Bill,
Gulp..who was the Yank who said ... it was I ??? Johnny Appleseed
or something?
Well, it my turn to fess up. I'm pretty certain that it was my slip of the
keyboard who started it all. Sorry.
:)
My only excuse is that in my area of domain knowledge King Hubbard
is very famous. H
Eliezer S. Yudkowsky wrote:
But if this isn't immediately obvious to you, it doesn't seem like a top
priority to try and discuss it...
Argh. That came out really, really wrong and I apologize for how it
sounded. I'm not very good at agreeing to disagree.
Must... sleep...
--
Eliezer S. Yudk
Ben Goertzel wrote:
>
> I'll read the rest of your message tomorrow...
>
>> But we aren't *talking* about whether AIXI-tl has a mindlike
>> operating program. We're talking about whether the physically
>> realizable challenge, which definitely breaks the formalism, also
>> breaks AIXI-tl in practi
Hmmm My friend, I think you've pretty much convinced me with this last
batch of arguments. Or, actually, I'm not sure if it was your excellently
clear arguments or the fact that I finally got a quiet 15 minutes to really
think about it (the three kids, who have all been out sick from school
I'll read the rest of your message tomorrow...
> But we aren't *talking* about whether AIXI-tl has a mindlike operating
> program. We're talking about whether the physically realizable
> challenge,
> which definitely breaks the formalism, also breaks AIXI-tl in practice.
> That's what I origina
Ben Goertzel wrote:
>
>> AIXI-tl *cannot* figure this out because its control process is not
>> capable of recognizing tl-computable transforms of its own policies
>> and strategic abilities, *only* tl-computable transforms of its own
>> direct actions. Yes, it simulates entities who know this; it
Hi,
> You appear to be thinking of AIXI-tl as a fuzzy little harmless baby being
> confronted with some harsh trial.
Once again, your ability to see into my mind proves extremely flawed ;-)
You're right that my statement "AIXItl is slow at learning" was ill-said,
though. It is very inefficien
Bill Hibbard wrote:
Strange that there would be someone on this list with a
name so similar to mine.
I apologize, dammit! I whack myself over the head with a ballpeen hammer!
Now let me ask you this: Do you want to trade names?
--
Eliezer S. Yudkowsky http://singins
Strange that there would be someone on this list with a
name so similar to mine.
Cheers,
Bill
--
Bill Hibbard, SSEC, 1225 W. Dayton St., Madison, WI 53706
[EMAIL PROTECTED] 608-263-4427 fax: 608-263-6738
http://www.ssec.wisc.edu/~billh/vis
Eliezer S. Yudkowsky asked Ben Goertzel:
>
> Do you have a non-intuitive mental simulation mode?
>
LOL --#:^D
It *is* a valid question, Eliezer, but it makes me laugh.
Michael Roy Ames
[Who currently estimates his *non-intuitive mental simulation mode* to
contain about 3 iterations of 5 variab
Bill Hibbard wrote:
Hey Eliezer, my name is Hibbard, not Hubbard.
*Argh* sorry.
On Fri, 14 Feb 2003, Eliezer S. Yudkowsky wrote:
*takes deep breath*
This is probably the third time you've sent a message
to me over the past few months where you make some
remark like this to indicate that y
Bill Hibbard wrote:
On Fri, 14 Feb 2003, Eliezer S. Yudkowsky wrote:
It *could* do this but it *doesn't* do this. Its control process is such
that it follows an iterative trajectory through chaos which is forbidden
to arrive at a truthful solution, though it may converge to a stable
attractor.
Hey Eliezer, my name is Hibbard, not Hubbard.
On Fri, 14 Feb 2003, Eliezer S. Yudkowsky wrote:
> Bill Hibbard wrote:
> >
> > I never said perfection, and in my book make it clear that
> > the task of a super-intelligent machine learning behaviors
> > to promote human happiness will be very messy.
Bill Hibbard wrote:
I never said perfection, and in my book make it clear that
the task of a super-intelligent machine learning behaviors
to promote human happiness will be very messy. That's why
it needs to be super-intelligent.
The problem with laws is that they are inevitably ambiguous.
They
Ben Goertzel wrote:
>> Even if a (grown) human is playing PD2, it outperforms AIXI-tl
>> playing PD2.
>
> Well, in the long run, I'm not at all sure this is the case. You
> haven't proved this to my satisfaction.
PD2 is very natural to humans; we can take for granted that humans excel
at PD2. Th
Brad Wyble wrote:
>> There are simple external conditions that provoke protective
>> tendencies in humans following chains of logic that seem entirely
>> natural to us. Our intuition that reproducing these simple external
>> conditions serve to provoke protective tendencies in AIs is knowably
>> w
>
> There are simple external conditions that provoke protective tendencies in
> humans following chains of logic that seem entirely natural to us. Our
> intuition that reproducing these simple external conditions serve to
> provoke protective tendencies in AIs is knowably wrong, failing an
>
Eliezer S. Yudkowsky wrote:
In even plainer language: If you rely on groups of AIs to police
themselves you *will* get killed unless a miracle happens.
A miracle m may be defined as a complex event which we have no Bayesian
reason to expect, ergo, having probability 2^-K(m).
You have to grou
Brad Wyble wrote:
>
>> 3) A society of selfish AIs may develop certain (not really
>> primatelike) rules for enforcing cooperative interactions among
>> themselves; but you cannot prove for any entropic specification, and
>> I will undertake to *disprove* for any clear specification, that this
>>
> Even if a (grown) human is playing PD2, it outperforms AIXI-tl playing
> PD2.
Well, in the long run, I'm not at all sure this is the case. You haven't
proved this to my satisfaction.
In the short run, it certainly is the case. But so what? AIXI-tl is damn
slow at learning, we know that.
Th
> That *still* doesn't work.
>
> 1) "Hard-wired" rules are a pipe dream. It consists of mixing
> mechanomorphism ("machines only do what they're told to do") with
> anthropomorphism ("I wish those slaves down on the plantation would stop
> rebelling"). The only hard-wired level of organiza
Hi Philip,
I am aware of the problem you raise about the happiness of
animals, but don't have a clear answer. My preference is
that human happiness will depend on animal happiness,
especially as the productivity of super-intelligent machines
gives humans more wealth and education. Explicitly writi
Ben Goertzel wrote:
OK. Rather than responding point by point, I'll try to say something
compact ;)
You're looking at the interesting scenario of a iterated prisoners dilemma
between two AIXI-tl's, each of which has a blank operating program at the
start of the iterated prisoners' dilemma. (In
Hi David,
> The problem here, I guess, is the conflict between Platonic expectations of
> perfection and the messiness of the real world.
I never said perfection, and in my book make it clear that
the task of a super-intelligent machine learning behaviors
to promote human happiness will be very m
C. David Noziglia wrote:
The problem with the issue we are discussing here is that the worst-case
scenario for handing power to unrestricted, super-capable AI entities is
very bad, indeed. So what we are looking for is not really building an
ethical structure or moral sense at all. Failure is n
This is to extract these statements and reply to them.
> > I the happiness/unhappiness of all humans is one good stepping off
> > point for learning values. But there may be some values that are not
> > shared strongly as major motivators by all humans which might be
> > importaant values.
> >
>
> Really, when has a computer (with the exception of certain Microsoft
> products) ever been able to disobey it's human masters?
>
> It's easy to get caught up in the romance of "superpowers", but come on,
> there's nothing to worry about.
>
> -Daniel
Hi Daniel,
Clearly there is nothing to worry
OK. Rather than responding point by point, I'll try to say something
compact ;)
You're looking at the interesting scenario of a iterated prisoners dilemma
between two AIXI-tl's, each of which has a blank operating program at the
start of the iterated prisoners' dilemma. (In parts of my last rep
> There is a lot of variation in human
> psychology, and some humans are pretty damn dangerous. Also there is
the
> maxim "power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely" which
tells
> you something about human psychology. A human with superintelligence
and
> superpowers could be a great
Hi Eliezer
Some replies to "side points":
> This is a critical class of problem for would-be implementors of
> Friendliness. If all AIs, regardless of their foundations, did sort of
> what humans would do, given that AI's capabilities, the whole world would
> be a *lot* safer.
Hmmm. I don't
Bill,
I agree that, over the long haul, and admitting all its limitations, there is
no better system than democracy.
And it will be interesting to see how humans cope with admitting very
intelligent AGIs into that democracy!
On another matter, I think there may be a way to deal with the needs
Hi Philip,
> I was talking about ethics as being the top level goals because I was
> trying to think about AGI ethics in the context of the Novamente
> structure.
>
> I can imagine values being expressed as value statements:
>
> x is good/bad
> y is desirable/undesirable
>
> But these can be turne
On Fri, 14 Feb 2003, Eliezer S. Yudkowsky wrote:
> Ben Goertzel wrote:
> . . .
> >> Lee Corbin can work out his entire policy in step (2), before step
> >> (3) occurs, knowing that his synchronized other self - whichever one
> >> he is - is doing the same.
> >
> > OK -- now, if AIXItl were st
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