[EM] Voting reform statement
A few months ago, we had a discussion where several people supported the idea of writing a common statement for people on this list to sign on to. I said that I would write such a statement, but until now, I haven't. I believe that, with the Rhode Island Voter Choice Commission about to be seated, now is an opportune time to do so. The statement below is my attempt to write something that I think will get broad consensus here.* It is only a first draft and I expect it to change significantly before we start to sign on to it.* I am probably being overoptimistic about how much we can agree on. I'd welcome discussion of any of the points below. Remember: the main objective here is not to convince others to agree with you, but to find the most-useful statement on which you can already agree. So once people have heard each side of a debate, if we still don't agree on something, we just remove that from the statement or present both sides; we should try to avoid getting sidetracked in endless debates on specific points. The study of voting systems has made significant progress over the last decade, and our understanding is even farther beyond what it was 20 years ago. One important place where that has happened is on the election methods mailing list. This mailing list is likely to include the largest and most diverse group of voting systems theorists in the world. It is a place where opinions vary and debate is vigorous. Thus, we think that the broad, though imperfect, consensus on the following ideas is worth paying attention to. We believe that the voting systems currently used in most of the English-speaking world, including single-round plurality voting (also termed First Past the Post, FPTP) and single-member districts (aka seats, ridings, or electorates), represent some of the worst voting systems known. We believe that reforming these systems would provide important societal benefits, and that there are clearly not corresponding reasons to oppose such reform from the perspective of the public interest. We may disagree about which specific reforms might provide the absolutely optimum results, but we can nevertheless agree that there are a number of options which would represent worthwhile improvements. *Single-winner reform* There are various criteria, both formally-defined and informal, by which one can judge a voting system. These criteria can be divided into several classes: 1. Honest-results-oriented criteria. These include such measures as Bayesian regret (that is, simulated societal satisfaction), the majority criterion, and the Condorcet criterion, which focus on whether the correct candidate, according to some definition, is elected. Although these criteria in some cases can favor different candidates as being correct, in most practical cases they agree. 2. Strategy-resistance criteria. Voting is a complex process, and inevitably there are some cases where some group could get an advantage by changing their votes. It is desirable to keep such cases to a minimum. For one thing, it's fairer not to reward such strategic voting behavior. But it's not just that. Perhaps more importantly, a voting system which gives too much of an incentive to strategic voters, can lead to widespread strategy which systematically distorts the results. 3. Process-oriented criteria. These include such measures as simplicity of the ballot, simplicity of the ballot-counting process, and feasibility of auditing or other fraud-prevention measures. 4. Candidate-incentive criteria. Systems which encourage or discourage clone candidates; give too much power to parties, as opposed to voters; have problems here. These criteria also include less strictly-defined concerns about the type of candidates and campaign strategies a system encourages; for instance, systems which effectively reduce the field to 2 major candidates could encourage negative advertising. There is a broad consensus among researchers plurality voting is among the worst systems for honest results, for strategy-resistance, and for candidate incentives. Honest voting can split votes among similar candidates, spoiling the election and leading opposing candidates to win. Voters respond by strategically choosing the lesser evil among the two major candidates, which can lead to complacent candidates because even corrupt, widely-disliked candidates can win. The system discourages candidates from entering the race, and encourages negative advertising. Although plurality has good simplicity and fraud-resistance, this is not enough to recommend its use. A number of proposed single-winner replacements for plurality exist. Although theorists can not find consensus about which of these systems is best, we can agree that many of them are clearly head-and-shoulders above plurality. Systems advanced as as best by some of us, and accepted as good by all of us, include (in categorical and alphabetical order): - Various *Bucklin* or median-based
Re: [EM] Voting reform statement
On Aug 15, 2011, at 7:09 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote: So, what do you think? Let the debate begin. I expect the above to be torn to shreds. But once it's starting to seem stable, I'll make a google doc out of it, so we can collaboratively polish up the language. Where you will lose many of us, I think, is in a flat endorsement of approval. The fundamental problem with approval voting is that, with more than two candidates, voting demands that the voter engage in strategic voting. That is, if my preference is ABC, then my decision whether to approve B cannot be made without strategizing. That flies in the face of your fine suggestion that strategy avoidance be an important criterion. (It's not an answer to say that approval strategy is easy or obvious; that's not the point, nor is it generally true, since it depends on having information not generally available about other voters' preferences and strategies.) The problems of IRV are minor compared to approval (and any other rating-based system). Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Voting reform statement
2011/8/15 Jonathan Lundell jlund...@pobox.com On Aug 15, 2011, at 7:09 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote: So, what do you think? Let the debate begin. I expect the above to be torn to shreds. But once it's starting to seem stable, I'll make a google doc out of it, so we can collaboratively polish up the language. Where you will lose many of us, I think, is in a flat endorsement of approval. The fundamental problem with approval voting is that, with more than two candidates, voting demands that the voter engage in strategic voting. That is, if my preference is ABC, then my decision whether to approve B cannot be made without strategizing. That flies in the face of your fine suggestion that strategy avoidance be an important criterion. (It's not an answer to say that approval strategy is easy or obvious; that's not the point, nor is it generally true, since it depends on having information not generally available about other voters' preferences and strategies.) Well, I specifically didn't make such a claim, because, although I believe it, I knew it would lose people. I would claim that approval strategy is at least as easy/obvious as plurality strategy; and that approval reacts at least as well to a lack of strategy as plurality. The problems of IRV are minor compared to approval (and any other rating-based system). You can believe that and still sign this statement, as long as you believe that approval is a worthwhile step up from plurality. Note that the statement nowhere claims that approval is better than IRV, just that it is likely to be able to get a broader consensus from theorists. Still... although you haven't actually said anything that contradicts what I wrote, you did say that I will lose you for endorsing approval, which makes me suspect that you also feel that approval is not a worthwhile step up from plurality. I'd love to convince you otherwise, but the most important thing is to get a worthwhile consensus statement. To me, any statement that can't flatly endorse even one system is meaningless, and I'd guess approval is probably the system which can get the broadest support, and also one of the few which has a real chance of being implemented for real-world political elections. Am I wrong? Would you, for instance, endorse SODA? Personally, I see voting reform as a step-by-step process. Yes, approval has unsatisfying aspects. But implementing approval is a clear step up from plurality; a clear step towards any system you might advocate; and a step that would give us useful empirical data to help decide which direction to go from there. I think that most voters would be wary of taking a larger leap, even to my one of my favored systems, which I think are among the simpler of the better options. And since the simpler, safer option of approval does exist, I can't even blame voters for that. So, the bottom line is: Jonathan, what do you suggest? Do you think that this statement would still be useful if we simply removed approval and thus made no clear policy suggestion? Do you think that there's some other system which could get broader support from this community than approval would? Or do you thing that a useful, broadly-supported statement is simply impossible? (Or do you see some other option which I don't?) JQ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] France 2007 presidential election -- IRV nonmonotonic
http://www.rangevoting.org/French2007studies.html#nonmono I have written to the 3 IRV-study-authors requesting their raw data, which should enable verifying this conclusion (which is already pretty certain, but not 100% certain). -- Warren D. Smith http://RangeVoting.org -- add your endorsement (by clicking endorse as 1st step) Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Voting reform statement
On Aug 15, 2011, at 8:35 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote: 2011/8/15 Jonathan Lundell jlund...@pobox.com On Aug 15, 2011, at 7:09 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote: So, what do you think? Let the debate begin. I expect the above to be torn to shreds. But once it's starting to seem stable, I'll make a google doc out of it, so we can collaboratively polish up the language. Where you will lose many of us, I think, is in a flat endorsement of approval. The fundamental problem with approval voting is that, with more than two candidates, voting demands that the voter engage in strategic voting. That is, if my preference is ABC, then my decision whether to approve B cannot be made without strategizing. That flies in the face of your fine suggestion that strategy avoidance be an important criterion. (It's not an answer to say that approval strategy is easy or obvious; that's not the point, nor is it generally true, since it depends on having information not generally available about other voters' preferences and strategies.) Well, I specifically didn't make such a claim, because, although I believe it, I knew it would lose people. I would claim that approval strategy is at least as easy/obvious as plurality strategy; and that approval reacts at least as well to a lack of strategy as plurality. The problems of IRV are minor compared to approval (and any other rating-based system). You can believe that and still sign this statement, as long as you believe that approval is a worthwhile step up from plurality. Note that the statement nowhere claims that approval is better than IRV, just that it is likely to be able to get a broader consensus from theorists. Still... although you haven't actually said anything that contradicts what I wrote, you did say that I will lose you for endorsing approval, which makes me suspect that you also feel that approval is not a worthwhile step up from plurality. I'd love to convince you otherwise, but the most important thing is to get a worthwhile consensus statement. To me, any statement that can't flatly endorse even one system is meaningless, and I'd guess approval is probably the system which can get the broadest support, and also one of the few which has a real chance of being implemented for real-world political elections. Am I wrong? Would you, for instance, endorse SODA? Personally, I see voting reform as a step-by-step process. Yes, approval has unsatisfying aspects. But implementing approval is a clear step up from plurality; a clear step towards any system you might advocate; and a step that would give us useful empirical data to help decide which direction to go from there. I think that most voters would be wary of taking a larger leap, even to my one of my favored systems, which I think are among the simpler of the better options. And since the simpler, safer option of approval does exist, I can't even blame voters for that. So, the bottom line is: Jonathan, what do you suggest? Do you think that this statement would still be useful if we simply removed approval and thus made no clear policy suggestion? Do you think that there's some other system which could get broader support from this community than approval would? Or do you thing that a useful, broadly-supported statement is simply impossible? (Or do you see some other option which I don't?) I'm doubtful that such a statement is possible, at least if you want universal assent. If we grant for the sake of the argument that approval is strictly preferable to plurality (and I might argue with that), then I don't see the case for rejecting IRV out of hand. Sure, there are list members who are allergic to IRV, but it seems to me that the argument against strategy-intensive rules is at least as convincing (more so to me). In general, if the primary reason we're rejecting plurality is its strategy problems (and your three listed problems, honest results, strategy-resistance, and candidate incentives all fall into a strategy category, seems to me), then it's hard for me to see a strong motivation for advocating approval. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Voting reform statement
2011/8/15 Jonathan Lundell jlund...@pobox.com On Aug 15, 2011, at 8:35 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote: 2011/8/15 Jonathan Lundell jlund...@pobox.com On Aug 15, 2011, at 7:09 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote: So, what do you think? Let the debate begin. I expect the above to be torn to shreds. But once it's starting to seem stable, I'll make a google doc out of it, so we can collaboratively polish up the language. Where you will lose many of us, I think, is in a flat endorsement of approval. The fundamental problem with approval voting is that, with more than two candidates, voting demands that the voter engage in strategic voting. That is, if my preference is ABC, then my decision whether to approve B cannot be made without strategizing. That flies in the face of your fine suggestion that strategy avoidance be an important criterion. (It's not an answer to say that approval strategy is easy or obvious; that's not the point, nor is it generally true, since it depends on having information not generally available about other voters' preferences and strategies.) Well, I specifically didn't make such a claim, because, although I believe it, I knew it would lose people. I would claim that approval strategy is at least as easy/obvious as plurality strategy; and that approval reacts at least as well to a lack of strategy as plurality. The problems of IRV are minor compared to approval (and any other rating-based system). You can believe that and still sign this statement, as long as you believe that approval is a worthwhile step up from plurality. Note that the statement nowhere claims that approval is better than IRV, just that it is likely to be able to get a broader consensus from theorists. Still... although you haven't actually said anything that contradicts what I wrote, you did say that I will lose you for endorsing approval, which makes me suspect that you also feel that approval is not a worthwhile step up from plurality. I'd love to convince you otherwise, but the most important thing is to get a worthwhile consensus statement. To me, any statement that can't flatly endorse even one system is meaningless, and I'd guess approval is probably the system which can get the broadest support, and also one of the few which has a real chance of being implemented for real-world political elections. Am I wrong? Would you, for instance, endorse SODA? Personally, I see voting reform as a step-by-step process. Yes, approval has unsatisfying aspects. But implementing approval is a clear step up from plurality; a clear step towards any system you might advocate; and a step that would give us useful empirical data to help decide which direction to go from there. I think that most voters would be wary of taking a larger leap, even to my one of my favored systems, which I think are among the simpler of the better options. And since the simpler, safer option of approval does exist, I can't even blame voters for that. So, the bottom line is: Jonathan, what do you suggest? Do you think that this statement would still be useful if we simply removed approval and thus made no clear policy suggestion? Do you think that there's some other system which could get broader support from this community than approval would? Or do you thing that a useful, broadly-supported statement is simply impossible? (Or do you see some other option which I don't?) I'm doubtful that such a statement is possible, at least if you want universal assent. Not universal, just as broad as possible. If we grant for the sake of the argument that approval is strictly preferable to plurality (and I might argue with that), then I don't see the case for rejecting IRV out of hand. Sure, there are list members who are allergic to IRV, but it seems to me that the argument against strategy-intensive rules is at least as convincing (more so to me). There are people here who have reasonable arguments that IRV is strictly worse than plurality, and so will not sign any statement advocating it. You are making a reasonable argument that to me says that Approval is only marginally better than plurality. So I don't see how that precludes you from being able to sign on to this statement. Perhaps your argument is better than the anti-IRV argument, but that's not the point here. We can certainly assume that it's impossible that everyone here will agree on any statement of that form. In general, if the primary reason we're rejecting plurality is its strategy problems (and your three listed problems, honest results, strategy-resistance, and candidate incentives all fall into a strategy category, seems to me), then it's hard for me to see a strong motivation for advocating approval. Again, broadest possible consensus. Approval is nobody's favorite (I think; it certainly isn't mine), but it's a good next step, and something we can (I hope) agree on. JQ Election-Methods mailing list - see
Re: [EM] Voting reform statement
On Aug 15, 2011, at 10:31 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote: 2011/8/15 Jonathan Lundell jlund...@pobox.com On Aug 15, 2011, at 8:35 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote: 2011/8/15 Jonathan Lundell jlund...@pobox.com On Aug 15, 2011, at 7:09 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote: So, what do you think? Let the debate begin. I expect the above to be torn to shreds. But once it's starting to seem stable, I'll make a google doc out of it, so we can collaboratively polish up the language. Where you will lose many of us, I think, is in a flat endorsement of approval. The fundamental problem with approval voting is that, with more than two candidates, voting demands that the voter engage in strategic voting. That is, if my preference is ABC, then my decision whether to approve B cannot be made without strategizing. That flies in the face of your fine suggestion that strategy avoidance be an important criterion. (It's not an answer to say that approval strategy is easy or obvious; that's not the point, nor is it generally true, since it depends on having information not generally available about other voters' preferences and strategies.) Well, I specifically didn't make such a claim, because, although I believe it, I knew it would lose people. I would claim that approval strategy is at least as easy/obvious as plurality strategy; and that approval reacts at least as well to a lack of strategy as plurality. The problems of IRV are minor compared to approval (and any other rating-based system). You can believe that and still sign this statement, as long as you believe that approval is a worthwhile step up from plurality. Note that the statement nowhere claims that approval is better than IRV, just that it is likely to be able to get a broader consensus from theorists. Still... although you haven't actually said anything that contradicts what I wrote, you did say that I will lose you for endorsing approval, which makes me suspect that you also feel that approval is not a worthwhile step up from plurality. I'd love to convince you otherwise, but the most important thing is to get a worthwhile consensus statement. To me, any statement that can't flatly endorse even one system is meaningless, and I'd guess approval is probably the system which can get the broadest support, and also one of the few which has a real chance of being implemented for real-world political elections. Am I wrong? Would you, for instance, endorse SODA? Personally, I see voting reform as a step-by-step process. Yes, approval has unsatisfying aspects. But implementing approval is a clear step up from plurality; a clear step towards any system you might advocate; and a step that would give us useful empirical data to help decide which direction to go from there. I think that most voters would be wary of taking a larger leap, even to my one of my favored systems, which I think are among the simpler of the better options. And since the simpler, safer option of approval does exist, I can't even blame voters for that. So, the bottom line is: Jonathan, what do you suggest? Do you think that this statement would still be useful if we simply removed approval and thus made no clear policy suggestion? Do you think that there's some other system which could get broader support from this community than approval would? Or do you thing that a useful, broadly-supported statement is simply impossible? (Or do you see some other option which I don't?) I'm doubtful that such a statement is possible, at least if you want universal assent. Not universal, just as broad as possible. If we grant for the sake of the argument that approval is strictly preferable to plurality (and I might argue with that), then I don't see the case for rejecting IRV out of hand. Sure, there are list members who are allergic to IRV, but it seems to me that the argument against strategy-intensive rules is at least as convincing (more so to me). There are people here who have reasonable arguments that IRV is strictly worse than plurality, and so will not sign any statement advocating it. You are making a reasonable argument that to me says that Approval is only marginally better than plurality. So I don't see how that precludes you from being able to sign on to this statement. Perhaps your argument is better than the anti-IRV argument, but that's not the point here. We can certainly assume that it's impossible that everyone here will agree on any statement of that form. In general, if the primary reason we're rejecting plurality is its strategy problems (and your three listed problems, honest results, strategy-resistance, and candidate incentives all fall into a strategy category, seems to me), then it's hard for me to see a strong motivation for advocating approval. Again, broadest possible consensus. Approval is nobody's favorite (I think; it certainly isn't
Re: [EM] Voting reform statement
It's true that I might agree to a statement if all it said were We believe that approval is marginally superior to plurality (thought to the extent that I agreed, I don't think it's enough better to merit any energy in advocating it). But that's not what you're proposing. Is it? No. I'm proposing saying that, in different words, along with a number of other things with which you haven't disagreed. Including that we believe that approval is a step towards systems which we see as significantly superior to plurality. (Remember - just as approval is 2-level Range, approval is also 2-level Schulze or what have you, and also no-intercandidate-preference SODA, etc.) So, either propose some specific change in the language relating to approval, or bring some other objection, or both. JQ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Voting reform statement
On Aug 15, 2011, at 11:58 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote: It's true that I might agree to a statement if all it said were We believe that approval is marginally superior to plurality (thought to the extent that I agreed, I don't think it's enough better to merit any energy in advocating it). But that's not what you're proposing. Is it? No. I'm proposing saying that, in different words, along with a number of other things with which you haven't disagreed. Including that we believe that approval is a step towards systems which we see as significantly superior to plurality. (Remember - just as approval is 2-level Range, approval is also 2-level Schulze or what have you, and also no-intercandidate-preference SODA, etc.) So, either propose some specific change in the language relating to approval, or bring some other objection, or both. The statement says, in effect, Range is good, IRV is bad. I disagree. Perhaps I'm the only one, in which case it's inconsequential that I'm not aboard. (What Schulze are we talking about? I associate the name with a Condorcet-cycle-breaking method.) Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Voting reform statement
On 8/15/2011 1:42 PM, Jonathan Lundell wrote: It's true that I might agree to a statement if all it said were We believe that approval is marginally superior to plurality (thought to the extent that I agreed, I don't think it's enough better to merit any energy in advocating it). I haven't been following discussions on this list at all closely for a long time, but I'm astonished to read someone assert that approval is only marginally superior to plurality. Does anyone else agree? Approval will pretty reliably overcome or at least greatly diminish plurality's worst weakness: the spoiler problem (as it is known and pretty well understood by most people who are experienced in voting in plurality elections). To me, that makes approval a great deal better (not merely marginally better) than plurality, notwithstanding the strategy issue, which I strongly doubt is nearly as problematic as Jonathan suggests it is. (Haven't Steven Brams and other well-informed advocates of approval persuasively addressed strategy concerns?) As a related question (I'm asking this as one of the less expert and engaged readers of this list): Have variations on approval voting been discussed that might have advantages over it, such as disapproval voting or favorites plus disapproval (i.e., vote for one or more most favored candidates and against any number of disapproved candidates)? One other important consideration: Approval voting is surely the single best method for making quick tentative or non-critical decisions during meetings. It is AS or NEARLY AS simple as plurality and doesn't even require that all the options be listed at the start of voting. For example, suppose a group is trying to decide where to hold its next meeting. Three different possible locations are selected. An approval vote is held, but none of the options get a lot of support. After that vote, additional options can be suggested and voted on and their support compared with support for the first three options. The reason this is important is that approval voting could be promoted as a very simple and practical improvement over plurality voting for making tentative or uncritical decisions in meetings and decisions among informal groups of people wanting to quickly make one or a few collective choices (e.g., a group wanting to agree on a restaurant or movie or something else to visit or participate in together). Even those concerned about approval's strategy problems can probably agree that because of the tentativeness or relative unimportance of such decisions, the strategy issue is much less of a concern. The point is that promoting approval as a simple, practical means for making many kinds of group decisions would, at the same time, be a good way of promoting the idea that there are practical alternative voting methods that are clearly superior to plurality voting for at least some purposes, possibly including formal elections. Furthermore, if a result of efforts to promote approval voting was that it became much more commonly used in meetings and by informal groups, the idea that serious consideration needs to be given to replacing plurality voting in formal elections should also become much easier to promote. -RS Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Voting Reform Statement
The study of voting systems has made significant progress over the last decade, and our understanding is even farther beyond what it was 20 years ago. One important place where that has happened is on the election methods mailing list. This mailing list is likely to include the largest and most diverse group of voting systems theorists in the world. It is a place where opinions vary and debate is vigorous. Thus, we think that the broad, though imperfect, consensus on the following ideas is worth paying attention to. We believe that the voting systems currently used in most of the English-speaking world, including single-round plurality voting (also termed First Past the Post, FPTP) and single-member districts (aka seats, ridings, or electorates), represent some of the worst voting systems known. We believe that reforming these systems would provide important societal benefits, and that there are clearly not corresponding reasons to oppose such reform from the perspective of the public interest. We may disagreeabout which specific reforms might provide the absolutely optimum results, but we can nevertheless agree that there are a number of options which would represent worthwhile improvements. *Single-winner reform* There are various criteria, both formally-defined and informal, by which one can judge a voting system. These criteria can be divided into several classes: 1. Honest-results-oriented criteria. These include such measures as Bayesian regret (that is, simulated societal satisfaction), the majority criterion,and the Condorcet criterion, which focus on whether the correct candidate, according to some definition, is elected. Although these criteria in some cases can favor different candidates as being correct, in most practicalcases they agree. 2. Strategy-resistance criteria. Voting is a complex process, and inevitably there are some cases where some group could get an advantage by changingtheir votes. It is desirable to keep such cases to a minimum. For one thing, it's fairer not to reward such strategic voting behavior. But it's not just that. Perhaps more importantly, a voting system which gives too much of an incentive to strategic voters, can lead to widespread strategywhich systematically distorts the results. 3. Process-oriented criteria. These include such measures as simplicity of the ballot, simplicity of the ballot-counting process, and feasibility of auditing or other fraud-prevention measures. 4. Candidate-incentive criteria. Systems which encourage or discourage clone candidates; give too much power to parties, as opposed to voters; have problems here. These criteria also include less strictly-defined concerns about the type of candidates and campaign strategies a system encourages; for instance, systems which effectively reduce the field to 2 major candidates could encourage negative advertising. There is a broad consensus among researchers plurality voting is among the worst systems for honest results, for strategy-resistance, and for candidate incentives. Honest voting can split votes among similar candidates, spoiling the election and leading opposing candidates to win. Voters respond by strategically choosing the lesser evil among the two major candidates, which can lead to complacent candidates because even corrupt,widely-disliked candidates can win. The system discourages candidates from entering the race, and encourages negative advertising. Although pluralityhas good simplicity and fraud-resistance, this is not enough to recommend its use. A number of proposed single-winner replacements for plurality exist. Although theorists can not find consensus about which of these systems is best, we can agree that many of them are clearly head-and- shoulders above plurality. Systems advanced as as best by some of us, and accepted as good by all of us, include (in categorical and alphabetical order): Put Approval Voting here in alphabetical order, and mention that each of the following methods is a generalization of Approval in a slightly different direction. In other words all of the most highly esteemed methods on the EM list turn out to be generalizations of Approval I know that you made this point in a slightly different way, but it could easily be passed over without registering mentally if we are not careful. - Various *Bucklin* or median-based systems such as *Majority Judgment* - Various *Condorcet* systems, including *Condorcet//Approval, various Condorcet//IRV hybrids, Ranked Pairs, *and* Schulze*. - *Range Voting* (aka Score Voting) - *SODA voting* Notably absent from the above list is IRV (aka Alternative Vote, Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Enhanced DMC
- Original Message -
From:
Date: Friday, August 12, 2011 3:12 pm
Subject: Enhanced DMC
To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com,
From: C.Benham
To: election-methods-electorama@electorama.com
Subject: [EM] Enhanced DMC
Forest,
The D in DMC used to stand for *Definite*.
Yeah, that's what we finally settled on.
I like (and I think I'm happy to endorse) this Condorcet
method
idea,
and consider it to be clearly better than regular DMC
Could this method give a different winner from the (Approval
Chain
Building ?) method you mentioned in the C//A thread (on 11
June 2011)?
Yes, I'll give an example when I get more time
Here's a possible scenario:
Suppose that approval order is alphabetical from most approval to least A, B,
C, D.
Suppose further that pairwise defeats are as follows:
CADBA together with BCD .
Then the set P = {A, B} is the set of candidates neither of which is pairwise
beaten by anybody with greater approval.
Since the approval winner A is not covered by B, it is not covered by any
member of P, so the enhanced version of DMC elects A.
But A is covered by C so it cannot be elected by any of the chain building
methods that elect only from the uncovered set.
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Voting reform statement
2011/8/15 Jonathan Lundell jlund...@pobox.com On Aug 15, 2011, at 11:58 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote: It's true that I might agree to a statement if all it said were We believe that approval is marginally superior to plurality (thought to the extent that I agreed, I don't think it's enough better to merit any energy in advocating it). But that's not what you're proposing. Is it? No. I'm proposing saying that, in different words, along with a number of other things with which you haven't disagreed. Including that we believe that approval is a step towards systems which we see as significantly superior to plurality. (Remember - just as approval is 2-level Range, approval is also 2-level Schulze or what have you, and also no-intercandidate-preference SODA, etc.) So, either propose some specific change in the language relating to approval, or bring some other objection, or both. The statement says, in effect, Range is good, IRV is bad. I disagree. Perhaps I'm the only one, in which case it's inconsequential that I'm not aboard. (What Schulze are we talking about? I associate the name with a Condorcet-cycle-breaking method.) It doesn't say that. It says, we can agree that range is at least marginally better than plurality, we cannot agree on that for IRV. I would happily sign a separate statement saying IRV is better than plurality, but I think including that here would lose too many. Schulze is just my default example of a complex but good Condorcet tiebreaker. And if you run it with only two-level ballots, it is equivalent to approval. If you want to suggest rewording to make it clear that you're only giving the weakest possible endorsement to Range, then go ahead. But remember, any amount you weaken the these are good systems section, weakens it for all of the listed systems. Because we are not going to get many people to sign on to a statement that makes distinctions between those systems. Or say clearly that you can't sign the statement in any form, and we'll stop worrying about you. I want this to get as much support as possible, but I know that I'll never get everyone. Again, I personally agree with much of what you are saying. Approval does force strategic thinking on the voter, more than many other options. (That's also true of Range, but not of MJ, so you shouldn't generalize to rating systems.) But this is not about just me. JQ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Voting Reform Statement
2011/8/15 fsimm...@pcc.edu The study of voting systems has made significant progress over the last decade, and our understanding is even farther beyond what it was 20 years ago. One important place where that has happened is on the election methods mailing list. This mailing list is likely to include the largest and most diverse group of voting systems theorists in the world. It is a place where opinions vary and debate is vigorous. Thus, we think that the broad, though imperfect, consensus on the following ideas is worth paying attention to. We believe that the voting systems currently used in most of the English-speaking world, including single-round plurality voting (also termed First Past the Post, FPTP) and single-member districts (aka seats, ridings, or electorates), represent some of the worst voting systems known. We believe that reforming these systems would provide important societal benefits, and that there are clearly not corresponding reasons to oppose such reform from the perspective of the public interest. We may disagreeabout which specific reforms might provide the absolutely optimum results, but we can nevertheless agree that there are a number of options which would represent worthwhile improvements. *Single-winner reform* There are various criteria, both formally-defined and informal, by which one can judge a voting system. These criteria can be divided into several classes: 1. Honest-results-oriented criteria. These include such measures as Bayesian regret (that is, simulated societal satisfaction), the majority criterion,and the Condorcet criterion, which focus on whether the correct candidate, according to some definition, is elected. Although these criteria in some cases can favor different candidates as being correct, in most practicalcases they agree. 2. Strategy-resistance criteria. Voting is a complex process, and inevitably there are some cases where some group could get an advantage by changingtheir votes. It is desirable to keep such cases to a minimum. For one thing, it's fairer not to reward such strategic voting behavior. But it's not just that. Perhaps more importantly, a voting system which gives too much of an incentive to strategic voters, can lead to widespread strategywhich systematically distorts the results. 3. Process-oriented criteria. These include such measures as simplicity of the ballot, simplicity of the ballot-counting process, and feasibility of auditing or other fraud-prevention measures. 4. Candidate-incentive criteria. Systems which encourage or discourage clone candidates; give too much power to parties, as opposed to voters; have problems here. These criteria also include less strictly-defined concerns about the type of candidates and campaign strategies a system encourages; for instance, systems which effectively reduce the field to 2 major candidates could encourage negative advertising. There is a broad consensus among researchers plurality voting is among the worst systems for honest results, for strategy-resistance, and for candidate incentives. Honest voting can split votes among similar candidates, spoiling the election and leading opposing candidates to win. Voters respond by strategically choosing the lesser evil among the two major candidates, which can lead to complacent candidates because even corrupt,widely-disliked candidates can win. The system discourages candidates from entering the race, and encourages negative advertising. Although pluralityhas good simplicity and fraud-resistance, this is not enough to recommend its use. A number of proposed single-winner replacements for plurality exist. Although theorists can not find consensus about which of these systems is best, we can agree that many of them are clearly head-and- shoulders above plurality. Systems advanced as as best by some of us, and accepted as good by all of us, include (in categorical and alphabetical order): Put Approval Voting here in alphabetical order, Is there anyone who feels that Approval is better than all the other systems listed here? I think that's true for each of the others; the list is supposed to be systems someone thinks are best and (almost) no-one (reasonably) thinks are worse than plurality. and mention that each of the following methods is a generalization of Approval in a slightly different direction. In other words all of the most highly esteemed methods on the EM list turn out to be generalizations of Approval I know that you made this point in a slightly different way, but it could easily be passed over without registering mentally if we are not careful. OK, that's a good suggestion. We'll do that when we get to editing details. JQ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Voting reform statement
On Aug 15, 2011, at 6:20 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote: Or say clearly that you can't sign the statement in any form, and we'll stop worrying about you. I want this to get as much support as possible, but I know that I'll never get everyone. OK, stop worrying, and I'll watch the progress of the statement. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Voting reform statement
Strategy thoughts: Assuming as candidates, Good, Soso, and lice: My preference is G but S is better than any lice. Thus I desire to vote for both G and S with G preferred. Plurality - can not vote for both. On days when I expect G to certainly lose I vote for S to protect, as best I can, against lice. Approval - can vote for both but this can cause G to lose. Simple rules and a bit better than plurality. IRV - can vote for both. Vote counting is both much labor and can fail to elect G even though best liked, if this is not seen by the way the counters look at the ballots. Range - can vote for both. After giving G top rating, S has a strategy headache: Rate S high and risk S winning over G; rate S low and risk S losing to lice. Condorcet - can vote for both and show clear preference for G over S. On Aug 15, 2011, at 9:20 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote: 2011/8/15 Jonathan Lundell jlund...@pobox.com On Aug 15, 2011, at 11:58 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote: It's true that I might agree to a statement if all it said were We believe that approval is marginally superior to plurality (thought to the extent that I agreed, I don't think it's enough better to merit any energy in advocating it). But that's not what you're proposing. Is it? No. I'm proposing saying that, in different words, along with a number of other things with which you haven't disagreed. Including that we believe that approval is a step towards systems which we see as significantly superior to plurality. (Remember - just as approval is 2-level Range, approval is also 2-level Schulze or what have you, and also no-intercandidate-preference SODA, etc.) So, either propose some specific change in the language relating to approval, or bring some other objection, or both. The statement says, in effect, Range is good, IRV is bad. I disagree. Perhaps I'm the only one, in which case it's inconsequential that I'm not aboard. (What Schulze are we talking about? I associate the name with a Condorcet-cycle-breaking method.) It doesn't say that. It says, we can agree that range is at least marginally better than plurality, we cannot agree on that for IRV. I would happily sign a separate statement saying IRV is better than plurality, but I think including that here would lose too many. Schulze is just my default example of a complex but good Condorcet tiebreaker. And if you run it with only two-level ballots, it is equivalent to approval. If you want to suggest rewording to make it clear that you're only giving the weakest possible endorsement to Range, then go ahead. But remember, any amount you weaken the these are good systems section, weakens it for all of the listed systems. Because we are not going to get many people to sign on to a statement that makes distinctions between those systems. Or say clearly that you can't sign the statement in any form, and we'll stop worrying about you. I want this to get as much support as possible, but I know that I'll never get everyone. Again, I personally agree with much of what you are saying. Approval does force strategic thinking on the voter, more than many other options. (That's also true of Range, but not of MJ, so you shouldn't generalize to rating systems.) But this is not about just me. JQ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Voting reform statement
On 8/15/11 9:20 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote: Or say clearly that you can't sign the statement in any form, and we'll stop worrying about you. I want this to get as much support as possible, but I know that I'll never get everyone. i would say that a good political document would be one that points out that the traditional vote-for-one ballot (either FPTP or delayed top-two runoff) has problems that election reform people have been pointing out for many decades. in fact, every thoughtful voter who wants to vote for an independent or a 3rd-party candidate is aware of a problem they need to think through (will I be throwing away my vote?). the whole idea of Ranked-Choice voting is to relieve the thoughtful voter of having to consider strategy when considering voting for a potential spoiler. then voters are discouraged from wasting their vote and that entrenches the two-party system. in case someone asks What's wrong with that?, then i recall Dumb and Dumber and tell people we shouldn't have to be forced to always choose between the two. now, setting aside Approval voting for the moment, then *any* reform must call for a change in the ballot structure. (Approval requires changing the structure only in the directions to voters; that they may vote for as many as they like.) the simplest change or upgrade from the traditional vote-for-one ballot, is a ranked ballot. so once this political document calls for Ranked-choice voting, i think it would be good to point out how IRV was sorta conceived in the first place and that IRV can work pretty good when any independent or a 3rd-party candidate is far below the two major candidates. the non-major candidate will not be a spoiler with IRV. but when there are 3 or more viable candidates, where the vote really gets split 3 ways, *then* IRV can also fail and has done so in political history. the political document should point out how this can and has happened. Again, I personally agree with much of what you are saying. Approval does force strategic thinking on the voter, more than many other options. (That's also true of Range, but not of MJ, so you shouldn't generalize to rating systems.) what is MJ? isn't some amount of strategic thinking necessary for *any* rating system (as opposed to ranked choice)? you have to turn this preference: Mother Teresa Mahatma Gandhi Joseph Stalin Satan into numerical ratings. that requires more thinking from the voter. as for positively advocating a specific reform, once we get past the traditional ballot and once we realize that IRV will not always deliver on its promise (to eliminate the spoiler problem and the strategic voting that results), if we don't want to complicate the voters' lives with an unnecessarily complex ballot, and once we agree that the reformed election should turn out no different than the traditional FPTP for the case of two candidates, then i think it should be a Condorcet method that is advocated. -- r b-j r...@audioimagination.com Imagination is more important than knowledge. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Voting reform statement
I like it, and would sign on to these general ideas. Thanks for writing it, Jameson. It's not bad as is, but I'm sure we can find ways to improve it as we work together. I'll try to help as much as I can, but I can't promise I'll be fast. ~ Andy On Mon, Aug 15, 2011 at 7:09 AM, Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.comwrote: A few months ago, we had a discussion where several people supported the idea of writing a common statement for people on this list to sign on to. I said that I would write such a statement, but until now, I haven't. I believe that, with the Rhode Island Voter Choice Commission about to be seated, now is an opportune time to do so. The statement below is my attempt to write something that I think will get broad consensus here.* It is only a first draft and I expect it to change significantly before we start to sign on to it.* I am probably being overoptimistic about how much we can agree on. I'd welcome discussion of any of the points below. Remember: the main objective here is not to convince others to agree with you, but to find the most-useful statement on which you can already agree. So once people have heard each side of a debate, if we still don't agree on something, we just remove that from the statement or present both sides; we should try to avoid getting sidetracked in endless debates on specific points. The study of voting systems has made significant progress over the last decade, and our understanding is even farther beyond what it was 20 years ago. One important place where that has happened is on the election methods mailing list. This mailing list is likely to include the largest and most diverse group of voting systems theorists in the world. It is a place where opinions vary and debate is vigorous. Thus, we think that the broad, though imperfect, consensus on the following ideas is worth paying attention to. We believe that the voting systems currently used in most of the English-speaking world, including single-round plurality voting (also termed First Past the Post, FPTP) and single-member districts (aka seats, ridings, or electorates), represent some of the worst voting systems known. We believe that reforming these systems would provide important societal benefits, and that there are clearly not corresponding reasons to oppose such reform from the perspective of the public interest. We may disagree about which specific reforms might provide the absolutely optimum results, but we can nevertheless agree that there are a number of options which would represent worthwhile improvements. *Single-winner reform* There are various criteria, both formally-defined and informal, by which one can judge a voting system. These criteria can be divided into several classes: 1. Honest-results-oriented criteria. These include such measures as Bayesian regret (that is, simulated societal satisfaction), the majority criterion, and the Condorcet criterion, which focus on whether the correct candidate, according to some definition, is elected. Although these criteria in some cases can favor different candidates as being correct, in most practical cases they agree. 2. Strategy-resistance criteria. Voting is a complex process, and inevitably there are some cases where some group could get an advantage by changing their votes. It is desirable to keep such cases to a minimum. For one thing, it's fairer not to reward such strategic voting behavior. But it's not just that. Perhaps more importantly, a voting system which gives too much of an incentive to strategic voters, can lead to widespread strategy which systematically distorts the results. 3. Process-oriented criteria. These include such measures as simplicity of the ballot, simplicity of the ballot-counting process, and feasibility of auditing or other fraud-prevention measures. 4. Candidate-incentive criteria. Systems which encourage or discourage clone candidates; give too much power to parties, as opposed to voters; have problems here. These criteria also include less strictly-defined concerns about the type of candidates and campaign strategies a system encourages; for instance, systems which effectively reduce the field to 2 major candidates could encourage negative advertising. There is a broad consensus among researchers plurality voting is among the worst systems for honest results, for strategy-resistance, and for candidate incentives. Honest voting can split votes among similar candidates, spoiling the election and leading opposing candidates to win. Voters respond by strategically choosing the lesser evil among the two major candidates, which can lead to complacent candidates because even corrupt, widely-disliked candidates can win. The system discourages candidates from entering the race, and encourages negative advertising. Although plurality has good simplicity and fraud-resistance, this is not enough to recommend its use. A
