Robert Naiman wrote: > I do not think that this will be true, and I'm willing to put money on > it. I will bet dinner to any Pen-L member willing to take the other > side of the following proposition: a year from today, the President of > Egypt will not be someone who was "handpicked" by the military, in the > sense that forces outside of the military representing public opinion > were excluded from the determination. > > So, for example, if there is an election, and if Amr Moussa - not from > the military - runs and wins, the other side of the bet should pay up. > On the other hand, if there is no election, or if there is a sham > election - one not judged "substantially free and fair" by > international observers - as a result of which Suleiman is President a > year from now, I will pay up. > > Who's in? We can select a committee of judges from among Pen-L members > to certify the winner of the bet.
I'm not a betting man, so I'm not in. (If you want to organize a poker game with a bunch of friends, count me in.) In any event, I don't think that you're asking the right question. The key thing is that the Egyptian military does not seem to be on the verge of splitting or becoming dysfunctional. Friedman may be right that they want to get rid of Mubarak, and they seem mostly unified on this stance. If the military is like that in other countries, they have three-pronged program, not necessarily in order: (1) maintenance of social order; (2) increasing the military budget, including the receipt of aid from the US; and (3) maintenance of the current hierarchy within the military, perhaps with the exception of one or two generals (likely older ones) who are seen as too close to Mubarak and may be forcibly retired. On the other side, the people who are protesting Mubarak seem to be pro- rather than anti-military, while the situation does not seem dire enough for the military to go the way of the Peruvian generals in 1968 (pushing radical reforms). So that it seems that no matter what happens, the military (and the police) will stay in place. This represents the heart and soul of the Egyptian state (which monopolizes the use of generally-acceptable force), which will preserve the power and influence of the ultra-rich elite that has grown under Mubarak. Egypt's capitalist economy and its economic dependence on the imperialist system (and US aid) will persist. (Egypt's dependence on tourism militates against radicalism.) Likely Mubarak will be the main scape-goat and will move to Saudi Arabia or some other garden spot. Then, there will be "free and fair elections," perhaps electing some non-military type, even Amr Moussa or Mohamed ElBaradei. But whoever gets elected will be substantially constrained by the power of the military and the non-Mubarak ultra-rich. (The existence of that power is not going to be subject to elections, especially to free and fair ones.) Like many presidents, even in the US, the structural constraints will push him to moderate his ideals and kow-tow to the military. In the broad scheme of things, it won't matter very much who is elected. Any radicalism will be temporary, as the military and the ultra-rich and the US mobilize to counteract such policies. Pretty soon, the new president will be triangulating. After an exhausting few weeks, the mass opposition will likely demobilize (and with Mubarak gone, lose its focus), weakening the power countervailing that of the rich and the military. I would guess that the new president would lean a bit toward more social-democratic (less neoliberal) policies, to at least _appear_ to be addressing the unemployment and inequality problems. Some of the leaders of the opposition will likely be given well-paid jobs in the government, addressing these issues (and co-opting them). Either these efforts will be underfunded, there will be more inflation (as they are financed with deficits), and/or there will be US aid (and control). On foreign policy, there likely will be a tilt (slightly) away from Israel. I'd guess that an increase in US military aid will reverse that tilt. Continuing to look at my crystal ball, it looks like any new government will give a sop to the Islamic forces, perhaps watering down Egypt's secular orientation a little while giving the MB a greater ability to operate openly in politics (which, by the way, would allow them to have open splits). Someone in or (more likely) close to the Muslim Brotherhood will get a cabinet post, without changing the general situation. The rise of an Iranian-type theocracy seems quite unlikely at this point. -- Jim Devine / "Living a life of quiet desperation -- but always with style!" _______________________________________________ pen-l mailing list [email protected] https://lists.csuchico.edu/mailman/listinfo/pen-l
