Joseph wrote:
In the discussion of commodity fetishism, Marx points to the fetishist nature
of value. He makes the famous assertion that *value* is "a relation between
persons expressed as a relation between things". This is the essence of the
illusion concerning value that is created by marketplace exchange. Value
appears to be a property of objects, but actually it is a relation between
persons.
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Paul C:
I think we should deconstruct this a little.
What appears to be a relation between objects is their monetary value which
appears as an attribute of the individual commodity. But this monetary value
is not the same thing as the labour value, since the monetary and labour value
have different units. In both monetary value and labour value you have a scalar
measure, ie, it is one dimensional. But this involves a loss of information
since the complexity of interactions in the social division of labour is of
higher dimension -- is for example a matrix. Both therefore suffer from
information loss since they are projections of a higher dimensional space onto
a submanifold.
But it is not strictly true to say that labour value is a relation between
persons. It is a socio technical relation, it is a one dimensional projection
of a much more complex structure composed of the social division of labour and
the current state of the forces of production available to society.
The sale of a commodity is a relation between persons ( at least between
juridical persons, not necessary human ones). This sale involves a price, so
the price is a relation between persons, in which the aggregate socio-technical
relations of production are only fleetingly visible.
To the extent, that as Smith argues, human labour is malleable and polymorphic
( the parable of the philosopher and the street porter ) the aggregate
socio-technical conditions of production can be represented as labour values,
since in principle labour can be redistributed through the division of labour
and represents the original social opportunity cost, or 'original currency'.
Joseph:
Indeed, as if to avoid any possibility of being misunderstood, Marx
insisted, and correctly so, that *value* is a "non-natural" property of a
commodity. He wrote things like:
"The iron, in the expression of the weight of the sugar-loaf, represents a
natural property common to both bodies, namely their weight; but the coat in
the expression of the value of the linen, represents a non-natural property
of both, something purely social, namely, their value." ("Capital", vol. I,
Chapter I, Section 3, Subsection 3. "The Equivalent Form of Value", p. 66,
Kerr edition.)
Note, he insisted on making this point about "value". He didn't say, well,
this is true about "price", but "value" is a somewhat better indicator of the
properties of an object. Instead he put emphasis on the non-natural nature of
value itself. And I think this is important, and very relevant to the
problems of today.
Paul:
Saying it is non natural is still compatible with Jim's point about it being a
social opportunity cost.
Joseph:
Why he focused on value is clear from another angle as well. Value reflects
the underlying laws of capitalist exchange and price. If, therefore, price
reflects commodity fetishism, value should reflect it in an even clearer
fashion, clearer because the discussion of value leaves out various
accidental complexities inherent in price and thus points out the essential
features more clearly.
Paul:
I am not sure that it is meaningful to say that value reflects any thing. A
reflection is a locally continuous mapping between two domains of the same
dimensionality. It may have vanishing points and duplications: in a curved
mirror I may see two copies of myself, and some parts of me may be compressed
into a single point: many to one mapping. It is not clear in what sense you can
say price reflects commodity fetishism. To stretch a point one might argue that
prices are a distorted reflection of values, but since commodity fetishism is
associated with the selling of commodities and is therefore part of the
commercial process, the fetishism and reflectionseems to be in the
representation of values as prices.
Since labour values exist prior to sale, are, according to Marx, something
generated in production, they exist before the good becomes a commodity and is
sold.
The University of Glasgow, charity number SC004401
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