Julio Huato wrote: > > Does equilibrium exist as a constitutive element of real economies or > > is "only" an idealized abstraction conceived for the convenience or > > caprice of the thinker? Both! Theoretical fixed points are > > formidable instruments of cognition *because* they capture key > > elements in all real processes, elements enmeshed in the stream of > > reality. Theoretical fixed points don't live in a Platonic world > > shadowing this world. They are aspects of this, actually-existing > > world.
Les Schaffer wrote: > yea .... but ... > > i haven't seen anyone yet locate your fixed points in actual existing > processes. i've heard people like Jim Devine say there is a shadow of > supply-demand curve (this i can sort of believe). but you make it sound > like its something we can sink our teeth into, and i am not yet > convinced. speaking, of course, as a non-economist, which is one reason > i am here, to see what the progressive econs say about all this. Supply, demand, and equilibrium are ideas, not empirical realities. However, they are sometimes useful ideas, because they can help us understand empirical reality (which cannot be known directly). To my mind, the idea of equilibration is more useful for understanding the world than actual equilibrium. We do not know what the actual equilibrium is, but we can sometimes see economic forces pushing prices and quantities in its general direction. (Of course, part of the issue is the decision when and where equilibration is a reasonable description of empirical processes and where it is not. Further, we must heed the existence of disequilibrating forces, which may overwhelm equilibrating ones.) The latter point (about the primacy of equilibration over the actual attainment of equilibrium) is the basis for the massive superiority of concepts of supply, demand, and equilibrium over RATEX. SD&E have a reasonable-sounding equilibration story that seems to work in some or even many cases, but RATEX does not. In a different message in the same thread, Julio writes: > I wonder though whether, at a more fundamental level, this contrast between > "idealization" and "simplification" is substantive or merely formal. I think > it's the latter. IMHO, Hegel exposed how artificial the Kantian split > between rationalism and empiricism was. He showed how they effectively are > each other, become each other, depend on each other, struggle with each > other, etc.< Of course, in principle rationalism and empiricism are not separate from each other (and interact with each other, etc.) It is definitely an artificial split. But in practice, some or even many people strive to attain a purely rationalist/idealist vision (e.g., G. Debreu) while others seek to attain a purely empiricist/inductive vision (e.g., the economic historian J.H. Clapham). In practice, this divergent efforts do not produce a unified vision in which the real (empirical) is rational (fitting deductive logic) and the rational is real. Hegel might say that in practice, we suffer from alienation. > To put it in my simplified/idealized terms, deep down, pure "deductive" math > turns out to be as "empirical" as the "inductive" natural and historical > sciences are "rational." < Authors of utopian novels (e.g., G. Debreu's THEORY OF VALUE) can build deductive sandcastles in the air because they are not tied down by such niceties as empirical tests or even specific empirical referents. (Hey, let's assume "free disposal" of excess supplies -- including labor-power? Hey, let's ignore time.) On the other hand, empiricists like Clapham strain to attain a different kind of ideal, total boredom without any kind of meaning or understanding of the tediously-listed "facts." As Martin Gardner once said, mathematics represents the abstract dimension of empirical reality. To me, that means that math, despite its seemingly imaginary quality, is an aspect of reality once we have simplified it by abstracting from the concrete, the specific qualities of empirical reality. As a mathematician once said to me, you can't count your cows without abstracting from the differences between them. (Supposedly it helps explain why numeric thinking advanced first among pastoral people, if that's true.) But even though mathematics has an empirical basis, it is not the same as an empirical picture of the world, even "deep down." The number of cows is not the same as the cows themselves. Is it really valid to lump Daisy with Bossy? Similarly, totally concrete understandings -- listing all of the qualities of the various cows and how they change over time -- does not correspond to the actual reality of the cows, since it misses the quantitative dimension. Still, many people strive for either purely deductive or purely inductive knowledge instead of seeking a dialectic between them (sometimes called "abductive" reasoning). Part of this process involves the rejection of both purely rational/idealist/deductive strivings (Debreu) and purely empirical/concrete/inductive strivings (Clapham). that's enough for the day. I've got to work on my income tax. -- Jim Devine / "Segui il tuo corso, e lascia dir le genti." (Go your own way and let people talk.) -- Karl, paraphrasing Dante. _______________________________________________ pen-l mailing list [email protected] https://lists.csuchico.edu/mailman/listinfo/pen-l
