Re: Multiple passports?
On Sun, Oct 30, 2005 at 03:05:25AM +, Justin wrote: > If I apply for a new one now, and then apply for a another one once the > gov starts RFID-enabling them, will the first one be invalidated? Or > can I have two passports, the one without RFID to use, and the one with > RFID to play with? Here in Germany the current ID (sans smartcard/rfid/biometics) will be valid until expiry date. -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE signature.asc Description: Digital signature
Re: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: [IP] more on U.S. passports to receive RFID implants start
On Sat, Oct 29, 2005 at 08:42:35PM -0400, Tyler Durden wrote: > One thing to think about with respect to the RFID passports... > > Um, uh...surely once in a while the RFID tag is going to get corrupted or > something...right? I'd bet it ends up happening all the time. In those > cases they probably have to fall back upon the traditional passport usage > and inspection. Actually, an RFID can be ridiculously reliable. It will also depend on how much harassment a traveler will be exposed to, when travelling. Being barred from entry will definitely prove sufficient deterrment. > The only question is, what could (believably) damage the RFID? Microwaving it will blow up the chip, and cause a scorched spot. Severing the antenna would be enough for the chip to become mute. Violetwanding or treating with a Tesla generator should destroy all electronics quite reliably -- you always have to check, of course. Also, the ID is quite expensive, and a frequent traveller will wind up with a considerable expense, and hassle. -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE signature.asc Description: Digital signature
Re: [PracticalSecurity] Anonymity - great technology but hardly used
On Thu, Oct 27, 2005 at 11:28:42PM -0400, R.A. Hettinga wrote: > The cypherpunks list is about anything we want it to be. At this stage in > the lifecycle (post-nuclear-armageddon-weeds-in-the-rubble), it's more > about the crazy bastards who are still here than it is about just about > anything else. While I don't exactly know why the list died, I suspect it was the fact that most list nodes offered a feed full of spam, dropped dead quite frequently, and also overusing that "needs killing" thing (okay, it was funny for a while). The list needs not to stay dead, with some finite effort on our part (all of us) we can well resurrect it. If there's a real content there's even no need from all those forwards, to just fake a heartbeat. -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE signature.asc Description: Digital signature
Re: [PracticalSecurity] Anonymity - great technology but hardly used
On Wed, Oct 26, 2005 at 08:41:48PM -0500, Shawn K. Quinn wrote: > 1) You have told your HR person what a bad idea it is to introduce a > dependency on a proprietary file format, right? Telling is useless. Are you in a sufficient position of power to make them stop using it? I doubt it, because that person will be backed both by your and her boss. Almost always. It's never about merit, and not even money, but about predeployed base and interoperability. In today's world, you minimize the surprise on the opposite party's end if you stick with Redmondware. (Businessfolk hate surprises, especially complicated, technical, boring surprises). > 2) OpenOffice can read Excel spreadsheets, and I would assume it can > save the changes back to them as well. OpenOffice & Co usually supports a subset of Word and Excel formats. If you want to randomly annoy your coworkers, use OpenOffice to process the documents in MS Office formats before passing them on, without telling what you're doing. Much hilarity will ensue. -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE signature.asc Description: Digital signature
[EMAIL PROTECTED]: Skype security evaluation]
- Forwarded message from "Steven M. Bellovin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> - From: "Steven M. Bellovin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Date: Sun, 23 Oct 2005 09:48:37 -0400 To: cryptography@metzdowd.com Subject: Skype security evaluation X-Mailer: exmh version 2.6.3 04/04/2003 with nmh-1.0.4 Skype has released an external security evaluation of its product; you can find it at http://www.skype.com/security/files/2005-031%20security%20evaluation.pdf (Skype was also clueful enough to publish the PGP signature of the report, an excellent touch -- see http://www.skype.com/security/files/2005-031%20security%20evaluation.pdf.sig) The author of the report, Tom Berson, has been in this business for many years; I have a great deal of respect for him. --Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED] ----- End forwarded message - -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE signature.asc Description: Digital signature
Re: cypherpunks@minder.net closing on 11/1
On Thu, Oct 13, 2005 at 04:49:00PM -0400, Brian Minder wrote: > The minder.net CDR node will be shutting down on November 1, 2005. This > includes the cypherpunks-moderated list. Please adjust your subscriptions > accordingly. Thanks Brian. I'm suggesting [EMAIL PROTECTED] as an alternative node to subscribe to. -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE signature.asc Description: Digital signature
[EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: Wikipedia & Tor]
- Forwarded message from Roger Dingledine <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> - From: Roger Dingledine <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Date: Tue, 27 Sep 2005 15:54:38 -0400 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Wikipedia & Tor User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.9i Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] On Tue, Sep 27, 2005 at 11:18:31AM -0400, Paul Syverson wrote: > On Tue, Sep 27, 2005 at 10:27:58AM -0400, Matt Thorne wrote: > > everyone is so worried about it, but has any one ever been successfully been > > able to use tor to effectively spam anyone? > > No. Cf. > http://tor.eff.org/faq-abuse.html#WhatAboutSpammers To be fair, this answer is yes. People have used Tor to deface Wikipedia pages, along with Slashdot pages, certain IRC networks, and so on. I think that counts as spam at least in a broad sense. > A potential for cooperation is the proposal below for authenticated > access to Wikipedia through Tor. I will not speak to any particular > design here, but if Wikipedia has a notion of clients trusted to post > to Wikipedia, it should be possible to work with them to have an > authentication server that controls access to Wikipedia through Tor. As I understand it, Jimmy is hoping that we will develop and maintain this notion. We would run both "halves" of the Tor network, and when they complain about a user, we would cut that user out of the authenticated side. Jimmy and I talked about Tor-and-Wikipedia many months ago, and the conclusion was that they (mediawiki) would be willing to try a variety of technological solutions to see if they work (i.e. cut down on vandalism and aren't too much of a burden to run). My favorite is to simply have certain address classes where the block expires after 15 minutes or so. Brandon Wiley proposed a similar idea but where the block timeout is exponentially longer for repeated abuse, so services that are frequently blocked will stay blocked longer. This is great. But somebody needs to actually code it. Wikipedia already needs this sort of thing because of AOL IPs -- they have similar characteristics to Tor, in that a single IP produces lots of behavior, some good some bad. The two differences as I understand them are that AOL will cancel user accounts if you complain loudly enough (but there's constant tension here because in plenty of cases AOL decides not to cancel the account, so Wikipedia has to deal some other way like temporarily blocking the IP), and that it's not clear enough to the Wikipedia operators that there *are* good Tor users. (One might argue that it's hard for Wikipedia to change their perception and learn about any good Tor uses, firstly because good users will blend in and nobody will notice, and secondly because they've prevented them all from editing so there are no data points either way.) So I've been content to wait and watch things progress. Perhaps we will find a volunteer who wants to help hack the mediawiki codebase to be more authentication-friendly (or have more powerful blocking config options). Perhaps we'll find a volunteer to help build the blind-signature pseudonymous authenticated identity management infrastructure that Nick refers to. Perhaps the Wikimedia operators will increasingly get a sense that Tor has something to offer besides vandalism. (I presume this thread re-surfaced because Tor users and operators are periodically telling Wikipedia that they don't like being blocked.) Maybe we will come to the point eventually that it makes sense to do something different than blocking the Tor IP addresses from editing Wikipedia. (Which, we should all remember compared the Gentoo forum situation, is a great step above blocking them from both reading and writing.) It could be that we never reach that point. Certain services on the Internet (like some IRC networks) that are really prone to abuse are probably doing the right thing by blocking all Tor users (and all AOL users, and all open proxies, and ...). And we want to keep Tor easy to block, or we're really going to start getting the other communities angry at us. In summary, I'm not too unhappy with the status quo for now. Tor needs way more basic development / usability work still. In the absence of actual volunteers-who-code on the side of Tor _or_ Wikipedia to resolve the problem, I'm going to focus on continuing to make Tor better, so down the road maybe we'll be able to see better answers. --Roger - End forwarded message - -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE signature.asc Description: Digital signature
/. [How Chinese Evade Government's Web Controls]
Link: http://slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=05/09/27/1235203 Posted by: CmdrTaco, on 2005-09-27 13:37:00 [1]Carl Bialik from the WSJ writes "China is moving to 'centralize all China-based Web news and opinion under a state regulator,' the Wall Street Journal reports, but determined citizens have found a way out of previous restrictions in what has become a cat-and-mouse game: '[2]Many Chinese Internet users, dismissing what they call government scare tactics, find ways around censorship. The government requires users of cybercafs to register with their state-issued ID cards on each visit, but some users avoid cybercaf registration by paying off owners. In response, the government has installed video cameras in some cafs and shut others. ... While certain words such as "democracy" are banned in online chat rooms, China's Web users sometimes transmit sensitive information as images, or simply speak in code, inserting special characters such as underscoring into typing.' Also noteworthy is that major portals seem to be cooperating with authorities' restrictions: 'Insiders who work for the big portal sites say they are already in regular contact with authorities about forbidden topics, such as the outlawed Falun Gong religious group, which their teams of Web editors pull off bulletin boards.'" References 1. mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] 2. http://online.wsj.com/public/article/0,,SB112777213097452525-zRQZ3S8IZkZDPMZNay0R6RUfXOw_20060926,00.html?mod=blogs - End forwarded message - -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE signature.asc Description: Digital signature
[EMAIL PROTECTED]: Wikipedia & Tor]
- Forwarded message from Arrakis Tor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> - From: Arrakis Tor <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Date: Tue, 27 Sep 2005 07:48:22 -0500 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Wikipedia & Tor Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] This is a conversation with Jimmy Wales regarding how we can get Wikipedia to let Tor get through. > Anyone with a port 80 can vandalize your website. Yes, but we notice that we can control a significant amount of vandalism by blocking ip numbers which have proven to be particularly problematic. TOR servers are among the absolute worst. And TOR operators don't seem to care. We go to the trouble > to block all the file sharing clients, and often abused ports and > protocols like IRC. Many of us typically block ports which do not have > any legitimate reason for being used. If all it take is a port 80 to > vandalize the wikipedia, of which port 80 is a public service, then > there is no point in discriminating against Tor users since every IP > is an equal opportunity offender. Equal *opportunity*, but we have very strong empirical evidence here. TOR ip numbers are the worst offenders that we have seen. People use TOR specifically to hide their identity, specifically to vandalize wikipedia. > You say that tor is quite irresponsibly managed. How would you propose > we manage tor servers differently? Ban users who vandalize wikipedia. That'd be a start. Rate limit edits at Wikipedia, that'd be good. Write an extension to your software which would help us to distinguish between "trusted" and "newbie" Tor clients. I completely fail to comprehend why Tor server operators consistently refuse to take responsibility for their crazed users. - End forwarded message - -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE signature.asc Description: Digital signature
Re: GPS Jammer Firm nearly ejected from Russian air show.
On Thu, Sep 22, 2005 at 04:50:07PM +0200, Nomen Nescio wrote: > GPS frequencies are fixed, so they can be interfered with. Only in Military receivers are somewhat hardened at least against terrestrial jamming. It would be probably impossible to be immune to strong airborne (balloons and drones) jammers. > these days of general technological incompetence, where intangible > scientific principles have reverted to their ancient status as mystic, > is the concept of RF interference newsworthy. -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE signature.asc Description: Digital signature
[EMAIL PROTECTED]: [IP] Request: Check your cell phone to see if it's always transmitting your location [priv]]
- Forwarded message from David Farber <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> - From: David Farber <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Date: Thu, 22 Sep 2005 08:57:50 -0400 To: Ip Ip Subject: [IP] Request: Check your cell phone to see if it's always transmitting your location [priv] X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.734) Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Begin forwarded message: From: Declan McCullagh Date: September 21, 2005 6:22:26 PM EDT To: politech@politechbot.com Subject: [Politech] Request: Check your cell phone to see if it's always transmitting your location [priv] Related Politech message: http://www.politechbot.com/p-05008.html And a column I wrote on this a while ago: http://news.com.com/2010-1071_3-5064829.html -Declan Original Message Subject: Always-on location tracking in cellphones Date: Wed, 21 Sep 2005 18:04:30 -0400 From: Richard M. Smith <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: 'Declan McCullagh' Hi Declan, We have talked before about the FCC mandate which is requiring all U.S. wireless carriers to provide location information to emergency operators accurate to about 150 feet on all 911 calls as part of the Enhanced 911 program (http://www.fcc.gov/911/enhanced/). To meet this FCC mandate, my Verizon Wireless Treo 650 cellphone includes some kind of GPS tracking technology. The Treo also has an option to select if location information is sent in to Verizon for all calls or only 911 calls. I was a bit surprised to learn that my Treo defaults to always sending location information. After a bit of initial confusion, I got confirmation from both Palm and Verizon Wireless that my observation about the default was correct. However, Verizon Wireless told me this is a mistake and going forward, they plan to change the default to "911 calls only". I'm curious now when other models of cellphones transmit location information to carriers. Can folks on Politech check their cellphones and phone manuals to see what kind of controls there are over location information and send me the results? I'll also need the make and model of the phone and the wireless carrier. For my Treo phone, I found the location option under "Phone Preferences" in the Options menu of the main phone screen. Thanks, Richard M. Smith http://www.ComputerBytesMan.com ___ Politech mailing list Archived at http://www.politechbot.com/ Moderated by Declan McCullagh (http://www.mccullagh.org/) - You are subscribed as [EMAIL PROTECTED] To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ - End forwarded message - -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE signature.asc Description: Digital signature
[EMAIL PROTECTED]: [IP] OT: Canada: Sweeping new surveillance bill to criminalize investigative journalism]
iminal defence investigations." Mr. Joynt said private detectives already steer clear of surveillance in residences and other private places. "What we would be concerned about is the definition of 'private activity,' " he stressed. "We are aware that there are certain things that are kind of sacrosanct and that we wouldn't videotape, such as people changing their clothes or going to the bathroom. But if it was a spousal domestic investigation, for example, and somebody was having sex in the front seat of a car, we would be videotaping it." Mr. Joynt also argued that parents should be entitled to install a hidden video camera in their kitchen, for example, if they are suspicious about how a child-care giver is interacting with their helpless infant. "If they become suspicious about the quality or the level of that care, they should be able to check it out and I don't think that employee's right to privacy supercedes the right of the child to a safe environment," Mr. Joynt said. - You are subscribed as [EMAIL PROTECTED] To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ - End forwarded message - -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE signature.asc Description: Digital signature
[EMAIL PROTECTED]: [IP] Radio jamming in New Orleans during rescue operations]
- Forwarded message from David Farber <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> - From: David Farber <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Date: Fri, 9 Sep 2005 08:25:43 -0400 To: Ip Ip Subject: [IP] Radio jamming in New Orleans during rescue operations X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.734) Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Begin forwarded message: From: "Glenn S. Tenney CISSP CISM" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Date: September 8, 2005 3:24:45 PM EDT To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Radio jamming in New Orleans during rescue operations I saw this... For IP if you like: http://www.waynemadsenreport.com/ September 2, 2005 -- Who is jamming communications in New Orleans? Ham radio operators are reporting that communications in and around New Orleans are being jammed. In addition, perplexed ham radio operators who were enlisted by the Federal government in 911 are not being used for hurricane Katrina Federal relief efforts. There is some misinformation circulating on the web that the jamming is the result of solar flares. Ham radio operators report that the flares are not the source of the communications jamming. If anyone at the National Security Agency is aware of the source of the jamming, from direction finding or satellite intelligence, please discretely contact me at [EMAIL PROTECTED] (from a private or temporary email account). In this case, the Bush administration cannot hide behind national security and it is the duty of every patriotic American to report such criminal activity to the press. Even though the information on the jamming may be considered classified -- it is in the public interest to disclose it. Also, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is reporting that no aircraft over New Orleans have been fired on over New Orleans or anywhere else in the area. Are the reports of shots being fired at aircraft an attempt by the Bush administration to purposely delay the arrival of relief to the city's homeless and dying poor? The neocons have turned New Orleans into Baghdad on the Mississipppi New Orleans: Who is jamming communications and why? UPDATE: We can now report that the jamming of New Orleans' communications is emanating from a pirate radio station in the Caribbean. The noise is continuous and it is jamming frequencies, including emergency high frequency (HF) radios, in the New Orleans area. The radio frequency jammers were heard last night, stopped for a while, and are active again today. The Pentagon must locate the positions of these transmitters and order the Air Force to bomb them immediately. However, we now have a new unconfirmed report that the culprit may be the Pentagon itself. The emitter is an IF (Intermediate Frequency) jammer that is operating south southwest of New Orleans on board a U.S. Navy ship, according to an anonymous source. The jamming is cross-spectrum and interfering with superheterodyne receiver components, including the emergency radios being used in New Orleans relief efforts. The jammed frequencies are: 72.0MHZ (high end of Channel 4 WWL TV New Orleans) 45.0MHZ(fixed mobile) 10.245MHZ (fixed mobile) 10.240 Mhz (fixed mobile) 11.340 Mhz (aeronautical mobile) 233 MHZ (fixed mobile) 455 IF (jammer) A former DoD source says the U.S. Army uses a portable jammer, known as WORLOCK, in Iraq and this jammer may be similar to the one that is jamming the emergency frequencies. UPDATE Sep. 3 -- A Vancouver, British Columbia Urban Search & Rescue Team deployed to New Orleans reported that their satellite phones were not working and they had to obtain other satellite phones to keep in touch with their headquarters and other emergency agencies in British Columbia. There is a report on a ham radio web site that jamming is adversely affecting the New Orleans emergency net on 14.265 Mhz. If a U.S. Navy ship is, in fact, jamming New Orleans communications, the crew must immediately shut down the jammer and take action against the Commanding Officer. *** We have just learned from a journalist in Mobile that yesterday, Sprint blocked all cell phone calls from the Gulf Coast region to points north and west. Calls were permitted between Alabama, Mississippi, and Florida but no calls could be made to Washington, New York, or Los Angeles September 5, 2005 ... Meanwhile, the communications jamming in the New Orleans area continues. It is now being reported by truck drivers on Interstate-10 as affecting the Citizens' Band (CB) frequencies. - You are subscribed as [EMAIL PROTECTED] To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message - -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE signature.asc Description: Digital signature
Re: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: [IP] Internet phone wiretapping ("Psst! The FBI is Having
On Fri, Sep 09, 2005 at 12:00:22AM -0700, James A. Donald wrote: > -- > From: Ulex Europae <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > Okay, I've been in a hole in the ground for a few > > years. What happened to Tim May? > > Gone very quiet. At the expiration party, he failed to > recommend gas chambers. Does anyone have a recent working email address? Does [EMAIL PROTECTED] still work? I don't have a usenet reader right now, and Google groups munges addresses. -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE signature.asc Description: Digital signature
Re: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: [IP] Internet phone wiretapping ("Psst! The FBI is Having
On Wed, Sep 07, 2005 at 10:16:31PM -0400, Ulex Europae wrote: > Okay, I've been in a hole in the ground for a few years. What happened > to Tim May? http://groups.google.com/groups?q=&start=0&scoring=d&enc_author=8NH-JhofCMh-TnQo0KXFjppET7C1dSi2gjvQCgNblIvwKtcqeQ&hl=en&; Nobody of importance, just an Usenet troll. -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE signature.asc Description: Digital signature
Re: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: [IP] Internet phone wiretapping ("Psst! The FBI is Having Trouble on the Line", Aug. 15)]
On Thu, Sep 08, 2005 at 05:31:32AM +0100, Dave Howe wrote: > Don't really need one. the Skype concept of "supernodes" - users that relay > conversations for other users - could be used just as simply, and is What hinders Mallory from running most of supernodes? > Starbucks-compatable. If the feds had to try and monitor traffic for every > VoIP > user that could potentially be used as a relay (*and* prove that any outbound > traffic from their target wasn't relayed traffic from another user) life would > get much harder for them much faster. > Plus of course some sort of assurance that skype's crypto isn't snakeoil :) It is snake oil until proven otherwise. -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE signature.asc Description: Digital signature
Re: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: Tor on USB]
On Thu, Sep 01, 2005 at 07:44:36PM -0400, Tyler Durden wrote: > In other words, if I go into a Starbucks with this thing, can my laptop or > whatever start acting like a temporary Tor node? I don't see why not, you'd be just middleman. If you want to wind up on this list http://serifos.eecs.harvard.edu:8000/cgi-bin/exit.pl you'll have to submit your stats, and it will take a day or two. > That's a very fascinating concept: A temporary, transient Tor network. Any > node on this network could cease to exist by the time someone tried to jam > large portions of it. Or at least, their attacks would have to be a hell of > a lot more flexible. An ephemeral P2P traffic remixing system with high node density in address space could bootstrap very quickly just from rendezvousing/scanning some random net blocks. -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE signature.asc Description: Digital signature
[EMAIL PROTECTED]: [Politech] Montana Supreme Court justice warns Orwell's 1984 has arrived [priv]]
- Forwarded message from Declan McCullagh <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> - From: Declan McCullagh <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Date: Fri, 05 Aug 2005 12:20:34 -0700 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: [Politech] Montana Supreme Court justice warns Orwell's 1984 has arrived [priv] User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird 1.0.2 (Macintosh/20050317) http://news.com.com/2061-10796_3-5820618.html Montana Supreme Court justice warns Orwell's 1984 has arrived August 5, 2005 12:13 PM PDT Believe it or not, it's perfectly legal for police to rummage through your garbage for incriminating stuff on you -- even if they don't have a warrant or court approval. The Supreme Court of Montana ruled last month that police could conduct a warrantless "trash dive" into the trash cans in the alley behind the home of a man named Darrell Pelvit. The cops discovered pseudoephedrine boxes -- a solvent with uses including the manufacture of methamphetamine -- and Pelvit eventually ended up in prison. Pelvit's attorney argued that his client had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his trash, but the court rejected the argument and said the trash was, well, meant to be thrown away. What's remarkable is the concurring opinion of Montana Supreme Court Justice James C. Nelson, who reluctantly went along with his colleagues but warned that George Orwell's 1984 had arrived. We reproduce his concurring opinion in full: -Declan -- Justice James C. Nelson concurs. I have signed our Opinion because we have correctly applied existing legal theory and constitutional jurisprudence to resolve this case on its facts. I feel the pain of conflict, however. I fear that, eventually, we are all going to become collateral damage in the war on drugs, or terrorism, or whatever war is in vogue at the moment. I retain an abiding concern that our Declaration of Rights not be killed by friendly fire. And, in this day and age, the courts are the last, if not only, bulwark to prevent that from happening. In truth, though, we area throw-away society. My garbage can contains the remains of what I eat and drink. It may contain discarded credit card receipts along with yesterday's newspaper and junk mail. It might hold some personal letters, bills, receipts, vouchers, medical records, photographs and stuff that is imprinted with the multitude of assigned numbers that allow me access to the global economy and vice versa. My garbage can contains my DNA. As our Opinion states, what we voluntarily throw away, what we discard--i.e., what we abandon--is fair game for roving animals, scavengers, busybodies, crooks and for those seeking evidence of criminal enterprise. Yet, as I expect with most people, when I take the day's trash (neatly packaged in opaque plastic bags) to the garbage can each night, I give little consideration to what I am throwing away and less thought, still, to what might become of my refuse. I don't necessarily envision that someone or something is going to paw through it looking for a morsel of food, a discarded treasure, a stealable part of my identity or a piece of evidence. But, I've seen that happen enough times to understand--though not graciously accept--that there is nothing sacred in whatever privacy interest I think I have retained in my trash once it leaves my control--the Fourth Amendment and Article II, Sections 10 and 11, notwithstanding. Like it or not, I live in a society that accepts virtual strip searches at airports; surveillance cameras; "discount" cards that record my buying habits; bar codes; "cookies" and spywear on my computer; on-line access to satellite technology that can image my back yard; and microchip radio frequency identification devices already implanted in the family dog and soon to be integrated into my groceries, my credit cards, my cash and my new underwear. I know that the notes from the visit to my doctor's office may be transcribed in some overseas country under an out-sourcing contract by a person who couldn't care less about my privacy. I know that there are all sorts of businesses that have records of what medications I take and why. I know that information taken from my blood sample may wind up in databases and be put to uses that the boilerplate on the sheaf of papers I sign to get medical treatment doesn't even begin to disclose. I know that my insurance companies and employer know more about me than does my mother. I know that many aspects of my life are available on the Internet. Even a black box in my car--or event data recorder as they are called--is ready and willing to spill the beans on my driving habits, if I have an event--and I really trusted that car, too. And, I also know that my most unwelcome and paternalistic relative, Uncle Sam, is with me from womb to tomb. Fueled by the paranoia of "ists" and "isms," Sam has the capability of spying on everything and everybody--and no doubt is. But, as Sam says: "It's for my own go
Prosecutors: CIA agents left trail
co. To avoid tracking, the agents would have had to use other systems not available to the general public, such as radios, Errico said. "As long as you use public communication systems, there is no way you can avoid being tracked," he said. Or, as Nativi put it: "When you go on this kind of operation, you need to turn off your damn phone." Yoram Schweitzer, a researcher for the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies in Tel Aviv, said he wasn't surprised the operatives stayed in five-star hotels, which provide excellent cover for those posing as businessmen or businesswomen. But analysts did question whether using of credit cards was advisable. Chris Aaron, a former editor of Jane's Intelligence Review magazine, said the team must have known that local cells phones put them at risk of being exposed. "A CIA team would have been aware of the Italian ability to log calls and track their location, so they clearly weren't worried about that," he said. The CIA in Washington has declined to comment on the case. Copyright 2005 The Associated Press. All rights reserved.This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed. -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE signature.asc Description: Digital signature
Re: [Clips] Finger points to British intelligence as al-Qaeda websites are wiped out
On Mon, Aug 01, 2005 at 01:51:57PM -0400, Tyler Durden wrote: > What?!! 300MB/s for a Tor node? OK, I'm a telecom guy and not a data guy > but that sounds suspiciously like someone loaded up an OC-3's worth of > traffic and then slammed your node. Ain't no hacker gonna do that. Any > indication the ostensible originating IP addresses are faked? No, it looked like a vanilla DDoS. According to the hoster, I've only seen a small piece of the log, which looked like this: 09:21:54.322650 IP 67.9.36.207 > 213.239.210.243: icmp 09:21:54.322776 IP 218.102.186.215 > 213.239.210.243: icmp 09:21:54.322895 IP 24.242.31.137 > 213.239.210.243: icmp 09:21:54.323017 IP 61.62.83.208 > 213.239.210.243: icmp 09:21:54.323140 IP 68.197.59.153 > 213.239.210.243: icmp 09:21:54.323263 IP 202.138.17.65 > 213.239.210.243: icmp 09:21:54.323375 IP 221.171.34.81 > 213.239.210.243: icmp 1376: echo request seq 23306 09:21:54.323500 IP 150.199.172.221 > 213.239.210.243: icmp 09:21:54.323623 IP 62.150.154.191 > 213.239.210.243: icmp 09:21:54.323741 IP 221.231.54.152 > 213.239.210.243: icmp 09:21:54.323863 IP 222.241.149.165 > 213.239.210.243: icmp 1456: echo request seq 24842 09:21:54.323984 IP 61.81.134.200 > 213.239.210.243: icmp 09:21:54.324105 IP 60.20.101.125 > 213.239.210.243: icmp 09:21:54.324227 IP 219.77.117.204 > 213.239.210.243: icmp 09:21:54.324229 IP 85.98.134.51 > 213.239.210.243: icmp 09:21:54.324355 IP 61.149.3.249 > 213.239.210.243: icmp 09:21:54.324475 IP 218.9.240.32 > 213.239.210.243: icmp 1456: echo request seq 29962 09:21:54.324598 IP 24.115.79.52 > 213.239.210.243: icmp 09:21:54.324720 IP 12.217.75.61 > 213.239.210.243: icmp 09:21:54.324844 IP 202.161.4.210 > 213.239.210.243: icmp 09:21:54.324847 IP 139.4.150.122.14238 > 213.239.209.107.80: R 2598318330:2598318330(0) win 0 09:21:54.324973 IP 211.203.38.29 > 213.239.210.243: icmp 09:21:54.325101 IP 68.74.58.171 > 213.239.210.243: icmp 09:21:54.325240 IP 211.214.159.102 > 213.239.210.243: icmp 09:21:54.325341 IP 221.231.53.52 > 213.239.210.243: icmp 09:21:54.325465 IP 24.20.194.42 > 213.239.210.243: icmp -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE signature.asc Description: Digital signature
Re: [Clips] Finger points to British intelligence as al-Qaeda websites are wiped out
On Mon, Aug 01, 2005 at 05:12:38PM -0400, Dan McDonald wrote: > I'm surprised that the target node has that much INBOUND bandwidth, quite > frankly. The node itself has only a Fast Ethernet port, but there's some 4 GBit available outside of the router. I'm genuinely glad the node has been taken offline as soon as the traffic started coming in in buckets, and I didn't have to foot the entire bill (the whole incident only cost me 20-30 GByte overall as far as I can tell). -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE signature.asc Description: Digital signature
Re: [Clips] Finger points to British intelligence as al-Qaeda websites are wiped out
On Mon, Aug 01, 2005 at 10:54:26AM -0400, Tyler Durden wrote: > Tor networks, anyone? Caveat when running Tor on a production machine, I got DDoS'd recently with some ~300 MBit/s. (Yes, my exit policy didn't contain IRC). -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE signature.asc Description: Digital signature
Department of Homeland Security Surveillance Truck
http://eyeball-series.org/dhs-truck.htm -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE signature.asc Description: Digital signature
[dave@farber.net: [IP] CIA agents tracked through sloppy cellphone use.]
- Forwarded message from David Farber <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> - From: David Farber <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Date: Fri, 24 Jun 2005 18:29:13 -0400 To: Ip ip Subject: [IP] CIA agents tracked through sloppy cellphone use. X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.730) Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Begin forwarded message: From: Francesco Callari <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Date: June 24, 2005 4:43:12 PM EDT To: Dave Farber <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Subject: [For IP, if you wish] CIA agents tracked through sloppy cellphone use. Dr. Farber, I thought the following may be of interest to IP readers. --- Today's US news sources show several reports on Italian prosecutors writing arrest warrants for 13 CIA agents in the kidnapping of a Muslim preacher in Milan in 2003. The Italian newspapers, however, provide some interesting technical details on the investigation, which hinged on tracking their cellphones. Excerpt translations follow. [Repubblica, 6/24/2005] Milan closes the inquiry - CIA, 12 agents face arrest. [...] "The CIA team bungled a lot, leaving clues everywhere. A group of cell phones is in Via Guerzoni [where the kidnapping occurred] around noon. The same cell phones moved toward Aviano Air Base shortly thereafter. Calls from those cell phone were made to the U.S. consulate and to numbers in Virginia. One of the same cell phones was located in Cairo the day after. From the cell phones [the investigators] tracked [...] the hotels in Milan where the team members stayed and the car rental agency where the van used in the operation was rented. [...] In those days of February 2003 the American team in Milan showed a surprising ignorance, or lack of care at least, in the use of their cellphones. Using the words of one of our sources, "they showed to know less than one of our homegrown thieves". Apparently they thought that replacing the phones' SIM cards was enough to prevent successful tracking. Not so, the Americans apparently ignored the unique hardware identifier of each GSM phone (the IMEI), which can be tracked regardless of the SIM card and the phone carrier. [Corriere della Sera, 6/24] Milan' prosecutors: jail the CIA agents. [Lots of details on the investigation results, including $120,000 of U.S. taxpayer's money spent by CIA team members to reside in 5 luxury hotels, plus a note about two couples of team members that took a vacation in "romantic hotels" in Valmalenco and along the Poet's Gulf after the kidnapping. The interesting bit involving cellphones is toward the end:] All the cellphones were irregular, since the registered owners were fake names, non-existing corporations and even innocent Milan women and a Rumenian bricklayer. However, the CIA operatives showed their own U.S. passports to register themselves in a total of 23 hotels and 4 rental car companies, and the phones could be placed in the same locations at the same times. The police tracked the photocopies of the passports, and determined that they were genuine documents, even though probably using showing cover names. - You are subscribed as [EMAIL PROTECTED] To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ - End forwarded message - -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE signature.asc Description: Digital signature
Re: [jrandom@i2p.net: [i2p] weekly status notes [jun 21]]
On Wed, Jun 22, 2005 at 12:00:47PM -0400, Tyler Durden wrote: > Any idea how much it would cost? How much time is involved? (My constraint > is the latter and not so much the former.) Debian setup is easiest, put deb http://mirror.noreply.org/pub/tor experimental-sarge main into your /etc/apt/sources.list and you can install tor via apt-get update and apt-get install tor You might want to touch /etc/tor/torrc to reflect your exit policies (my colo blocks port 6667), and bandwidth capping (I cap at 80 KB, which leaves me with some 10-15 GBytes traffic/day). ExitPolicy reject 0.0.0.0/8,reject 169.254.0.0/16,reject 127.0.0.0/8, reject 192.168.0.0/16,reject 10.0.0.0/8,reject 172.16.0.0/12 ExitPolicy accept *:20-22,accept *:53,accept *:79-81,accept *:110,accept *:143,accept *:389,accept *:443,accept *:636,accept *:706,accept *:873,accept *:993,accept *:995 ExitPolicy reject *:1214,reject *:4661-4666,reject *:6346-6347,reject *:6419,reject *:6667,reject *:6881-6889 ExitPolicy accept *:1024-65535,reject *:* BandwidthRate 80 KB -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE signature.asc Description: Digital signature
[perry@piermont.com: US DoJ wants ISPs to be forced to log their customers activities]
EU is pushing for the same; global "harmonization" of legisation, and of course then mutual peering of connection info (though it's a lot of data) is probably coming. - Forwarded message from "Perry E. Metzger" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> - From: "Perry E. Metzger" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Date: Fri, 17 Jun 2005 11:20:39 -0400 To: cryptography@metzdowd.com Subject: US DoJ wants ISPs to be forced to log their customers activities Quoting: The U.S. Department of Justice is quietly shopping around the explosive idea of requiring Internet service providers to retain records of their customers' online activities. http://news.com.com/Your+ISP+as+Net+watchdog/2100-1028_3-5748649.html -- Perry E. Metzger[EMAIL PROTECTED] - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED] - End forwarded message - -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE signature.asc Description: Digital signature
Re: /. [Intel Adds DRM to New Chips]
On Thu, Jun 02, 2005 at 11:05:30AM +0200, DiSToAGe wrote: > I have read infos that say that audio and video drivers will be in the > trusted chain. If your hardware system is used by an os (i.e. win) on > which you can't create drivers, and only industry signed drivers can be > used you can't bypass this by hacking drivers ... The code running in the trusted sandbox isn't magic, so if it's complex enough there will be vulnerabilities (not a problem in theory, but in practice). > My though is the hardware drm can be reverse engineered ? If you use My thought is, can cryptosystems be broken? Not by 31337 h4x0rs, obviously. > cert on your DRM you must put cert and private keys on your DRM chip ... Not you -- somebody else. Generated on board, probably, or generated externally, and loaded into the hardware. > So you have somewhere memory (rom or else) where you have this private So far, so good. > and cert datas. So with good tools you can read what are the bits in > this DRM. So you can make a "soft drm" that use all the instructions of If you mean by good tools 100 k$ worth of hardware (and a skilled operator) to read out the state of bits on die, after etching away the enclosing, you're correct. Why do you think a system designed to contain and keep a secret will contain a convenient backdoor? > the reverse engineered hard drm, you but the reverse engineered private > key, certs on your soft drm. All this goes on a "emulated" drm part on > your os emulator. So booting the os believe that it is hard, because all > instructions are the same, certs is the same, and private key can be > used by your soft drm to en/crypt drm files ...??? We see that with time > almost all can be reverse engineered, can it be the same with hard drm > systems ?? -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE signature.asc Description: Digital signature
Re: /. [Intel Adds DRM to New Chips]
On Thu, Jun 02, 2005 at 12:26:09PM +0200, DiSToAGe wrote: > yes, with "you" I meen "you being an hardware maker" Yes, the hardware maker hides the secret in a bit of tamperproof hardware you buy. That's the whole idea of digital restriction management -- taking away things you could do with the hardware and data you paid for. If it wasn't for the tremendous abuse potential that this functionality just begs for, DRM would be actually be a good solution for motivating customers to reimburse content creators, and ensure sustainability of the creative process. Would. In some alternative universe, somewhere. Where the cow leaped over the moon. Not in this universe. > > > Why do you think a system designed to contain and keep a secret will contain > > a convenient backdoor? > > > > not a backdoor, we forget to much that every system is only 1 and 0 > through electricity and physical circuits. If you can make them you can Every system is only made from some 100-odd different atoms. > watch them (with time and monney i agree). Perhaps thinking that datas The point of a tamper-proof storage for secrets is that it takes ridiculous amounts of work to break it open, and to extract the secret in one piece. And you'll only get that *one* secret. So much easier to exploit the analog hole (but watch out for watermarks). > (certs, instructions) can be "hidden" behind a physical thing is only a > dream ? I ask myself if not every cryptosystem where you must have The stone you stubbed your toe upon is also just a dream. Still hurts, doesn't it? > something "hidden" or "physically not accessible" in point of the > process is not sure ? All of cryptography is based on keeping secrets. The hiding secrets in tamperproof hardware angle is that everybody owns safes but not their contents. Sounds ridiculously difficult to sell, doesn't it? It helps if you lie about it, and paint the safes in gaudy colors, and make them useful for lots of other, pretty and shiny things. But the lying about it bit is crucial. -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE signature.asc Description: Digital signature
Re: /. [Intel Adds DRM to New Chips]
On Sat, May 28, 2005 at 11:26:28PM -0400, Tyler Durden wrote: > (Continued) > "Contrary to expectations, however, sales of the chip have been suprisingly > low, with zero interest shown by major PC manufacturers. One major PC > industry executive, who wished to remain anonymous sated: "There are 100s > of millions of people trading files every day throughout the globe. I'm > going to start using this chip and give up that market because...?" What actually seems to be happening is that chipset DRM is being deployed silently, though not on a wide scale yet, and but for game consoles in a facultative version. Of course, such dormant DRM can be activated with subsequent software upgrades (watch the sneaky software-DRM games Cupertino plays). The billion dollar question is: will users let themselves lock in into the DRM prison, just because of a dangling premium content carrot, and the "I gots your IP, my lawyers 0wnZ0r Ur 455" litigation stick? We're going to see soon, as HDTV on BluRay&Co is going to be that experiment. The next-generation signal lanes to display devices are encrypted, so there's only the analog hole left to the naive user. Online activation of software is already quite widespread, so it seems customers are willing to accept restriction to ownership and use. > OK, Gov officials will eventually start trying to introduce laws mandating > such technologies be used, but by then it's going to come down to a battle > of lobbies: The Entertainment industry vs Telecom+PCs++Software. Which can > pump dollars into Senatorial hands faster? The entertainment industry has an order of magnitude less funds, but seems to spend them far more efficiently. Also, the Far East market is increasingly supplying itself, so Hollywood has less and less angle there. Let US and EU get the crippleware, while the rest of the world gets swamped with plaintext pirated copies (a single break is enough). -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE signature.asc Description: Digital signature
/. [Dissidents Seeking Anonymous Web Solutions?]
Link: http://slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=05/05/13/0250226 Posted by: Cliff, on 2005-05-13 19:38:00 from the browsing-without-regard-for-politics dept. [1]DocMurphy asks: "I'm working with some dissidents who are looking for ways to use the Internet from within repressive regimes. Many have in-home Internet access, but think it too risky to participate in pro-freedom activities on home PCs. Internet cafés are also available, but although fairly anonymous, every machine may be infected with keystroke loggers that give governments access to and knowledge of 'banned' sites. Dissidents not only want to remain anonymous themselves, but also wish to not compromise the sites they access. Any suggestions for products/procedures/systems out there making anonymous access & publishing a reality under repressive regime run Internet access?" References 1. mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] - End forwarded message - signature.asc Description: Digital signature
Re: [Politech] Passport RFID tracking: a between-the-lines read [priv] (fwd from declan@well.com)
On Mon, May 09, 2005 at 12:13:18PM -0700, cypherpunk wrote: > And of course there is Eugen* Leitl, who mindlessly forwards far and > wide everything that enters his mailbox. I don't know whether we Consider me bitten by Choate. It's totally incurable. > should be annoyed or relieved that he fails to exercise the slightest > editorial effort by adding his own thoughts, if he has any, to the > material he passes around. I don't need the list. Goddamn heise has more cypherpunk content than the list. Tim May's tired trolls have more cypherpunk content than the list. I'm trying to keep it going by keeping a steady trickle of relevant info but I'm honestly wondering if it's worth the effort. If you think I'm going to add editing effort, thus cutting some 10 minutes out of my already busy day you're out of your fucking mind. If you want high quality content, post it yourself. -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net signature.asc Description: Digital signature
Re: [silk] Google Targeted ads - gmail (fwd from rishab@dxm.org)
On Fri, Apr 01, 2005 at 10:17:46AM -0800, Sarad AV wrote: > hi, > > Maybe it was just a bot parsing the contents of the > mail. Cannot say for sure. Reading every ones g-mail > doesn't appear to be practical. Did you miss the part where Google unofficially admitted storing queries for good? Given their attidude, and storage, they're storing *anything* they can. Everyone is using Google. Not just for searching; Orkut and Google local, News, AdWords, Gmail, what have you. You don't have to run it, you can just read over their shoulders to get a really detailed profile on any user. Or subpoena stuff on some selected users. Now here's your one stop shop for evil. A position for Google minister for propaganda is about to be posted, so I hear. -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgpTzz47mlvB8.pgp Description: PGP signature
What Will We Do With Innocent People's DNA?
Link: http://slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=05/03/21/1937206 Posted by: timothy, on 2005-03-21 23:11:00 from the if-you-have-nothing-to-hide dept. [1]NevDull writes "As creepy as it may be to deal with identity theft from corporate databases, [2]imagine being swabbed for DNA samples as a suspect in a crime, being vindicated by that sample, and never even being told why you were suspected. This article discusses a man, Roger Valadez, who's fighting both to have his DNA sample and its profile purged from government records, and to find out why he and his DNA were searched in the BTK case. DA Nola Foulston said, 'I think some people are overwrought about their concerns.' -- convenient as she wasn't the one probed without explanation. The article then mentions that 'In California, police will be able in 2008 to take DNA samples from anyone arrested for a felony, whether the person is convicted or not, under a law approved by voters in November.' What will be the disposition of the DNA of the innocent?" References 1. http://www.funkytests.com/ 2. http://wireservice.wired.com/wired/story.asp?section=Breaking&storyId=1007713&tw=wn_wire_story ----- End forwarded message - -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgpDnHtYmqlEg.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: [p2p-hackers] good-bye, Mnet, and good luck. I'm going commercial! plus my last design doc (fwd from zooko@zooko.com)
On Thu, Mar 10, 2005 at 10:48:12PM -0800, Steve Schear wrote: > >Why? BT is designed with zero privacy in mind. > > And this was a profound error, IMHO. One of the epiphanies from my work at It was a deliberate decision on Bram Cohen's part. BT is a very useful medium to deliver software updates, movies und most for what there are currently broadcast media for. If you want to be invisible to lawyers, you have to use something else. (Or at least run BT on a large zombie cloud, so you have plausible deniability). > MN was that a secrecy-oriented proxy network development and successful > deployment needed to precede P2P file sharing if such networks were to > survive determined technical and legal challenges. End users often care If a network has been declared illegal, and you're a part of that network, and somebody receives packets from you which are part of IP-protected binary blob, and your ISP rats on you, your ass is grass with the right kind of IP nazi legislation. Obvously, the only way to prevent that from happening is not be part of that network, not make your ISP rat on you -- or, much better, do not let that legislation happen at all. If it does happen, freedom becomes illegal. > little about what 'under the hood' of their P2P app only that they can get > the content conveniently and they are not subjected to annoyances like spy > or adware. > > >> exposure of the trackers was a prominent topic of MN planning discussions > >> and its odd that precautions, like distributing the tracker functions > >into > >> clients or hiding them inside a TOR-like proxy network weren't taken > > > >You can post BT links on a P2P network. > > But trackers must still be widely accessible by the general population of > BT users and can you offer the content or obtain it without likely > identification? Web pages have static addresses in DNS. Search on P2P in dynamic IP is much more ephemeral, and requires ISPs to keep track of (customer IPv4 time_period) tuples long enough so that their logs can be subpoenaed. -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgpiQZGVFVAjY.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: [p2p-hackers] good-bye, Mnet, and good luck. I'm going commercial! plus my last design doc (fwd from zooko@zooko.com)
On Wed, Mar 09, 2005 at 10:06:45PM -0800, Steve Schear wrote: > I worked with Bram and Zooko at Mojo Nation (where both BT and Mnet got > their respective genesis) and was frankly surprised when the MPAA was so > easily able to target and put out of commission BT's trackers. The Why? BT is designed with zero privacy in mind. > exposure of the trackers was a prominent topic of MN planning discussions > and its odd that precautions, like distributing the tracker functions into > clients or hiding them inside a TOR-like proxy network weren't taken You can post BT links on a P2P network. > earlier. -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgpYTRGso4T7m.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: Handheld Licence Plate Scanner/OCR/Lookup
On Fri, Mar 04, 2005 at 02:03:23PM -0800, Bill Stewart wrote: > Bootfinder, made by G2 Systems in Alexandria VA, > is a combination of a handheld digital camera, Germany has recently deployed a Toll Collect system which has license plate OCR mounted on many points (hundreds to thousands) over highways. It reads all license plates (missing out some 5% or so currently), supposedly discarding everything but the truck's. Currently. It is sufficient to create movement profiles of individual vehicles with a rather good resolution (but then, mobile phones are even more useful for that). -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgpbYlSA8jXIW.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: palm beach HIV
On Tue, Feb 22, 2005 at 12:25:23PM -0500, Tyler Durden wrote: > Sheeit...I'm starting to think May was no longer all that interested in the > Crypto stuff...seems he really just wanted to rant and terrify the > clueless... I don't know why he's into Usenet trolling these days. I suspect there's a lot of disgust of where things cypherpunkly now stand. Sense of betrayal, etc. Don't do we all, if we look into which a shithole the net has degenerated these days? Ever noticed that everybody interesting has left years ago? This is true for about every great list. -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgpbUAXnpa8Og.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: MIME stripping
This message is signed. On Mon, Feb 21, 2005 at 10:57:37PM +, Justin wrote: > On 2005-02-21T22:40:03+0100, Eugen Leitl wrote: > > Yes, complain to the Al-Q. node maintainer. The same code which strips my > > digital signatures also wrap the lines. > > Really? > > http://groups-beta.google.com/groups?q=&start=0&scoring=d&enc_author=8NH-JhofCMh-TnQo0KXFjppET7C1dSi2gjvQCgNblIvwKtcqeQ&; > > <http://groups-beta.google.com/groups?q=&start=0&scoring=d&enc_author=8NH-JhofCMh-TnQo0KXFjppET7C1dSi2gjvQCgNblIvwKtcqeQ&;> > > -- > Certainly there is no hunting like the hunting of man, and those who > have hunted armed men long enough and liked it, never really care for > anything else thereafter. --Hemingway, Esquire, April 1936 > > [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature] -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgpii0nVdcs7r.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: palm beach HIV
On Mon, Feb 21, 2005 at 05:40:13PM -0500, Damian Gerow wrote: > Thus spake Eugen Leitl ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) [21/02/05 16:57]: > : > For those who hate word wrap... > : > > : > > : > <http://groups-beta.google.com/groups?q=&start=0&scoring=d&enc_author=8NH-Jho > : fCMh-TnQo0KXFjppET7C1dSi2gjvQCgNblIvwKtcqeQ&> > : > : Funny, wrapped again! > > Not for me. Neither when I sent it nor when I received it. Your client, > perhaps? No, Mutt doesn't wrap earls. > : > > : > : Yes, complain to the Al-Q. node maintainer. The same code which strips my > : digital signatures also wrap the lines. > > Funny. Doesn't wrap mine. You don't sign. It used to be much worse, would completely reformat the messages. Wrapped earls I can live with. -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgpOmksHR9bcp.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: MIME stripping
Weird. I won't sign this message. On Mon, Feb 21, 2005 at 10:57:37PM +, Justin wrote: > On 2005-02-21T22:40:03+0100, Eugen Leitl wrote: > > Yes, complain to the Al-Q. node maintainer. The same code which strips my > > digital signatures also wrap the lines. > > Really? > > http://groups-beta.google.com/groups?q=&start=0&scoring=d&enc_author=8NH-JhofCMh-TnQo0KXFjppET7C1dSi2gjvQCgNblIvwKtcqeQ&; > > <http://groups-beta.google.com/groups?q=&start=0&scoring=d&enc_author=8NH-JhofCMh-TnQo0KXFjppET7C1dSi2gjvQCgNblIvwKtcqeQ&;> > > -- > Certainly there is no hunting like the hunting of man, and those who > have hunted armed men long enough and liked it, never really care for > anything else thereafter. --Hemingway, Esquire, April 1936 > > [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature] -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net
Re: SHA1 broken?
On Sat, Feb 19, 2005 at 03:53:53PM +, Dave Howe wrote: > I wasn't aware that FPGA technology had improved that much if any - feel > free to correct my misapprehension in that area though :) FPGAs are too slow (and too expensive), if you want lots of SHA-1 performance, use a crypto processor (or lots of forthcoming C5J mini-ITX boards), or an ASIC. Assuming, fast SHA-1 computation is the basis for the attack -- we do not know that. While looking, came across http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/02jul/slides/saag-1.pdf "We really DO NOT need SHA-256 for Message Authentication", mid-2002. -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgpiyYiZfRHUC.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: palm beach HIV
On Mon, Feb 21, 2005 at 08:25:47PM +, Justin wrote: > Calling Tim May! Calling Tim May! You rang? http://groups-beta.google.com/groups?q=&start=0&scoring=d&enc_author=8NH-JhofCMh-TnQo0KXFjppET7C1dSi2gjvQCgNblIvwKtcqeQ&; -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgpgd3MNBo7Cd.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: palm beach HIV
On Mon, Feb 21, 2005 at 04:17:43PM -0500, Damian Gerow wrote: > Thus spake Eugen Leitl ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) [21/02/05 16:07]: > : > Calling Tim May! Calling Tim May! > : > : You rang? > : > : > http://groups-beta.google.com/groups?q=&start=0&scoring=d&enc_author=8NH-JhoA > : AAAfCMh-TnQo0KXFjppET7C1dSi2gjvQCgNblIvwKtcqeQ& > > For those who hate word wrap... > > > <http://groups-beta.google.com/groups?q=&start=0&scoring=d&enc_author=8NH-JhofCMh-TnQo0KXFjppET7C1dSi2gjvQCgNblIvwKtcqeQ&;> Funny, wrapped again! > Yes, complain to the Al-Q. node maintainer. The same code which strips my digital signatures also wrap the lines. -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgpfkmSaLAPup.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: [FoRK] Google (fwd from rst@ai.mit.edu)
- Forwarded message from [EMAIL PROTECTED] - From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2005 12:42:21 -0500 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: fork@xent.com Subject: Re: [FoRK] Google X-Mailer: VM 7.08 under Emacs 21.3.1 Lucas Gonze writes: > > P.S. Maybe I just hate the Google hype, of which there is much. > > The creepy all-seeing eye is what gets me. They can surely use my > verification email for gmail to cross-ref me to google groups, my blog, > and eventually all the way back to my ftp traces from the 80s. It hurts > to think about. I never understood why the privace fuss over gmail centered on their target ads. Use of tracking cookies across multiple Google services is a lot more worrisome. Playing with gmail without getting tracked is tricky at best -- last I checked, it just didn't work unless you took a search-tracking cookie as well. You could try to deal with that by setting up a browser profile with its own cookie jar, and using it for gmail and nothing else. But I think you'd still need a securely pseudonymous throwaway email address to set up the gmail account. And the lack of searches on that cookie would let them know, at least, that they're dealing with a privacy freak. FWIW, I'm really not sure what level of paranoia to adopt wrt Google. "Don't be evil" is a nice slogan, though "evil" is to some extent in the eye of the beholder. They don't seem too upset to put a few more bricks in the Great Firewall of China, for instance: http://news.zdnet.co.uk/internet/security/0,39020375,39167942,00.htm But that makes them no different from a lot other American companies, like Yahoo and Cisco, which have also been happy to cooperate, in their own ways. It's hard to make a case for Google as being uniquely evil or dangerous based so far on public misdeeds. But here, for what it's worth, is the most paranoid case I can easily concot. Suppose you were genuinely, unabashedly evil. And suppose you wanted to accumulate as much information as you could. (If people give you the information for free, so much the better). And suppose you wanted to get a lot of very smart people to make it easy to search and access that information for your nefarious purposes. (They, of course, wouldn't need to know what they are ultimately working on). You'd want access to everything at Google. But you wouldn't necessarily want to be up front and center promoting it in public. Better by far to let some genuine idealists be the public face -- while your agents quietly hang out inside, subverting the place. rst ___ FoRK mailing list http://xent.com/mailman/listinfo/fork - End forwarded message - -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgprY2CT5MMqy.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: What is a cypherpunk?
On Wed, Feb 09, 2005 at 04:58:22PM -0800, James A. Donald wrote: > Corporate lawyers did not descend on Linux until there were Corporations never saw Linux coming. Now that FOSS is on the radar screen, you'll see lots of very obvious ramming through of IP protection in software. You haven't noticed the software patent charade happening in EU right now? It is not at all obvious who's going to win. > enough wealthy linux users to see them in court, and send in > their own high priced lawyers to give them the drubbing they > deserved. You're misinterpreting the events. Industry has so far been fighting with propagada only. Outside of FOSS IP wars are the rule. > > > If, however, you decline to pay taxes, men with guns will > > > attack you. > > > If you ignore a kkkorporate cease & desist, men with guns > > will get you, too. > > You live in a world of your own. > > In civil court, the guy with no assets has a huge advantage > over the guy with huge assets -because the guy with huge assets What a nice boolean universe you live in. Fact is that FOSS can be easily DoSed by lawyers of a party with deeper pockets (basically, any party with deeper pocket than a couple of bearded hackers). > *cannot* send men with guns to beat him up and put him in jail > - he can only seize the (nonexistent) assets of the guy with no > assets. So what we instead see is frivolous and fraudulent Excellent strawman. Where are you getting these? I need to order a couple. > lawsuits by people with no assets against big corporations, for > example the silicone scam. > > It is in criminal court where the guy with no assets goes > unjustly to jail, and that is the doing of the state, not the > corporation. Again, neither state nor the corporate has your wellbeing as optimization criterium. It does frequently happen that superpersonal organization units result in a better world than the alternatives. Then, quite often not. We need smarter agents. -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgp167h3664aO.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: What is a cypherpunk?
On Wed, Feb 09, 2005 at 09:09:56AM -0800, James A. Donald wrote: > There is nothing stopping you from writing your own operating > system, so Linus did. Yes. Corporate lawyers descending upon your ass, because you -- allegedly -- are in violation of some IP somewhere. See you in court. > If, however, you decline to pay taxes, men with guns will > attack you. If you ignore a kkkorporate cease & desist, men with guns will get you, too. Eventually. Corporations can play the system, whether they hire bandits, or use the legal system, or buy a politician to pass a law. > That is the difference between private power and government > power. There is no difference. Both are coercive. Some of the rules are good for you, some are good for the larger assembly of agents, some are broken on arrival. We need smarter agents. -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgpua4Q2lFRed.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: Dell to Add Security Chip to PCs
On Fri, Feb 04, 2005 at 08:21:47PM +, Justin wrote: > They managed with the HTDV broadcast flag mandate. If I film off a HDTV screen with a HDTV camera (or just do single-frame with a good professional camera) will the flag be preserved? Watermarks will, but that's the next mass genocide by IP nazis. -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgppAYQ2XiCC8.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: Dell to Add Security Chip to PCs
On Sat, Feb 05, 2005 at 01:19:46AM +, Justin wrote: > > If I film off a HDTV screen with a HDTV camera (or just do single-frame > > with a good professional camera) will the flag be preserved? > > I don't think so, I think the flag is in the bitstream and doesn't > affect visual output at all. You still run into significant quality I know; that was a rhetorical question. > loss trying to get around it that way. I doubt the quality loss would be perceivable. What you'll get will be persistent artifacts which would allow source fingerprinting via digital forensics. > The point is that HDTV is a popular consumer technology, and the MPAA > and TV networks alone managed to hijack it. I have yet to see a single HDTV movie/broadcast, and I understand most TV sets can't display anything beyond 800x600. DVD started with a copy protection, too. -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgp4aWbLkVGr5.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: [s-t] bright lights, big computers digest #1
[from somelist] > Subject: Re: [s-t] The return of Das Blinkenlight > Date: Mon, 31 Jan 2005 19:00:49 -0500 > > >In the early 90's I was a product manager for a (now-defunct) company > >that made LAN hubs-- this was when a 10Base-T port would cost you a couple > > > This reminded me of a story from a few years ago. > > Apparently a lot of modem manufacturers tied the activity light on > the modem directly to the circuit which modulated the sound. > > Then someone realized that with a telescope, and and optical > transister, one could read that datastream as if hooked to the modem > directly. > > And astonishing numbers of businesses had their modem pools facing > windows, because the blinkenlights looked impressive. <http://applied-math.org/optical_tempest.pdf> Not just modems. Some Cisco routers, even at megabit rates. 2002 publication, although the research was over the previous couple of years. And (for instance) the Paradyne Infolock 2811-11 DES encryptor, which has an LED on the plaintext data. How we laughed. The paper also covers using LEDs (such as keyboard LEDs) as covert data channels. And yes, it cites Cryptonomicon. I'm not sure whether this was more or less cool than Marcus Kuhn's work on reconstructing CRT displays from reflected light, by reverse convolution with the impulse-response curves of the various phosphors. Both papers are fantastic reads, very accessible, very stimulating. <http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~mgk25/ieee02-optical.pdf> Nick B - End forwarded message - -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgpFHmleewRBU.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: Dell to Add Security Chip to PCs
On Wed, Feb 02, 2005 at 05:30:33PM +0100, Erwann ABALEA wrote: > Please stop relaying FUD. You have full control over your PC, even if this Please stop relaying pro-DRM pabulum. The only reason for Nagscab is restricting the user's rights to his own files. Of course there are other reasons for having crypto compartments in your machine, but the reason Dell/IBM is rolling them out is not that. > one is equiped with a TCPA chip. See the TCPA chip as a hardware security > module integrated into your PC. An API exists to use it, and one if the > functions of this API is 'take ownership', which has the effect of > erasing it and regenerating new internal keys. Really? How interesting. Please tell us more. -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgpNWd5zynCg5.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: Dell to Add Security Chip to PCs
On Wed, Feb 02, 2005 at 12:45:58PM -0500, Steve Thompson wrote: > Well we all know that having complete control over one's own > computer is far too dangerous. Obviously, it would be best if > computers, operating systems, and application software had > proprietary back-doors that would enable the secret police to > arbitrarily monitor the all goes on in the suspicious and dark > recesses of memory and the CPU. If there's nasty Nagscab living on your motherboard, you might as well use it for something constructive: http://www.linuxjournal.com/article/6633 (Of course the stuff might contain undocumented "features", so only a fool would rely it to conform to specs, all the time). -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgpGWG1YRbs5v.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: Researchers Combat Terrorists by Rooting Out Hidden Messages
On Tue, Feb 01, 2005 at 11:21:31PM -0800, Steve Schear wrote: > At 02:07 PM 2/1/2005, Tyler Durden wrote: > > >Counter-stego detection. > > > >Seems to me a main tool will be a 2-D Fourier analysis...Stego will > >certainly have a certain "thumbprint", depending on the algorithm. Are Stego doesn't need to have a detectable (as telling apart from noise) signature. If you show me how you test for stego I can show you a way to package content that will pass that test. The problem space is similiar to build good digital watermarks. The difficulty is constructing a realistic-looking noise for a given set of digital sources. Given that the tests take crunch, this will be limited to forensics. (And one would wonder why the turdorrists smart enough to use steganography wouldn't use really good cryptographic file systems). And any idiot knows successful terrorists don't use crypto. > >there certain images that can hide stego more effectively? IN other words, > >these images should have a lot of spectral energy in the same frequency > >bands where Stego would normally show. > > Images that ideal for hiding secret messages using stego are those that by > default contain stego with no particular hidden content. A sort of Crowds > approach to stego. If you have noise in the signal, can you substitute that noise with your payload easily, or is it better to use synthetic low-noise signals, and add your suitably encoded payload to it? -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgpGwDIdZ6SpC.pgp Description: PGP signature
Safeway Club Card Leads to Bogus Arson Arrest
Link: http://slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=05/01/29/030223 Posted by: michael, on 2005-01-29 11:03:00 from the if-you're-innocent-you-have-nothing-to-fear dept. [1]Richard M. Smith writes "Tukwila, Washington firefighter, Philip Scott Lyons found out the hard way that supermarket loyalty cards come with a huge price. Lyons was arrested last August and charged with attempted arson. Police alleged at the time that Lyons tried to set fire to his own house while his wife and children were inside. According to [2]KOMO-TV and the Seattle Times, a major piece of evidence used against Lyons in his arrest [3]was the record of his supermarket purchases that he made with his Safeway Club Card. Police investigators had discovered that his Club Card was used to buy fire starters of the same type used in the arson attempt. For Lyons, the story did have a [4]happy ending. All charges were dropped against him in January 2005 because another person stepped forward saying he or she set the fire and not Lyons." References 1. http://www.ComputerBytesMan.com/ 2. http://www.komotv.com/stories/32785.htm 3. http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2002055245_arson06m.html 4. http://heraldnet.com/stories/05/01/28/100loc_arson001.cfm - End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgps4QEw1Famx.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: MPAA files new film-swapping suits
On Fri, Jan 28, 2005 at 10:16:44AM -0500, Tyler Durden wrote: > That's an interesting point. They seem to be "attacking" at precisely the > correct rate to forcibly evolve P2P systems to be completely invulnerable > to such efforts. Not really. The P2P assm^H^H^H^H architects are reissuing new systems with holes patched reactively. There's no reason for a P2P system designed in 1996 to be water-tight to any threat model of 2010. (Strangely enough, they had IP nazis and lawyers back then, too). > Hum. Perhaps Tim May works for MPAA? Nah... he wasn't THAT bright, was he? I think he was primarily one thing: frustrated. It's hard to see the idiots win, year after year. -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgptka0VZTih7.pgp Description: PGP signature
Terrorists don't let terrorists use Skype
From: Adam Shostack <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Date: Tue, 11 Jan 2005 10:48:12 -0500 To: David Wagner <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Cc: cryptography@metzdowd.com Subject: Re: Simson Garfinkel analyses Skype - Open Society Institute From [EMAIL PROTECTED] Thu Jan 27 01:04:39 2005 User-Agent: Mutt/1.4.2i On Mon, Jan 10, 2005 at 08:33:41PM -0800, David Wagner wrote: | In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> you write: | >Voice Over Internet Protocol and Skype Security | >Simson L. Garfinkel | >http://www.soros.org/initiatives/information/articles_publications/articles/security_20050107/OSI_Skype5.pdf | | >Is Skype secure? | | The answer appears to be, "no one knows". The report accurately reports | that because the security mechanisms in Skype are secret, it is impossible | to analyze meaningfully its security. Most of the discussion of the | potential risks and questions seems quite good to me. | | But in one or two places the report says things like "A conversation on | Skype is vastly more private than a traditional analog or ISDN telephone" | and "Skype is more secure than today's VoIP systems". I don't see any | basis for statements like this. Unfortunately, I guess these sorts of | statements have to be viewed as blind guesswork. Those claims probably | should have been omitted from the report, in my opinion -- there is | really no evidence either way. Fortunately, these statements are the | exception and only appear in one or two places in the report. The basis for these statements is what the other systems don't do. My Vonage VOIP phone has exactly zero security. It uses the SIP-TLS port, without encryption. It doesn't encrypt anything. So, its easy to be more secure than that. So, while it may be bad cryptography, it is still better than the alternatives. Unfortunately. Adam - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED] - Forwarded message from Peter Gutmann <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> - From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Peter Gutmann) Date: Wed, 12 Jan 2005 05:00:29 +1300 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: cryptography@metzdowd.com Subject: Re: Simson Garfinkel analyses Skype - Open Society Institute David Wagner <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: >>Is Skype secure? > >The answer appears to be, "no one knows". There have been other posts about this in the past, even though they use known algorithms the way they use them is completely homebrew and horribly insecure: Raw, unpadded RSA, no message authentication, no key verification, no replay protection, etc etc etc. It's pretty much a textbook example of the problems covered in the writeup I did on security issues in homebrew VPNs last year. (Having said that, the P2P portion of Skype is quite nice, it's just the security area that's lacking. Since the developers are P2P people, that's somewhat understandable). Peter. ----- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED] - End forwarded message - -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgpNicinrrcp8.pgp Description: PGP signature
Ronald McDonald's SS
nd their "routine support." Advisers said Rumsfeld, after requesting a fresh legal review by the Pentagon's general counsel, interprets "traditional" and "routine" more expansively than his predecessors. "Operations the CIA runs have one set of restrictions and oversight, and the military has another," said a Republican member of Congress with a substantial role in national security oversight, declining to speak publicly against political allies. "It sounds like there's an angle here of, 'Let's get around having any oversight by having the military do something that normally the [CIA] does, and not tell anybody.' That immediately raises all kinds of red flags for me. Why aren't they telling us?" The enumeration by Myers of "emerging target countries" for clandestine intelligence work illustrates the breadth of the Pentagon's new concept. All those named, save Somalia, have allied themselves with the United States -- if unevenly -- against al Qaeda and its jihadist allies. A high-ranking official with direct responsibility for the initiative, declining to speak on the record about espionage in friendly nations, said the Defense Department sometimes has to work undetected inside "a country that we're not at war with, if you will, a country that maybe has ungoverned spaces, or a country that is tacitly allowing some kind of threatening activity to go on." Assistant Secretary of Defense Thomas O'Connell, who oversees special operations policy, said Rumsfeld has discarded the "hide-bound way of thinking" and "risk-averse mentalities" of previous Pentagon officials under every president since Gerald R. Ford. "Many of the restrictions imposed on the Defense Department were imposed by tradition, by legislation, and by interpretations of various leaders and legal advisors," O'Connell said in a written reply to follow-up questions. "The interpretations take on the force of law and may preclude activities that are legal. In my view, many of the authorities inherent to [the Defense Department] . . . were winnowed away over the years." After reversing the restrictions, Boykin said, Rumsfeld's next question "was, 'Okay, do I have the capability?' And the answer was, 'No you don't have the capability. . . . And then it became a matter of, 'I want to build a capability to be able to do this.' " Known by several names since its inception as Project Icon on April 25, 2002, the Strategic Support Branch is an arm of the DIA's nine-year-old Defense Human Intelligence Service, which until now has concentrated on managing military attachés assigned openly to U.S. embassies around the world. Rumsfeld's initiatives are not connected to previously reported negotiations between the Defense Department and the CIA over control of paramilitary operations, such as the capture of individuals or the destruction of facilities. According to written guidelines made available to The Post, the Defense Department has decided that it will coordinate its human intelligence missions with the CIA but will not, as in the past, await consent. It also reserves the right to bypass the agency's Langley headquarters, consulting CIA officers in the field instead. The Pentagon will deem a mission "coordinated" after giving 72 hours' notice to the CIA. Four people with firsthand knowledge said defense personnel have already begun operating under "non-official cover" overseas, using false names and nationalities. Those missions, and others contemplated in the Pentagon, skirt the line between clandestine and covert operations. Under U.S. law, "clandestine" refers to actions that are meant to be undetected, and "covert" refers to those for which the U.S. government denies its responsibility. Covert action is subject to stricter legal requirements, including a written "finding" of necessity by the president and prompt notification of senior leaders of both parties in the House and Senate. O'Connell, asked whether the Pentagon foresees greater involvement in covert action, said "that remains to be determined." He added: "A better answer yet might be, depends upon the situation. But no one I know of is raising their hand and saying at DOD, 'We want control of covert operations.' " One scenario in which Pentagon operatives might play a role, O'Connell said, is this: "A hostile country close to our borders suddenly changes leadership. . . . We would want to make sure the successor is not hostile." Researcher Rob Thomason contributed to this report. -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgpQiTRRgv8jT.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: Scientific American on Quantum Encryption
On Thu, Jan 20, 2005 at 10:47:38AM -0500, Trei, Peter wrote: > I've actually seen these devices in operation. The thing > that impressed me most was that the path need not be a > single fiber from end to end - you can maintain quantum > state across a switchable fiber junction. This means Very impressive. If they manage to keep the entanglement all the way up to LEO by line of sight it would be even more impressive (anyone thinks this can be done at all?) > you are no longer limited to a single pair of boxes talking to > each other. What makes it very important is early beginnings of practical quantum computing. Will photonics and spintronics in solid state at RT play well with each other? Will error correction scale to large qubit register sizes? Will the algorithm space be large and rich enough to be practical? All very interesting questions Scientific American fails to raise. > True, the SciAm article doesn't address a lot of issues, > but the fact remains that this technology is interesting > and important. I agree that this technology is interesting and important, but not for what it claims to be used for. Quantum encryption right now is a tool to milk the gullible, and hence very much crypto snake oil. For these distances one-time pads by trusted couriers would seem so much more practical and so much cheaper. -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgpIzevOdZDJw.pgp Description: PGP signature
OpenVPN
If you haven't checked it out yet, you should. Really easy to set up (two Windows XP machines through a NAT on DSL, ping ~50 ms, preshared key, single port open; right now). Looking forward to see how C3-accelerated AES (OpenSSL next stable will support it out of the box) will do, across multiple platforms. Le IPsec c'est mort, vive le OpenVPN. -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgpj4YzslDNi2.pgp Description: PGP signature
Carnivore No More
Link: http://slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=05/01/15/1424207 Posted by: CowboyNeal, on 2005-01-15 15:03:00 from the calling-it-quits dept. [1]wikinerd writes "FBI has [2]retired the controversial Carnivore software, strongly criticized by privacy advocates for its email capturing abilities. However, it is believed that unspecified commercial surveillance tools are employed now. What does that mean for Internet users' privacy?" [3]Click Here References 1. http://portal.wikinerds.org/ 2. http://www.securityfocus.com/news/10307 3. http://ads.osdn.com/?ad_id=5671&alloc_id=12342&site_id=1&request_id=5016758&op=click&page=%2farticle%2epl ----- End forwarded message - -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgpAYW0DN2lDH.pgp Description: PGP signature
Google Exposes Web Surveillance Cams
Link: http://slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=05/01/09/1411242 Posted by: CmdrTaco, on 2005-01-09 15:00:00 from the pick-a-password-people dept. An anonymous reader writes "Blogs and message forums buzzed this week with the discovery that a pair of simple Google searches permits [1]access to well over 1,000 unprotected surveillance cameras around the world - apparently without their owners' knowledge." Apparently many of the cams are even aimable. Oops! [2]Click Here References 1. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/01/08/web_surveillance_cams_open_to_all/ 2. http://ads.osdn.com/?ad_id=5717&alloc_id=12468&site_id=1&request_id=231150&op=click&page=%2farticle%2epl ----- End forwarded message - -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgprzkB9noxTs.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: Tasers for Cops Not You
On Sat, Jan 08, 2005 at 03:55:33PM -0600, Shawn K. Quinn wrote: > On Sat, 2005-01-08 at 13:20 -0800, John Young wrote: > > Here are photos of the Taser in manufacture, sale, training, > > promo, and accidental misfire: > > > > > > http://cryptome.org/taser-eyeball.htm > > This came up 404 as of a few minutes ago. The correct URL is http://cryptome.org/taser/taser-eyeball.htm > > -- > Shawn K. Quinn <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgpASVOW0y4Cb.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: Banks Test ID Device for Online Security
On Wed, Jan 05, 2005 at 02:43:00PM -0300, Mads Rasmussen wrote: > Here in Brazil it's common to ask for a new pin for every transaction Ditto in Germany, when PIN/TAN method is used. There's also HBCI-based banking, which either uses keys living in filesystems, or smartcards -- this one doesn't need TANs. Gnucash and aqmoney/aqmoney2 can do HBCI, even with some smartcards. -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgpJ1kjse2XhX.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: An interesting thread...Hacking Bluetooth
On Wed, Dec 22, 2004 at 02:13:52PM -0500, Tyler Durden wrote: > "Here4s another myth: you cannot hack bluetooth from a distance of more > than 40 metres. Not true. My technical partner Felix can crack it at over > half a kilometre. Which is why he enjoys driving around so much in areas The official record right now is 1.74 km: http://www.heise.de/newsticker/meldung/49907 http://trifinite.org/trifinite_stuff_bluebug.html#news No doubt you can do much better with a large dish, and good alignment, as well as a clear line of sight. > where we know British, American, Israeli or Russian ops are living or > working. The great thing about many German cities is that most affordable > residences are within metres of the street anyway." > > Any comments? Bluetooth attacks aren't exactly new. No idea what else that tinfoil-hatted person is spouting. -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgp08WpW435PH.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: Coffee, Tea, or Should We Feel Your Pregnant Wife's Breasts Before Throwing You in a Cell at the Airport and Then Lying About Why We Put You There?
On Tue, Dec 21, 2004 at 11:57:08AM -0600, Shawn K. Quinn wrote: > If you *need* to get to Hawaii, Puerto Rico, etc., driving, riding > Greyhound, or riding Amtrak are NOT OPTIONS. Emigration is always an option, though. Quite a few have done that already. -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgpoiBVBIQ9G9.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: Gait advances in emerging biometrics
On Thu, Dec 16, 2004 at 06:46:51PM -0800, Major Variola (ret) wrote: > Very nice quote. > > Can I get an insurance policy on you, with me as beneficiary? Heh. Your tinfoil hat factor is way higher than mine. (Also, politics isn't about people on the Net. It's about people marching in the streets). -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgpcMwitXycxD.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: Gait advances in emerging biometrics
On Wed, Dec 15, 2004 at 07:58:27PM -0800, Major Variola (ret) wrote: > Look up Johansson, et al. Point light displays. Yes you can tell > sex, age, etc., from the ratios of rotational axes, etc, but a stone > in the shoe is a bitch. Isolated biometrics are nigh to useless. But integrated, they become increasingly more and more difficult to fool. Some of it is cheap, too. There are phase-evaluating 2d integrated sensors which have a depth of up to 7 m, which are very cheap in principle. Mounted in a gate, this will give you face/ear/head geometry. Calculating a fingerprint from a topology map is something any embedded can do. With IR/NIR you'll get a skin pigmentation map. Teraherz will give you body geometry. Olfactorics will give you volatile MHC fragments, and thus a hash of your immune diversity (and your current perfume). Add gait recognition, and you've got a real rich telebiometrics signature. Anyone who owns that infrastructure is even more dangerous than who 0wns the voting machines. The perfect enabler to establish a totalitarian control system. > All faith is in drivers' licenses, a total joke, I got gummies on your > 'prints, all your time-derivatives are mine. > > But grant$ are good, and flavor$ of DARPA be bitchin. Absolutely. It's like owning a mint for grant money. -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgpS2DE63LApa.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: Mixmaster is dead, long live wardriving
On Sat, Dec 11, 2004 at 08:17:32AM -0600, Riad S. Wahby wrote: > This seems like a peculiarity of your location. Here in Austin almost > all of downtown is covered by free wireless. I wonder how much of it is deliberate. I run my AP open for any passerby, and expect similiar in return when I pass through their area. Speaking of wireless, I'm very impressed with LinkSys WRT54GS alternative firmware advances. It's only a question of time before robust ad hoc meshes are available by simply reflashing your AP with alternative firmware. -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgpupIzHVBEmo.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: punkly current events
On Sat, Dec 11, 2004 at 06:39:13AM -0800, Major Variola (ret) wrote: > I agree, with the additional constraint that mix functionality piggyback > with a more popular feature. Most folks won't install even the most > benign, easy to use mixer; but include a mix server in a jazzy > IM or next-gen napster program, and you get deployed. The major advantage of massive rollout is speedy traffic remixing on the local loop, which requires a high occupation density in address space. The advantages are ~realtime, reliable traffic remixing. Can you use UDP broadcast on cable or xDSL? -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgpnCct154nke.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: punkly current events
On Fri, Dec 10, 2004 at 06:01:25AM -0500, Gabriel Rocha wrote: > The latter statement my well be true, I don't use the network, nor know > the ratios of good/bad traffic. But I am very curious to find out what I don't have data either. I'm guessing the "bad" traffic part is 95-98%. (I'm extrapolating from absence, as the only responses to the abuse address were people harassed by idiots). > would be considered geographically "safe" jurisdictions in this sense. > Not just today, but given the general trend, where would you see such a > jurisdition being found in a year or five or ten? While there is a distinct trend in NA, EU and elsewhere to try to snoop, and to control, it's not obvious the development is permanent, and irreversible. P2P traffic in general is increasing, and trivial remixing and encryption is becoming more and more widespread (arrr!). Spam and malware traffic also increases the noise level. You could claim your machine was infected with mixmaster malware, or something. -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgpi8stvkmwpi.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: punkly current events
On Thu, Dec 09, 2004 at 06:33:09PM -0800, Major Variola (ret) wrote: > Someone should have commented here, so I will, that some judges (earning > hanging) basically said that anonymity is not a right. This > in the context of mask-wearing in public. If the Klan doesn't have > a right to wear pillowcases what makes you think mixmaster will > survive? Because nodes are not geographically constrained to US jurisdiction? If mixter won't survive, it's due to spammers, and malware spreaders. -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgpyFCnk2cDda.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: punkly current events
On Fri, Dec 10, 2004 at 06:53:26AM -0800, Major Variola (ret) wrote: > > Name a place which is not subject to US juridiction? Ok, Iran, N Kr, Most places outside US which are not banana republics. I'm living in one. > until > we pull a regime change (tm) on them. Yeah, they have a lot of 'net > bandwidth, right. > > And if extradition isn't happening fast enough, we'll send a DEA > agent or snatch-und-grab specops to kidnap them. What, all this to shut down a remop? Could as well reprogram one of these aging ICBMs... > Hegemony isn't just for breakfast anymore. If you think you're not > under Bush's boot, you just haven't pissed him off enough, yet. Which threat model? Individual remop, a country, a bloc? Last time I looked US deficit was well on the way to turn thalers into Soviet-era paper. It is somewhat hard to posture as a world hegemon if everybody knows you're only operating because every significant investor is propping you up, since running danger of losing their entire investment (in for a penny...). If it's going to give, it's going to be a landslide. Of course, then the entire house of cards is going to crash down, which would suck. It could even bring down the tigers/dragons, though they probably have enough own momentum by now. -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgpu8T86VQjty.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: cog sci as a tool of the beast?
On Tue, Dec 07, 2004 at 08:15:22PM -0800, Major Variola (ret) wrote: > The viewscreens of the future will simply monitor the blood flow > to various areas of the cortex to see if we are lying when we > express our minute of hate, or love for the rulers. RT is so > passe. Not enough resolution. You might do with a skullcap, but even that is doubtful. -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgpMB1wjxuucI.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: "Word" Of the Subgenius...
On Wed, Dec 08, 2004 at 09:17:30AM -0500, John Kelsey wrote: > Maybe, maybe not. The thing I always find interesting and annoying about Tim > May's posts is that he's sometimes making really clearly thought out, > intelligent points, and other times spewing out nonsense so crazy you can't > believe it's coming from the same person. It's also clear he's often yanking > peoples' chains, often by saying the most offensive thing he can think of. > But once in awhile, even amidst the crazy rantings about useless eaters and > ovens, he'll toss out something that shows some deep, coherent thought about > some issue in a new and fascinating direction. There was no doubt he was trolling. I never figured out the precise reason, though. Attempted suicide by cop? Free speech illustration? You tell me. Neither is sufficient interesting. -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgpCFRdiVkcdX.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: Patriot Insurance
Can we please get out of the regional fixation? The cypherpunks list isn't about the US, US pissant wars, and similiar boring backwater shit. It's too bad this list is dying a death of a thousand paper cuts inflicted by moronic posts, as so many others had. I haven't used a .procmailrc in a couple years, perhaps we can postpone this with a little collective effort. On Thu, Nov 25, 2004 at 01:38:58PM +, Will Morton wrote: >"US Patriot Financial (USPF) exists to help Americans, who risk > their lives making this world a better place, obtain life insurance. > This includes resident aliens. >Whether you are a soldier deploying overseas, a DOD contractor > helping to rebuild war torn countries, a missionary volunteering to > help the most needy, or a business man or woman traveling the globe to > support our economy we can help. >Using our extensive network of life insurance carriers, we are able > to provide protection to those whose service leads them into some of the > world's most dangerous places. This includes US citizens living abroad." > >http://www.uspfinancial.com/ > >How long have soldiers deployed in war-zones been able to get life > insurance? Would love to see their actuarial process... > >W -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgpz7Ad4UpKbq.pgp Description: PGP signature
Tin Foil Passports?
Link: http://slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=04/11/27/0026222 Posted by: michael, on 2004-11-27 05:05:00 from the joke's-on-you dept. Daedala writes "The debate over [1]contactless chips with biometric information in passports continues. Vendors have been chosen for testing in the [2]U.S. and [3]Australia. [4]Privacy advocates are still arguing about the measure, as are [5]security reporters and [6]bloggers. The [7]specs themselves are interesting, to say the least. The EETimes says that [8]in interoperability tests, the potential chips could be read from 30 feet away. However, both they and the New York Times have published [9]articles reporting vendors' low-cost solution: '[I]incorporate a layer of metal foil into the cover of the passport so it could be read only when opened.' Don't they know that the whole tinfoil hat thing is supposed to be a joke?" IFRAME: [10]pos6 References 1. http://yro.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=04/08/22/0040202&tid=158 2. http://www.eetimes.com/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=52200157 3. http://www.eetimes.com/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=51200486 4. http://www.privacyinternational.org/article.shtml?cmd%5B347%5D=x-347-60594 5. http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/nov2004/nf2004115_1663_db016.htm 6. http://hasbrouck.org/blog/archives/000434.html 7. http://www.icao.int/mrtd/download/technical.cfm 8. http://www.eetimes.com/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=45400010 9. http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/26/politics/26passport.html?hp&ex=1101531600&en=6e6254bd574cba42&ei=5094&partner=homepage 10. http://ads.osdn.com/?ad_id=5819&alloc_id=12652&site_id=1&request_id=4960775 - End forwarded message - -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgpmcfNmzJsOG.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: Fallujah: Marine Eye-Witness Report
On Wed, Nov 24, 2004 at 12:08:37PM -0500, Tyler Durden wrote: > Oh wait, I guess I have to explain that. After the Soviets were pushed out > of Afghanistan the place became a veritable breeding ground for all sorts > of virulent strains of Islam, warlords, and so on. Iraq would likely > denigrate into the same, eventually launching similarly nice little > activities. What do you think the Iraq shenanigan has done to US's prestige? Nevermind terrorists, we're talking hard cold cash here. -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgp9xb386pmiQ.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: Fallujah: Marine Eye-Witness Report
On Tue, Nov 23, 2004 at 10:02:56PM -0800, James A. Donald wrote: > And the problem with a civil war in Iraq is? Because not only you're an evil fuck, but you're letting the others know you're an evil fuck. Now that is stupid. Look into historic records... -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgpWDJaMUDO8S.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: The Values-Vote Myth
On Sat, Nov 06, 2004 at 06:25:19PM +, Justin wrote: > Not true. > > http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/11/03/voter.turnout.ap/ > > "[Curtis] Gans puts the total turnout at nearly 120 million people. > That represents just under 60% of eligible voters..." You didn't vote against a candidate, you tacitly accept whatever other voters decide. For you. There isn't "none of the above" option, unfortunately. > 120m * 100%/60% = 200 million eligible voters (The U.S. population > according to census.gov was 290,809,777 as of 2003-07-01 > > http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/ > "Bush Vote: 59,459,765" > Let's generously round that up to 65 million. > > 65m/200m = 32.5% of eligible voters voted for Bush > 65m/290.8m = 22.4% of the U.S. population voted for Bush > > I can't find an accurate number of registered voters, but one article > suggests 15% of registered voters don't vote. That means there are > probably around 141m registered voters. Bush didn't even win majority > support from /those/. > > 65m/141m = 46% of registered voters voted for Bush Don't mince numbers. About half of those who could and could be bothered to vote voted for more of the same. At least that's how the rest of the world is going to see it. -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgpssFR0nkjou.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: Why Americans Hate Democrats-A Dialogue
On Sat, Nov 06, 2004 at 09:31:24AM -0800, James Donald wrote: > I routinely call people like you nazi-commies. How novel and interesting. Cut the rhetoric, get on with the program. Cypherpunks write code. -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgpRySwSekh7f.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: The Values-Vote Myth
On Sat, Nov 06, 2004 at 08:46:17AM -0500, Tyler Durden wrote: > So: A 'moral values' question for Cypherpunks. Does this election indict > the American people as being complicit in the crime known as "Operation Of course. What kind of question is that? Regardless of voting fraud, about half of US has voted for four more years of the same. Guilty. > Freedom"? (I notice everyone forgot about that name.) Huh? What was the question, again? -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgplDt75HxeY3.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: Finding Galt's Gulch (fwd)
On Thu, Nov 04, 2004 at 08:05:34PM -0600, J.A. Terranson wrote: > Where does one go today, if they are unwilling to participate in the > Failed Experiment? (BTW: No, Lichtenstein does not accept immigrants, and > yes, I have reverified this recently). Go East. Fortunes are made there. -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgp4gTtKuy0Hg.pgp Description: PGP signature
Diebold
So, we know Diebold commited vote fraud. Irregularities, my ass. Why did Kerry just roll over? The second time, after Gore? This just doesn't make sense. There's been over a year to prepare. Or is the entire process just a charade? -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgpL7b1jxJfWi.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: This Memorable Day
On Tue, Nov 02, 2004 at 08:16:41AM -0500, R. A. Hettinga wrote: > <http://online.wsj.com/article_print/0,,SB109936293065461940,00.html> No cypherpunks content. Just local politics. -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgpkbAEtb245e.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: bin Laden gets a Promotion
On Sat, Oct 30, 2004 at 02:42:25PM -0400, Sunder wrote: > As usual, South Park is a great source of wisdom. So, are you voting for > the Giant Douche or the Turd Sandwich? My candidate is Mr Hanky, Poo party. -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgpSoQcbyxMnZ.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: Geodesic neoconservative empire
On Fri, Oct 29, 2004 at 09:24:20PM -0500, J.A. Terranson wrote: > Agreed. Our interest in not in Afghanistan/Iraq per se. Our interest is > in ruling the *planet*, rather than any individual pissant player. Empires never last, and if there's going to be a new one, it's going to be Chinese. (Of course it won't last, either). It sucks to be old-growth in a large new-growth market. -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgp9MyKcAfxHN.pgp Description: PGP signature
[FoRK] Google buys Keyhole (fwd from andrew@ceruleansystems.com)
- Forwarded message from "J. Andrew Rogers" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> - From: "J. Andrew Rogers" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Date: Wed, 27 Oct 2004 10:36:38 -0700 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: [FoRK] Google buys Keyhole X-Mailer: WebMail 1.25 Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Finally. I've been sitting on this story for weeks, and I was looking forward to this morning because there is a lot about this deal that is worth talking about, particularly with regard to how this fits into Google's portfolio. Even though I knew about the deal, I have no clue as to the reasoning why Google bought them. All the talk about them being a "map provider" is a bit of nonsense, since Keyhole is a hell of a lot more than a map provider. If they wanted maps they could have gone to the source, since it isn't like Keyhole creates their own map data -- Keyhole is more of a data integrator. Salient points: - Keyhole is fussy Windows-only client software (something that won't change soon), which appears to be a departure from Google's normally web-centric applications. - Keyhole can consume some serious bandwidth, and isn't really something that will scale to average home use (in many different ways) without wholesale re-architecting of the system. - Keyhole has terabytes of very interesting databases, many of which are not public. For example, the US DoD has become fond of using Keyhole to process all sorts of reconnaissance, intelligence, and battle planning data. And more Federal agencies and foreign governments are moving to do the same. I've maintained for some time that Google is very aggressively trying to position themselves as a very deep data-mining operation, and are facilitating that by arranging that as much data as possible flow through their systems. I've stated in the past that they have the potential to be super-evil, if only because of the access they are being granted to vast ranges of data, which many people seem more than happy to grant. From that perspective, I find the above points worrisome. It will be very interesting to see what they do with this. cheers, j. andrew rogers ___ FoRK mailing list http://xent.com/mailman/listinfo/fork - End forwarded message - -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgph5GrGRzlFR.pgp Description: PGP signature
the simian unelected is blocking the world
Access to http://www.georgewbush.com/ is blocked but from US IP address space. Access Denied You don't have permission to access "http://www.georgewbush.com/"; on this server. http://www.anonymization.net/http://www.georgewbush.com works with no problems, though. Ha Ha Curious George. -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgpMCFIqAfTTo.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: the simian unelected is blocking the world
On Wed, Oct 27, 2004 at 09:02:48AM -0500, J.A. Terranson wrote: > > On Wed, 27 Oct 2004, Eugen Leitl wrote: > > > Access to http://www.georgewbush.com/ is blocked but from US IP address > > space. > > Works from 204.238.179.0/24. Of course it works. For you. It's US according to ip2location.com 204.238.179.1 US UNITED STATES MISSOURICLAYTON MISSOURI FREENET > Where are your coming in from? Germany, and I'm still blocked. -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgpYkBAgx3Z21.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: Donald's Job Description
On Mon, Oct 25, 2004 at 03:20:28PM -0400, R. A. Hettinga wrote: > *Nobody* was a counterbalance to Tim, me or anyone else. Simple fact, no > matter how much he pissed on my shoes, or anyone else's. What's he up to these days? It seems he got tired of of USENET, too http://groups.google.com/groups?q=tcmay%40got.net&hl=en&lr=&c2coff=1&safe=off&sa=G&scoring=d Too bad. -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgprLvkBjwgDx.pgp Description: PGP signature
[FoRK] "Your papers, citizen" (fwd from deafbox@hotmail.com)
- Forwarded message from Russell Turpin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> - From: "Russell Turpin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Date: Mon, 25 Oct 2004 15:31:39 + To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: [FoRK] "Your papers, citizen" This was on Slashdot's political feed. Here's the jaw-dropper: McCain envisions erecting physical checkpoints, dubbed "screening points," near subways, airports, bus stations, train stations, federal buildings, telephone companies, Internet hubs and any other "critical infrastructure" facility deemed vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Secretary Tom Ridge would appear to be authorized to issue new federal IDs--with biometric identifiers--that Americans could be required to show at checkpoints. Here's the article: http://news.zdnet.com/2100-1009_22-5415111.html _ FREE pop-up blocking with the new MSN Toolbar ? get it now! http://toolbar.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200415ave/direct/01/ ___ FoRK mailing list http://xent.com/mailman/listinfo/fork - End forwarded message - -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgpMjPztq4TqO.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: Airport insanity
Can you guys please take it outside? The majority of us just isn't interested. On Sun, Oct 24, 2004 at 12:49:52PM -0700, James A. Donald wrote: > Nail your colors to the mast. Pick one of the above and defend > it. -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgpt1nBwKP7hO.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: Airport insanity
On Sat, Oct 23, 2004 at 11:37:02PM -0400, Adam wrote: > None-the-less, this has been one of the more inteteresting (and > infuriating) threads in recent memory of Cypherpunks. I'm glad we're > going through it with such vigor. That thread bores me to tears. I miss technical content. Or, at least, a few pointers of where the action is. I'm tinkering with Nehemiah's RNG (/dev/hw_random is next to useless without a patch), and about to start using PadLock patches, once C5P hardware arrives. I'm also going to look into OpenBSD, once 3.6 is up on mirrors. What is happening in TCP/IP level traffic remixing? P2P apps? Can someone in the know provide a boilerplate, or at least a list of raw URLs? -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgpRVFkhn5Xcv.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: Airport insanity
On Thu, Oct 21, 2004 at 09:43:16AM -0700, James A. Donald wrote: > When people are under attack, you cannot tell them to suck it > up, which is what you are doing. If we had no government, we I'm not under attack. Are you? The Ghengis Khan thing's been a while back. > might well be doing pogroms against american muslims - and a > good thing to. This ways lies much rotting severed heads on stakes, and screaming. We've been there before. No need for a repetition. > War causes governments, and causes governments to gain power, > but the US government was not the aggressor in this war. US Your reality model is rather unique. Given that what your alleged representatives are doing results in massive loss of prestige, you don't want to associate with defectors. That stink's going to cling for a while. > government meddling in the middle east was unwise and > unnecessary, but it did not provoke, nor does it justify, this > war. > > The intent of a large minority of muslims was to start a holy > war between the west and Islam, and the majority of muslims The only war there is was started by ShrubCo, and was tacitly approved by about half of your countrymen. This isn't Nuremberg, but I color your guilty. > lack the will or courage to stop them, or even criticize them. > That was not the intent of Americans, or the American > government. They started it, they meant to start it. Americans Ha ha. > tried to avoid it, some of them are still trying to avoid it. > All Americans are still trying to conduct the war on the > smallest possible scale, against the smallest possible subset > of Islam, disagreeing only on how small that subset can be. Your reality distortion field manages to make bearded fanatics look good. Quite an accomplishment. Herr Reichspropagandaminister would have been proud. -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgp6EplBncDIz.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: Foreign Travelers Face Fingerprints and Jet Lag
On Fri, Oct 01, 2004 at 09:43:04PM -0400, R. A. Hettinga wrote: > "It was more easy to visit before," she said. "But I will still come back." Well, no, I won't. (And quite a number of others). No biometrics ID for me either. -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgp5sdpQgjYHg.pgp Description: PGP signature
[IP] Carry Umbrella in DC (fwd from dave@farber.net)
- Forwarded message from David Farber <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> - From: David Farber <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Date: Wed, 29 Sep 2004 19:18:53 -0400 To: Ip <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Subject: [IP] Carry Umbrella in DC X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.619) Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Begin forwarded message: From: "James P. Howard, II" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Date: September 29, 2004 6:53:37 PM EDT To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Carry Umbrella in DC I work in downtown DC (a few blocks from the White House) and this morning saw a plain white blimp over Farragut Park. This thing has no insignia, no numbers, no markings at all and it spent all day circling the city. CNN, and numerous other sources explain this is an Army survellience blimp. Aside from posse comitatus, this is simply immoral. I for one welcome our new art deco overlords. Here's the CNN story: http://edition.cnn.com/2004/US/09/29/security.blimp.ap/ Security blimp tested in Washington skies WASHINGTON (AP) -- Here's a head-turner for a security-nervous city: A large white object was spotted in the skies above the nation's capital in the pre-dawn hours Wednesday. Pentagon police said the Defense Department is testing a security blimp -- fully equipped with surveillance cameras. The white blimp was spotted early Wednesday morning hovering at various times over the Pentagon and the U.S. Capitol. The 178-foot-long device, which is expected to remain in the skies until Thursday, is conducting a mission for the Defense Department. Authorities say the airship is equipped with infrared cameras designed to provide real-time images to military commanders on the ground. The equipment on the blimp already is being used to protect troops in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Army says the device will make at least one 24-hour flight in the District of Columbia area. It has been in the region since last week, and is also being used for test runs over the U.S. Marine Corps Base in nearby Quantico, Virginia, and the Chesapeake Bay. -- James P. Howard, II -- [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.jameshoward.us/ -- 202-390-4933 - You are subscribed as [EMAIL PROTECTED] To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ - End forwarded message - -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgp6OwY3KcNfa.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: How to fuck with airports - a 1 step guide for (Redmond) terrorists.
On Tue, Sep 28, 2004 at 03:06:54PM -0700, Bill Stewart wrote: > Either way, if they knew the system was going to crash every 49.7 days, > and they had a process to have a technician reboot it every 30 days, If I knew somebody delivered me a mission critical system like that, I'd sue. The system required a human in the loop to periodically do action XY, or it would reliably fail? And the system before didn't? And it wasn't there as a fallback? The mind boggles. Even more interesting: how many heads have rolled due to this? -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgp561xlCCort.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: Geopolitical Darwin Awards
On Mon, Sep 20, 2004 at 08:19:30PM -0700, Major Variola (ret) wrote: > fission rate, ie fewer spare neutrons to spoil the fun. Even pure > Pu-239, > the result of short irradiation, has a problem with premature > ejaculation. So use a tritium-boosted fission nuke. Not as hard to do a true fusion device. -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgpCtMplPGiQk.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: "Forest Fire" responsible for a 2.5mi *mushroom cloud*?
On Sun, Sep 12, 2004 at 07:50:35AM +0200, Thomas Shaddack wrote: > On Sun, 12 Sep 2004, J.A. Terranson wrote: > > > "No big deal"? Who are they kidding? > > A 2-mile wide cloud is WAY too big to be caused by a single explosion, > unless REALLY big. The forest fire claim sounds more plausible in this To make a crater visible from LEO it better had to be big. Does Oppau ring a bell? http://www.muenster.org/uiw/fach/chemie/material/gif/oppau.jpg > regard. An existing cloud could be used for masking, though. -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgpSzmUZNxB6n.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: "Forest Fire" responsible for a 2.5mi *mushroom cloud*?
On Sun, Sep 12, 2004 at 05:07:55PM -0500, J.A. Terranson wrote: > On Sun, 12 Sep 2004, Eugen Leitl wrote: > > > http://www.muenster.org/uiw/fach/chemie/material/gif/oppau.jpg > > Wow! I had no idea ammonium nitrate (ANFO for all intents and purposes, > yes?) could produce that kind of result! How much was there? About 4.5 kT of 50:50 ammonium nitrate/ammonium sulfate mix. One of the largest, if not *the* largest nonnuclear explosions ever. -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgpYj9UwO0FvC.pgp Description: PGP signature
[FoRK] Veeery Intewesting... (fwd from beberg@mithral.com)
- Forwarded message from Adam L Beberg <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> - From: Adam L Beberg <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Date: Thu, 02 Sep 2004 22:39:09 -0500 To: FoRK <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Subject: [FoRK] Veeery Intewesting... User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird 0.7.3 (Windows/20040803) http://www.sianews.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=1062 There over 800 prison camps in the United States, all fully operational and ready to receive prisoners. They are all staffed and even surrounded by full-time guards, but they are all empty. These camps are to be operated by FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) should Martial Law need to be implemented in the United States and all it would take is a presidential signature on a proclamation and the attorney general's signature on a warrant to which a list of names is attached. Ask yourself if you really want to be on Ashcroft's list. ... -- Adam L. Beberg - [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.mithral.com/~beberg/ ___ FoRK mailing list http://xent.com/mailman/listinfo/fork ----- End forwarded message - -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgpo9Fuy8U3YG.pgp Description: PGP signature
