Re: Jim Bell's adversity
On Tue, Oct 22, 2019 at 03:43:15AM +, jim bell wrote:
> On Monday, October 21, 2019, 06:16:53 PM PDT, Zenaan Harkness
> wrote:
>
>
> On Tue, Oct 22, 2019 at 10:46:54AM +1100, Zenaan Harkness wrote:
> > On Mon, Oct 21, 2019 at 09:14:10PM +, jim bell wrote:
> > > First claim:
> > >
> > > EVENTS
> > >
> > > All previous pages and paragraphs herein are incorporated inclusive.
> > >
> > > Claim #1
> > >
> > > Beginning at a concealed time unknown to plaintiffs, various government
> > > agents including Defendants Jeff Gordon and Steven Walsh but not limited
> > > to these, with the assistance of unknown-named private citizens, began to
> > > act as individuals and as groups and as a group, in all their respective
> > > capacities, in a collusion and a conspiracy against private citizens
> > > including the plaintiffs in a scheme or plan in order to deny and violate
> > > their Constitutional rights.
> > >
> > > These victim private citizens included attendees of a Portland, Oregon
> > > political/social/legal group called the "Multnomah County Common Law
> > > Court", (hereafter MCCLC), which met during the late 1996 through 1997
> > > time frame, and continued until a date and time unknown to Plaintiff
> > > James Dalton Bell. The group of government agents and private-citizen
> > > co-conspirators is hereafter in some cases referred to as the
> > > Infiltrators, and the group of MCCLC attendees and other victims is
> > > referred to as Citizens.
> > > - end of quote
> > > --
> >
> >
> > Stunning. Absolutely stunning stuff! And still to today, "main
> > stream" media blackout.
>
> And that INCLUDES Declan McCullagh. Remember him? He had the prospect of
> covering a truly gigantic story, but he flinched. In early 2002, he claimed
> he would visit me at USP Lompoc, to cover my story, He never showed. And he
> lied about it: Claimed that he couldn't, 'at the last moment', but in
> reality he didn't even bother to fill out the paperwork to have a visit
> approved...and that would have had to happen 2 weeks prior to the visit.
> I don't object to the mere lack of a visit: I objected to the fact that he
> apparently went from covering the story...WHEN the government would have
> WANTED him to cover it...to suddenly abandoning the story once I got
> 'convicted'.
>
> > Well, today is a new day - I encourage you to create a new
> > affidavit/deposition, attaching/exhibiting all previous documents,
> > get it signed and witnessed, and begin your claim anew.
> Eventually...
>
> > There can be no statute of limitations on such government corruption,
> > and with the two lame stream parties fighting amongst themselves,
> > there's a chance you'll get an actual proper case going this time...
>
> Limitations is very complicated. According to a 1937 Supreme Court decision,
> Erie Railroad v. Tompkins
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erie_Railroad_Co._v._Tompkins the SC held that
> if a federal law had no explicit rule attached, Federal courts had to
> 'borrow' the corresponding rule from State law. This included the
> limitations period ("statute of limitations"). That would have been great
> in the State of Washington, which up to 1993 'tolled' (stopped the clock) on
> a civil suit while a person was a prisoner. Here's a good handling of the
> general problem, not specifically on Washington:
> https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1583=ilj
>
> Before 1993, being a prisoner tolled the limitations period. In 1993, that
> law was repealed.
> https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/1993/aug/15/wa-repeals-cons-tolling-statute/
>
> I knew about this in 2001, so I knew that I couldn't wait.
Additionally, you can always file, along with your claim, a "special
leave" application (or whatever they call that in the US - this
means, although you may technically be past any particular arguable
statute of limitation, you apply to the court to waive that
limitation, in the interests of justice (amongst other grounds...).
And always remember to add the various "public interest" grounds -
the public has an interest that wrongs and evils are (if belatedly)
brought to justice, the public have an interest to see justice be
done, the public have especially significant interests around the
organs (departments) and executors (individuals) of government, being
held to account.
If you include a bunch of such grounds, and all your evidence, and
it's still not enough, and you -still- need more "persuasion" (this
is the term used in Australian courts), your next step is to build
support for the exposure of the injustice and the claim to bring at
least some justice, with one or more of:
- petition to parliament, with as many petitioners as you are
willing to spend time gathering
- a letter in support of your case from one or another
WIRED: IBM Says Google’s Quantum Leap Was a Quantum Flop
WIRED: IBM Says Google’s Quantum Leap Was a Quantum Flop. https://www.wired.com/story/ibm-googles-quantum-leap-quantum-flop
Whodathunkit? CIA, FBI computers used for Wikipedia edits
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - People using CIA and FBI computers have edited entries in the online encyclopedia Wikipedia on topics including the Iraq war and the Guantanamo prison, according to a new tracing program. A screenshot of Wikipedia.com, taken on August 16, 2007. (image onsite) The changes may violate Wikipedia’s conflict-of-interest guidelines, a spokeswoman for the site said on Thursday. The program, WikiScanner, was developed by Virgil Griffith of the Santa Fe Institute in New Mexico and posted this month on a Web site that was quickly overwhelmed with searches. The program allows users to track the source of computers used to make changes to the popular Internet encyclopedia where anyone can submit and edit entries. WikiScanner revealed that CIA computers were used to edit an entry on the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. A graphic on casualties was edited to add that many figures were estimated and were not broken down by class. Another entry on former CIA chief William Colby was edited by CIA computers to expand his career history and discuss the merits of a Vietnam War rural pacification program that he headed. Aerial and satellite images of the U.S. prison for terrorism suspects at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, were removed using a computer traced to the FBI, WikiScanner showed. CIA spokesman George Little said he could not confirm whether CIA computers were used in the changes, adding that “the agency always expects its computer systems to be used responsibly.” The FBI did not have an immediate response. Computers at numerous other organizations and companies were found to have been involved in editing articles related to them. Griffith said he developed WikiScanner “to create minor public relations disasters for companies and organizations I dislike (and) to see what ‘interesting organizations’ (which I am neutral towards) are up to.” It was not known whether changes were made by an official representative of an agency or company, Griffith said, but it was certain the change was made by someone with access to the organization’s network. It violates Wikipedia’s neutrality guidelines for a person with close ties to an issue to contribute to an entry about it, said spokeswoman Sandy Ordonez of the Wikimedia Foundation, Wikipedia’s parent organization. However, she said, “Wikipedia is self-correcting,” meaning misleading entries can be quickly revised by another editor. She said Wikimedia welcomed the WikiScanner. WikiScanner can be found at wikiscanner.virgil.gr/ https://www.reuters.com/article/us-security-wikipedia/cia-fbi-computers-used-for-wikipedia-edits-idUSN1642896020070816 Rr Sent from my Androgyne dee-vice with K-9 Mail
Re: Assange "fails in bid to delay extradition battle with US"
On Monday, October 21, 2019, 08:12:07 PM PDT, Greg Newby wrote: On Mon, Oct 21, 2019 at 06:51:31PM +, jim bell wrote: >> Jim Bell's comment: >> (But first, note that the term "extraterritoriality" was commonly used in >> TWO senses in regards to Assange: First, perhaps the most common usage was >> the fact that Assange could stay in the Embassy as if it were a different >> country, not UK. That is NOT the sense I am most interested in, at least in >> part because nobody seemed to be substantially challenging that issue. The >> second usage, is the concept that a country can have criminal jurisdiction >> over acts committed in another nation. Put simply, can the US declare >> actions by a person outside the US, when there is no clear connection to the >> US? I very much doubt that, in this case. Below, you can see that I >> looked at some statutes, and did not find any specific reference to >> 'extraterritoriality' as part of the statutes which were then cited. This >> material includes points which included references to US court decisions >> which declared that unless a statute clearly claims 'extraterritoriality' >> over acts in other nations, it should be presumed to not apply. >> Did the US add any charges which DID have extraterritoriality references >> built into the statutes?) > >> It's frustrating that these news-item references aren't written to include >> issues such as extraterritoriality included. I will now do a time limited >> Google-search for 'Assange extraterritoriality' over the last months to find >> useful references. Nothing. Perhaps a law journal will have addressed this >> important matter. >> Let's not forget what I said on April 29, 2019: >Thanks for resending the analysis below. I spent a little time following up on >your searches, including looking at whether 'comity' is a pathway to valid >extratorritality. Like you, I came up with no basis in the USC, including, as >you cited, in the sections dealing with espionage. I noticed at least a couple decades ago that the word "comity" is pronounced dangerously close to "comedy". And with very similar meaning, as well. Months ago, I sent an email to a woman barrister on Assange's case my analysis, below. No answer, but I suppose I didn't expect one. >Commentary: >It is not in the interests of most commercial media outlets to highlight the >legal shortcomings of the US efforts to extradite Assange, any more than it is >to highlight the attacks on journalistic freedom, war on whistleblowers, etc. >But even non-mainstream coverage seems to ignore the key issue of >extraterritoriality. It's not a difficult concept to grasp. I don't think this >is a concept that occurs to most journalists. >From the 1973 movie, "The Paper Chase". >https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zruWCuNmWV8 "You come in with a skull full of mush, and you leave thinking like a lawyer." I remember seeing this movie first in a theater, first-run. It really impressed me! It was at this time I decided...that I definitely DIDN'T WANT TO BECOME A LAWYER!!! Why? Because science and engineering don't cheat. Law sets up rules, but then the people doing it cheat. >Generations of Americans have grown up with the notion that the US is the >World's police force. The ubiquity of US enforcement - i.e., military might, >and many other mechanisms - is not questioned. It is celebrated. Sadly, yes. >My theory concerning the relentless pursuit of Assange is that the ultimate >court outcomes are not the main object. The main object is ongoing and very >public punishment, certainly including unending incarceration and >intimidation, for daring to air the US' dirty laundry.- Greg Well, I DEMAND they 'play by the rules', in the way they refused to do so in my case. Jim Bell > ---jim bell > To:CypherPunks > Apr 29 at 5:31 PM > From: https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1153486/download > 15(B) to intentionally access a computer, without authorization and exceeding > authorized access, to obtain information from a department and agency of the > United States in furtherance of a criminal act in violation of the laws of > the United States, that is, a violation of Title 18, United States Code, > Sections 641, 793(c), and 793(e). (In violation of Title 18, United States > Code, Sections 371, 1030(a)(l), 1030(a)(2), 1030(c)(2)(B)(ii).) > > [end of partial quote] > There is a principle of American law, upheld by the Supreme Court, that a > Federal law is only supposed to be considered of "extraterritorial" > application (applies outside the boundaries of United States territory) if > the Congress specifically intended that application, and was signified by > including such language within the law > itself.https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extraterritorial_jurisdiction > > "In Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 2010, the
Re: Jim Bell's adversity
On Monday, October 21, 2019, 06:16:53 PM PDT, Zenaan Harkness
wrote:
On Tue, Oct 22, 2019 at 10:46:54AM +1100, Zenaan Harkness wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 21, 2019 at 09:14:10PM +, jim bell wrote:
> > First claim:
> >
> > EVENTS
> >
> > All previous pages and paragraphs herein are incorporated inclusive.
> >
> > Claim #1
> >
> > Beginning at a concealed time unknown to plaintiffs, various government
> > agents including Defendants Jeff Gordon and Steven Walsh but not limited to
> > these, with the assistance of unknown-named private citizens, began to act
> > as individuals and as groups and as a group, in all their respective
> > capacities, in a collusion and a conspiracy against private citizens
> > including the plaintiffs in a scheme or plan in order to deny and violate
> > their Constitutional rights.
> >
> > These victim private citizens included attendees of a Portland, Oregon
> > political/social/legal group called the "Multnomah County Common Law
> > Court", (hereafter MCCLC), which met during the late 1996 through 1997 time
> > frame, and continued until a date and time unknown to Plaintiff James
> > Dalton Bell. The group of government agents and private-citizen
> > co-conspirators is hereafter in some cases referred to as the Infiltrators,
> > and the group of MCCLC attendees and other victims is referred to as
> > Citizens.
> > - end of quote
> > --
>
>
> Stunning. Absolutely stunning stuff! And still to today, "main
> stream" media blackout.
And that INCLUDES Declan McCullagh. Remember him? He had the prospect of
covering a truly gigantic story, but he flinched. In early 2002, he claimed he
would visit me at USP Lompoc, to cover my story, He never showed. And he lied
about it: Claimed that he couldn't, 'at the last moment', but in reality he
didn't even bother to fill out the paperwork to have a visit approved...and
that would have had to happen 2 weeks prior to the visit.
I don't object to the mere lack of a visit: I objected to the fact that he
apparently went from covering the story...WHEN the government would have WANTED
him to cover it...to suddenly abandoning the story once I got 'convicted'.
> Well, today is a new day - I encourage you to create a new
> affidavit/deposition, attaching/exhibiting all previous documents,
> get it signed and witnessed, and begin your claim anew.
Eventually...
> There can be no statute of limitations on such government corruption,
> and with the two lame stream parties fighting amongst themselves,
> there's a chance you'll get an actual proper case going this time...
Limitations is very complicated. According to a 1937 Supreme Court decision,
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erie_Railroad_Co._v._Tompkins the SC held that
if a federal law had no explicit rule attached, Federal courts had to 'borrow'
the corresponding rule from State law. This included the limitations period
("statute of limitations"). That would have been great in the State of
Washington, which up to 1993 'tolled' (stopped the clock) on a civil suit while
a person was a prisoner. Here's a good handling of the general problem, not
specifically on Washington:
https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1583=ilj
Before 1993, being a prisoner tolled the limitations period. In 1993, that law
was repealed.
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/1993/aug/15/wa-repeals-cons-tolling-statute/
I knew about this in 2001, so I knew that I couldn't wait.
>Timing is really important Jim - the folks who did you over in their
pathetic star chamber, may not (all?) be holding seats of powertoday.
Yes, I knew how important knowing these statutes was.
>Then again, other similarly criminal humans may have replaced those
who've moved on."
No doubt..
>Notwithstanding, it's a fair bet that the first time you attempted to
file your claim, those who had most to lose by your claim running in
the courts, were still in direct power.
>And so although a good experience, that may not have been the wisest
time to bring your claim - as in, today might have much better chance
of success for you.
>This is my assumptive hope...
I believe I will eventually get what amounts to 'justice'. AP?
>If you do deign to launch your claim at this time, and you have any
questions at all, feel free to send me any question at all either on
or off list - some I can answer, but only generally (Australian
jurisdiction here, and IANAL).
>Also, you may happen across someone in the US who is of good spirit
and has some knowledge (even just on legal process) who may be
willing to assist you.
Well, the lawsuit I wrote in 2003 should have been plenty...
Re: riots in chile
See this infographic: https://www.reddit.com/r/COMPLETEANARCHY/comments/dkspnx/the_actual_causes_of_insurrection_in_chile/ Rr Sent from my Androgyne dee-vice with K-9 Mail On October 21, 2019 11:32:41 AM PDT, "Punk - Stasi 2.0" wrote: > > >https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-50106743 > >one obvious question : to what degree are the riots the result of a >facebook-nsa-fukerberg-pentagon-etc experiment. > >as an interesting aside their are not mentioned here >https://consortiumnews.com/ - I guess that site is an even bigger piece >of shit than I thought.
Tik-Tok... It's NOT just for Pepe Pervs
The company Nazis keep! Just wonder if they use pink hearts too? "Islamic State propagandists are reportedly trying to exploit social media app TikTok as a recruiting tool. The Wall Street Journal says social media monitoring agency Storyful recently identified around two dozen ISIS-related accounts, all of which have since been removed. The accounts posted videos aimed at recruiting followers and bolstering support for the terrorist group — featuring Islamic State anthems and footage of corpses and ISIS fighters. It’s not clear how big a presence ISIS has on TikTok. Terrorist propaganda is a perennial issue for social media platforms. Companies like Facebook and Google share a database of known terrorist imagery that can be automatically removed when it’s detected online. They’ve also faced (and won) several lawsuits for allowing it even temporarily on their platforms. Facebook said in September that it removed more than 26 million pieces of global terrorist propaganda over the past two years. TikTok’s parent company ByteDance didn’t immediately respond to a request for comment about how much terrorist content TikTok finds and takes down. The accounts that Storyful identified also appear to be relatively small. The Journal identifies one video as earning 68 likes and some accounts as having around 1,000 followers; Storyful didn’t immediately confirm whether that’s typical of the accounts’ popularity, or whether these are the first accounts they’ve found on TikTok. TikTok videos circulate largely thanks to TikTok’s recommendation algorithm. And in this case, it’s not clear that the algorithm is promoting ISIS content, just that this content exists on the hugely popular platform. However, as the Journal notes, TikTok has a young user base and is known for lighthearted, joke-y content — sometimes to the point of alleged political censorship. So there’s an added incongruity when it’s used by terrorists." https://www.theverge.com/2019/10/21/20925416/tiktok-islamic-state-terrorist-propaganda-recruitment-account-videos Rr Sent from my Androgyne dee-vice with K-9 Mail
Re: Assange "fails in bid to delay extradition battle with US"
On Mon, Oct 21, 2019 at 06:51:31PM +, jim bell wrote: > On Monday, October 21, 2019, 09:15:26 AM PDT, Greg Newby > wrote: > > > >Spotted in Fox news online, but it looks like this is also on the AP wire > https://www.foxnews.com/world/wikileaks-julian-assange-appears-in-court > > >Meanwhile, it appears Chelsea Manning is still in jail in Alexandria, for > >refusing to cooperate with the grand jury investigation against Assange: > >https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chelsea_Manning > > > >The Fox article: > > >WikiLeaks’ Julian Assange fails in bid to delay extradition battle with US > >Greg Norman > >By Greg Norman | Fox News > > Jim Bell's comment: > (But first, note that the term "extraterritoriality" was commonly used in TWO > senses in regards to Assange: First, perhaps the most common usage was the > fact that Assange could stay in the Embassy as if it were a different > country, not UK. That is NOT the sense I am most interested in, at least in > part because nobody seemed to be substantially challenging that issue. The > second usage, is the concept that a country can have criminal jurisdiction > over acts committed in another nation. Put simply, can the US declare > actions by a person outside the US, when there is no clear connection to the > US? I very much doubt that, in this case. Below, you can see that I looked > at some statutes, and did not find any specific reference to > 'extraterritoriality' as part of the statutes which were then cited. This > material includes points which included references to US court decisions > which declared that unless a statute clearly claims 'extraterritoriality' > over acts in other nations, it should be presumed to not apply. > Did the US add any charges which DID have extraterritoriality references > built into the statutes?) > > It's frustrating that these news-item references aren't written to include > issues such as extraterritoriality included. I will now do a time limited > Google-search for 'Assange extraterritoriality' over the last months to find > useful references. Nothing. Perhaps a law journal will have addressed this > important matter. > Let's not forget what I said on April 29, 2019: Thanks for resending the analysis below. I spent a little time following up on your searches, including looking at whether 'comity' is a pathway to valid extratorritality. Like you, I came up with no basis in the USC, including, as you cited, in the sections dealing with espionage. Commentary: It is not in the interests of most commercial media outlets to highlight the legal shortcomings of the US efforts to extradite Assange, any more than it is to highlight the attacks on journalistic freedom, war on whistleblowers, etc. But even non-mainstream coverage seems to ignore the key issue of extraterritoriality. It's not a difficult concept to grasp. I don't think this is a concept that occurs to most journalists. Generations of Americans have grown up with the notion that the US is the World's police force. The ubiquity of US enforcement - i.e., military might, and many other mechanisms - is not questioned. It is celebrated. My theory concerning the relentless pursuit of Assange is that the ultimate court outcomes are not the main object. The main object is ongoing and very public punishment, certainly including unending incarceration and intimidation, for daring to air the US' dirty laundry. - Greg > ---jim bell > To:CypherPunks > Apr 29 at 5:31 PM > From: https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1153486/download > 15(B) to intentionally access a computer, without authorization and exceeding > authorized access, to obtain information from a department and agency of the > United States in furtherance of a criminal act in violation of the laws of > the United States, that is, a violation of Title 18, United States Code, > Sections 641, 793(c), and 793(e). (In violation of Title 18, United States > Code, Sections 371, 1030(a)(l), 1030(a)(2), 1030(c)(2)(B)(ii).) > > [end of partial quote] > There is a principle of American law, upheld by the Supreme Court, that a > Federal law is only supposed to be considered of "extraterritorial" > application (applies outside the boundaries of United States territory) if > the Congress specifically intended that application, and was signified by > including such language within the law > itself.https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extraterritorial_jurisdiction > > "In Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 2010, the Supreme Court held that in > interpreting a statute, the "presumption against extraterritoriality" is > absolute unless the text of the statute explicitly says otherwise." > > "https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2016/06/us-supreme-court-continues-to-limit-extraterritori > > > http://www.virginialawreview.org/volumes/content/rjr-nabisco-and-runaway-canon > >From that: > "The
Re: minion-design.pdf / low bandwidth high latency long term connections
On Mon, Oct 21, 2019 at 11:03:40PM -0300, Punk - Stasi 2.0 wrote: > On Tue, 22 Oct 2019 12:40:25 +1100 > Zenaan Harkness wrote: > > > covfefe net is the UDP network layer chaff fill, packet switched > > network. > > 1) can you stop your stupid trump nazi propaganda? there's no 'covfefe > net' Stop getting triggered, snowflake ;) You can name your version whatever meme suits you. I'll kick it off for you right now - you can probably improve this tho: - Juan "I am not a snowflake" Net > 2) can it be (virtual) packet switched actually? 'Onion routing' > means ones has to set up a 3 hops route using public keys to > get 3 symmetric keys etc. That's done once per circuit in > tor. Doing it once per packet may be a bit too much? You're right - we can't set up per packet, but instead set up (exchange PKs, negotiate a session key), per-node. Remember, I must be able to control my own routing/hops decisions, for my chosen routing of packets within any circuit of my choosing. Once I've established a "symmetric session key" for the nodes I want to route through and nodes I wish to talk to, I can then send any number of wheat or chaff UDP packets (which must be indistinguishable from each other), to any target node that I've negotiated such session keys with. Session key's might be long lasting - I need to bone up on perfect forward secrecy though (PFS); TODO. > > This is where chaff fill - those "dummy messages" mentioned above - > > needs to be done, in the network layer. > > > > The reason? Once available, any "message" or "stream" type can layer > > on top (including TCP) - the nature of a network layer of course. > > >
covfefe net stream types
Attached. This is just a grab bag needing adding to. Stream types Current stream types grab bag: - "main stream" web browsing - bittorrent/ ftp/ http file upload and download - regular movie download - software updates distribution - multi-cast - voice (internet radio) - video (internet TV) - text messages/ tweets - extremely high value but rare short text messages - boring/ regular text messages - real time media, e.g. voice and video phone calls - latency sensitive, as opposed to e.g. radio show distribution, which can tolerate significant buffering and therefore latency - routing/ network control/setup/request/response type messages
Re: minion-design.pdf / low bandwidth high latency long term connections
On Mon, Oct 21, 2019 at 10:38:55PM -0300, Punk - Stasi 2.0 wrote: > On Tue, 22 Oct 2019 11:03:59 +1100 > Zenaan Harkness wrote: > > > On Mon, Oct 21, 2019 at 06:58:57PM -0300, Punk - Stasi 2.0 wrote: > > > > > > courtesy of tor scum dingledine and matheson and a GCHQ guy, danezis > > > who now works for facebook-NSA as well. Wait, facebook, nsa, gchq, > > > university of london, etc so many aliases for the same mafia. > > > > > > > > > anyway : https://www.mixminion.net/minion-design.pdf > > > > Have not begun to read that yet, > > there's a good deal of handwaving bullshit in there > > "The adversary can delay messages...The efficacy of this attack is poorly > understood, but > it may well be quite damaging" > > so they admit that their own fucking system is 'poorly understood' by > their own fucking selves and may be 'quite damaged' - well I guess that's at > least half honest. > > > "Dummy traffic is an old approach to improving anonymity, but its efficacy is > still not well analyzed." > > oh really? > > "We need stronger intuition about how to use dummy messages." > > ...stronger...intuition...? > > "While many people have speculated about the benefits of dummy traffic, we > have not yet seen any convincing analysis." > > > > "Exit attacks - Use the mix network to send hate mail" > "ISPs do not tolerate systems that potentially deliver hate mail" > > > ...'hate mail'? agents of the child murdering pentagon like dingledine > are worried about 'hate mail'...? > > > bottom line for me is that the system is (a lot) more complex than I > expected - and doesn't seem too reliable either. > > > The 'acknowledgments' section is kinda 'intersting' too > > cohen and 'zooko' wilcox get mentioned and..."We further thank all the > unnamed cypherpunks out there who have worked on remailer issues for the past > decades." > > > isn't the collaboration between 'cypherpunks' and the pentagon quite > touching. Indeed. covfefe net is the UDP network layer chaff fill, packet switched network. This is where chaff fill - those "dummy messages" mentioned above - needs to be done, in the network layer. The reason? Once available, any "message" or "stream" type can layer on top (including TCP) - the nature of a network layer of course.
Re: F2F UDP mesh net prototype proof of concept
On Mon, Oct 21, 2019 at 06:28:01PM +1100, Zenaan Harkness wrote: > On Sun, Oct 20, 2019 at 08:40:09PM -0300, Punk - Stasi 2.0 wrote: > > 3) virtual-circuit-switched, or packet-switched? Is packet switiching > > the most expensive and the most secure option? More on "Is packet switching the most expensive"? Packet switching is actually the least expensive (in CPU and bw overhead), optimal (in bw usage) base layer. The simplest reason this is so, is that TCP (or any other connection oriented protocol) as a base layer, incurs various oveheads - re-transmission delays, latency due to (required for TCP) re-ordering queues, and other attack and timing issues related to the specific protocol in use (TCP for Tor), and the point being: - these issues/overheads, are incurred for all streams, even packet based streams which do NOT need TCP overhead.
Re: Jim Bell's adversity
On Tue, Oct 22, 2019 at 10:46:54AM +1100, Zenaan Harkness wrote: > On Mon, Oct 21, 2019 at 09:14:10PM +, jim bell wrote: > > First claim: > > > > EVENTS > > > > All previous pages and paragraphs herein are incorporated inclusive. > > > > Claim #1 > > > > Beginning at a concealed time unknown to plaintiffs, various government > > agents including Defendants Jeff Gordon and Steven Walsh but not limited to > > these, with the assistance of unknown-named private citizens, began to act > > as individuals and as groups and as a group, in all their respective > > capacities, in a collusion and a conspiracy against private citizens > > including the plaintiffs in a scheme or plan in order to deny and violate > > their Constitutional rights. > > > > These victim private citizens included attendees of a Portland, Oregon > > political/social/legal group called the "Multnomah County Common Law > > Court", (hereafter MCCLC), which met during the late 1996 through 1997 time > > frame, and continued until a date and time unknown to Plaintiff James > > Dalton Bell. The group of government agents and private-citizen > > co-conspirators is hereafter in some cases referred to as the Infiltrators, > > and the group of MCCLC attendees and other victims is referred to as > > Citizens. > > - end of quote > > -- > > > Stunning. Absolutely stunning stuff! And still to today, "main > stream" media blackout. > > Well, today is a new day - I encourage you to create a new > affidavit/deposition, attaching/exhibiting all previous documents, > get it signed and witnessed, and begin your claim anew. > > There can be no statute of limitations on such government corruption, > and with the two lame stream parties fighting amongst themselves, > there's a chance you'll get an actual proper case going this time... Timing is really important Jim - the folks who did you over in their pathetic star chamber, may not (all?) be holding seats of power today. Then again, other similarly criminal humans may have replaced those who've moved on. Notwithstanding, it's a fair bet that the first time you attempted to file your claim, those who had most to lose by your claim running in the courts, were still in direct power. And so although a good experience, that may not have been the wisest time to bring your claim - as in, today might have much better chance of success for you. This is my assumptive hope... If you do deign to launch your claim at this time, and you have any questions at all, feel free to send me any question at all either on or off list - some I can answer, but only generally (Australian jurisdiction here, and IANAL). Also, you may happen across someone in the US who is of good spirit and has some knowledge (even just on legal process) who may be willing to assist you.
Re: Box for simple Tor node.
On Tue, Oct 22, 2019 at 10:20:35AM +1100, Zenaan Harkness wrote: > On Mon, Oct 21, 2019 at 06:06:15PM +, jim bell wrote: > > On Monday, October 21, 2019, 04:00:16 AM PDT, grarpamp > > wrote: > > To do that, it would be desireable to make that > > chaff look as much as possible like real traffic. > > Ahh, I see the thought. Yes, that thought makes sense on first blush, > but the problem is, if our encryption is so poor that chaff packets > are distinguishable from wheat, our chaff system is broken. > > And yes, as above, chaff is to fill the gaps, not to create flows or > streams that are not otherwise needed - the goal is simply to > disguise traffic, not to create completely arbitrary fill traffic > (and if the encryption is not broken, all traffic should look > completely arbitrary - this is a fundamental 'broken' with Tor's non > chaff filled TCP flows). > > > > A packet sent > > through all, or a large number of nodes will have a genuine path. > > Yes, "chaff paths" is the concept here, now I understand. I believe > that would be counter productive to network utilisation, and as > coderman points out, for too little gain. > > I can see how chaff paths could possibly make sense in the Tor > network. > > Also, but more fundamentally, what we are aiming for with chaff fill, > at least in a packet switched network, is something better than "chaff > paths": > > - we want streams to not be distinguishable >- this is a known (and fundamental) problem with Tor > > - chaff packets seeks a functional improvement on this fundamental >problem with Tor > > - the reason Tor is so bad, is that entry and exit nodes are >dominated by GPAs, and the "default set up of Tor Browser" for an >end user is therefore fundamentally broken >- this is why I stress the importance of running your own home > node (if you're using Tor at all), and more so, running that as > an exit node if you want any reasonable plausible deniability > > Covfefe net hopes to overcome this fundamental Tor (as it stands) > problem. On second blush, although I might trust an immediate friend (first hop), I might effectively set up a circuit through friend B, to C, where I control the chaff, inserting chaff when I'm not using this "mini circuit" - in this way B does not know that the circuit from A to C is partly chaff, or purely data, or purely chaff. Node C might have something to say about that if I don't utilize this mini route for too long (that would be a waste of B's generous bandwidth provision). We could consider or name this mini route ABC, a chaff route in the sense that A controls the route, inserting chaff as needed. > > Assuming the spy bugs one node, he will see traffic come in, and > > leave for another. Just like an ordinary instance of traffic. > > "chaff fill" is a misnomer perhaps leading people's' thoughts astray, > we should say something like: > > Chaff packets: > > 1) Are, to an onlooker or snooper, indistinguishable from wheat > packets, both in their size, and in their timing of delivery, and > in all consequential timing for packets returning, or outgoing, > from the node that receives a chaff packet. > > 2) Are only ever used as padding to fill gaps, so that stream begin, > and stream end are not distinguishable (to the snoop), and also > so that stream data, and surrounding chaff packets, are also not > distinguishable from one another. > > (A stream is a packet flow such as a request, and the corresponding > response for the content of a web page.) > > > > An alternative would be a system where each node spontaneously > > generates chaff. Spying on a node would see such spontaneous > > 'traffic' generations. Maybe it would be clearer that that was > > chaff? > > Yes, this is the Covfefe model - chaff packets, to fill the gaps, so > the snoop cannot tell whether any data or streams are being sent, or > not, at all. > > > > But I'm just throwing out ideas. I assume that the 'chaff' issue > > has been professionally detailed in some academic papers. > > Possibly - if someone has a link, I'd be happy to read it, but the > principle seems to jump out and smack us in the face, but I can > imagine that there could be some useful academic analysis of chaff > and network theory - if such exists... >
minion-design.pdf / low bandwidth high latency long term connections
On Mon, Oct 21, 2019 at 06:58:57PM -0300, Punk - Stasi 2.0 wrote:
>
> courtesy of tor scum dingledine and matheson and a GCHQ guy, danezis
> who now works for facebook-NSA as well. Wait, facebook, nsa, gchq, university
> of london, etc so many aliases for the same mafia.
>
>
> anyway : https://www.mixminion.net/minion-design.pdf
Have not begun to read that yet, but one of the stream covfefe will
"recommend as a default for all users" is a really low bandwidth
("bw") and high latency, permanent connection.
1KiB/s is much too fat, and at 80MiB/day (2.4GiB per month) folks
will complain.
But let's consider just 512 bytes every 10 minutes (a single small
UDP packet):
1 * 6 * 24 * 30 ~= up to 4320 separate "message sends" per month
each message send can contain up to 512 / 128 = 4 "std tweets"
therefore 17,280 "std tweets" at 10 minute latency
at 512 * 6 * 24 * 30 ~= 2.1 MiB bandwidth per month
NOW we're talking some serious chaff for high value random tweets at
any time, with a maximum latency of 10 minutes, for only 2.1MiB of
bandwidth per month!
No doubt some folks can imagine some nice applications for this
"recommended baseload" stream :)
Now, if your mixing, then those 17,280 tweets need to be divided by
the "mixing hop count" to work out actual payload, so let's say your
actual tweets go through 10 hops, we have (up to) 1,728 high value
tweets per node, per month, with possibly up to 10*10=100 minutes
maximum latency (although I'm confident we can eliminate most of that
with nodes cascading off one another in waves, so that maximum
latency should be at most say 30 time units.
If we need lower latency, say 1 minute, we're still only talking
21MiB bandwidth per month - and as a bonus we have 10 fold message
capacity, for 1/10th the latency, a win win (except on the bw front
of course).
To repeat a key point from a previous email: by treating different
types of streams for their own nature, we can not only reason about
network impact and various performance metrics, but we can ensure
that any design caters to include that type of stream.
Re: F2F UDP mesh net prototype proof of concept
On Mon, Oct 21, 2019 at 06:58:57PM -0300, Punk - Stasi 2.0 wrote: > > courtesy of tor scum dingledine and matheson and a GCHQ guy, danezis > who now works for facebook-NSA as well. Wait, facebook, nsa, gchq, university > of london, etc so many aliases for the same mafia. > > > anyway : https://www.mixminion.net/minion-design.pdf Thank you, I'll have a read.
Re: Jim Bell's adversity
On Mon, Oct 21, 2019 at 09:14:10PM +, jim bell wrote:
> My comments inline:
> On Sunday, October 20, 2019, 12:32:30 AM PDT, Zenaan Harkness
> wrote:
>
> On Sun, Oct 20, 2019 at 06:08:02AM +, jim bell wrote:
> > On Saturday, October 19, 2019, 07:31:14 PM PDT, Zenaan Harkness
> > wrote:
> >
> >
> >> >Hi Jim, I want to know - were you ever offered any "sell out" type of
> >>> option from the prosecutors who put you in jail for all those years?
> >
> >
> >> The only 'deal' I was given was an offer for 2 years if I pled guilty, in
> >> 2001. I refused, because I knew that the government was corrupt. What I
> >> didn't know, at the time, was that this corrupt government (and a previous
> >> corrupt attorney) engaged in a fake "appeal" case in the Ninth Circuit
> >> Court of Appeals, case number 99-30210. Do a Google search for 'jim bell
> >> "99-30210".
> >> https://cpunks.wordpress.com/2013/11/19/jim-bell-to-andy-greenberg-your-errors-about-me-in-your-book/
> >>
> >> This explains how I found out that Andy Greenberg is such a jerk. Clearly
> >> he wants to avoid covering what would have been a fascinating story, but
> >> one that puts the Federal government in a very bad light.
> >> And here's the lawsuit I wrote, until June 2003.
> >> https://cryptome.org/jdb/jdb-v-usa-ric.htm
> >
> >> I also didn't know that my then-current corrupt attorney was strenuously
> >>working on the Federal government's behalf, and would work with the judge
> >>to prohibit me from putting on MY defense. The only 'defense' I received
> >>was the one the Feds wanted to allow me. Essentially nothing.
> >> These events are why I will demand a change in the system before I allow
> >> it to operate: Whenever a person is charged with a crime, the government
> >> MUST offer a deal, including a specific time of imprisonment. If the
> >> defendant refuses the deal, and if he is convicted, he cannot be sentenced
> >> to any time greater than the plea deal defined, plus 10% or 6 months.
> >> And, the jury will have to state what the maximum punishment their verdict
> >> will allow, and if that is lower than the deal, that jury's limitation
> >> will control.
> >> The reason is that the current system forces people to plead guilty based
> >> on the threat of far greater punishment than what the government would
> >> otherwise be satisfied with. Take away that threat, and the government
> >> will have no choice but give realistic plea agreements, knowing that the
> >> defendant has a free choice to refuse, without what amounts to
> >> retaliation.
> > Jim Bell
>
>
> >Indeed. High corruption.
>
>
> >And might we collectively add, damn bro, what a stand you took!
>
> >That was 18 years or something right? Because you would NOT plead
> guilty?
> A total of about 13 years, from May 1997 through March 12, 2012, spread over
> a period of about 15 years.
>
>
> >THAT, is a serious stand for principle!
>
> Keep in mind that I should have EASILY been able to destroy the government's
> case, if I had known about the pre-April-2000 existence of the 9th Circuit
> appeals case 99-30210, which I believe was re-forged in about April 2000.
> They had faked an ongoing 'appeals case', ostensibly in my name, and
> ostensibly I was representing myself ('pro-se'), but in reality the dozens of
> mailings that should have been coming to me were concealed by government
> agents. Court people, Federal Bureau of Prisons people, etc. Completely
> unexpectedly, in March 2000, I demanded (in a letter to the 9th Circuit) an
> 'appeal' for my 'probation violation' case. That, I much later realized, put
> these government crooks in a major bind: Ordinary, I would have to demand an
> appeal within 10 court-days, excluding weekends and holidays. (So I was WAY
> too late!!!) But it turns out that the Government was actually in the
> process of giving me a forged-and-fake 'appeal', which they had been doing
> since about June 1999, so they couldn't turn around and deny me an appeal!!
> Eventually, after I was released in April 2000, I was given a (colluding)
> lawyer, Jonathan Solovy (Seattle) who apparently agreed to conceal the
> pre-April-2000 faked existence of appeal 99-30210. Had he asked even one
> question, like "Jim, it looks like you've been handing this case since June
> 1999 pro-se. What was your theory of appeal?" I would then have said, "I
> don't know what you are talking about. I initiated this case in March 2000
> by a letter I sent to the 9th Circuit, demanding an appeal case." That
> simple revelation would have blown apart everything. As is was, I only
> discovered the pre-April 2000 existence of case 99-30210 in about June 2003.
> So, Solovy was a major crook who enabled the government to convict me.
>
> "OK. So. You have a moral and ethical claim (not yet "made out")
> against the US government."
>
> Larger
Re: Box for simple Tor node.
On Mon, Oct 21, 2019 at 06:06:15PM +, jim bell wrote: > On Monday, October 21, 2019, 04:00:16 AM PDT, grarpamp > wrote: > > > On 10/13/19, jim bell wrote: > >> arbitrarily-long hops (256 hops? 65,536 hops? > >> An even larger power-of-2 hops?) > > >Hops, alone, don't add much protection beyond > a good routing of 3 to 9 or so. They're more for fucking > with traditional jurisdictional log reconstruction trails, > than dealing with GPA's, GT-1's and GAA'a including Sybil > that can just follow traffic patterns across the mesh bisecting > in real time, or more generally... sort and match traffic patterns > between all sets of two edge hosts. > > Okay, I was just joshing about the "256 hops" part. While there may not be > any hard limit built into the system, I believe I later said that 16 hops > would be enough for anybody.(Somehow, didn't I remember about 35 years ago > that Bill Gates said something like, ""640 kilobytes of main memory would be > enough for anybody? We see where THAT led!) > > > >If applied together with other tech, especially > regarding nets where you want any kind of > useable stream (even delivery of storage or msgs > is in a way a stream), beyond those hops is going to get > really unperformant, and less security return than thought. > > >You can demo today by recompile Tor and Phantom and tweak I2P, > to set arbitrary hop levels beyond single digits... are you more > secure from G* as result... probably not. > > However, one use of "many" hops would be the generation of chaff > 'traffic'. The goal, presumably, of adding chaff is to disguise > the real traffic. Sort of. The goal of chaff is to fill the blanks - so when I'm not sending wheat, in Tor land, it's obvious that I've stopped sending. Chaff means when I stop sending, my node still send chaff - just purely random filled packets, so that an observer cannot tell whether I've begun or ended a connection, or whether I'm sending anything at all. (Same for the receive loop of course too...) > To do that, it would be desireable to make that > chaff look as much as possible like real traffic. Ahh, I see the thought. Yes, that thought makes sense on first blush, but the problem is, if our encryption is so poor that chaff packets are distinguishable from wheat, our chaff system is broken. And yes, as above, chaff is to fill the gaps, not to create flows or streams that are not otherwise needed - the goal is simply to disguise traffic, not to create completely arbitrary fill traffic (and if the encryption is not broken, all traffic should look completely arbitrary - this is a fundamental 'broken' with Tor's non chaff filled TCP flows). > A packet sent > through all, or a large number of nodes will have a genuine path. Yes, "chaff paths" is the concept here, now I understand. I believe that would be counter productive to network utilisation, and as coderman points out, for too little gain. I can see how chaff paths could possibly make sense in the Tor network. Also, but more fundamentally, what we are aiming for with chaff fill, at least in a packet switched network, is something better than "chaff paths": - we want streams to not be distinguishable - this is a known (and fundamental) problem with Tor - chaff packets seeks a functional improvement on this fundamental problem with Tor - the reason Tor is so bad, is that entry and exit nodes are dominated by GPAs, and the "default set up of Tor Browser" for an end user is therefore fundamentally broken - this is why I stress the importance of running your own home node (if you're using Tor at all), and more so, running that as an exit node if you want any reasonable plausible deniability Covfefe net hopes to overcome this fundamental Tor (as it stands) problem. > Assuming the spy bugs one node, he will see traffic come in, and > leave for another. Just like an ordinary instance of traffic. "chaff fill" is a misnomer perhaps leading people's' thoughts astray, we should say something like: Chaff packets: 1) Are, to an onlooker or snooper, indistinguishable from wheat packets, both in their size, and in their timing of delivery, and in all consequential timing for packets returning, or outgoing, from the node that receives a chaff packet. 2) Are only ever used as padding to fill gaps, so that stream begin, and stream end are not distinguishable (to the snoop), and also so that stream data, and surrounding chaff packets, are also not distinguishable from one another. (A stream is a packet flow such as a request, and the corresponding response for the content of a web page.) > An alternative would be a system where each node spontaneously > generates chaff. Spying on a node would see such spontaneous > 'traffic' generations. Maybe it would be clearer that that was > chaff? Yes, this is the Covfefe model - chaff packets, to fill the gaps, so the snoop cannot tell whether any
Re: Jim Bell's adversity
My comments inline:
On Sunday, October 20, 2019, 12:32:30 AM PDT, Zenaan Harkness
wrote:
On Sun, Oct 20, 2019 at 06:08:02AM +, jim bell wrote:
> On Saturday, October 19, 2019, 07:31:14 PM PDT, Zenaan Harkness
> wrote:
>
>
>> >Hi Jim, I want to know - were you ever offered any "sell out" type of
>>> option from the prosecutors who put you in jail for all those years?
>
>
>> The only 'deal' I was given was an offer for 2 years if I pled guilty, in
>> 2001. I refused, because I knew that the government was corrupt. What I
>> didn't know, at the time, was that this corrupt government (and a previous
>> corrupt attorney) engaged in a fake "appeal" case in the Ninth Circuit Court
>> of Appeals, case number 99-30210. Do a Google search for 'jim bell
>> "99-30210".
>> https://cpunks.wordpress.com/2013/11/19/jim-bell-to-andy-greenberg-your-errors-about-me-in-your-book/
>>
>> This explains how I found out that Andy Greenberg is such a jerk. Clearly
>> he wants to avoid covering what would have been a fascinating story, but one
>> that puts the Federal government in a very bad light.
>> And here's the lawsuit I wrote, until June 2003.
>> https://cryptome.org/jdb/jdb-v-usa-ric.htm
>
>> I also didn't know that my then-current corrupt attorney was strenuously
>>working on the Federal government's behalf, and would work with the judge to
>>prohibit me from putting on MY defense. The only 'defense' I received was
>>the one the Feds wanted to allow me. Essentially nothing.
>> These events are why I will demand a change in the system before I allow it
>> to operate: Whenever a person is charged with a crime, the government MUST
>> offer a deal, including a specific time of imprisonment. If the defendant
>> refuses the deal, and if he is convicted, he cannot be sentenced to any time
>> greater than the plea deal defined, plus 10% or 6 months.
>> And, the jury will have to state what the maximum punishment their verdict
>> will allow, and if that is lower than the deal, that jury's limitation will
>> control.
>> The reason is that the current system forces people to plead guilty based on
>> the threat of far greater punishment than what the government would
>> otherwise be satisfied with. Take away that threat, and the government will
>> have no choice but give realistic plea agreements, knowing that the
>> defendant has a free choice to refuse, without what amounts to retaliation.
> Jim Bell
>Indeed. High corruption.
>And might we collectively add, damn bro, what a stand you took!
>That was 18 years or something right? Because you would NOT plead
guilty?
A total of about 13 years, from May 1997 through March 12, 2012, spread over a
period of about 15 years.
>THAT, is a serious stand for principle!
Keep in mind that I should have EASILY been able to destroy the government's
case, if I had known about the pre-April-2000 existence of the 9th Circuit
appeals case 99-30210, which I believe was re-forged in about April 2000. They
had faked an ongoing 'appeals case', ostensibly in my name, and ostensibly I
was representing myself ('pro-se'), but in reality the dozens of mailings that
should have been coming to me were concealed by government agents. Court
people, Federal Bureau of Prisons people, etc. Completely unexpectedly, in
March 2000, I demanded (in a letter to the 9th Circuit) an 'appeal' for my
'probation violation' case. That, I much later realized, put these government
crooks in a major bind: Ordinary, I would have to demand an appeal within 10
court-days, excluding weekends and holidays. (So I was WAY too late!!!) But it
turns out that the Government was actually in the process of giving me a
forged-and-fake 'appeal', which they had been doing since about June 1999, so
they couldn't turn around and deny me an appeal!!
Eventually, after I was released in April 2000, I was given a (colluding)
lawyer, Jonathan Solovy (Seattle) who apparently agreed to conceal the
pre-April-2000 faked existence of appeal 99-30210. Had he asked even one
question, like "Jim, it looks like you've been handing this case since June
1999 pro-se. What was your theory of appeal?" I would then have said, "I
don't know what you are talking about. I initiated this case in March 2000 by
a letter I sent to the 9th Circuit, demanding an appeal case." That simple
revelation would have blown apart everything. As is was, I only discovered
the pre-April 2000 existence of case 99-30210 in about June 2003. So, Solovy
was a major crook who enabled the government to convict me.
"OK. So. You have a moral and ethical claim (not yet "made out")
against the US government."
Larger than you can possibly imagine !!!
"You might be familiar with the two documents required to begin any
court case?
- your story (e.g. affidavit, deposition, etc)
- your originating process (Originating Motion, Grand Jury Summons,
Re: Assange "fails in bid to delay extradition battle with US"
On Monday, October 21, 2019, 09:15:26 AM PDT, Greg Newby wrote: >Spotted in Fox news online, but it looks like this is also on the AP wire https://www.foxnews.com/world/wikileaks-julian-assange-appears-in-court >Meanwhile, it appears Chelsea Manning is still in jail in Alexandria, for >refusing to cooperate with the grand jury investigation against Assange: >https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chelsea_Manning >The Fox article: >WikiLeaks’ Julian Assange fails in bid to delay extradition battle with US >Greg Norman >By Greg Norman | Fox News Jim Bell's comment: (But first, note that the term "extraterritoriality" was commonly used in TWO senses in regards to Assange: First, perhaps the most common usage was the fact that Assange could stay in the Embassy as if it were a different country, not UK. That is NOT the sense I am most interested in, at least in part because nobody seemed to be substantially challenging that issue. The second usage, is the concept that a country can have criminal jurisdiction over acts committed in another nation. Put simply, can the US declare actions by a person outside the US, when there is no clear connection to the US? I very much doubt that, in this case. Below, you can see that I looked at some statutes, and did not find any specific reference to 'extraterritoriality' as part of the statutes which were then cited. This material includes points which included references to US court decisions which declared that unless a statute clearly claims 'extraterritoriality' over acts in other nations, it should be presumed to not apply. Did the US add any charges which DID have extraterritoriality references built into the statutes?) It's frustrating that these news-item references aren't written to include issues such as extraterritoriality included. I will now do a time limited Google-search for 'Assange extraterritoriality' over the last months to find useful references. Nothing. Perhaps a law journal will have addressed this important matter. Let's not forget what I said on April 29, 2019: ---jim bell To:CypherPunks Apr 29 at 5:31 PM From: https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1153486/download 15(B) to intentionally access a computer, without authorization and exceeding authorized access, to obtain information from a department and agency of the United States in furtherance of a criminal act in violation of the laws of the United States, that is, a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 641, 793(c), and 793(e). (In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 371, 1030(a)(l), 1030(a)(2), 1030(c)(2)(B)(ii).) [end of partial quote] There is a principle of American law, upheld by the Supreme Court, that a Federal law is only supposed to be considered of "extraterritorial" application (applies outside the boundaries of United States territory) if the Congress specifically intended that application, and was signified by including such language within the law itself.https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extraterritorial_jurisdiction "In Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 2010, the Supreme Court held that in interpreting a statute, the "presumption against extraterritoriality" is absolute unless the text of the statute explicitly says otherwise." "https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2016/06/us-supreme-court-continues-to-limit-extraterritori http://www.virginialawreview.org/volumes/content/rjr-nabisco-and-runaway-canon >From that: "The Supreme Court threw out the lawsuit after invoking the presumption against extraterritoriality. That canon of statutory interpretation instructs judges to assume “that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”[8] In applying the presumption in RJR Nabisco, however, a majority of four Justices[9] rejected multiple indications that Congress intended RICO’s private right of action to extend abroad[10] while raising the bar on what Congress must do to make its extraterritorial expectations clear.[11]" [end of quote] Understanding the presumption against extraterritoriality: https://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1170=bjil Very interesting: https://www.thefacultylounge.org/2019/04/some-thoughts-on-the-extradition-of-julian-assange.html >From that:"THE RULE OF DUAL CRIMINALITY: Even if extradition is sought only >under the computer intrusion indictment, it will still need to meet the test >of dual criminality, found in Article 2, which provides that "An offense shall >be an extraditable offense if the conduct on which the offense is based is >punishable under the laws in both States." Although computer hacking is no >doubt also a crime in the U.K., there is a further wrinkle of territoriality, >because Assange's alleged offense was committed outside the
What
happened to Punks username?
Re: Neowin: New OnionShare 2.2 update makes it easy to share files and host sites on the Tor network
On Monday, October 21, 2019, 04:10:23 AM PDT, grarpamp wrote: On 10/17/19, jim bell wrote: > > Okay, I'm not advocating (or opposing) this concept. It just seemed to me > >that since we are talking TOR-related features, we should pay attention to >> what TOR currently claims to provide. >> I think a few months ago, I mentioned the idea (which I assume somebody else >> thought of first, probably years ago) of splitting a file into two (or >> more?) pieces, stored in two (or more?) separate systems), which when XOR'd >> together, provide the (forbidden, banned, 'reallybad!!!' 'highly-illegal') >> product file. Neither file, alone, would be 'forbidden'. >> The purpose of this is not 'secrecy' of course, but merely deniability. >> Without the other file(s), the one file _I_ possess will be >> indistinguishable from a random number. In fact, it could be a random >> number, which when XOR'd with a forbidden text, becomes what amounts to >> another random number, and somebody else's system will hold the other >> 'random number' . Think Vernam cipher, otherwise known as a "one-time >> pad". https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One-time_pad >See the related... >https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OFFSystem Yup. Sounds like it, Remember, 'deniability', not 'secrecy'. Jim Bell
Re: Box for simple Tor node.
On Monday, October 21, 2019, 04:00:16 AM PDT, grarpamp wrote: On 10/13/19, jim bell wrote: >> arbitrarily-long hops (256 hops? 65,536 hops? >> An even larger power-of-2 hops?) >Hops, alone, don't add much protection beyond a good routing of 3 to 9 or so. They're more for fucking with traditional jurisdictional log reconstruction trails, than dealing with GPA's, GT-1's and GAA'a including Sybil that can just follow traffic patterns across the mesh bisecting in real time, or more generally... sort and match traffic patterns between all sets of two edge hosts. Okay, I was just joshing about the "256 hops" part. While there may not be any hard limit built into the system, I believe I later said that 16 hops would be enough for anybody.(Somehow, didn't I remember about 35 years ago that Bill Gates said something like, ""640 kilobytes of main memory would be enough for anybody? We see where THAT led!) >If applied together with other tech, especially regarding nets where you want any kind of useable stream (even delivery of storage or msgs is in a way a stream), beyond those hops is going to get really unperformant, and less security return than thought. >You can demo today by recompile Tor and Phantom and tweak I2P, to set arbitrary hop levels beyond single digits... are you more secure from G* as result... probably not. However, one use of "many" hops would be the generation of chaff 'traffic'. The goal, presumably, of adding chaff is to disguise the real traffic. To do that, it would be desireable to make that chaff look as much as possible like real traffic. A packet sent through all, or a large number of nodes will have a genuine path. Assuming the spy bugs one node, he will see traffic come in, and leave for another. Just like an ordinary instance of traffic. An alternative would be a system where each node spontaneously generates chaff. Spying on a node would see such spontaneous 'traffic' generations. Maybe it would be clearer that that was chaff? But I'm just throwing out ideas. I assume that the 'chaff' issue has been professionally detailed in some academic papers. Jim Bell
covfefe packet switched network - user routing - hiding hop counts/ routing info, from intermediate nodes and GPAs
Example: A routes packet P, via nodes B then C, to node D.
Nodes: A B C D
PK means "public key", each node knows the PK of the other nodes it
communciates with or routes to.
Using PK is shorthand - actual encrypted link usually uses PK crypto
to negotiate a symmetric session key, which might be changed over
time and other complexities, but for the purpose of comprehending
basic implementation steps and understanding issues arising, it's
sufficient to think in simpler terms of just per node public keys.
"Physical" hops in the following example routes:
AB
BC
CD
"Virtual" routes we can consider in examples:
AB
ABC
ABCD
and also BC, BD, and CD
Each hop, e.g. AB, needs their comms to be encrypted to protect from
eves droppers.
So when A sends P to B, P is encrypted with B's PK.
We can use a notation like B(P) to mean encrypt P with B's PK.
Similarly notation B'(B(P)) to mean decrypt B(P) to get the
raw/unencrypted packet P, from the encrypted version B(P).
1) A sends P only to B
1.1 A encrypts P to B, i.e. sending B(P) to B
1.2 B decrypts, doing B'(B(P)) to get P
2) A sends P to C, via B
A wants B to not read P, only to forward C(P) on to C;
So, naievely, A sends C(P) to B, with a request to forward C(P)
onwards to C.
This is naieve, since two problems arise:
i) A's request to B is not encrypted, only P is encrypted as
C(P).
ii) A sends the encrypted packet C(P) first to B (with the
routing instruction), and then B also sends C(P) (without any
additional routing instructions), to C, but the same set of
encrypted bytes has been sent first via AB, and second via BC;
the obvious problem with this is that an onlooker (GPA), can
simply see that "something" (encrypted) has been sent from A to
C, which defeats the purpose of A sending via B at all - there
is no benefit over just sending C(P) directly to C.
This particular sub-problem can be solved in a couple of
immediate ways:
I) B receives C(P) from A, so instead of sending that to C, it
sends C(C(P)) to C, which C can decrypt, but C needs to know,
or guess how many layers to unwrap, and this puts extra
unnecessary load on C - the more hops, the more load on the end
point of the route, aka not good.
II) A first encrypts P using C's PK, then does similarly for node
B, so sending B(C(P)) to B, which B decrypts to get C(P), which
B can on-send to node C with no extra encryption effort!
This puts the load on A, to encrypt its packets according to
the total route desired.
This is logical, as A wants to minimize trust in any downstream
nodes, so doing the work yourself pays off with certainty and
less need for trust, greater privacy, and while A is at it, it
can embed the required routing header for each hop, into the
appropriately layer, thus encrypting all routing requests.
A routing header can be denoted with the letter "r", followed if
needed by the node letter for the target node of the route request,
e.g. "rC" means "route this packet to node C".
So for A to 'properly' send P to node C:
2.1 A sends B(rC+C(P)) to node B
2.2 B decrypts, getting rC + C(P)
2.3 B sends C(P) to node C
An obvious information exposure bug in steps 2.1 and 2.3 is that the
unless we somehow compensate for this, the packet B(rC+C(P)), is
larger than the packet C(P) - so our GPA snoop can see that A's
packet sent to B, is larger than B's packet sent to C, and it's not
hard to guess that the difference is gonna be routing information.
The simple solution to different packet sizes is to rely on B to pad
C(P) with some random bytes (which need to be ignored by C), so that
it's the same size as B(rC+C(P)).
But this means once again, relying on B to do the right thing here.
Can we get around this reliance on B?
The problem only gets worse as we go to an example that includes the
next hop, CD...
Separating routing requests into separate packets ("control" packets
or whatever we might call them) would have downsides of extra
buffering and latency to handle dropped packets, packet sequence
problems (we're talking UDP here), lower-level packet routing timing
issues, requests to resend packets that don't arrive after a timeout
etc etc. This is way too complex (reimplementing TCP basically), so
forget that - routing requests must be embedded, attached or
otherwise be very closely associated, with the packets being routed.
Whether routing info is a "tag", a "byte", an IP (v4 or v6) address
or etc doesn't matter - a smaller header doesn't make the problem go
away, AFAICS.
Re: Neowin: New OnionShare 2.2 update makes it easy to share files and host sites on the Tor network
On Mon, Oct 21, 2019 at 07:08:58AM -0400, grarpamp wrote: > See the related... > > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OFFSystem Nice! Can imagine OFFSystem, combined with even just 1- or 2-hop onion routing, where you route amongst 'friends', to be a viable low overhead (extra bandwidth) and reasonably low latency and therefore to replace existing torrent clients. Which reminds me - we must treat different streams according to the nature of the stream. - Phone call demands low latency, reasonably low bandwidth. - Bittorrent demands high throughput, is fine with utilizing excess available bandwidth (like running a coin miner in your idle process). - Text messages/ txt chat, are miniscule bandwidth, can tolerate unpredictable latency (at least, up to a few seconds if it so happens), but to achieve a systemic difference, we -must- achieve wheat in the chaff (and "via trusted friends") "disappearing act". - some txt messages can tolerate super high latency, in exchange for significantly increased anonymity and etc properties - comfort for the main stream end consumer crowd accessing MSM web sites, demands low privacy, low security, bursty, relatively low latency streams to view heavy moronic web page "CNN brain programming" - like Tor achieves Within the confines of: - packet switched altnet - with end-user node making own routing decisions - plus applied/configured meat space "friend trust metrics" I believe we can group streams into the above categories and others which make sense. Different security requires different routing - even accessing an MSM web page could be diverted to my altnet chaff fill node, if more important stuff is not being up/down-loaded via my node, but only if my node is not doing something I deem more important. With a fundamentally flexible packet switched UDP base layer, we can build appropriate stream "protocols" or "configurations" on top, to satisfy different users, uses and/ or apps - at least this is the goal - don't lock in the end users to a single stream modality, so that we don't keep rewriting the stack over and over and ...
Re: F2F UDP mesh net prototype proof of concept
On Sun, Oct 20, 2019 at 08:40:09PM -0300, Punk - Stasi 2.0 wrote: > 3) ... Packet size? Check out MTU: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maximum_transmission_unit Most ISPs deliver an IP network. There's a bit of a movement to push ethernet out to the home: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethernet_in_the_first_mile MTU is a known/solved problem - basically for streams to be efficient, you must use packet sizes which correspond to the minimum packet size in your circuit, otherwise you introduce things like buffering, packet dis/reassembly and therefore latency and/or link inefficiencies. Garlic routing https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Garlic_routing is intended as an improvement over onion routing where smaller messages get combined, to improve anonymity - but the principle can improve link efficiency too of course, so that's a win win. In any case, with UDP base layer, or rather, packet switching, folks can experiment with variations of these concepts much more easily than with a TCP base layer.
Re: Pipe-Net
On Mon, Oct 21, 2019 at 06:27:42AM -0400, grarpamp wrote: > On 10/17/19, coderman wrote: > >> There are many, many analogies you can draw about a network of this > >> type to an ATM (asynchronous transfer mode) network. > > > > > > i'm old enough to remember writing XTI/STREAMS code for ATM networks. (blast > > from the past!) > > > > ATM CBR SVCs would be a perfect fit for padding schemes, if they existed for > > consumer use :) > > > Telco generated clocked TDM bucket brigades... > Suggested for years overlays can still emulate them to good use... > full time chaff padding fill all node-to-node links at negotiated maintained > rates, displace chaff with wheat as it comes in, reclock and enforce > the line contracts, keying, etc at the switchports (overlay nodes). > *VC padding requires lots of management overhead and signaling > between layers in overlay net to avoid user traffic saturating paths, > finding bw routes, etc, forget that. Chaff fill at node-to-node > link layer is easier... just as physical link crypto over fulltime fill > works in background between switchports (there are proposals > for ethernet to do this, embedded PHY instead of aftermarket > anti-SPY gadget). Nodes already know what other nodes the > upper layer wants to talk to, so they nego fill with them before > swapping out lower fill for upper wheat on demand. Tor-like circuit > extends in upper layer still works. User traffic in upper layers rides > happy till users fill their own circuits they provisioned into the net, > no different than tor or any other overlay today. I'm parsing most of that, but not all. "Negotiating" chaff for wheat is the issue - who to trust, or rather, how to achieve a functional, --against GPAs/ government adversaries-- model/ improvement over Tor! If we rely on layers below end-user control, we lose a major element of security we're trying to achieve here. We can begin with low bw links for wheat in the chaff text messages - bittorrent floods at all times would kill backbones in a sense - that's why unlimited plans ultimately shape.
Re: Box for simple Tor node.
On Mon, Oct 21, 2019 at 06:59:00AM -0400, grarpamp wrote: > On 10/13/19, jim bell wrote: > > arbitrarily-long hops (256 hops? 65,536 hops? > > An even larger power-of-2 hops?) > > Hops, alone, don't add much protection beyond > a good routing of 3 to 9 or so. They're more for fucking > with traditional jurisdictional log reconstruction trails, That's a point. > than dealing with GPA's, GT-1's and GAA'a including Sybil GPA - Global Passive Adversary GAA - Global Active Adversary GT-1 - ?? > that can just follow traffic patterns across the mesh bisecting > in real time, or more generally... sort and match traffic patterns > between all sets of two edge hosts. "between two edge hosts (aka src and dst)" is the point why more than say 3 to 9 hops adds little to nought - and if you're onion routing, not only reducing bw by [header_size] per layer, but consuming overall network bandwidth according to hop count (again, to little or no advantage to privacy). > If applied together with other tech, especially > regarding nets where you want any kind of > useable stream > (even delivery of storage or msgs is in a way a stream), indeed > beyond those hops is going to get > really unperformant, and less security return than thought. No increase in security in relation to conceivable attacks. Jurisdictional hops - e.g. through Russia if you're avoiding USGov etc - sound conceptually useful. > You can demo today by recompile Tor and Phantom and tweak I2P, > to set arbitrary hop levels beyond single digits... are you more > secure from G* as result... probably not. Link(s) to Phantom please?
Re: Neowin: New OnionShare 2.2 update makes it easy to share files and host sites on the Tor network
On 10/17/19, jim bell wrote: > Okay, I'm not advocating (or opposing) this concept. It just seemed to me > that since we are talking TOR-related features, we should pay attention to > what TOR currently claims to provide. > I think a few months ago, I mentioned the idea (which I assume somebody else > thought of first, probably years ago) of splitting a file into two (or > more?) pieces, stored in two (or more?) separate systems), which when XOR'd > together, provide the (forbidden, banned, 'reallybad!!!' 'highly-illegal') > product file. Neither file, alone, would be 'forbidden'. > The purpose of this is not 'secrecy' of course, but merely deniability. > Without the other file(s), the one file _I_ possess will be > indistinguishable from a random number. In fact, it could be a random > number, which when XOR'd with a forbidden text, becomes what amounts to > another random number, and somebody else's system will hold the other > 'random number' . Think Vernam cipher, otherwise known as a "one-time > pad". https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One-time_pad See the related... https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OFFSystem > On Thursday, October 17, 2019, 12:36:16 PM PDT, Steven Schear > wrote: > > Filesharing is a privacy dead end. Only something like Mojo Nation / Mnet > publishing, where few or no participants need be aware of or hold file > contents, offer viable plausible deniability.
Re: Box for simple Tor node.
On 10/13/19, jim bell wrote: > arbitrarily-long hops (256 hops? 65,536 hops? > An even larger power-of-2 hops?) Hops, alone, don't add much protection beyond a good routing of 3 to 9 or so. They're more for fucking with traditional jurisdictional log reconstruction trails, than dealing with GPA's, GT-1's and GAA'a including Sybil that can just follow traffic patterns across the mesh bisecting in real time, or more generally... sort and match traffic patterns between all sets of two edge hosts. If applied together with other tech, especially regarding nets where you want any kind of useable stream (even delivery of storage or msgs is in a way a stream), beyond those hops is going to get really unperformant, and less security return than thought. You can demo today by recompile Tor and Phantom and tweak I2P, to set arbitrary hop levels beyond single digits... are you more secure from G* as result... probably not.
Re: Pipe-Net
On 10/17/19, coderman wrote: >> There are many, many analogies you can draw about a network of this >> type to an ATM (asynchronous transfer mode) network. > > > i'm old enough to remember writing XTI/STREAMS code for ATM networks. (blast > from the past!) > > ATM CBR SVCs would be a perfect fit for padding schemes, if they existed for > consumer use :) Telco generated clocked TDM bucket brigades... Suggested for years overlays can still emulate them to good use... full time chaff padding fill all node-to-node links at negotiated maintained rates, displace chaff with wheat as it comes in, reclock and enforce the line contracts, keying, etc at the switchports (overlay nodes). *VC padding requires lots of management overhead and signaling between layers in overlay net to avoid user traffic saturating paths, finding bw routes, etc, forget that. Chaff fill at node-to-node link layer is easier... just as physical link crypto over fulltime fill works in background between switchports (there are proposals for ethernet to do this, embedded PHY instead of aftermarket anti-SPY gadget). Nodes already know what other nodes the upper layer wants to talk to, so they nego fill with them before swapping out lower fill for upper wheat on demand. Tor-like circuit extends in upper layer still works. User traffic in upper layers rides happy till users fill their own circuits they provisioned into the net, no different than tor or any other overlay today.
Re: F2F UDP mesh net prototype proof of concept
On Mon, Oct 21, 2019 at 06:28:01PM +1100, Zenaan Harkness wrote: > There are ~7 billion people on Earth. Napkin calculations are important when it comes to such numbers as 7 billion. In terms of routing, if we create a flat "whole earth altnet" address space, this also implies that each node needs to know, or may need to know, or may be directly contacted by (sooner or later), every other node on earth - all 7 billion if we assume on average one node per human. So we can say things like: - assume that node identification and all node metrics, are stored in 1KiB of data and so each node will sooner or later need to store, at an absolute minimum, 7 * 10^9 * 1024*8 (1KiB of bits) / 8 / 1024^3 ~= 6,675 GiB ! So we must compress that (again, assuming a flat virtual network for the time being, ignoring natural physical proximities and natural physical grouping/clumpiness). Let's say a node_info requires: - IPv6 altnet address - 128 bits - say 5-bits per metric, and 6 metrics (stat fields) = 30 bits - a few booleans (node blocked by me, "friend", "known" etc) - say 30 bits - a display name is desired, say on average compressed to 160 bits IF the above is sufficient, we have now ~348 bits per node, instead of 8192 (1 kibibyte = 1024 * 8 = 8192 bits), and our node static storage requirement (for end user routing) becomes: 7 * 10^9 * 348 / 8 / 1024^3 = ~ 283 GiB Now we reduce storage costs by assuming that, from my personal node perspective, the majority of people in the world (the majority of nodes) will fit within a bell curve of "average", and can be treated as such, until and unless they identify themselves as not average (either preferred, or avoided or blocked, again, by me) - other than that, most folks will not distinguish themselves to me, they will be in the set "unknown" and otherwise uninteresting. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Normal_distribution Ultimate bell curve density is an empirical matter, but for now we can make the averaging assumptions, pluck a random normal deviate out of thin air statistics to please ourselves and say it'll be a standard normal distribution and that the only interesting nodes (out of 7 billion) are gonna be beyond the second sigma - i.e. no more than about ~5%, as ~95% will be "normal". (Defining "normal" in the context of "empirical metrics for a node I am currently connected to" shall come later.) So, 5% of 7 billion = ~350 million nodes of interest, multiplied by ~348 bits (for long term per-interesting-node storage) gives: 7 * 10^9 * 0.05 * 348 / 8 / 1024^3 = ~ 14 GiB Still too high for a mobile phone, albeit in the realms of "possible today". We can obviously get rid of display names (these are bulk "interesting" but not "known friends" nodes), and assume for now 5 instead of 30 state bits per node: 7 * 10^9 * 0.05 * 163 / 8 / 1024^3 = ~ 6.6 GiB And if we change our random normal distribution assumption to 3 standard deviations being "normal" (~0.3% abnormal/metriced), we get: 7 * 10^9 * 0.003 * 163 / 8 / 1024^3 = ~ 400 MiB And finally we're in the realm of "possibly reasonable". Of course, the most interesting sets are "those I choose to regularly connect to" and "those I completely block", so we can likely get that 400MiB down a bit further still...
Re: F2F UDP mesh net prototype proof of concept
On Mon, Oct 21, 2019 at 06:28:01PM +1100, Zenaan Harkness wrote: > On Sun, Oct 20, 2019 at 08:40:09PM -0300, Punk - Stasi 2.0 wrote: > > 3) virtual-circuit-switched, or packet-switched? Is packet switiching > > the most expensive and the most secure option? Packet size? Re circuit switching, Tor does what's called onion routing, using TCP circuits per onion layer. This means A connects to B with a (encrypted) TCP connection, and requests of B a next hop connection to C. So B decrypts A's first layer incoming connection, which contains A's encrypted connection to C, and B forwards the packets of that connection, on to node C. This layered encryption means B cannot read the contents of A's connection with C. It also is supposed to mean that because A's initial connection to B is effective double encrypted, external onlookers should not be able to determine that A is connecting to C, only that A is connecting to B, but in practice to actually deliver this promise would require an effective chaff fill mechanism, to actually obfuscate when and how much data A sends to B, etc.
Re: F2F UDP mesh net prototype proof of concept
On Sun, Oct 20, 2019 at 08:40:09PM -0300, Punk - Stasi 2.0 wrote: > On Mon, 21 Oct 2019 09:30:02 +1100 > Zenaan Harkness wrote: > > I could have called this RayzerNet, which has a better ring to it, > > yep, but you don't need to call it anything. We can discuss the basic > architecture without you using it as an excuse for your fascist propaganda. I certainly don't need to call it "anything" - plain English words are a bitch for search terms ... seriously. Glad we agree on this one. > So, what about defining only the core features of an hypothetical > system? > > 1) peer to peer - no 'directory authorities' ack > 2) are all nodes equal, bandwidth wise, or are there bigger nodes that > provide some kind of 'convenient' (and less secure prolly) routing services? all nodes equal, in the sense you use the word equal every node is of course a unique snowflake - i.e. a unique set of ISP, possibly >1 network connection, possibly >=1 dark fibre links (off public network back links) such as N2N (neighbour to neighbour ETH or WIFI down your street/ suburb), cpu, ram etc > 3) virtual-circuit-switched, or packet-switched? Is packet switiching > the most expensive and the most secure option? Packet size? Now this is a good question. We must consider the limits, and for sanity compare with existing global Internet. There are ~7 billion people on Earth. The existing physical network (phys net), is clumpy - nations, in particular island nations including Australia, have backbones running around them joining cities, and branches out to regional areas, which ultimately branch out to individual premises (a home, an office). It's kind of a fractal of a star network, so sort of centralized. At each aggregating point or "layer", is a router, routing within that clump, and routing externally to other clumps, to other "star networks". With mobile phones (literally pocket supercomputers by the standards of 3 decades ago), we have more dynamic possibilities, and demands from users: - we -should- make use of physical peer to peer "ad hoc" wireless mesh networks, but this has yet to be solved in any production environment, except "sort of" by the occasional burning man etc set up - which have AIUI so far just been an "off grid" local star network replacing the traditional network - when known friends are near to each other, our phones should send text messages BYPASSING the national/ centralised govnet Avoiding physical correlation of nodes is probably unwise, due to such possible benefits. This implies inherent network "clumpiness". So, back to routing - we can assume, with IPv6 at least, a flat global node address space - at least, we can do this in a virtual layer above govnet. But do we want to? We want to replace govnet, not assume govnet. This means we want to in some sense create a practical physical alt net, which is not govnet, and so our design MUST cater for this from the get go, even though many links shall in the early days make use of govnet.
Re: F2F UDP mesh net prototype proof of concept
On Sun, Oct 20, 2019 at 08:40:09PM -0300, Punk - Stasi 2.0 wrote: > On Mon, 21 Oct 2019 09:30:02 +1100 > Zenaan Harkness wrote: > > > On Sun, Oct 20, 2019 at 07:22:12PM -0300, Punk - Stasi 2.0 wrote: > > > On Sun, 20 Oct 2019 20:58:37 +1100 > > > Zenaan Harkness wrote: > > > > > > > > > > See https://github.com/zenaan/covfefe if you wish to follow along > > > > with this exploration. > > > > > > "covfefe"? - you might want to first explain why you chose that name > > > and then change it. > > > > > > Until you do, it may be safe to dismiss you as a fascist trump agent. > > > > Doesn't matter if it's Antifa Rayzer who wishes to speak, Trump or > > Juan who wishes to speak. The right is sacrosanct, > > right, and that has fuck to do with the name you chose. A free > speech platform is unbiased. The name you chose isn't unbiased at > all. My expressions in this world are at base, events of my exercise of my right to communicate freely, pursuant to my will. Rail on muffa :) BTW, such reaction, ironically, is the very motivation, and further motivation, for further memeing, which to some is just hilarious and the source of endless giggles. But in this case I intend to get on with the work at hand - a meme name is enough for me and covfefe has more public traction than Rayzer, and besides, some domain squatter is trying to sell covfefe.com for ~ USD $8,000 :D > > and > > notwithstanding if anyoen of these call to censor (or worse, murder, > > in the case of Rayzer), they have a right to say what they wish to > > say. > > > > If we cannot stand for the right of those with disagree with, to say > > what they wish to say, we don't deserve our own freedom of > > communication. > > and what has that got to do with you creating an account at > github-MICROSOFT-NSA and naming it after some fascist bullshit > 'meme'? I am inclined to create a git account somewhere else - I created my github account before it was purchased by MS, if you must know... so, momentum. But if you suggest an alternative, I'd be glad to swap actually - been wanting to get off of github since they sold out. You are of course free and encouraged to create your own forks, originations, deployments and etc under whatever meme suits ya - I was pretty sure I didn't need to say that but hey, feel free to chomp on another tastily rabbit hole bated meme hook ;) I'll reply to the tech discussion in a separate email.
