DIS: Re: BUS: Champion's Contests
On Thu, Feb 26, 2009 at 5:04 AM, Alex Smith ais...@bham.ac.uk wrote: A contest's contestmaster CAN transfer ownership of or destroy a Medal in that contest's possession, but only as explicitly described by the contest's text; one exception to this is that a contest CANNOT transfer a Medal to its contestmaster. Platonic capability? Hm. -- Taral tar...@gmail.com Please let me know if there's any further trouble I can give you. -- Unknown
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: Champion's Contests
On Thu, 2009-02-26 at 08:43 -0800, Taral wrote: On Thu, Feb 26, 2009 at 5:04 AM, Alex Smith ais...@bham.ac.uk wrote: A contest's contestmaster CAN transfer ownership of or destroy a Medal in that contest's possession, but only as explicitly described by the contest's text; one exception to this is that a contest CANNOT transfer a Medal to its contestmaster. Platonic capability? Hm. Deliberately platonic. Sorting it out with CFJs is probably better than allowing a contestmaster to arbitrarily give someone a win and probably even escape exile on the resulting punishment. -- ais523
DIS: Re: BUS: Re: OFF: [CotC] CFJ 2383a assigned to woggle, comex, Goethe
Goethe wrote: [Note: (not part of judgement) I assume we are judging on the culpability rather than the sentencing here?] Correct, I explicitly appealed culpability.
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: Re: OFF: [CotC] CFJ 2383a assigned to woggle, comex, Goethe
On Thu, 26 Feb 2009, Ed Murphy wrote: Goethe wrote: [Note: (not part of judgement) I assume we are judging on the culpability rather than the sentencing here?] Correct, I explicitly appealed culpability. Ok I certainly stand by Affirm then; the place to take into account Sgeo being silly is in sentencing or a sentence appeal (e.g. considering discharge). -g.
DIS: Re: BUS: Re: OFF: [CotC] CFJ 2383a assigned to woggle, comex, Goethe
On Thu, 26 Feb 2009, comex wrote: I move to AFFIRM. I have not carefully weighed the full implications of my failure to include arguments. I think that counts as an included argument.
DIS: Re: BUS: Re: OFF: [CotC] CFJ 2383a assigned to woggle, comex, Goethe
On Thu, 26 Feb 2009, Charles Reiss wrote: And even if the above were not the better interpretation, surely the ambiguity on this matter would be sufficient to fail to satisfy R1504's condition (d) the Accused could have reasonably believed that the alleged act did not violate the specified rule. My issue here is that the defendant specifically and directly confessed to it. If e'd provided either a defense like yours or complete silence, that would be fine - or at least enough for (d). I think we need to take such confessions at face value, or do you think it's a judge's burden to decide when a defendant really meant it? (And if so, isn't that a matter for sentencing anyway?) We generally accept, prima facie, that what people say about unconfirmable matters (e.g. what they were thinking at the time) is true. And people should have the right to say what they want, even self-damaging things; it's more harmful to the game to say I know you confessed, but we're going to ignore that. -G.
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: Re: OFF: [CotC] CFJ 2383a assigned to woggle, comex, Goethe
On Thu, Feb 26, 2009 at 12:41, Kerim Aydin ke...@u.washington.edu wrote: On Thu, 26 Feb 2009, Charles Reiss wrote: And even if the above were not the better interpretation, surely the ambiguity on this matter would be sufficient to fail to satisfy R1504's condition (d) the Accused could have reasonably believed that the alleged act did not violate the specified rule. My issue here is that the defendant specifically and directly confessed to it. If e'd provided either a defense like yours or complete silence, that would be fine - or at least enough for (d). I think we need to take such confessions at face value, or do you think it's a judge's burden to decide when a defendant really meant it? (And if so, isn't that a matter for sentencing anyway?) We generally accept, prima facie, that what people say about unconfirmable matters (e.g. what they were thinking at the time) is true. And people should have the right to say what they want, even self-damaging things; it's more harmful to the game to say I know you confessed, but we're going to ignore that. -G. (d) deliberately does not care about what the defendent actually thinks, only what e could have thought. Therefore, there is no reason to consider the defendent's admission in deciding whether it is acceptable. -woggle
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: Re: OFF: [CotC] CFJ 2383a assigned to woggle, comex, Goethe
On Thu, 26 Feb 2009, Charles Reiss wrote: On Thu, Feb 26, 2009 at 12:41, Kerim Aydin ke...@u.washington.edu wrote: (d) deliberately does not care about what the defendent actually thinks, only what e could have thought. Therefore, there is no reason to consider the defendent's admission in deciding whether it is acceptable. Um, IIRC I wrote (d), and I beg to differ on it what it deliberately cares about. -G.
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: Re: OFF: [CotC] CFJ 2383a assigned to woggle, comex, Goethe
ais523 wrote: If SHOULD as defined leads to an infinite regress, this does not mean it's impossible to breach. To be legal, Sgeo would have had to read the ruleset, or thought about reading the ruleset and decided not to, or thought about thinking about reading the ruleset and deciding not to and deciding not to, etc.. This is an infinite regress, but note that the higher elements in it are so ridiculously convoluted that I'm not certain humans are even capable of that level of indirected thinking. In any case, even if there are an infinite number of ways to not break the rule, that doesn't mean Sgeo didn't break the rule, if he met none of those conditions. (Compare the Metagoracontractian Metareligion; the whole concept of contracts all the way down was ridiculous, and ehird was rightly seen not to have been obligated by the infinite chain. Likewise, Sgeo cannot rely on an infinite chain of alternative obligations here; in order to meet the SHOULD, then he either has to do the task, or the rule-defined alternative, or the rule-defined alternative to the rule-defined alternative, etc. It is not the case that Sgeo platonically fulfils some sort of obligation at infinity, just as it was not the case with ehird's contracts.) Gratuitous: I agree that Sgeo did not meet any of the conditions, but the rules don't clearly define failure to meet any of the conditions as being a violation. SHOULD is defined by Rule 2152, which also defines some things that clearly pertain to violations (sections 2, 5, and 6) and some other things that clearly don't (sections 1 and 4). should is loosely defined by Rule 2152, giving Rule 754 an opportunity to get involved; ordinary-language definitions seem to run about 70% flat-out obligation and 30% obligation, propriety, or expediency equally weighted (except for order of appearance within a single clause). Rule 2152 is based on RFC 2119, which defines SHOULD non-recursively (the full implications must etc.) and SHOULD NOT recursively (the full implications should etc.). Evidence: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/should http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/should http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: Re: OFF: [CotC] CFJ 2383a assigned to woggle, comex, Goethe
On Thu, Feb 26, 2009 at 13:01, Kerim Aydin ke...@u.washington.edu wrote: On Thu, 26 Feb 2009, Charles Reiss wrote: On Thu, Feb 26, 2009 at 12:41, Kerim Aydin ke...@u.washington.edu wrote: (d) deliberately does not care about what the defendent actually thinks, only what e could have thought. Therefore, there is no reason to consider the defendent's admission in deciding whether it is acceptable. Um, IIRC I wrote (d), and I beg to differ on it what it deliberately cares about. -G. Looking at the archives, I guess you probably did. But I don't know how else you expected people to interpret a change from the old wording (UNAWARE, appropriate if the defendant reasonably believed that the alleged act did not violate the specified rule) to one that uses could have. And, well, I think it's an improvement. - woggle
DIS: Re: OFF: Distribution of proposal 6120
NUM C I AI SUBMITTER TITLE 6120 D 1 2.0 Murphy Increase the ticket ration FOR -Yally
DIS: Re: BUS: Day 1: The Defendant Steps out of His Box. Day 2: The Defendant is Eaten by Vines.
On Thu, 26 Feb 2009, Elliott Hird wrote: Arguments: According to Goethe, if you admit you breached the rules you're guilty, regardless of whether or not the rules say you're guilty. I didn't say that. We're talking about cases where (a) we actually interpret an action as a breach; in which case (b) we're asking whether a confession of having known about the breach is accepted. -Goethe
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: Day 1: The Defendant Steps out of His Box. Day 2: The Defendant is Eaten by Vines.
On Thu, 26 Feb 2009, Kerim Aydin wrote: On Thu, 26 Feb 2009, Elliott Hird wrote: Arguments: According to Goethe, if you admit you breached the rules you're guilty, regardless of whether or not the rules say you're guilty. I didn't say that. We're talking about cases where (a) we actually interpret an action as a breach; in which case (b) we're asking whether a confession of having known about the breach is accepted. More specifically, while your confession might pass the test for R1504(d), it fails R1504(a). -G.
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: Re: OFF: [CotC] CFJ 2383a assigned to woggle, comex, Goethe
On Thu, Feb 26, 2009 at 16:26, Kerim Aydin ke...@u.washington.edu wrote: On Thu, 26 Feb 2009, Charles Reiss wrote: On Thu, Feb 26, 2009 at 13:01, Kerim Aydin ke...@u.washington.edu wrote: On Thu, 26 Feb 2009, Charles Reiss wrote: On Thu, Feb 26, 2009 at 12:41, Kerim Aydin ke...@u.washington.edu wrote: (d) deliberately does not care about what the defendent actually thinks, only what e could have thought. Therefore, there is no reason to consider the defendent's admission in deciding whether it is acceptable. Um, IIRC I wrote (d), and I beg to differ on it what it deliberately cares about. -G. Looking at the archives, I guess you probably did. But I don't know how else you expected people to interpret a change from the old wording (UNAWARE, appropriate if the defendant reasonably believed that the alleged act did not violate the specified rule) to one that uses could have. And, well, I think it's an improvement. All I'm saying is that if a defendant admits that e could have known, we should take eir word for it. Here's an example. Let's say there's a really obscure way that everyone in the game is violating a rule, but no one knows it. Then, one person does eir own research and learns about it, and is very sure about it. But e continues to knowingly violate it anyway. And then, later, e confesses. Well... given the research, that particular person could have/should have known. And when e confesses, we take eir word for it that e knew what e was doing. -G. I think plainly this is not what R1504(d) says since it considers whether some hypothetical situation exists where the defendent could have believed it did not violate the rule. This perhaps does not excuse them for violations after research, but ought to excuse them when others who did the same research may have concluded that no, it did not violate the rule. And, anyways, I do not think it is in the best interest of the game to limit the R1504(d) defense like this: doing so encourages people to hide their knowledge: if you ever believe that something you and others do violates a rule, you're better off pretending not to know about it or to have the contrary interpretation, for otherwise such evidence might be used against you in a future criminal case. -woggle
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: Re: OFF: [CotC] CFJ 2383a assigned to woggle, comex, Goethe
On Thu, Feb 26, 2009 at 1:15 PM, Ed Murphy emurph...@socal.rr.com wrote: I agree that Sgeo did not meet any of the conditions, but the rules don't clearly define failure to meet any of the conditions as being a violation. I noticed this too: 6. MUST, SHALL, REQUIRED, MANDATORY: Failing to perform the described action violates the rule in question. 7. SHOULD, ENCOURAGED, RECOMMENDED: Before failing to perform the described action, the full implications of failing to perform it should be understood and carefully weighed. #6 explicitly says violates the rule, and #7 makes no mention of violating the rule. However, I interpreted this as a simple omission -- a literal reading here results in a paragraph with no effect other than on a meta-game level. -- Taral tar...@gmail.com Please let me know if there's any further trouble I can give you. -- Unknown
DIS: Re: BUS: Day 1: The Defendant Steps out of His Box. Day 2: The Defendant is Eaten by Vines.
On Thu, Feb 26, 2009 at 5:50 PM, comex com...@gmail.com wrote: I contest this. NoVing someone immediately upon joining is very rude. E ceased to play for a month, let em be. Dodging punishments by leaving the game is permitted -- but don't expect to rejoin without paying your dues. -- Taral tar...@gmail.com Please let me know if there's any further trouble I can give you. -- Unknown
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: Re: OFF: [CotC] CFJ 2383a assigned to woggle, comex, Goethe
On Thu, 26 Feb 2009, Charles Reiss wrote: I think plainly this is not what R1504(d) says since it considers whether some hypothetical situation exists where the defendent could have believed it did not violate the rule. This perhaps does not excuse them for violations after research, but ought to excuse them when others who did the same research may have concluded that no, it did not violate the rule. Part of the *whole point* of this is that the defendant had a chance to raise any or all of these defenses! If e doesn't, it's appropriate for the judge to find against em. The judge had a confession that was pretty deliberate-looking. Look: if a defendant specifically says I'm going to withhold evidence or give a false confession just to see what the court does, that's eir own business; allowing em to do so and then penalizing the judge (for it does penalize the judge to overturn a case) is not reasonably just. And, anyways, I do not think it is in the best interest of the game to limit the R1504(d) defense like this: doing so encourages people to hide their knowledge: if you ever believe that something you and others do violates a rule, you're better off pretending not to know about it or to have the contrary interpretation, for otherwise such evidence might be used against you in a future criminal case. No, you're best off saying hey, I just learned that doing this violates a rule. I haven't done it since I learned that, and I'm telling others so they can avoid it too (or change the rule; if it's unavoidable, (e) kicks in). And again, I'm not even saying that a confession of hey, I think this might violate the rule, but I'm not sure so I'm trying anyway should be considered a confession; I'm talking about confessions like ha ha, I did it anyway. And what's wrong with addressing this in a sentencing appeal, anyway (e.g. yes e technically could have known, but it's because e took the advice of others, so DISCHARGE is just fine). I'm leery of setting culpability decisions that allow people to hide behind hey, I kinda knew this was illegal but wasn't sure, so I couldn't have known. -Goethe
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: Re: OFF: [CotC] CFJ 2383a assigned to woggle, comex, Goethe
Taral wrote: On Thu, Feb 26, 2009 at 1:15 PM, Ed Murphy emurph...@socal.rr.com wrote: I agree that Sgeo did not meet any of the conditions, but the rules don't clearly define failure to meet any of the conditions as being a violation. I noticed this too: 6. MUST, SHALL, REQUIRED, MANDATORY: Failing to perform the described action violates the rule in question. 7. SHOULD, ENCOURAGED, RECOMMENDED: Before failing to perform the described action, the full implications of failing to perform it should be understood and carefully weighed. #6 explicitly says violates the rule, and #7 makes no mention of violating the rule. However, I interpreted this as a simple omission -- a literal reading here results in a paragraph with no effect other than on a meta-game level. Which, as noted, is exactly how I intended #7 to operate. (We have other rules with even less significant effect.) If the courts decide otherwise, then so be it, but until then I'm not conceding the issue.
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: Re: OFF: [CotC] CFJ 2383a assigned to woggle, comex, Goethe
On Thu, Feb 26, 2009 at 6:20 PM, Ed Murphy emurph...@socal.rr.com wrote: Which, as noted, is exactly how I intended #7 to operate. (We have other rules with even less significant effect.) If the courts decide otherwise, then so be it, but until then I'm not conceding the issue. The problem is that SHOULD is used for several important functions. I read SHOULD as should, unless you can justify yourself to a judge. -- Taral tar...@gmail.com Please let me know if there's any further trouble I can give you. -- Unknown
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: Re: OFF: [CotC] CFJ 2383a assigned to woggle, comex, Goethe
On Thu, Feb 26, 2009 at 18:08, Kerim Aydin ke...@u.washington.edu wrote: On Thu, 26 Feb 2009, Charles Reiss wrote: I think plainly this is not what R1504(d) says since it considers whether some hypothetical situation exists where the defendent could have believed it did not violate the rule. This perhaps does not excuse them for violations after research, but ought to excuse them when others who did the same research may have concluded that no, it did not violate the rule. Part of the *whole point* of this is that the defendant had a chance to raise any or all of these defenses! If e doesn't, it's appropriate for the judge to find against em. The judge had a confession that was I disagree. The judge has an affirmative duty to check each possible defense emselves regardless of what the defendant says in order to avoid making an inappropriate judgment on culpability. Ideally, figures related to the case (not necessarily the defendant) will bring forward arguments to make this search easy, and if no one does, the judge can be excused for doing a poor job at finding them. In this respect, criminal ought to be similar to inquiry cases. pretty deliberate-looking. Look: if a defendant specifically says I'm going to withhold evidence or give a false confession just to see what the court does, that's eir own business; allowing em to do so and then penalizing the judge (for it does penalize the judge to overturn a case) is not reasonably just. And, anyways, I do not think it is in the best interest of the game to limit the R1504(d) defense like this: doing so encourages people to hide their knowledge: if you ever believe that something you and others do violates a rule, you're better off pretending not to know about it or to have the contrary interpretation, for otherwise such evidence might be used against you in a future criminal case. No, you're best off saying hey, I just learned that doing this violates a rule. I haven't done it since I learned that, and I'm telling others so they can avoid it too (or change the rule; if it's unavoidable, (e) kicks in). Or, if said rule violation happens to be in your favor, people will probably assume that you're stretching the truth and you knew all along. And again, I'm not even saying that a confession of hey, I think this might violate the rule, but I'm not sure so I'm trying anyway should be considered a confession; I'm talking about confessions like ha ha, I did it anyway. Let's suppose a reasonable argument existed that the action was, in fact, legal. Then, in such a case, we would be punishing the person for telling us the truth rather than lying and giving an argument they considered bogus. I don't think this result is just. And what's wrong with addressing this in a sentencing appeal, anyway (e.g. yes e technically could have known, but it's because e took the advice of others, so DISCHARGE is just fine). I'm leery of setting culpability decisions that allow people to hide behind hey, I kinda knew this was illegal but wasn't sure, so I couldn't have known. The sentencing rules don't force the judge to take this factor into account at all (a sentence of APOLOGY or SILENCE is probably still appropriate), so it's not clear that an appeal could rightly remedy it. -woggle
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: Re: OFF: [CotC] CFJ 2383a assigned to woggle, comex, Goethe
On Thu, 26 Feb 2009, Charles Reiss wrote: I disagree. The judge has an affirmative duty to check each possible defense emselves regardless of what the defendant says in order to avoid making an inappropriate judgment on culpability. Ideally, figures related to the case (not necessarily the defendant) will bring forward arguments to make this search easy, and if no one does, the judge can be excused for doing a poor job at finding them. In this respect, criminal ought to be similar to inquiry cases. Then you and I firmly disagree. It used to be that a judge was permitted to DISMISS a case (criminal or inquiry) with the words the Caller didn't do eir homework or present a case. It is a recent style, driven in part by laziness on the part of the Callers and what was initially courtesy on the part of the judges, that has led us to degrade Callers' evidence standards to almost nothing. It is not specifically in the rules that the judge has to do all the work! I attempted to bring some sanity back to the judge's burden with explicitly legislating UNDETERMINED where the Caller was lazy, though that's for Inquiries only. In this case, the judge was presented with direct and specific evidence that (d) was satisfied in the form of an undisputed confession - why should e be required to dig farther than that: should e magically divine that the confession was wrong? Or should e be required to say did you really mean it? I mean, really really mean it? No, you're best off saying hey, I just learned that doing this violates a rule. I haven't done it since I learned that, and I'm telling others so they can avoid it too (or change the rule; if it's unavoidable, (e) kicks in). Or, if said rule violation happens to be in your favor, people will probably assume that you're stretching the truth and you knew all along. We might sort of assume that, but our culture is to assume that such statements aren't lies. If Sgeo had said at any point before the verdict I didn't mean it, I was testing a point I would accept it immediately. If we allow this after-the-verdict addition, what's to keep a defendant from purposefully withholding evidence, then appealing the verdict with the new evidence in the hope of dinging the judge with an overturn penalty (which now includes a decrease in Court ranking). And again, I'm not even saying that a confession of hey, I think this might violate the rule, but I'm not sure so I'm trying anyway should be considered a confession; I'm talking about confessions like ha ha, I did it anyway. Let's suppose a reasonable argument existed that the action was, in fact, legal. Then, in such a case, we would be punishing the person for telling us the truth rather than lying and giving an argument they considered bogus. I don't think this result is just. If the action turns out to be illegal (despite a reasonable argument for legality) and the person says that e definitely thought it was illegal and did it on purpose thinking it was illegal, Guilty. If e expresses doubts about illegality (again, before the trial) then not guilty. If I was being mean, I'd say e could be dinged for misleading the judge into taking the confession at face value! And what's wrong with addressing this in a sentencing appeal, anyway (e.g. yes e technically could have known, but it's because e took the advice of others, so DISCHARGE is just fine). I'm leery of setting culpability decisions that allow people to hide behind hey, I kinda knew this was illegal but wasn't sure, so I couldn't have known. The sentencing rules don't force the judge to take this factor into account at all (a sentence of APOLOGY or SILENCE is probably still appropriate), so it's not clear that an appeal could rightly remedy it. If you don't thing the result is just, as you say above, then a sentence of DISCHARGE is appropriate because another result would be manifestly unjust. -Goethe
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: Re: OFF: [CotC] CFJ 2383a assigned to woggle, comex, Goethe
[stuff] As far as I remember, my confession was not that I violated a rule, just that I failed to throughly consider the consequences of not reading the ruleset during read the ruleset week.
Re: DIS: Re: BUS: Re: OFF: [CotC] CFJ 2383a assigned to woggle, comex, Goethe
On Thu, Feb 26, 2009 at 21:01, Kerim Aydin ke...@u.washington.edu wrote: [snip] And what's wrong with addressing this in a sentencing appeal, anyway (e.g. yes e technically could have known, but it's because e took the advice of others, so DISCHARGE is just fine). I'm leery of setting culpability decisions that allow people to hide behind hey, I kinda knew this was illegal but wasn't sure, so I couldn't have known. The sentencing rules don't force the judge to take this factor into account at all (a sentence of APOLOGY or SILENCE is probably still appropriate), so it's not clear that an appeal could rightly remedy it. If you don't thing the result is just, as you say above, then a sentence of DISCHARGE is appropriate because another result would be manifestly unjust. The sentence of DISCHARGE being appropriate doesn't change the appropriateness of the other sentences. This may mean that no judgment other than AFFIRM would be appropriate in the hypothetical appeal. -woggle
