You are talking about: 5) Persons must be capable of verbal communication. 6) Persons are distinguishable from other entities by being conscious in some special way: there is a way in which we are conscious in which no other species is conscious. Sometimes this is identied as self-consciousness or one sort or another.
The term "verbal" threw a lot of my students. Verbal means "having to do with the word." Vocal means "having to do with the voice. People who write or who use sign language are still being "verbal" because words are signs, and so are hand shapes. So the mute are not excluded, so long as they understand and communicate with some kind of language. We assume that those in a coma did at one time have "consciousness" as we define it; but the problem lies in our vocabulary, not the inner state of the injured human being. Who knows what kind of mental experience they are having in a coma that can't be detected? Dennett goes on to discuss these and many other issues about personhood, which is an essay ultimately about machine intelligence. I've been having a debate with a friend about Kurzweil's "poetry turing test." What is the last bastion of human superiority to a machine? Creativity, it seems. But even that is being challenged. So this article was of interest to me for what it examined in terms of human attitudes towards "persons" (which may or may not be human... Don't forget we might want to consider dolphins or aliens from another planet as such... so long as they meet the following requirements. That's why he left out the human body. Person does not equal human in this computation. Human beings not considered full "persons" by society at large (judging by the way the rights given them and the respect they are treated with): infants and children, the retarded or mentally deficient, convicts-- denied the right to vote, drive, have the freedom of movement, decision-making, using money, make legal decisions, etc. Many who read the article think erroneously that it reflects his opinions. He is making an index of what he sees society at large to consider proper "personhood."-- It raises ethical questions such as: are we responsible for our homeless? Can we just dismiss that tattered man sitting on the corner there as below concern? Why was slavery even tolerated? What programs do we support?. This question of avatarhood should be posed to him. I would be curious to know his answer because at the moment, being an avatar doesn't inspire the same kind of sympathy or prove to be a tragic handicap or social injustice such that extenuating circumstances be given them.... except, perhaps, for Piaget. Sarah On Sun, Oct 24, 2010 at 4:05 PM, Janice Carello <[email protected]>wrote: > Hmm.... I'm not sure why, exactly, but I'm having a real hard time with > Dennet's list. According to Dennet: if one is mute, they are not a person; > if one has autism, they are not a person; if one is in a coma, they are not > a person; if one is developmentally disabled; they are not a person. > However, if one is a psychopath, they are a person. ? > > Dennet focuses mostly on the cognitive aspects of being a person. I don't > understand how having a body (or a virtual representation of oneself that > can be seen and that appears as a body) could be left off of the list of > what it means to be a person. I can see lots of reasons for imagining one > does not have a body, or that one has more than one body--clearly many > humans have a desire to "transcend" their body in some way for various > reasons--but the fact remains that persons do have bodies. I also have a > hard time believing that if avatars could not be seen--only appeared as > sound or text--that we would be having this discussion. > > It seems to me that being a person involves several aspects: behavior, > emotions, sensation, and cognition, at a minimum. One may have limited > ability to fully express oneself in one or more (if not all) of these > domains--or prefer to express oneself in one or more of these domains--but > still be a person. Dennet's list suggests that not all humans should be > considered persons. I think that is what is bugging me about his list. > > > On Sun, Oct 24, 2010 at 2:10 PM, Sal Armoniac <[email protected]>wrote: > >> Of all of you, I've spent the most time in Second Life--as author and >> artist (publishing poetry under the name of my avatar and making machinima >> attributed to "Hypatia Pickens."). This matter has been of great interest >> to artists, writers and builders in "Second Life" as has content theft >> (tremendous rage is generated when someone uses a "copy bot" to reproduce >> items--artwork, clever and well-crafted clothing, furniture, trinkets--that >> are scripted as non-copyable. Some people make their incomes in Second Life >> selling things, Where the medical article Alicia pointed us to becomes >> interesting is the "personhood" of a number of disabled people I've become >> friends with. Eric has hit the right button: an avatar is useless unless >> it operates in a social context. No sane person would attribute rights to a >> Second Life avatar that is never used, or which never shows up in the >> virtual world because its owner or driver or inventor or user or puppeteer >> has lost interest in it. If you make a drawing of an invented person, it is >> just that. A drawing. It is not an avatar. If you put it in motion, if >> you turn it into an animation, it is still not an avatar. Avatar means "the >> incarnation of a deity." It assumes, at least in Sanskrit, that a real mind >> governs it and walks among us. >> >> I've taught "Robots and Representation" several times now over the past >> ten years (maybe twenty... some version of it ever since I wrote "Hollow >> Pursuits.") One of my favorite essays is that by Daniel Dennett called >> "Conditions of Personhood" but since I've been teaching my Avatar class, >> I've been closely following Mark Stephen Meadows' _I, Avatar_ in which he >> addresses this very topic and then some. He's very interested in the >> ambiguous separation/fusion of the avatar and its driver. The question seems >> to rest upon two terms that become vague in meaning when we separate them >> from physical human beings. We do talk about "Animal Right," something >> hotly debated. And corporations are treated legally as "persons." So what >> do these mean? Can rights and personhood pertain to non-human entities? >> But where does the avatar begin and the driver end? In what instances are >> the rights of an avatar to be separated from the rights of the human >> operator? I can think of one example-- in another article, a man who did >> business in a virtual world wanted to do so using his avatar name and not >> his real name. It became a legal issue. Where money was concerned, an >> avatar was a non-entity. Compare this way of thinking with Dennett's: >> >> Dennett sets out six conditions for "personhood." I note that he does not >> include the human body: >> >> 1) Persons are rational beings. >> 2) Persons are beings to which states of consciousness are attributed, or >> to which psychological or mental or intentional predicates are ascribed. >> 3) Whether something counts as a person depends in some way on an attitude >> taken toward it, a stance adopted with respect to it (this is important) >> 4) The object toward which this personal stance is taken must be capable >> of reciprocating in some way. >> 5) Persons must be capable of verbal communication. >> 6) Persons are distinguishable from other entities by being conscious in >> some special way: there is a way in which we are conscious in which no other >> species is conscious. Sometimes this is identied as self-consciousness or >> one sort or another. >> >> Take the case of my friend Piaget in Second Life. His human body is >> severely disabled; he can't move and he directs his commands to Second Life >> by means of "voice." He may well consider his avatar body to be more >> significant to him, to be more HIM than his human body. Is Piaget, when I >> interact with him, rational? Yes. Can I attribue a psychologica or mental >> state to him? Yes. Do I treat him like a person even though I've never >> seen his real body? Yes of course. Does he reciprocate? Indeed. He >> communicates by type chat, and he is conscious. He prefers to be called >> Piaget. Do I care what his real name is? No. His interaction with me in >> the social world of Second Life is enough. The issue changes when he is >> taken to the hospital. His real name, social security number, insurance, >> credit cards, drivers license, and birth certificate certify him as a person >> in the real world, but I can't be a part of that--only a listener if he >> chooses to tell me, as he sometimes does. In a virtual world, we have >> money, but it is not taxed, and it can't be used as currency when real world >> business is involved. >> >> So a seventh condition of personhood that Dennett may need to add are all >> the legal and financial interactions and documents that "certify" us as >> persons in the world. Money talks. And we all know how it validates. >> >> If Piaget were to lose his Second Life account for some reason, or if some >> griefer were to destroy it, would he have the right to press suit? Would >> his personhood have been damaged? >> >> >> Hypatia Pickens, sometimes known as "Sarah" ;) >> >> >> >> >> >> On Fri, Oct 22, 2010 at 12:34 PM, Eric Scoles <[email protected]>wrote: >> >>> "Rights" is a very slippery concept. There's certainly a sense in which >>> we all have the "right" to do anything we can. I used to joust regularly >>> with a guy on Plastic.com who had as a signature "the only thing a free man >>> can be forced to do is die." In his mind, you always had a "right" to do >>> anything at all, as long as it didn't impinge on the right of another person >>> to control their personal property (e.g., their body); anything you did that >>> was within you sphere of "rights" was a matter of choice. (He was a >>> libertarian, of course.) But that's a pretty expansive use of the term >>> "rights". >>> >>> I don't think "rights" make sense outside of a social context -- we're >>> social animals, after all, even the act of using language requires the >>> conceptualization of an "other" to take in what we say, and even if that >>> 'other' is ourself -- and if that's true, we have rights to the extent that >>> we are "granted" them -- though what it means to be "granted" rights, and >>> who/what has authority to grant them, is still an open question. If we live >>> according to laws, I'd argue we accept the ability of a law-enforcing entity >>> to "grant" at least some rights; others we may hold as being above the law, >>> but that's only because we have a moral/ethical rationale for them, and >>> where does that rationale come from? It doesn't come from me as an atomic, >>> disconnected individual -- no human who's capable of talking and acting in >>> the world really is such a thing, even though they might think they are. >>> That said, as an individual (though not disconnected), we do make decisions >>> about who or what we hold to have the authority to grant or enforce rights. >>> >>> The kind of discussion the paper's trying to provoke happens in the >>> context of the pre-supposition that rights do come from somewhere outside of >>> the pure individual decision that you have right x or y. The idea is to >>> stake ideological territory. So even if it seems redundant or absurd, >>> there's still merit in doing it (the very fact that some can see it as >>> redundant and some can see it as absurd to my mind means it's a discussion >>> we ought to have). >>> >>> As far as property rights go, those are all interesting questions, and >>> the 'using right now' rubric is particularly interesting. Reminds me of the >>> line from *The Sound and the Fury*: "As soon as he [Chief Ikemotubbe] >>> conceived of the idea that the land could be sold, it ceased to be his." >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Fri, Oct 22, 2010 at 11:52 AM, Jason Olshefsky <google.jo@ >>> jayceland.com> wrote: >>> >>>> On Oct 22, 2010, at 4:59 AM, Alicia Henn wrote: >>>> > This is an interesting article on rights for avatars. It seems >>>> reasonable and yet ludicrous at the same time. My officemate and I have had >>>> a great time expanding on it. - Alicia >>>> >>>> First, <sarcasm>kudos</sarcasm> for calling it "Get Your Paws off of My >>>> Pixels: Personal Identity and Avatars as Self". >>>> >>>> My initial reaction is, "videoconferencing and message boards" The end. >>>> In other words, if our virtual representation in a videoconferencing >>>> setting or on a message board can be considered a representation of self >>>> (that is, an insult or attack on our representation is considered similar >>>> to >>>> the same done to our individual self) then what difference is it if our >>>> representation is an avatar in a virtual world? >>>> >>>> Upon reading further, I found it rather evocative: I could barely read a >>>> few lines without my thoughts drifting. I kept analyzing what we consider >>>> "rights" and "property". >>>> >>>> Americans have come to believe rights are given -- that government >>>> grants rights. Yet isn't that foolish? Of course I can say what's on my >>>> mind; stopping me from doing so is egregious. When rights are >>>> internalized, >>>> all this legalese on when they are applicable goes away. >>>> >>>> Consider also an actor or performer. In that case, they often do the >>>> reverse: permit their self to represent the non-self. If someone insulted >>>> Steven Colbert in the context of his fictional self, would that have the >>>> same impact as insulting Steven Colbert the real person? Should we really >>>> think Steven Colbert the character is the same thing as Steven Colbert the >>>> person? >>>> >>>> Then the whole talk about how virtual property is considered like real >>>> property. All my thoughts drifted to how "real property" is just virtual >>>> property unless you are in close physical proximity to it. Let's say you >>>> bought a piece of land and never set foot on it or even visited anyone near >>>> it. Then the courthouse burned down and all property records were lost. >>>> What did you really own? As an aside, if Second Life went out of business >>>> and shut off its servers, would people have the right to claim losses of >>>> virtual property? >>>> >>>> Speaking of virtual property, isn't it funny that I could lose $50,000 >>>> in a retirement account and that would be upsetting but perfectly >>>> acceptable, yet if my bank statement comes up $1 short I'll call them to >>>> complain? I'm heading down a path where I recognize property only as >>>> things >>>> I'm using right now. I consider an alternate world where things like the >>>> contents of my house are "things I left lying around the earth" so others >>>> are welcome to them. Alas, we expend an lot of psychological effort >>>> worrying about stuff we left lying around. >>>> >>>> ---Jason Olshefsky >>>> http://JayceLand.com/ <http://jayceland.com/> >>>> http://JayceLand.com/blog/ <http://jayceland.com/blog/> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "R-SPEC: The Rochester Speculative Literature Association" group. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>>> [email protected]<r-spec%[email protected]> >>>> . >>>> For more options, visit this group at >>>> http://groups.google.com/group/r-spec?hl=en. >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> -- >>> eric scoles | [email protected] >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "R-SPEC: The Rochester Speculative Literature Association" group. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> [email protected]<r-spec%[email protected]> >>> . >>> For more options, visit this group at >>> http://groups.google.com/group/r-spec?hl=en. >>> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "R-SPEC: The Rochester Speculative Literature Association" group. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> [email protected]<r-spec%[email protected]> >> . >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/r-spec?hl=en. >> > > > > -- > Janice > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "R-SPEC: The Rochester Speculative Literature Association" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]<r-spec%[email protected]> > . > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/r-spec?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "R-SPEC: The Rochester Speculative Literature Association" group. 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