Ben, you say: I don't pose a tetradic reduction thesis applicable to all relations. I just say that there's a fourth semiotic term that isn't any of the classic three.
A sign stands for an object to an interpretant on the basis of a recognition. I think that an increasingly good reason to suppose that recognition can't be reduced to interpretant, sign, and object, is that nobody has done so in any kind of straightforward way. REPLY: Has anybody tried? BEN: Basically, signs & interpretants lack experience conveyable to the mind. How will you reduce experience of them respecting the object, reduce such experience into things that lack experience conveyable to the mind? Where did the experience vanish to? You can analyze, but not reduce, experience into such by shifting phenomenological gears, semiotic frame of reference, etc. REPLY: I don't see anything reductive in assuming that the analysis of cognition, including recognition, can be done in terms of a signs, objects, and interpretants as elements of or in cognitive processes, andif this involves shifting phenomenological gears and semiotic frames of reference then so be it.. Your suggestion that recognition should be acknowledged to be a distinctive fourth factor seems to accomplish nothing other than to make it impossible to analyze recognition at all since the conception of it is already given, as a sort of logical primitive, prior to its use as an analytic element. But the truth is, Ben, that I just don't understand your argument. I just can/t follow it, and I can't really answer you effectively for that reason. I guess I will have to leave that to Gary for the time being and hope that I will in time come to understand what you are getting at. I always take what you say seriously, at the very least. Joe Ransdell -- No virus found in this outgoing message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.375 / Virus Database: 267.15.8/260 - Release Date: 2/14/2006 --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
