It is found in "How to Make Our Ideas Clear":
The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who
investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in
this opinion is the real. That is the way I would explain reality. CP
5.407
Joe Ransdell
Dear Folks,
Thanks for all the discussion of real, true and existence. I take the
above quote to mean that truth (or the lack of it) is a property of opinions
and real (or the lack of it) is a property of the objects to which those
opinions (signs) refer. An opinion that is true represents an object that
is real.
But what is the relation between real and existance? Can a first (such as a
quality) whose mode of being is mere potential (not actual) be in itself
real? A quality embodied in a real object I agree is real, but I remain
puzzled as to the reality of qualites as mere firsts. I guess what I
wondering is whether Peirce equates the real soley with what actually exist
or whether real can also be applied to mere firsts.
I suppose one could use Peirce's above definition of real to apply to mere
qualities (as firsts). For example, if one were to express a true opinion
as to what potential qualities might be realized in objects or what the
character of those qualities might be, those qualities (as the hypothetical
objects of those opinions) would be real. One could also express false
opinions regarding mere qualities (how many there are and their nature) in
which case the qualities referred to would not be real.
And if the immediately above interpretation of real is correct (as I now
think it is) then I would say that real is a property of all modes of being
(potential, actual and general). To be, is to be real. However true or
false is a property only of thought. Unreal is a property only of objects
that are falsely represented. Anything that has potential or actual being
is real but we can mis-represent or falsely represent both qualities and
objects and to the extent that that either is falsely represented (or
interpreted) that quality or object is not real.
So, for example, hallucinations are real but they are falsely interpreted
and the objects they are thought to represent by the person experiencing the
hallucination are not real. Similarly possible objects do not necessarily
exist but if truly (faithfully) represented then they are real. All
potentially possible objects (truly represented) are real but impossible
objects are not. And so on...
I think that sovles the problem for me. My basic conclusion is that all
modes of being are real. An object need not exist to be real but it must be
possible. Some representations are true and some are false. Objects
represented are real or false to the extent the representation is true. I
wanted to make sure I had an understanding of real, true and actual that
allowed for all sorts of conceptions including lies, illusions,
contradictory statements, and mere potential states of affairs. I think the
above does it but would welcome errors being pointed out.
Cheers,
Jim Piat
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