On 03/11/2017 04:20 AM, Alex wrote:
the only really read-write directories (their changes are
actually persisted) are /home and /usr/local.

That is enough to be able to persist.


As the others already stated there could be problems for the actually
running session, i.e. the rogue command could siphon all your data to a
remote location, but it would be only able to access data in that AppVM
and not the others. This action would not need any root access, because
all data is from the very same user that downloaded/started the rogue
program in the first place, so it already has access.

The only advantage that root access would give could arguably be
persistance (i.e. installation, as you suggested with DNF), but that
advantage is fake and will vanish on AppVM reboot.

Disagree there. Root access would bestow greater ability to launch attacks against VM isolation. That would be rare in of itself, but the chance for improved security comes for free.

-

There is another, much bigger issue: We don't want our systems to become a zoo of infected VMs with malware thrashing about in them (and on our networks!) with us as zookeepers. That would be irresponsible.

Qubes' abilities should not be framed in a way that would encourage that. Even if isolation works 100% of the time, we should view that as the opportunity to remove and prevent malware---preferably with some help from the guest OS.

Put another way: If VMs were teeth, would you prefer to have one cavity this year, or seven?

--

Chris Laprise, tas...@openmailbox.org
https://twitter.com/ttaskett

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