There's a name for it. It's called "ideology." In this case, it is
worthwhile reviewing the sources. Destutt de Tracy proposed the term
positively as a replacement for metaphysics. Dr. M. gave it a pejorative
twist.

Destutt:

The idea of property and of exclusive property arises then necessarily in a
> sensible being from this alone, that it is susceptible of passion and
> action; and it rises in such a being because nature has endowed it with an
> inevitable and inalienable property, that of its individuality.


Whereas, Marx:

>
> When, therefore, the bourgeois tells the communists: by abolishing my
> existence as a bourgeois, you abolish my existence as an individual; when
> thus he identifies himself as a bourgeois with himself as an individual,
> one must, at least, recognize his frankness and shamelessness. For the
> bourgeois it is actually the case, he believes himself to be an individual
> only insofar as he is a bourgeois.
>


> But when the theoreticians of the bourgeoisie come forward and give a
> general expression to this assertion, when they equate the bourgeois’s
> property with individuality in theory as well and want to give a logical
> justification for this equation, then this nonsense begins to become solemn
> and holy. ...
>


> All this theoretical nonsense, which seeks refuge in etymology, would be
> impossible if the actual private property that the communists want to
> abolish had not been transformed into the abstract notion of “property”.
> This transformation, on the one hand, saves one the trouble of having to
> say anything, or even merely to know anything, about actual private
> property and, on the other hand, makes it easy to discover a contradiction
> in communism, since after the abolition of (actual) property it is, of
> course, easy to discover all sorts of things in communism which can be
> included in the concept “property”. In reality, of course, the situation is
> just the reverse. In reality I possess private property only insofar as I
> have something vendible, whereas what is peculiar to me [meine Eigenheit]
> may not be vendible at all. My frock-coat is private property for me only
> so long as I can barter, pawn or sell it, so long [as it] is [marketable].
> If it loses that feature, if it becomes tattered, it can still have a
> number of features which make it valuable for me, it may even become a
> feature of me and turn me into a tatterdemalion. But no economist would
> think of classing it as my private property, since it does not enable me to
> command any, even the smallest, amount of other people’s labour. A lawyer,
> an ideologist of private property, could perhaps still indulge in such
> twaddle.





On Sat, Apr 27, 2013 at 10:08 AM, Jim Devine <[email protected]> wrote:

> Eubulides wrote:
> >  Because, of course, only Marxists know what value *really* is or
> that so-called 'laws of motion' is/are, axiomatically, the penultimate
> metaphor for delivering the one true theory of capitalist societies.<
>
> and:
> > In all my years of living, suffering and study I've yet
> to see/think/feel that there is a shred of evidence that we *need*
> the concept, let alone theories, of value, to reduce the
> self-inflicted suffering of humanity.<
> I am a bit confused by this thread and may be missing what all of this is
> about. There seem to be at least three different themes...
>
> Anyway (on one topic), the question isn't really whether or not people
> "need" value theory or theories of capitalism's laws of motion. (The
> answer, of course, depends on what we _mean_ by "value" and "laws of
> motion," but that's not my topic.)
>
> To my mind, the key question is whether or not people need theory at all.
> That is, do we need metaphors to add order to our understandings of the
> empirical world? A "theory" is really nothing but a specific kind of
> metaphor (a word I'm using to stand in for all mental imagery). For those
> of us who try to think like scientists (even though that isn't fully
> possible), theorizing involves efforts to create a metaphor that is more
> internally consistent (in terms of logic) and more consistent with
> perceived empirical reality than other available metaphors are.
>
> As far as I can tell, Ian (a.k.a. Eubulides) uses the word "metaphor" as
> if it's a bad thing. But without metaphors, people cannot think. That is,
> without metaphors, life is the "blooming, buzzing confusion" perceived by
> an infant (to quote William James, likely out of context).
>
> The problem occurs when the metaphor is reified, becoming a capital-T
> Truth, a religious-type dogma that's never to be questioned or tested in
> any way. This reification can arise with any metaphors, including those of
> value theory and laws of motion, also including other theories (such as
> ideas about utility maximization or supply & demand). This problem can even
> plague those self-styled "empiricists" who reject the use of theories
> (metaphors) altogether; their theorizing usually involves denial that they
> actually use theory.
>
> But what about the "theory of value"? Maybe the theory can be described in
> terms of a meta-metaphor. And when we talk about a "labor theory of value,"
> we have to remember that it can only be understood in the context of
> _competing_ theories of value. So we have to mention the dominant theory of
> value in economics. This is that the "value" of something is its
> (quantified) utility to individuals who buy it. That value would be truly
> revealed in practice if we lived in a system of perfect markets, but (in
> theory) the current set of prices is a reasonable approximation of the
> underlying set of values, at least in the U.S. The meta-metaphor is the
> vision that we are all atomized individuals[*] who interact with each other
> only via markets. We are all buyers and sellers.
> In this context, what is the (Marxian) "labor theory of value"? I'm not
> going to write about the actual theory (since that's another debate).
> What's important here is the meta-metaphor, i.e., the vision that even
> though we are individuals we are also all part of a unified society.
> Further, to allow society to survive and even grow, labor must be done.
> Some or all individuals must contribute labor to society as a whole. In the
> current form of society, some people are workers and others not.
>
> Maybe there are other meta-metaphors that can structure our understanding
> of the empirical reality of political economy that I don't know about. But
> we need _some_ kind of (meta)metaphor here.
> --
> Jim Devine /  "Segui il tuo corso, e lascia dir le genti." (Go your own
> way and let people talk.) -- Karl, paraphrasing Dante.
>
> [*] "I'm not" -- Spike Milligan.
>
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>


-- 
Cheers,

Tom Walker (Sandwichman)
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