On 12/15/2016 03:00 AM, Michael Paquier wrote:
On Wed, Dec 14, 2016 at 8:33 PM, Heikki Linnakangas <hlinn...@iki.fi> wrote:But, a password stored in plaintext works with either MD5 or SCRAM, or any future authentication mechanism. So as soon as we have SCRAM authentication, it becomes somewhat useful again.In a nutshell: auth / stored MD5 SCRAM plaintext ----------------------------------------- password Y Y Y md5 Y N Y scram N Y Y If a password is stored in plaintext, it can be used with any authentication mechanism. And the plaintext 'password' authentication mechanism works with any kind of a stored password. But an MD5 hash cannot be used with SCRAM authentication, or vice versa.So.. I have been thinking about this portion of the thread. And what I find the most scary is not the fact that we use plain passwords for SCRAM authentication, it is the fact that we would need to do a catalog lookup earlier in the connection workflow to decide what is the connection protocol to use depending on the username provided in the startup packet if the pg_hba.conf entry matching the user and database names uses "password".
I don't see why we would need to do a catalog lookup any earlier. With "password" authentication, the server can simply request the client to send its password. When it receives it, it performs the catalog lookup to get pg_authid.rolpassword. If it's in plaintext, just compare it, if it's an MD5 hash, hash the client's password and compare, and if it's a SCRAM verifier, build a verifier with the same salt and iteration count and compare.
And, honestly, why do we actually need to have a support table that spread? SCRAM is designed to be secure, so it seems to me that it would on the contrary a bad idea to encourage the use of plain passwords if we actually think that they should never be used (they are actually useful for located, development instances, not production ones).
I agree we should not encourage bad password practices. But as long as we support passwords to be stored in plaintext at all, it makes no sense to not allow them to be used with SCRAM. The fact that you can use a password stored in plaintext with both MD5 and SCRAM is literally the only reason you would store a password in plaintext, so if we don't want to allow that, we should disallow storing passwords in plaintext altogether.
So what I would suggest would be to have a support table like that: auth / stored MD5 SCRAM plaintext ----------------------------------------- password Y Y N md5 Y N Y scram N N Y
I was using 'Y' to indicate that the combination works, and 'N' to indicate that it does not. Assuming you're using the same notation, the above doesn't make any sense.
So here is an idea for things to do now: 1) do not change the format of the existing passwords 2) do not change pg_authid 3) block access to instances if "password" or "md5" are used in pg_hba.conf if the user have a SCRAM verifier. 4) block access if "scram" is used and if user has a plain or md5 verifier. 5) Allow access if "scram" is used and if user has a SCRAM verifier. We had a similar discussion regarding verifier/password formats last year but that did not end well. It would be sad to fall back again into this discussion and get no result. If somebody wants to support access to SCRAM with plain password entries, why not. But that would gain a -1 from me regarding the earlier lookup of pg_authid needed to do the decision making on the protocol to use. And I think that we want SCRAM to be designed to be a maximum stable and secure.
The bottom line is that at the moment, when plaintext passwords are stored as is, without any indicator that it's a plaintext password, it's ambiguous whether a password is a SCRAM verifier, or if it's a plaintext password that just happens to begin with the word "scram:". That is completely unrelated to which combinations of stored passwords and authentication mechanisms we actually support or allow to work.
The only way to distinguish, is to know about every verifier kind there is, and check whether rolpassword looks valid as anything else than a plaintext password. And we already got tripped by a bug-of-omission on that once. If we add more verifier formats in the future, it's bound to happen again. Let's nip that source of bugs in the bud. Attached is a patch to implement what I have in mind.
Alternatively, you could argue that we should forbid storing passwords in plaintext altogether. I'm OK with that, too, if that's what people prefer. Then you cannot have a user that can log in with both MD5 and SCRAM authentication, but it's certainly more secure, and it's easier to document.
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