http://thefutureofthings.com/column/1003/creativity-the-last-human-stronghold.html
On Mon, Oct 25, 2010 at 1:43 AM, Sal Armoniac <[email protected]> wrote: > You are talking about: > > 5) Persons must be capable of verbal communication. > 6) Persons are distinguishable from other entities by being conscious in > some special way: there is a way in which we are conscious in which no other > species is conscious. Sometimes this is identied as self-consciousness or > one sort or another. > > The term "verbal" threw a lot of my students. Verbal means "having to do > with the word." Vocal means "having to do with the voice. People who write > or who use sign language are still being "verbal" because words are signs, > and so are hand shapes. So the mute are not excluded, so long as they > understand and communicate with some kind of language. > > We assume that those in a coma did at one time have "consciousness" as we > define it; but the problem lies in our vocabulary, not the inner state of > the injured human being. Who knows what kind of mental experience they are > having in a coma that can't be detected? > > Dennett goes on to discuss these and many other issues about personhood, > which is an essay ultimately about machine intelligence. I've been having a > debate with a friend about Kurzweil's > "poetry turing test." What is the last bastion of human superiority to a > machine? Creativity, it seems. But even that is being challenged. So > this article was of interest to me for what it examined in terms of human > attitudes towards "persons" (which may or may not be human... Don't forget > we might want to consider dolphins or aliens from another planet as such... > so long as they meet the following requirements. That's why he left out the > human body. Person does not equal human in this computation. > > Human beings not considered full "persons" by society at large (judging by > the way the rights given them and the respect they are treated with): > infants and children, the retarded or mentally deficient, convicts-- denied > the right to vote, drive, have the freedom of movement, decision-making, > using money, make legal decisions, etc. > > Many who read the article think erroneously that it reflects his opinions. > He is making an index of what he sees society at large to consider proper > "personhood."-- It raises ethical questions such as: are we responsible for > our homeless? Can we just dismiss that tattered man sitting on the corner > there as below concern? Why was slavery even tolerated? What programs do > we support?. This question of avatarhood should be posed to him. I would be > curious to know his answer because at the moment, being an avatar doesn't > inspire the same kind of sympathy or prove to be a tragic handicap or social > injustice such that extenuating circumstances be given them.... except, > perhaps, for Piaget. > > Sarah > > > On Sun, Oct 24, 2010 at 4:05 PM, Janice Carello > <[email protected]>wrote: > >> Hmm.... I'm not sure why, exactly, but I'm having a real hard time with >> Dennet's list. According to Dennet: if one is mute, they are not a person; >> if one has autism, they are not a person; if one is in a coma, they are not >> a person; if one is developmentally disabled; they are not a person. >> However, if one is a psychopath, they are a person. ? >> >> Dennet focuses mostly on the cognitive aspects of being a person. I don't >> understand how having a body (or a virtual representation of oneself that >> can be seen and that appears as a body) could be left off of the list of >> what it means to be a person. I can see lots of reasons for imagining one >> does not have a body, or that one has more than one body--clearly many >> humans have a desire to "transcend" their body in some way for various >> reasons--but the fact remains that persons do have bodies. I also have a >> hard time believing that if avatars could not be seen--only appeared as >> sound or text--that we would be having this discussion. >> >> It seems to me that being a person involves several aspects: behavior, >> emotions, sensation, and cognition, at a minimum. One may have limited >> ability to fully express oneself in one or more (if not all) of these >> domains--or prefer to express oneself in one or more of these domains--but >> still be a person. Dennet's list suggests that not all humans should be >> considered persons. I think that is what is bugging me about his list. >> >> >> On Sun, Oct 24, 2010 at 2:10 PM, Sal Armoniac <[email protected]>wrote: >> >>> Of all of you, I've spent the most time in Second Life--as author and >>> artist (publishing poetry under the name of my avatar and making machinima >>> attributed to "Hypatia Pickens."). This matter has been of great interest >>> to artists, writers and builders in "Second Life" as has content theft >>> (tremendous rage is generated when someone uses a "copy bot" to reproduce >>> items--artwork, clever and well-crafted clothing, furniture, trinkets--that >>> are scripted as non-copyable. Some people make their incomes in Second Life >>> selling things, Where the medical article Alicia pointed us to becomes >>> interesting is the "personhood" of a number of disabled people I've become >>> friends with. Eric has hit the right button: an avatar is useless unless >>> it operates in a social context. No sane person would attribute rights to a >>> Second Life avatar that is never used, or which never shows up in the >>> virtual world because its owner or driver or inventor or user or puppeteer >>> has lost interest in it. If you make a drawing of an invented person, it is >>> just that. A drawing. It is not an avatar. If you put it in motion, if >>> you turn it into an animation, it is still not an avatar. Avatar means "the >>> incarnation of a deity." It assumes, at least in Sanskrit, that a real mind >>> governs it and walks among us. >>> >>> I've taught "Robots and Representation" several times now over the past >>> ten years (maybe twenty... some version of it ever since I wrote "Hollow >>> Pursuits.") One of my favorite essays is that by Daniel Dennett called >>> "Conditions of Personhood" but since I've been teaching my Avatar class, >>> I've been closely following Mark Stephen Meadows' _I, Avatar_ in which he >>> addresses this very topic and then some. He's very interested in the >>> ambiguous separation/fusion of the avatar and its driver. The question seems >>> to rest upon two terms that become vague in meaning when we separate them >>> from physical human beings. We do talk about "Animal Right," something >>> hotly debated. And corporations are treated legally as "persons." So what >>> do these mean? Can rights and personhood pertain to non-human entities? >>> But where does the avatar begin and the driver end? In what instances are >>> the rights of an avatar to be separated from the rights of the human >>> operator? I can think of one example-- in another article, a man who did >>> business in a virtual world wanted to do so using his avatar name and not >>> his real name. It became a legal issue. Where money was concerned, an >>> avatar was a non-entity. Compare this way of thinking with Dennett's: >>> >>> Dennett sets out six conditions for "personhood." I note that he does >>> not include the human body: >>> >>> 1) Persons are rational beings. >>> 2) Persons are beings to which states of consciousness are attributed, or >>> to which psychological or mental or intentional predicates are ascribed. >>> 3) Whether something counts as a person depends in some way on an >>> attitude taken toward it, a stance adopted with respect to it (this is >>> important) >>> 4) The object toward which this personal stance is taken must be capable >>> of reciprocating in some way. >>> 5) Persons must be capable of verbal communication. >>> 6) Persons are distinguishable from other entities by being conscious in >>> some special way: there is a way in which we are conscious in which no other >>> species is conscious. Sometimes this is identied as self-consciousness or >>> one sort or another. >>> >>> Take the case of my friend Piaget in Second Life. His human body is >>> severely disabled; he can't move and he directs his commands to Second Life >>> by means of "voice." He may well consider his avatar body to be more >>> significant to him, to be more HIM than his human body. Is Piaget, when I >>> interact with him, rational? Yes. Can I attribue a psychologica or mental >>> state to him? Yes. Do I treat him like a person even though I've never >>> seen his real body? Yes of course. Does he reciprocate? Indeed. He >>> communicates by type chat, and he is conscious. He prefers to be called >>> Piaget. Do I care what his real name is? No. His interaction with me in >>> the social world of Second Life is enough. The issue changes when he is >>> taken to the hospital. His real name, social security number, insurance, >>> credit cards, drivers license, and birth certificate certify him as a person >>> in the real world, but I can't be a part of that--only a listener if he >>> chooses to tell me, as he sometimes does. In a virtual world, we have >>> money, but it is not taxed, and it can't be used as currency when real world >>> business is involved. >>> >>> So a seventh condition of personhood that Dennett may need to add are all >>> the legal and financial interactions and documents that "certify" us as >>> persons in the world. Money talks. And we all know how it validates. >>> >>> If Piaget were to lose his Second Life account for some reason, or if >>> some griefer were to destroy it, would he have the right to press suit? >>> Would his personhood have been damaged? >>> >>> >>> Hypatia Pickens, sometimes known as "Sarah" ;) >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Fri, Oct 22, 2010 at 12:34 PM, Eric Scoles <[email protected]>wrote: >>> >>>> "Rights" is a very slippery concept. There's certainly a sense in which >>>> we all have the "right" to do anything we can. I used to joust regularly >>>> with a guy on Plastic.com who had as a signature "the only thing a free man >>>> can be forced to do is die." In his mind, you always had a "right" to do >>>> anything at all, as long as it didn't impinge on the right of another >>>> person >>>> to control their personal property (e.g., their body); anything you did >>>> that >>>> was within you sphere of "rights" was a matter of choice. (He was a >>>> libertarian, of course.) But that's a pretty expansive use of the term >>>> "rights". >>>> >>>> I don't think "rights" make sense outside of a social context -- we're >>>> social animals, after all, even the act of using language requires the >>>> conceptualization of an "other" to take in what we say, and even if that >>>> 'other' is ourself -- and if that's true, we have rights to the extent that >>>> we are "granted" them -- though what it means to be "granted" rights, and >>>> who/what has authority to grant them, is still an open question. If we live >>>> according to laws, I'd argue we accept the ability of a law-enforcing >>>> entity >>>> to "grant" at least some rights; others we may hold as being above the law, >>>> but that's only because we have a moral/ethical rationale for them, and >>>> where does that rationale come from? It doesn't come from me as an atomic, >>>> disconnected individual -- no human who's capable of talking and acting in >>>> the world really is such a thing, even though they might think they are. >>>> That said, as an individual (though not disconnected), we do make decisions >>>> about who or what we hold to have the authority to grant or enforce rights. >>>> >>>> The kind of discussion the paper's trying to provoke happens in the >>>> context of the pre-supposition that rights do come from somewhere outside >>>> of >>>> the pure individual decision that you have right x or y. The idea is to >>>> stake ideological territory. So even if it seems redundant or absurd, >>>> there's still merit in doing it (the very fact that some can see it as >>>> redundant and some can see it as absurd to my mind means it's a discussion >>>> we ought to have). >>>> >>>> As far as property rights go, those are all interesting questions, and >>>> the 'using right now' rubric is particularly interesting. Reminds me of the >>>> line from *The Sound and the Fury*: "As soon as he [Chief Ikemotubbe] >>>> conceived of the idea that the land could be sold, it ceased to be his." >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Fri, Oct 22, 2010 at 11:52 AM, Jason Olshefsky <google.jo@ >>>> jayceland.com> wrote: >>>> >>>>> On Oct 22, 2010, at 4:59 AM, Alicia Henn wrote: >>>>> > This is an interesting article on rights for avatars. It seems >>>>> reasonable and yet ludicrous at the same time. My officemate and I have >>>>> had >>>>> a great time expanding on it. - Alicia >>>>> >>>>> First, <sarcasm>kudos</sarcasm> for calling it "Get Your Paws off of My >>>>> Pixels: Personal Identity and Avatars as Self". >>>>> >>>>> My initial reaction is, "videoconferencing and message boards" The >>>>> end. In other words, if our virtual representation in a videoconferencing >>>>> setting or on a message board can be considered a representation of self >>>>> (that is, an insult or attack on our representation is considered similar >>>>> to >>>>> the same done to our individual self) then what difference is it if our >>>>> representation is an avatar in a virtual world? >>>>> >>>>> Upon reading further, I found it rather evocative: I could barely read >>>>> a few lines without my thoughts drifting. I kept analyzing what we >>>>> consider >>>>> "rights" and "property". >>>>> >>>>> Americans have come to believe rights are given -- that government >>>>> grants rights. Yet isn't that foolish? Of course I can say what's on my >>>>> mind; stopping me from doing so is egregious. When rights are >>>>> internalized, >>>>> all this legalese on when they are applicable goes away. >>>>> >>>>> Consider also an actor or performer. In that case, they often do the >>>>> reverse: permit their self to represent the non-self. If someone insulted >>>>> Steven Colbert in the context of his fictional self, would that have the >>>>> same impact as insulting Steven Colbert the real person? Should we really >>>>> think Steven Colbert the character is the same thing as Steven Colbert the >>>>> person? >>>>> >>>>> Then the whole talk about how virtual property is considered like real >>>>> property. All my thoughts drifted to how "real property" is just virtual >>>>> property unless you are in close physical proximity to it. Let's say you >>>>> bought a piece of land and never set foot on it or even visited anyone >>>>> near >>>>> it. Then the courthouse burned down and all property records were lost. >>>>> What did you really own? As an aside, if Second Life went out of >>>>> business >>>>> and shut off its servers, would people have the right to claim losses of >>>>> virtual property? >>>>> >>>>> Speaking of virtual property, isn't it funny that I could lose $50,000 >>>>> in a retirement account and that would be upsetting but perfectly >>>>> acceptable, yet if my bank statement comes up $1 short I'll call them to >>>>> complain? I'm heading down a path where I recognize property only as >>>>> things >>>>> I'm using right now. I consider an alternate world where things like the >>>>> contents of my house are "things I left lying around the earth" so others >>>>> are welcome to them. Alas, we expend an lot of psychological effort >>>>> worrying about stuff we left lying around. >>>>> >>>>> ---Jason Olshefsky >>>>> http://JayceLand.com/ <http://jayceland.com/> >>>>> http://JayceLand.com/blog/ <http://jayceland.com/blog/> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups "R-SPEC: The Rochester Speculative Literature Association" group. >>>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>>>> [email protected]<r-spec%[email protected]> >>>>> . >>>>> For more options, visit this group at >>>>> http://groups.google.com/group/r-spec?hl=en. >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> -- >>>> eric scoles | [email protected] >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "R-SPEC: The Rochester Speculative Literature Association" group. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>>> [email protected]<r-spec%[email protected]> >>>> . >>>> For more options, visit this group at >>>> http://groups.google.com/group/r-spec?hl=en. >>>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "R-SPEC: The Rochester Speculative Literature Association" group. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> [email protected]<r-spec%[email protected]> >>> . >>> For more options, visit this group at >>> http://groups.google.com/group/r-spec?hl=en. >>> >> >> >> >> -- >> Janice >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >> Groups "R-SPEC: The Rochester Speculative Literature Association" group. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> [email protected]<r-spec%[email protected]> >> . >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/r-spec?hl=en. >> > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "R-SPEC: The Rochester Speculative Literature Association" group. 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