, but it >>> entails very little. Rather, everything entails "A is A." Thus we often say >>> "presupposes" in the sense of "entails." Thus fallibililism can be more >>> basic than scientific falsificationism, yet the latter arguably entails the >>> former, i.e., scientifice falsificationism entails/presupposes fallibilism. >>> >>> Jaime Nubiola treated of another angle on Peirce's fallibilism in "C. S. >>> Peirce and G. M. Searle: The Hoax of Infallibilism." >>> http://www.unav.es/users/PeirceSearle.html Peirce at times wrote of >>> allowing of practical certainty as opposed to theoretical certainty. >>> >>> Note to list: remember to delete the automatic text added by the server to >>> posts' ends, when replying to a post. >>> >>> Best, Ben >>> >> >> --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- >> You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L >> listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to >> [email protected] with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of >> the message. To post a message to the list, send it to >> [email protected] >> --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- >> You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L >> listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to >> [email protected] with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of >> the message. To post a message to the list, send it to >> [email protected] > > --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L > listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to > [email protected] with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of > the message. 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