You say you don't think that I am asking the right question. But surely you would agree that what one thinks is "the right question" (presumably, there is more than one "right question") depends on what one thinks is worth caring about.
For example, I care about ending the economic blockade of Gaza. The continuation of the current policy is a matter of life and death for civilians in Gaza - a fact documented by Israeli human rights groups. I think that a change of government in Egypt to one in which public opinion plays a significantly greater role in foreign policy formation than it did under Mubarak - a change that I think is likely - is likely to cause the economic blockade of Gaza to fall. I think that this is worth caring about. Do you think that this is not worth caring about? If you do think that this is worth caring about, then do you think is it not a "right question" to consider whether it is likely to come to pass? Do you think that a change that brought this about would not be meaningful? I will offer a companion wager: within one year, the economic blockade of Gaza will fall. On Sat, Feb 5, 2011 at 2:13 PM, Jim Devine <[email protected]> wrote: > Robert Naiman wrote: >> I do not think that this will be true, and I'm willing to put money on >> it. I will bet dinner to any Pen-L member willing to take the other >> side of the following proposition: a year from today, the President of >> Egypt will not be someone who was "handpicked" by the military, in the >> sense that forces outside of the military representing public opinion >> were excluded from the determination. >> >> So, for example, if there is an election, and if Amr Moussa - not from >> the military - runs and wins, the other side of the bet should pay up. >> On the other hand, if there is no election, or if there is a sham >> election - one not judged "substantially free and fair" by >> international observers - as a result of which Suleiman is President a >> year from now, I will pay up. >> >> Who's in? We can select a committee of judges from among Pen-L members >> to certify the winner of the bet. > > I'm not a betting man, so I'm not in. (If you want to organize a poker > game with a bunch of friends, count me in.) > > In any event, I don't think that you're asking the right question. The > key thing is that the Egyptian military does not seem to be on the > verge of splitting or becoming dysfunctional. Friedman may be right > that they want to get rid of Mubarak, and they seem mostly unified on > this stance. If the military is like that in other countries, they > have three-pronged program, not necessarily in order: (1) maintenance > of social order; (2) increasing the military budget, including the > receipt of aid from the US; and (3) maintenance of the current > hierarchy within the military, perhaps with the exception of one or > two generals (likely older ones) who are seen as too close to Mubarak > and may be forcibly retired. > > On the other side, the people who are protesting Mubarak seem to be > pro- rather than anti-military, while the situation does not seem dire > enough for the military to go the way of the Peruvian generals in 1968 > (pushing radical reforms). > > So that it seems that no matter what happens, the military (and the > police) will stay in place. This represents the heart and soul of the > Egyptian state (which monopolizes the use of generally-acceptable > force), which will preserve the power and influence of the ultra-rich > elite that has grown under Mubarak. Egypt's capitalist economy and its > economic dependence on the imperialist system (and US aid) will > persist. (Egypt's dependence on tourism militates against > radicalism.) > > Likely Mubarak will be the main scape-goat and will move to Saudi > Arabia or some other garden spot. Then, there will be "free and fair > elections," perhaps electing some non-military type, even Amr Moussa > or Mohamed ElBaradei. But whoever gets elected will be substantially > constrained by the power of the military and the non-Mubarak > ultra-rich. (The existence of that power is not going to be subject > to elections, especially to free and fair ones.) Like many presidents, > even in the US, the structural constraints will push him to moderate > his ideals and kow-tow to the military. In the broad scheme of things, > it won't matter very much who is elected. Any radicalism will be > temporary, as the military and the ultra-rich and the US mobilize to > counteract such policies. Pretty soon, the new president will be > triangulating. After an exhausting few weeks, the mass opposition will > likely demobilize (and with Mubarak gone, lose its focus), weakening > the power countervailing that of the rich and the military. > > I would guess that the new president would lean a bit toward more > social-democratic (less neoliberal) policies, to at least _appear_ to > be addressing the unemployment and inequality problems. Some of the > leaders of the opposition will likely be given well-paid jobs in the > government, addressing these issues (and co-opting them). Either these > efforts will be underfunded, there will be more inflation (as they are > financed with deficits), and/or there will be US aid (and control). > > On foreign policy, there likely will be a tilt (slightly) away from > Israel. I'd guess that an increase in US military aid will reverse > that tilt. Continuing to look at my crystal ball, it looks like any > new government will give a sop to the Islamic forces, perhaps watering > down Egypt's secular orientation a little while giving the MB a > greater ability to operate openly in politics (which, by the way, > would allow them to have open splits). Someone in or (more likely) > close to the Muslim Brotherhood will get a cabinet post, without > changing the general situation. The rise of an Iranian-type theocracy > seems quite unlikely at this point. > -- > Jim Devine / "Living a life of quiet desperation -- but always with style!" > _______________________________________________ > pen-l mailing list > [email protected] > https://lists.csuchico.edu/mailman/listinfo/pen-l > -- Robert Naiman Policy Director Just Foreign Policy www.justforeignpolicy.org [email protected] _______________________________________________ pen-l mailing list [email protected] https://lists.csuchico.edu/mailman/listinfo/pen-l
