Frances, List,
thanks for enter the discussion...
You wrote: "The "recognizant" thus
would be part of a tridential and trichotomic system of signs, and should
then not be held as the basis of some extended tetradic model of
signs."
I would add, at least as long there is no better
reorganization of all the logic (and not only linguistic) approach (based on CSP
proposal).
With an other name, the Recognizant is already there in
Peirce's proposal. As far as I can understand there is no hole nor lack
there.
In my limited opinion I would try to avoid to give new names
to what is logically already there. This would be something like create a "new
stone" in Nietzsche's words, a kind of positivistic approach instead of a more
abstract or general point of view.
In respect to the "semiotic square" I agree that there is a
semiological-verbal-polar, so to say, tetradic organization and at the same time
a more abstract triadic-logic-semiotic structure (sic) behind. The decision
about the "words" that have to occupy the polar positions is crucial and mostly
gratuitous or arbitrary.
In respect to a design project... this could be very long...
but just using/playing with some of your
words:
we could say that the sequence is an artificial gadget for
explaining what is really simultaneous or at least co-existent in a process
of design.
There is a syntactic-theoretical level of knowledge in each
designer "BEFORE" he is asked to design, at the SAME time there is a
semantic-contextual awareness about materials and technologies, and at the SAME
time there is a pragmatic-experience related to habitability.
The triadic approach is against a positivistic sequence
or taxonomy.
In this sense the Semiotic Nonagon may confuse some people
because it shows a graphic-stiff-taxonomy "first"... instead what has to be
emphasized is the constantly changing interrelations of the different 9 or
27 or... aspects.
A triadic sign is an effect or a consequence of a triadic
continuously re-arranging process. It is never SOMETHING!!! but only something
for somebody, for something in some respect etc etc all at the same time. If
time changes... then we have already an other sign... that we can also call
recognizant... but I think that if this is so... it is not really
necessary.
So, of course that "a design that works pragmatically in
one environmental or ecological and ideological context may not necessarily
work the same way in another" because it will be an other sign for that other
context.
Best
Claudio
----- Original Message -----
From: "Frances Kelly" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" <[email protected]>
Sent: Wednesday, March 08, 2006 9:05 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] Design and Semiotics Revisited (...new
thread from "Peircean elements" topic)
>
> Forgive the interjection, but here are some interpretations of mine on
> Peircean ideas that may be related to your present concerns in signs
> and my current interests in designs. Let me state my speculations and
> invite corrections to them.
>
> The initial grammatic division of semiosis, or the fundamental
> structure of signs as information they bear, does rightly consist of:
> (1) representamens; and (2) referred objects; and (3) interpretants.
> This grammatic division however is only the first of three divisions,
> where interpretants in fact go on to permeate the other two divisions,
> which divisions are roughly critics and rhetorics. The "recognizant"
> as a sign force therefore may be merely a further development of an
> interpretant supersign beyond the information it is sensed to bear,
> and perhaps mainly within the rhetoric division. The "recognizant"
> thus would be part of a tridential and trichotomic system of signs,
> and should then not be held as the basis of some extended tetradic
> model of signs.
>
> If further quasi categories are to be found or deemed beyond the
> trichotomic phenomenal categories of terness, in the familiar plan of
> firstness and secondness and thirdness, then they might be of nomenal
> zeroness as an empty class holder in waiting, or even perhaps of
> epiphenomenal enthness to include fourthness and beyond. This however
> takes mind into some extra semiotic arena of the celestreal or
> ethereal or supereal world, which is not phenomenal or existential or
> experiential, nor logically categorical for that matter. States of
> thingness beyond phenomenal terness are after all senseless and
> illogical, because they are absolutely of nothingness or vaguely of
> anythingness and everythingness, which when outside the existence and
> experience of tridential phenomena makes them pointless and
> meaningless and useless.
>
> It is not known by me if Peirce admitted any aspects of the world that
> might be held to precede or succeed the phenomenal world. It is clear
> however that only phenomena can be felt or sensed or known, and that
> any other aspect before or beyond phenomena must then be done so by
> analogy using phenomenal representamen that are signs.
>
> Now, there are continuent phenomenal representamen or eternal things
> that are seemingly not objects nor signs, but that are felt by all
> phenomena or phanerons, to include physiotic mechanisms of dead matter
> and biotic organisms of live life; and if evolution takes things that
> far, there are existent phenomenal representamen or synechastic
> objects that are semiosic signs of semiosic objects. These are
> certainly felt, but may and can also be sensed and willed and known by
> phenomena acting as signers. Exactly just how phenomena evolve into
> being representamens, and then into infinite continua and definite or
> indefinite existentia is open to exploratory probes, but it is likely
> by some process of representation, upon which the logic of relations
> or relativity could be brought to bear. The whole wide world
> nonetheless is surely permeated and fully perfused with representamen,
> if not with signs. Phenomena is thus more of metaphysical "seeming"
> than of nomenal or epiphenomenal being.
>
> What thus "seems" to sense is likely that all objects are phenomenal
> and existent representamen, but that there are objects that are not
> signs. This makes the representamen of phenomena the umbrella over all
> else, and means that representamen is not necessarily a synonym of
> sign. The sequential layout of phenomenal synechastic representamen
> might thus range from (1) object to (2) sign to (3) signer, where
> signer might embrace the recognizant. The sequential layout of
> phenomenal semiosic representamen might then range in acts of semiosis
> from (1) sign to (2) object to (3) purpose like effect or worth or
> response or some other outcome. One issue here for me is whether
> existent phenomenal objects can be classed as synechastic and as
> semiosic justly within a Peircean scheme.
>
> One point on the "semiotic square" as a diagrammatic model is that for
> me tentatively it is seemingly not dyadic or tetradic or polyadic, but
> is basically triadic. My view holds that it consists of related poles
> whose signs are of: (1) horizontal contradictarity or opposition, such
> as false and true on the top plane with doubt and belief on the bottom
> plane; and (2) diagonal contrariety or reposition, thereby allowing
> for the critical judgement of say a doubted truth or a believed
> falsity; and (3) vertical complimentarity or apposition, such as a
> doubted falsity or a believed truth. In using the model, my experience
> furthermore has been that any attempt to fit too much of divisional
> semiosis and semiotics into one square may often fail. It is also
> usually the diagonal poles that yield the enlightening brute position
> of secondness, which is after all the key to factuality and
> sensibility and reality. This kind of restructuring for the "semiotic
> square" does violate its semiological origins, but seems useful.
>
> In any event, the pragmatist application of Peircean categorics and
> semiotics to the act of design and its many fields of study, to
> include architecture, is an intriguing one for me. Such a design model
> or diagram for use by designers however must likely reverse the
> categoric and semiotic order, from say syntactics and semantics and
> pragmatics, to that of pragmatics and semantics and syntactics,
> because the design process starts with the plan of a project or
> product first. In other words, the signer as designer must consider
> the outcome initially in their mapping, which is to logically hold to
> a presumed and presupposed conclusion as a result, before the rules
> and cases are presented. The consequential truth of the design matter
> may of course not yield the conclusion sought, and that may be a flaw
> in the design process and in this design model. Furthermore, a design
> that works pragmatically in one environmental or ecological and
> ideological context may not necessarily work the same way in another.
> This might go to the very limits of pragmatism itself.
>
>
>
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