Robert Naiman responded to me:
> No, it overstates the case to say that I don't think you care about
> the "details." I think that your abstract analysis makes it appear
> that those details don't exist for you. I think that if someone asks
> you if you care about such details, you will say yes and mean it. But
> I think that your abstract analysis ought to reflect that.
This is pretty abstract, so I'll respond on the same level: though it
can be useful analytically, the concrete/abstract dichotomy is a false
one. Philosophically speaking, "concrete" details are abstract if
their context is ignored (because they leave out the connections
between details). Simultaneously, the "abstract" structure of society
(or the "big picture") is concrete, since it has a real-world impact
on the individuals who live with the system, constraining and helping
to determine the nature of the specific events that occur (i.e.,
details). This is found out, for example, when a politician pursues
policies that go against the grain of the system (given the current
balance of power) and suddenly faces a mass political mobilization of
the rich and their dollars, a "capital strike," and/or "capital
flight." These phenomena are pretty damn real, as Salvador Allende
discovered.
(abstraction = simplifying, leaving things out, hopefully to
facilitate understanding.)
> I also don't agree with your Manichean dichotomy between caring about
> elections and caring about popular mobilization ...
As much as I respect the Zoroastrian tradition, it's not Manichean;
it's an analytical distinction. I think it's important to analyze what
in heck's going on before cheer-leading. Or if we must lead cheers,
make sure that you're trying to figure out what their implications are
rather than latching onto some "good guy" on the basis of the apparent
color of his hat. No political position should be etched into
political stone and treated as the final Truth. It's true that, as
some old crank once wrote, "the point is to change it," but it's also
best to "look before you leap."
I think the word you were looking for was "duality." The
election/mobilization distinction is not a true duality. Just as
popular mobilizations can affect what politicians can do and what they
actually do (so that Nixon's policies could be seen as very liberal or
even "socialist" by today's Beckian standards), politicians can
encourage popular mobilization, in order to widen and deepen their
bases (to broadly shift the balance of political power), allowing them
to strengthen their programs and their implementation. My impression
is that the latter is something that Hugo Chavez does.
However, in standard politics ("bourgeois" politics, if you will), the
duality is treated as if it were real. Politicians know that they can
be pushed and shaped by popular mobilizations, but they try to keep
that from happening. Back-room deals with big-money boys and political
fixers are much more controllable and sometimes lucrative. Almost no
professional politicians try to "build their base" in a way that
changes the political-economic balance of power in any way except
those which promote their careers. Thus, for example, Obama exploited
the outpouring of disgust toward #2 that became mass adulation of him,
but then has worked hard to channel and chain that mobilization so
that it serves only him and his political party. (If the mass
mobilization lacks any kind of independent organization (autonomous
from the politicians), it can easily succumb to this effort to
demobilize them.)
> Both internationally and within Egypt, there are understood standards
> for what would constitute a "free and fair election." I think that an
> election that meets those standards is likely to result in a
> significant change in Egyptian government policy; for example, such an
> election likely to bring down the economic blockade of Gaza.
I wasn't quibbling about fairness and freeness, but I doubt that this
policy would result if the military and the rich opposed it (since the
actual results of politics depend crucially on the many, many days
during which no official elections occur. They might accept this
policy and thus throw a sop to the people involved in the popular
mobilization (to the extent that they have called for this change) and
(likely) the Muslim Botherhood. But as I said, Israel would mobilize
against this change and it's quite likely that the US would go along,
so this change would likely be reversed -- or (perhaps more likely)
replaced with a different policy that's just as likely to kill
Palestinians. More drone attacks (as Obama's in Afghanistan &
Pakistan), anyone?
by the way, to what extent is the popular mobilization in Cairo
expressing opposition to the blockade of Gaza? My impression is that
it's focussed on Mubarak over all other concerns.
>... If there is a "free and fair election," that is an arena in which
> popular mobilization will be expressed and have an effect.
>
> If there isn't a "free and fair election," it is likely that popular
> mobilization with continue to be suppressed.
even with a "free and fair election," the suppression will likely to
be continued. After all, the politicians and especially the generals
and the rich don't want any kind of popular mobilization. Popular
mobilizations go against the grain of "liberal capitalism," especially
in a globalized world. And these elites don't want that boat rocked if
they can avoid it.
> So these are overlapping concerns, not disjoint concerns.
I didn't say otherwise.
--
Jim Devine / "Living a life of quiet desperation -- but always with style!"
_______________________________________________
pen-l mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.csuchico.edu/mailman/listinfo/pen-l
