[EM] Re : Re : Toy election model: 2D IQ (ideology/quality) model

[Kevin Venzke]

Hi Jameson,
 
 
De : Jameson Quinn 
>>À : Kevin Venzke 
>>Cc : em 
>>Envoyé le : Mercredi 9 Novembre 2011 2h06
>>Objet : Re: [EM] Re : Toy election model: 2D IQ (ideology/quality) model
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>2011/11/8 Kevin Venzke 
>>
>>Speaking of quoting messages, I have to admit I don't understand how it is 
>>even supposed to be done under Yahoo. I can indent the message, and I used to 
>>be able to correctly quote plain text messages. But usually when I try to 
>>quote an html message I just end up destroying the formatting somehow.
>>> 
>>>Anyway, to Jameson:
>>> 
>>>
>>>De : Jameson Quinn 
>>>À : kathy.d...@gmail.com
>>>Cc : EM 
>>>Envoyé le : Dimanche 6 Novembre 2011 20h23
>>>Objet : Re: [EM] Toy election model: 2D IQ (ideology/quality) model
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
 3. It is therefore reasonable to hope for a voting system that tends to
> elect centrists, but slightly less so than a Condorcet system.

Why would utility be considered more important than centrist?  Or would it?



>>>Utility is the goal, almost tautologically. I mean yeah, there's plenty of 
>>>ways you could criticize the model, or even the idea that the votes have 
>>>anything at all to do with the utility that the voters will gain from a 
>>>given candidate winning; but until someone comes up with something better, 
>>>for democracy at least, utility is the best paradigm we have.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>I don't think I agree. Utilities are everpresent in simulations because they 
>>>are a convenient way to represent the priorities of the voters. They can 
>>>easily be generated from distances in space. But, it's not obvious that 
>>>these priorities need to be aggregable (we could use a system where the 
>>>"addition" of different voters' priorities isn't even a straightforward 
>>>task) and it's not obvious that maximizing the aggregation should even be a 
>>>goal. You don't need to do it. 
>>
>>
>>I know there are proofs for a single agent that something equivalent to 
>>utility is the only way to have consistent priorities and avoid being "money 
>>pumped". ("You have A? OK, will you trade that and $1 for B? Now will you 
>>trade that and $1 for C? OK, now will you trade that and $1 for A? Heh heh 
>>heh, you just gave me $3 for nothing, fool.") I suspect you could prove 
>>something similar for aggregate agents (societies). Basically, utilities are 
>>the only way to avoid the Condorcet paradox.
>>
>>
I understand what you're saying about being money pumped, though I don't see 
how a similar thing would work for societies. Utility does give you a result 
when Condorcet doesn't, but I'm not sure this is a huge problem unless your 
scenario is mostly generating scenarios where Condorcet or say Schwartz isn't 
making any distinctions.

>>
>>I do not think that this means that utilities are somehow real. I do think 
>>that it is a pretty good argument for using a utility-based model.
>>
>>I've said before that I prefer to look at sincere Condorcet efficiency and 
>>strategic incentives. 
>>
>>
>>While I'm advocating using utilities, I must say that we could do a lot worse 
>>than your plan. In particular, as I've said elsewhere, using utilities is no 
>>substitute for looking at strategic incentives.
>>
>>So you don't get one clean number from me, sorry. But I think it may be less 
>>artificial than aggregated utility.
>>>
>>>Furthermore I doubt that aggregate utility is likely to get you anywhere 
>>>unique. Electorates in practice try to get sincere CWs elected. If someone 
>>>ever pointed to a simulation and a scenario and a rule and said, "here is a 
>>>concrete method by which we can favor higher utility candidates over sincere 
>>>Condorcet efficiency" my intuition would be that their tools are 
>>>underestimating the voters. When the sincere CW loses, it represents an 
>>>error from the standpoint of what the electorate was trying to do. I think 
>>>it would take some genius work to capitalize consistently on such errors, 
>>>and gain more than is lost.
>>
>>
>>I suspect that Majority Judgment does exactly that. My evidence? B+L's study 
>>that shows that MJ is the only system which does not elect almost solely 
>>centrists nor almost solely extremists, in a model based on 2007 France. That 
>>is to say, where Condorcet elected centrists, MJ sometimes elected 
>>extremists. And in my toy model, that is sometimes the right answer.

Well, I believe you that you have read this study and that's what it said. That 
result of the study doesn't make a lot of sense to me though. As I suggested, I 
would guess that if I read what their model was, I would feel that it's 
underestimating the voters' motivation or ability to strategize.

>
>
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>>All that said, I would be interested to hear if someone has made an argument 
>>>that majority rule, as a sensible principle, depends on some other more 
>>>fundamental principle.
>>
>>
>>OK, here goes: utility is happiness and is the true goal. Majority rule is 
>>just the most

[EM] Re : [Off Topic] Banning those Me-Tooing like brain-dead AOLers [/Off Topic]

[Kevin Venzke]

 De : ⸘Ŭalabio‽ 
>>À : EM 
>>Envoyé le : Mercredi 9 Novembre 2011 22h10
>>Objet : [EM] [Off Topic] Banning those Me-Tooing like brain-dead AOLers [/Off 
>>Topic]
>>
>    ¡Hello!
>
>    ¿How fare you?
>
>    Lately, some unnamed members have been metooing like brain-dead AOLers.  
>Some others have complained about this.  Although I have not complained, it 
>irks me.  I have a simple solution:
>
>    If someone metoos like a brain-dead AOLers, direct the pffender to read 
>this primer about posting protocol:
>
>    
>http://web.archive.org/web/20080113211450/http://www.greenend.org.uk/rjk/2000/06/14/quoting.html
>
>    If the offenders continues to metoo like a brain-dead AOLer, an admin 
>should banner the offenders immediately.  If an offender tries to rejoin under 
>a different name, I see no alternative other than summoning “Weird Al” 
>Yankovic for permanently dealing with the trouble maker:
>
>    “¡And postin’, ‘¡Me Too!’, like some brain-dead AOL-er!”
>    “¡I should do the world a favor and cap you like Old Yeller!”
>    “¡You’re just about as useless as JPEGs to Hellen Keller!”


This is a pretty stupid post. Worse than the one where you suggested 
some readers should kill themselves. I couldn't even tell what this one was 
talking about until I followed the link.

Kevin
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

[EM] Approval Bad Example

[C.Benham]

Mike Ossipoff wrote (9 Nov 2011):


Here's the definition of MDD,TR:

3-slot method: Top, Middle, Bottom (unmarked)

Disqualify any candidate(s) having a majority pairwise defeat.

The winner is the un-disqualified candidate with the most top ratings.

[end of MDD,TR definition]



This definition isn't complete. As it is, it isn't decisive because it's 
possible

that *all* the candidates can be disqualified.  You need to specify that if
all the candidates have a majority-strength defeat then none of them are
disqualified.

I'm not a fan of this method for reasons I may elaborate on in a later post.
It has a strong random-fill incentive, and fails the Plurality and Mono-add-
Plump criteria.

Chris Benham


Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

[EM] [Off Topic] Banning those Me-Tooing like brain-dead AOLers [/Off Topic]

[⸘Ŭalabio‽]

¡Hello!

¿How fare you?

Lately, some unnamed members have been metooing like brain-dead AOLers. 
 Some others have complained about this.  Although I have not complained, it 
irks me.  I have a simple solution:

If someone metoos like a brain-dead AOLers, direct the pffender to read 
this primer about posting protocol:


http://web.archive.org/web/20080113211450/http://www.greenend.org.uk/rjk/2000/06/14/quoting.html

If the offenders continues to metoo like a brain-dead AOLer, an admin 
should banner the offenders immediately.  If an offender tries to rejoin under 
a different name, I see no alternative other than summoning “Weird Al” Yankovic 
for permanently dealing with the trouble maker:

“¡And postin’, ‘¡Me Too!’, like some brain-dead AOL-er!”
“¡I should do the world a favor and cap you like Old Yeller!”
“¡You’re just about as useless as JPEGs to Hellen Keller!”
——
“Weird Al” Yankovic
http://youtube.com/watch?v=qpMvS1Q1sos

 The above video is not for the faint of heart, but it graphically 
shows what “Weird Al” Yankovic does to people metooing like brain-dead AOLers.  
;-)

Those metooing like brain-dead AOLers are full of excuses.  The most 
common excuse is laziness.  Frankly, laziness is not an excuse.  The other most 
common excuse  is the emailprogram.  The internet is full of free 
emailprograms.  The requirements are so simple:

*   The mailprogram should support editing in plain text.
*   It should support Unicode.

It makes life easier for everyone if we all use plain text without 
attachments.  Indeed, on usenet exists the saying:

“¡If you care enough to send the very best, send plain text!”

The ability to handle Unicode is because we do much mathematics on this 
list and cite people with names using characters not found in ASCII.  This is 
an example of mathematics using plain text in Unicode:

Φ=(1+√5)/2
1-ϕ=1/Φ
Φ²=1+Φ

Φ (Phi) is the symbol for the Golden Ratio.  The Series Fibonacci 
converges on Φ.

ISO 216 defines the ratio, sizes, and grammage of paper.  The ration 
ISO 216 uses is:

1:√2

The reason is that on can create 2 pieces of papers in the series with 
the same aspectratio by just halving a piece of paper in the next larger size.

With margins, the text area on a A4-paper is 80:128 (80 columns by 128 
lines) characters of plain text.  The text area on A4-paper is very nearly Φ.

By the way, one should set the width of the text field in the 
emailprogram to 80 characters.

That is enough examples of mathematics using Unicode in plain text.  
Characteristics of a good emailclient are:

*   Plain Text.
*   Unicode.

Settings:

*   Plain Text
*   Width of 80 characters.
*   UTF-8.

Send:

*   Plain Text.
*   80 Characters wide.
*   UTF-8.
*   No Attachments.

¡This is not rocketscience!

¡Peace!

-- 

“⸘Ŭalabio‽” 

Skype:
Walabio

An IntactWiki:
http://intactipedia.org/

“You are entitled to your own opinion, but you are not entitled to your 
own facts.”
——
Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan

Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

[EM] Approval Bad Example

[C.Benham]

Jameson,

In response to Forest asking if there was a method that satisfies 
something plus FBC you

responded:


Yes. 321 voting 





  321 voting


  From Electowiki

Jump to: navigation <#column-one>, search <#searchInput>

3-level rated ballots. Of the 3 candidates with the most ratings, take 
the 2 candidates with the most top-ratings, and then take the 1 
pairwise winner among those.




This fails FBC in the same way that ER-IRV(whole) does. From my 2 Nov. 
EM post:




Here is Kevin Venzke's example from a June 2004  EM post:

6: A
3: C>B
2: C=B  (sincere is C>B)
2: B

The method is ER-IRV(whole). If the 2 C=B voters sincerely vote C>B then
the first-round scores are
A6,  C5,  B2.   B is eliminated and A wins.

As it is the first-round scores are A6, C5, B4. B is still eliminated
and A wins.

To meet FBC no voters should have any incentive to vote their sincere
favourite below equal-top.

6: A
3: C>B
2: B>C  (sincere is C>B)
2: B

But if those 2 voters (sincere C>B, was C=B) do that and strictly
top-rank their compromise candidate B, then the first-round scores are 
A6,  B4,  C3.  C is eliminated and B wins: B7, A6.


By down-ranking their sincere favourite those 2 voters have gained a
result they prefer that they couldn't have got any other way, a clear 
failure of the

Favorite Betrayal Criterion (FBC).



Even if  321 voting met FBC with 3 candidates it  it wouldn't with more, 
because
sincerely rating your sincere favourite  Top instead of Bottom could 
mean that your
favourite displaces your compromise candidate from the  top 3 most rated 
candidates and

goes on to lose when your compromise would have won.

Chris Benham
.


Forest Simmons wrote (9 Nov 2011):

I'm assuming "approval bad example" is typified by the implicit approval 
order in the scenario


49 C
27 A>B
24 B

It seems to me that IF we (1) want to respect the Plurality Criterion, 
(2) discourage "chicken"  strategy,
(3) stick with determinism, and (4) not take advantage of proxy ideas,  
then our method must allow
equal-rank-top and elect C in the above scenario, but elect B when B is 
advanced to top equal with A in

the middle faction:

49 C
27 A=B
24 B

Then if sincere preferences are

49 C
27 A>B
24 B>A,

the B faction will be deterred from truncating A.  While if the B 
supporters are sincerely indifferent
between A and C, the A supporters can vote approval style (A=B) to get B 
elected.


Do we agree on this?

Note that IRV (=whole) satisfies this, but now the question remains ... 
is there a method that satisfies

this which also satisfies the FBC?

Forest







Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] Electoral Pluralism

[Dave Ketchum]

Agreed I strayed beyond "consensus statement".  You gave me room to  
work on some details that need considering in the overall task.


On Nov 9, 2011, at 9:24 PM, David L Wetzell wrote:



DLW wrote: In light of the #OWS statement on electoral reform.
http://anewkindofparty.blogspot.com/2011/11/people-before-parties-electoral-reforms.html

My Thoughts about an alternative possible "consensus" statement for  
non-electoral analytical types.


1. Democracy is a never-ending experiment.  It also is like a  
garden that can go to seed.
We need to join the rest of the world in experimenting with better  
ways to tend our democracy.
This entails changes in election rules, not just changing who is in  
power.


2. The most important change is to use both single-winner and multi- 
winner (or Proportional Representation) election rules.
Single-winner elections give us leadership who can be held  
accountable.
Multi-winner elections  give us pluralism and protection for  
minority rights.
We need both of these values.  A common sense way to combine them  
is to use more multi-winner
elections for "more local" elections that otherwise are rarely  
competitive, while continuing to use mainly single-winner elections

for "less local" elections.


[endquote]

DK: Single-winner makes sense for single-person tasks such as mayor,  
sheriff, or governor.  We should agree that this class of tasks  
should be left to this type of electing.


Proportional representation makes sense for multi-person tasks such  
as councils or senates.  These tasks have often been elected via  
single-winner mode - if so, change to multi-person should be done  
only when/if value is seen in this by groups involved..


[/endquote]

dlw:I doubt those "elected" by single-winner to such posts will ever  
see the value of switching to a multi-seat election.  But I would  
not classify the Senator races in the US as rarely competitive.  The  
US and state congressional and city council elections would be much  
more natural options.  And we wouldn't need to make all of them  
multi-seat winners either.  The statement only calls for more "more  
local" elections to be decided with multi-seat elections.  So in a  
parliamentary system like Great Britain, one could switch from FPTP  
single-seat elections to super-districts with 4 seats each, which  
would be allocated by a 3-seat form of PR and a single-seat  
(possible alternative to FPTP) election.


We care not whether everyone sees the value - someone successful with  
FPTP could get told to see the light or lose even with FPTP.


My being in NY's 52nd Senate district made it easy to use that label -  
but, use something else please, since some states do not have senates.


I do have trouble with your "more local". The House of Representatives  
in DC normally includes members elected as multi-seat winners.  Both  
governors and village clerks are normally single-winner.


3. We need to realize that election rules are like screwdrivers.   
One election rule does not work well with all elections.
As such, we need to consider alternatives to our current election  
rule, First-Past-the-Post.
Most election rule alternatives like (.short list with links to  
brief descriptions.), but not the  "top two primary" used in (...)  
or the plurality "at large" voting used in (), would improve  
things.


[endquote]

DK:Agreed FPTP is a loser from a simpler time.
 Need to allow voters to vote for more-than-one, although some  
voters, some of the time, will see no need for this.

[endquote]

The point here is to call for electoral pluralism, rather than to  
attack FPTP.  This way when our opponents defend FPTP in some way  
that obfuscates the matter, we can reply that we are calling for the  
use of more than one election, since FPTP is not the right election  
rule for all elections.  They'll have a harder time arguing against  
that!


Perhaps trim this a bit, but this and the next need should be about  
universal, leaving FPTP at the bottom of the heap.


DK: Need to allow voters, when voting for more-than-one, to  
indicate relative preference among these. Primaries were an  
invention to help with FPTP pain.  Methods that satisfy the above  
needs see little, or no, value in primaries with their expense.
 Runoffs were another aid for FPTP pain.  As with primaries,  
possible value of runoffs decreases with methods that do better in  
the main election.
 Approval, while fixing the first above problem at little cost,  
fails to help with the second.

[endquote]
dlw:  You're missing the point.  Yes, there's lots of things one can  
do, but the key thing is to frame the need to experiment and to use  
more than just FPTP.  Because I would argue that it's the near  
exclusive use of FPTP which is the worst thing of all, we can  
compensate for its continued use in some elections...


Methods list:
 Need to be understandable to, at least, most voters.
 If to be usable over coun

Re: [EM] Electoral Pluralism

[David L Wetzell]

>
>
> DLW wrote: In light of the #OWS statement on electoral reform.
>
> http://anewkindofparty.blogspot.com/2011/11/people-before-parties-electoral-reforms.html
>
>
> My Thoughts about an alternative possible "consensus" statement for
> non-electoral analytical types.
>
> 1. Democracy is a never-ending experiment.  It also is like a garden that
> can go to seed.
> We need to join the rest of the world in experimenting with better ways to
> tend our democracy.
> This entails changes in election rules, not just changing who is in power.
>
> 2. The most important change is to use both single-winner and multi-winner
> (or Proportional Representation) election rules.
> Single-winner elections give us leadership who can be held accountable.
>  Multi-winner elections  give us pluralism and protection for minority
> rights.
> We need both of these values.  A common sense way to combine them is to
> use more multi-winner
> elections for "more local" elections that otherwise are rarely
> competitive, while continuing to use mainly single-winner elections
> for "less local" elections.
>
> [endquote]

>
> DK: Single-winner makes sense for single-person tasks such as mayor,
> sheriff, or governor.  We should agree that this class of tasks should be
> left to this type of electing.
>
> Proportional representation makes sense for multi-person tasks such as
> councils or senates.  These tasks have often been elected via single-winner
> mode - if so, change to multi-person should be done only when/if value is
> seen in this by groups involved..
>


> [/endquote]
>

dlw:I doubt those "elected" by single-winner to such posts will ever see
the value of switching to a multi-seat election.  But I would not classify
the Senator races in the US as rarely competitive.  The US and state
congressional and city council elections would be much more natural
options.  And we wouldn't need to make all of them multi-seat winners
either.  The statement only calls for more "more local" elections to be
decided with multi-seat elections.  So in a parliamentary system like Great
Britain, one could switch from FPTP single-seat elections to
super-districts with 4 seats each, which would be allocated by a 3-seat
form of PR and a single-seat (possible alternative to FPTP) election.

>
> 3. We need to realize that election rules are like screwdrivers.  One
> election rule does not work well with all elections.
> As such, we need to consider alternatives to our current election rule,
> First-Past-the-Post.
> Most election rule alternatives like (.short list with links to brief
> descriptions.), but not the  "top two primary" used in (...) or the
> plurality "at large" voting used in (), would improve things.
>
> [endquote]


> DK:Agreed FPTP is a loser from a simpler time.
>  Need to allow voters to vote for more-than-one, although some voters,
> some of the time, will see no need for this.
>
[endquote]

The point here is to call for electoral pluralism, rather than to attack
FPTP.  This way when our opponents defend FPTP in some way that obfuscates
the matter, we can reply that we are calling for the use of more than one
election, since FPTP is not the right election rule for all elections.
 They'll have a harder time arguing against that!


> DK: Need to allow voters, when voting for more-than-one, to indicate
> relative preference among these. Primaries were an invention to help
> with FPTP pain.  Methods that satisfy the above needs see little, or no,
> value in primaries with their expense.
>  Runoffs were another aid for FPTP pain.  As with primaries, possible
> value of runoffs decreases with methods that do better in the main election.
>  Approval, while fixing the first above problem at little cost, fails
> to help with the second.
>
[endquote]
dlw:  You're missing the point.  Yes, there's lots of things one can do,
but the key thing is to frame the need to experiment and to use more than
just FPTP.  Because I would argue that it's the near exclusive use of FPTP
which is the worst thing of all, we can compensate for its continued use in
some elections...

>
> Methods list:
>  Need to be understandable to, at least, most voters.
>  If to be usable over county and state districts, must NOT have to
> retrieve local data as IRV does.
>  Should (must?) tolerate write-ins.
>  Must tolerate several candidates running in a race and report their
> relative strength.  This means that a weak candidate will be visible, with
> this helping progress to be visible, up or down.
>

dlw: Yes, but we don't need to include all that in a statement for the
public. It's part of the process of experimentation, or learning from
experience and the ex post use of analysis to make clear what's likely
going on...

>
>  dlw
>
>

Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] Electoral Pluralism

[Dave Ketchum]

On Nov 9, 2011, at 6:26 PM, David L Wetzell wrote:


In light of the #OWS statement on electoral reform.
http://anewkindofparty.blogspot.com/2011/11/people-before-parties-electoral-reforms.html

My Thoughts about an alternative possible "consensus" statement for  
non-electoral analytical types.


1. Democracy is a never-ending experiment.  It also is like a garden  
that can go to seed.
We need to join the rest of the world in experimenting with better  
ways to tend our democracy.
This entails changes in election rules, not just changing who is in  
power.


2. The most important change is to use both single-winner and multi- 
winner (or Proportional Representation) election rules.
Single-winner elections give us leadership who can be held  
accountable.
Multi-winner elections  give us pluralism and protection for  
minority rights.
We need both of these values.  A common sense way to combine them is  
to use more multi-winner
elections for "more local" elections that otherwise are rarely  
competitive, while continuing to use mainly single-winner elections

for "less local" elections.


Single-winner makes sense for single-person tasks such as mayor,  
sheriff, or governor.  We should agree that this class of tasks should  
be left to this type of electing.


Proportional representation makes sense for multi-person tasks such as  
councils or senates.  These tasks have often been elected via single- 
winner mode - if so, change to multi-person should be done only when/ 
if value is seen in this by groups involved..


3. We need to realize that election rules are like screwdrivers.   
One election rule does not work well with all elections.
As such, we need to consider alternatives to our current election  
rule, First-Past-the-Post.
Most election rule alternatives like (.short list with links to  
brief descriptions.), but not the  "top two primary" used in (...)  
or the plurality "at large" voting used in (), would improve  
things.


Agreed FPTP is a loser from a simpler time.
 Need to allow voters to vote for more-than-one, although some  
voters, some of the time, will see no need for this.
 Need to allow voters, when voting for more-than-one, to indicate  
relative preference among these.
 Primaries were an invention to help with FPTP pain.  Methods  
that satisfy the above needs see little, or no, value in primaries  
with their expense.
 Runoffs were another aid for FPTP pain.  As with primaries,  
possible value of runoffs decreases with methods that do better in the  
main election.
 Approval, while fixing the first above problem at little cost,  
fails to help with the second.


Methods list:
 Need to be understandable to, at least, most voters.
 If to be usable over county and state districts, must NOT have  
to retrieve local data as IRV does.

 Should (must?) tolerate write-ins.
 Must tolerate several candidates running in a race and report  
their relative strength.  This means that a weak candidate will be  
visible, with this helping progress to be visible, up or down.


 dlw

Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

[EM] Descending Acquiescing Coalitions versus Nested Acquiescing Coalitions

[fsimmons]

DAC (descending acquiescing coalitions) disappointed Woodall because of the 
following example:

 03: D
 14: A
 34: A>B
 36: C>B
 13: C

The MDT winner is C, but DAC elects B.

DAC elects B even though the set {B} has a DAC score of zero, because the 
"descending" order of 
scores includes both the set {C,B} (with a score of 49) and the set {A,B} (with 
a score of 48), and the 
only candidate common to both sets is B, so B is elected by DAC.

But suppose that we change DAC to NAC (Nested Acquiescing Coalitions) so that 
sets in the sequence 
of descending scores are not only skipped over when the intersection is empty, 
but also skipped over 
when the set with the lower score is not a subset of the previously included 
sets.  Then, in the above 
example, C is elected.

I want to point out that this NAC method also solves the "bad approval problem" 
by electing C, B, and A 
respectively, given the respective ballot sets

49 C
27 A>B
24 B,

and

49 C
27 A=B
24 B,

and

49 C
27 A>B
24 B>A .

Which of the good properties of DAC are retained by NAC?

Thanks,

Forest

Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

[EM] Electoral Pluralism

[David L Wetzell]

In light of the #OWS statement on electoral reform.
http://anewkindofparty.blogspot.com/2011/11/people-before-parties-electoral-reforms.html


My Thoughts about an alternative possible "consensus" statement for
non-electoral analytical types.

1. Democracy is a never-ending experiment.  It also is like a garden that
can go to seed.
We need to join the rest of the world in experimenting with better ways to
tend our democracy.
This entails changes in election rules, not just changing who is in power.

2. The most important change is to use both single-winner and multi-winner
(or Proportional Representation) election rules.
Single-winner elections give us leadership who can be held accountable.
Multi-winner elections  give us pluralism and protection for minority
rights.
We need both of these values.  A common sense way to combine them is to use
more multi-winner
elections for "more local" elections that otherwise are rarely competitive,
while continuing to use mainly single-winner elections
for "less local" elections.

3. We need to realize that election rules are like screwdrivers.  One
election rule does not work well with all elections.
As such, we need to consider alternatives to our current election rule,
First-Past-the-Post.
Most election rule alternatives like (.short list with links to brief
descriptions.), but not the  "top two primary" used in (...) or the
plurality "at large" voting used in (), would improve things.

 dlw

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[EM] Approval Bad Example

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

Forrest--

I'm assuming "approval bad example" is typified by the implicit approval order 
in the scenario

49 C
27 A>B
24 B

Yes, A majority prefer A and B to C. They're the voters to whom A is favorite 
and the voters to whom B is favorite.

Knowing that the more-numerous A voters will vote for B, the B voters can win 
by defection.

You continued:

It seems to me that IF we (1) want to respect the Plurality Criterion, (2) 
discourage "chicken"  strategy, 
(3) stick with determinism, and (4) not take advantage of proxy ideas,  then 
our method must allow 
equal-rank-top and elect C in the above scenario

[endquote]

...when A voters and B voters vote only for their favorites.

If the B voters (in 3-slot balloting) rate B above bottom, and C at bottom, 
shouldn't the method
defeat C and elect A or B?

You continued:

, but elect B when B is advanced to top equal with A [by the A voters].

Sure. But what if the A voters vote A top, B middle, and C bottom?

C should lose. Should A lose too, even though they're more numerous, and even 
though A pairbeats B,
just because the A voters were the ones who were co-operative and responsible 
enough to 
rate B above bottom, to defeat C?

You wrote:

in 
the middle faction:

[endquote]

But it isn't a matter of one faction in the middle. The A-preferring voters and 
the B-preferring voters
all prefer A and B to C. The A and B voters share one end, rather than either 
being in the middle.




You continued:

49 C
27 A=B
24 B

Then if sincere preferences are

49 C
27 A>B
24 B>A,

the B faction will be deterred from truncating A.

[endquote]

Is that attainable in a method meeting FBC and Participation?

...or in a method meeting those plus 1CM and 3P?

You continued:

 While if the B supporters are sincerely indifferent 
between A and C

[endquote]

Ok, but, to me, an essential element of the example is that the A supporters 
and the B supporters
all prefer A and B to C.

You continued:

, the A supporters can vote approval style (A=B) to get B elected.

Do we agree on this?

[endquote]

Wait a minute...If the A supporters were indifferent between B and C, then 
they'd have
no motive to suppport B against C, unless it would elect A. In some methods 
their A>B>C
ballot would achieve that. MDD,TR is such a method.

You continued:

Note that IRV (=whole) satisfies this, but now the question remains ... is 
there a method that satisfies 
this which also satisfies the FBC?

Chris mentioned something that should have been obvious to me: MDD,TR passes in 
the Approval
bad example.

Here's the definition of MDD,TR:

3-slot method: Top, Middle, Bottom (unmarked)

Disqualify any candidate(s) having a majority pairwise defeat.

The winner is the un-disqualified candidate with the most top ratings.

[end of MDD,TR definition]

MDD,TR avoids electing B in the Approval bad example (ABE). In fact, it elects 
A, which
seems the fairest outcome, allowing the A voters to defeat C by giving hir a 
majority
defeat via B. And by not penalizing the A voters by rewarding the B voters for 
defection.

Additionally (unless I'm mistaken), MDD,TR meets FBC and SFC.

Regrettably it fails 1CM and 3P.

MTA better protects a group of factions with similar policy-proposals against 
other groups.

MDD,TR doesn't do that as well, but it better protects that group of similar 
factions against eachother.

In our electoral system, there is great mutual antagonism among factions and 
parties with similar
policy proposals, and so maybe MDD,TR would be better for our elections, as 
compared to MTA.

Of course both of those methods fail Participation. It has been pointed out to 
me that Participation
failure, while only an "aesthetic embarrassment criterion", might be used by 
reform-opponents to
defeat MTA, MDD,TR, MDDA or MDD,ER-Bucklin(whole).

Mike Ossipoff


  
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Re: [EM] Approval Bad Example

[Jameson Quinn]

2011/11/9 Jameson Quinn 

> 2011/11/9 
>
>> I'm assuming "approval bad example" is typified by the implicit approval
>> order in the scenario
>>
>> 49 C
>> 27 A>B
>> 24 B
>>
>> It seems to me that IF we (1) want to respect the Plurality Criterion,
>> (2) discourage "chicken"  strategy,
>> (3) stick with determinism, and (4) not take advantage of proxy ideas,
>>  then our method must allow
>> equal-rank-top and elect C in the above scenario, but elect B when B is
>> advanced to top equal with A in
>> the middle faction:
>>
>> 49 C
>> 27 A=B
>> 24 B
>>
>> Then if sincere preferences are
>>
>> 49 C
>> 27 A>B
>> 24 B>A,
>>
>> the B faction will be deterred from truncating A.  While if the B
>> supporters are sincerely indifferent
>> between A and C, the A supporters can vote approval style (A=B) to get B
>> elected.
>>
>> Do we agree on this?
>>
>
> I do, at least. I disagree with any criteria that say that A must win in
> the top example; that only encourages A voters to dishonestly add B even if
> they don't prefer her.
>
>
>>
>> Note that IRV (=whole) satisfies this, but now the question remains ...
>> is there a method that satisfies
>> this which also satisfies the FBC?
>>
>
> Yes. 321 voting .
>

Note that 321 voting can fail the chicken dilemma/ABE if there are clones
of candidate C. However, it would take some fine vote management to ensure
that the clones worked but didn't win. Personally, I believe that a party
cloning strategy would be very hard in practice.

Jameson



>
>>
>> Forest
>> 
>> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list
>> info
>>
>
>

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Re: [EM] Approval Bad Example

[Jameson Quinn]

2011/11/9 

> I'm assuming "approval bad example" is typified by the implicit approval
> order in the scenario
>
> 49 C
> 27 A>B
> 24 B
>
> It seems to me that IF we (1) want to respect the Plurality Criterion, (2)
> discourage "chicken"  strategy,
> (3) stick with determinism, and (4) not take advantage of proxy ideas,
>  then our method must allow
> equal-rank-top and elect C in the above scenario, but elect B when B is
> advanced to top equal with A in
> the middle faction:
>
> 49 C
> 27 A=B
> 24 B
>
> Then if sincere preferences are
>
> 49 C
> 27 A>B
> 24 B>A,
>
> the B faction will be deterred from truncating A.  While if the B
> supporters are sincerely indifferent
> between A and C, the A supporters can vote approval style (A=B) to get B
> elected.
>
> Do we agree on this?
>

I do, at least. I disagree with any criteria that say that A must win in
the top example; that only encourages A voters to dishonestly add B even if
they don't prefer her.


>
> Note that IRV (=whole) satisfies this, but now the question remains ... is
> there a method that satisfies
> this which also satisfies the FBC?
>

Yes. 321 voting .


>
> Forest
> 
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
>

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[EM] Approval Bad Example

[fsimmons]

I'm assuming "approval bad example" is typified by the implicit approval order 
in the scenario

49 C
27 A>B
24 B

It seems to me that IF we (1) want to respect the Plurality Criterion, (2) 
discourage "chicken"  strategy, 
(3) stick with determinism, and (4) not take advantage of proxy ideas,  then 
our method must allow 
equal-rank-top and elect C in the above scenario, but elect B when B is 
advanced to top equal with A in 
the middle faction:

49 C
27 A=B
24 B

Then if sincere preferences are

49 C
27 A>B
24 B>A,

the B faction will be deterred from truncating A.  While if the B supporters 
are sincerely indifferent 
between A and C, the A supporters can vote approval style (A=B) to get B 
elected.

Do we agree on this?

Note that IRV (=whole) satisfies this, but now the question remains ... is 
there a method that satisfies 
this which also satisfies the FBC?

Forest

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[EM] IRV Variant

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

Robert Bristow says:

how 'bout also refraining from ALL CAPS

[endquote]

I don't know if Robert intends that to refer to some practice of mine. 
Abbreviations
using initial letters typically use all-caps. That practice isn't original with 
me.

Robert continues:

, the use of a really dumb text 
quoting protocol

[endquote]

Well, what's "really dumb" is the person who regards himself as the authority
on how something should be done.

The belief that your own preferences or choices are the standard for merit is a 
delusion.
People suffering from that delusion tend to have the worst manners.

Perhaps Robert needs to read the conduct guidelines for this mailing list.

Just so you understand, Robert, instead of presenting your own preferences or 
choices
as the standard for merit, you need to actually say _why_ you think that your 
way of doing
something is better, or why some other way of doing things is worse.

Perhaps Robert thinks that I should go through large blocks of text, typing "> 
" at the
beginning of each line, because that would conform to what Robert is more used 
to. No thanks.

Robert continues:

, and the assumption that one speaks for the group when 
they've been around for an entire month.

[endquote]

Vague and referentless.

In what message, posted on what day, did I say that I spoke for a group? Robert 
forgot
to tell us that.

Quite aside from that, I was among those who were on this mailing list at the 
time that it was started.

Robert says:

(and MIKE OSSIPOFF, electing the CW *is* majority rule, when the CW 
exists.  

[endquote]

No, not unless the pairwise defeats are majority defeats. Not all pairwise 
defeats are majority defeats.
Does Robert know what "majority" means?

A majority is more than half of the voters in a particular election.

But there are a number of majority rule criteria. They include Majority 
Favorite, Mutual Majority (Majority
for Solid Coalitions), SDSC, WDSC, SFC, 1CM, 3P, UP, etc. 

All of those can be met by methods that don't meet the Condorcet Criterion.

CC doesn't have a monopoly on majority rule, and, in fact, CC isn't about 
majority, in the usual sense of
that word. 

Robert continues:

and i'll bet i know and understand a lot more of the gritty 
details of the Burlington VT IRV elections in 2006 and 2009 and exactly 
what went wrong in 2009 than you seem to grant.)

[endquote]

Did I say you didn't know what happened in Burlington?

I don't claim to know anything about what happened in Burlington, other than 
that
IRV was rejected. I don't know what IRV failure led to that rejection.

Mike Ossipoff

  
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Re: [EM] IRV variants

[fsimmons]

> I don't get it. (I am confused by your explanation of the 
> algorithm).
> How do you think this is better than your latest version of 
> Enhanced DMC?

It takes care of the chicken problem.  But forget my confusing process; the 
IRV- Condorcet you 
describe here is a simpler solution, as long as you allow equal rankings, and 
count them as whole (as 
opposed to fractional):

> 
> I think a good method is the IRV-Condorcet hybrid that differs 
> from IRV 
> only by before any and each elimination
> checks for an uneliminated candidate X that pairwise beats all 
> the other 
> uneliminated candidates and elects the
> first such X to appear.

Yes this is simpler.

> 
> That of course gains Condorcet, and it keeps IRV's Mutual 
> Dominant Third 
> Burial Resistance property.
> So if a candidate X pairwise beats all the other candidates and 
> is 
> ranked above all the other candidates on more than
> a third of the ballots then (as with IRV) X must win and a rival 
> candidate Y's supporters can't get Y elected (assuming
> they can somehow change their ballots) by Burying X.
> 
> Does your method share that property?
> 
> > 49 C
> > 27 A>B
> > 24 B
> >
> > Candidate A starts out as underdog, survives B, and is beaten 
> by C, so 
> > C wins.
> 
> 
> From what I think I do understand of your algorithm 
> description, 
> doesn't candidate B start out as "underdog"?

Yes, I was in too much of a hurry when I wrote that.

Also contrary to my hopes the method turned out to be non-monotonic, because 
the IRV elimination 
order can eliminate a candidate earlier as a result of more first place 
support.  Only elimination orders 
without this defect can be used as a basis for a monotone method.

Forest

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Re: [EM] Re : Toy election model: 2D IQ (ideology/quality) model

[Juho Laatu]

On 9.11.2011, at 11.45, Jameson Quinn wrote:

> 2011/11/9 Juho Laatu 

> Utility example:
> - There are two alternatives. A) One person will lose $1, others will not 
> lose anything. B) All will lose some equal small amount, so that the sum of 
> losses will be $10001. The point is that if we use utilities, let's not use 
> the sum of utilities as the criterion.
> 
> Money is not utility. Almost anyone will tell you that utility is not linear 
> in money; this simple fact will mean that a utility-based calculation will 
> always have more of an egalitarian tendency than a money-based calculation. 
> In fact, you can make it as egalitarian as you could reasonably want by 
> deciding how nonlinear your utility model is.

Yes, I agree, money is not directly utility, especially if you talk about large 
and small sums like here. This example should however work also with pure 
utilities, maybe e.g. with "dissatisfaction hormone levels" of the citizens. I 
guess the key point in the utility examples was that in many cases one actually 
wants to have also reasonably equal utilities and/or one wants to maximize the 
lowest utilities, in addition to having high sum of utilities.

Juho





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Re: [EM] Election Day causes stress

[Michael Allan]

Dear Ted,

We might provide electoral systems (and methods) that provide support
for actual decision making, as opposed merely to expression.  The
design of our current systems rests on the assumption that the
electors can make a decision without voting amonst themselves, and
that voting is only useful for registering a decision that was
*already made*.  If this is assumption is false, then it would mean
that no decision was actually made by the electors prior to election
day, a situation that is likely to cause stress.

   Professor Waismel-Manor said he hoped to collaborate with American
   scholars "to provide the public and decision makers in Washington
   substantiated data that may or may not confirm that voting is
   indeed stressful, what causes this stress, ... [etc]."

If Professor Waismel-Manor is indeed correct that the decision makers
are in Washington and not in the public, then he may inadvertently
have stumbled upon the answer he seeks.

Other factors contributing to stress may be the absence of good
choices on the ballot, something electors have been known to complain
about, plus the futility of voting in elections in which one's vote
has no effect whatsoever.

-- 
Michael Allan

Toronto, +1 416-699-9528
http://zelea.com/


Ted Stern wrote:
> http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/08/science/voters-experience-stress-on-election-day-study-finds.html
> 
> I remember hearing about other studies showing that making difficult
> decisions "uses up" the energy and neurotransmitters required for will
> power.
> 
> So to bring this back on topic, I think we should be looking for
> methods that make voting decisions easier for the voter, because it
> will lead to better, less stressful decisions.
> 
> Ted
> -- 
> araucaria dot araucana at gmail dot com

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Re: [EM] Re : Toy election model: 2D IQ (ideology/quality) model

[Jameson Quinn]

2011/11/9 Juho Laatu 

> On 9.11.2011, at 10.06, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>
> 2011/11/8 Kevin Venzke 
>
>
> All that said, I would be interested to hear if someone has made an
>> argument that majority rule, as a sensible principle, depends on some other
>> more fundamental principle.
>>
>
> OK, here goes: utility is happiness and is the true goal. Majority rule is
> just the most strategy-proof principle which tends to agree with maximum
> utility.
>
>
> Here's another approach to justifying majority rule. The target is to
> achieve a stable state in a society that respects the one-man-one-vote
> principle. If we elect the Condorcet winner, then the society will be happy
> with that choice in the sense that there will always be a majority
> supporting that candidate against changing him to someone else. In the old
> days one-man-one-vote could have meant also one-man-one-veapon, meaning
> that there would be no mutiny.
>

That's what I meant by "strategy-proof". You said it better.


> Today we may just think that even if some people do have stronger feelings
> than others, we should consider all of them to have equal strength.
>

I agree with that. I think that in this case "stronger feelings" is just a
special case of strategic exaggeration, where you've convinced yourself
that it isn't strategic.


>
> I think both approaches (majority, utility) have their problems and
> paradoxes. There are different needs in different situations, and we could
> use different criteria in different elections / decision making situations.
>
> Utility example:
> - There are two alternatives. A) One person will lose $1, others will
> not lose anything. B) All will lose some equal small amount, so that the
> sum of losses will be $10001. The point is that if we use utilities, let's
> not use the sum of utilities as the criterion.
>

Money is not utility. Almost anyone will tell you that utility is not
linear in money; this simple fact will mean that a utility-based
calculation will always have more of an egalitarian tendency than a
money-based calculation. In fact, you can make it as egalitarian as you
could reasonably want by deciding how nonlinear your utility model is.


> - In the same way we might assume that in a situation where one person
> hates all the others, and all persons are candidates, we should not elect
> the person that hates all others although that might give us the highest
> sum of utilities.
>

Unlikely that the hater would not be at least disliked. Also, see above
about certain emotions themselves being exaggerations rather than honest
utility assessments. Obviously, a voting system can never specifically know
which emotions (as expressed on ballots) are exaggerated (either
consciously or unconsciously, it doesn't matter); but it can minimize the
incentives to exaggerate. I don't think that it's at all obvious that
Condorcet does a better job of minimizing those incentives than, say,
MJ
.


>
> These examples are just intended to demonstrate that there is no easy way
> out from the problems of both approaches.
>

I'm not claiming that the utility paradigm has no problems or
contradictions. But they're not quite so obvious as you suggest.


> Different situations may benefit of different criteria. There is no single
> ideal and best method that should be used in all elections.
>

Wait until you see my vaporware... It will basically implement a "what
system should I use" flowchart. So I certainly agree here.


> Overall utility can be measured in many different ways (including also
> some majority oriented approaches).
>
> Juho
>
>
>
>
> 
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
>
>

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Re: [EM] Re : Toy election model: 2D IQ (ideology/quality) model

[Juho Laatu]

On 9.11.2011, at 10.06, Jameson Quinn wrote:

> 2011/11/8 Kevin Venzke 

> All that said, I would be interested to hear if someone has made an argument 
> that majority rule, as a sensible principle, depends on some other more 
> fundamental principle.
> 
> OK, here goes: utility is happiness and is the true goal. Majority rule is 
> just the most strategy-proof principle which tends to agree with maximum 
> utility. 

Here's another approach to justifying majority rule. The target is to achieve a 
stable state in a society that respects the one-man-one-vote principle. If we 
elect the Condorcet winner, then the society will be happy with that choice in 
the sense that there will always be a majority supporting that candidate 
against changing him to someone else. In the old days one-man-one-vote could 
have meant also one-man-one-veapon, meaning that there would be no mutiny. 
Today we may just think that even if some people do have stronger feelings than 
others, we should consider all of them to have equal strength.

I think both approaches (majority, utility) have their problems and paradoxes. 
There are different needs in different situations, and we could use different 
criteria in different elections / decision making situations.

Utility example:
- There are two alternatives. A) One person will lose $1, others will not 
lose anything. B) All will lose some equal small amount, so that the sum of 
losses will be $10001. The point is that if we use utilities, let's not use the 
sum of utilities as the criterion.
- In the same way we might assume that in a situation where one person hates 
all the others, and all persons are candidates, we should not elect the person 
that hates all others although that might give us the highest sum of utilities.

These examples are just intended to demonstrate that there is no easy way out 
from the problems of both approaches. Different situations may benefit of 
different criteria. There is no single ideal and best method that should be 
used in all elections. Overall utility can be measured in many different ways 
(including also some majority oriented approaches).

Juho




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Re: [EM] Re : Toy election model: 2D IQ (ideology/quality) model

[Jameson Quinn]

2011/11/8 Kevin Venzke 

> Speaking of quoting messages, I have to admit I don't understand how it is
> even supposed to be done under Yahoo. I can indent the message, and I used
> to be able to correctly quote plain text messages. But usually when I try
> to quote an html message I just end up destroying the formatting somehow.
>
> Anyway, to Jameson:
>
>
>   *De :* Jameson Quinn 
> *À :* kathy.d...@gmail.com
> *Cc :* EM 
> *Envoyé le :* Dimanche 6 Novembre 2011 20h23
> *Objet :* Re: [EM] Toy election model: 2D IQ (ideology/quality) model
>
>
>
> > 3. It is therefore reasonable to hope for a voting system that tends to
> > elect centrists, but slightly less so than a Condorcet system.
>
> Why would utility be considered more important than centrist?  Or would it?
>
> Utility is *the* goal, almost tautologically. I mean yeah, there's plenty
> of ways you could criticize the model, or even the idea that the votes have
> anything at all to do with the utility that the voters will gain from a
> given candidate winning; but until someone comes up with something better,
> for democracy at least, utility is the best paradigm we have.
>
>
>
> I don't think I agree. Utilities are everpresent in simulations because
> they are a convenient way to represent the priorities of the voters. They
> can easily be generated from distances in space. But, it's not obvious that
> these priorities need to be aggregable (we could use a system where the
> "addition" of different voters' priorities isn't even a straightforward
> task) and it's not obvious that maximizing the aggregation should even be a
> goal. You don't need to do it.
>

I know there are proofs for a single agent that something equivalent to
utility is the only way to have consistent priorities and avoid being
"money pumped". ("You have A? OK, will you trade that and $1 for B? Now
will you trade that and $1 for C? OK, now will you trade that and $1 for A?
Heh heh heh, you just gave me $3 for nothing, fool.") I suspect you could
prove something similar for aggregate agents (societies). Basically,
utilities are the only way to avoid the Condorcet paradox.

I do not think that this means that utilities are somehow real. I do think
that it is a pretty good argument for using a utility-based model.


> I've said before that I prefer to look at sincere Condorcet efficiency and
> strategic incentives.
>

While I'm advocating using utilities, I must say that we could do a lot
worse than your plan. In particular, as I've said elsewhere, using
utilities is no substitute for looking at strategic incentives.


> So you don't get one clean number from me, sorry. But I think it may be
> less artificial than aggregated utility.
>
> Furthermore I doubt that aggregate utility is likely to get you anywhere
> unique. Electorates in practice try to get sincere CWs elected. If someone
> ever pointed to a simulation and a scenario and a rule and said, "here is a
> concrete method by which we can favor higher utility candidates over
> sincere Condorcet efficiency" my intuition would be that their tools are
> underestimating the voters. When the sincere CW loses, it represents an
> error from the standpoint of what the electorate was trying to do. I think
> it would take some genius work to capitalize consistently on such errors,
> and gain more than is lost.
>

I suspect that Majority Judgment does exactly that. My evidence? B+L's
study that shows that MJ is the only system which does not elect almost
solely centrists nor almost solely extremists, in a model based on 2007
France. That is to say, where Condorcet elected centrists, MJ sometimes
elected extremists. And in my toy model, that is sometimes the right answer.


>
> All that said, I would be interested to hear if someone has made an
> argument that majority rule, as a sensible principle, depends on some other
> more fundamental principle.
>

OK, here goes: utility is happiness and is the true goal. Majority rule is
just the most strategy-proof principle which tends to agree with maximum
utility.

That wasn't too hard.

I'm not actually a utility fundamentalist; I don't think that it's
necessarily real. But yes, I do think that on the whole, it's closer to
being a fundamental principle than Condorcet.

I also think that, even if it's not truer, people's brains are more set up
to understand comparing some quality measure for each candidate, than
comprehending a Condorcet matrix-based procedure. So even if the Condorcet
criterion itself is easy to state so that people "understand" it, they're
going to naturally feel more comfortable with a quality measure procedure
(such as Approval, Range, MJ, SODA), than with a comparison-based one (such
as any Condorcet, MMPO, IBIFA). Even IRV is seen as "less complicated" than
Copeland//Approval because it's a linear, not a parallel, process, not
because the rules are simpler.

Jameson


>
> Kevin
>
>
> 
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
>
>