date:20111124

Hi Jameson,
 
De : Jameson Quinn 
>>À : Chris Benham  
>>Cc : MIKE OSSIPOFF ; "fsimm...@pcc.edu" 
>>; em  
>>Envoyé le : Mercredi 23 Novembre 2011 4h18
>>Objet : Re: [EM] An ABE solution
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> 
>>My perspective is the following:
>>1. Most real-world elections will have a sincere CW, although that might not 
>>be visible from the ballots.
>>1a. Those elections without a sincere CW don't really have a "wrong answer", 
>>so I don't worry as much about the pathologies in that case.
>>2. Therefore, we can divide FBC-violating strategies into two (overlapping) 
>>classes: those which work when there is not a CW among the other voters, 
>>which I will call "offensive" strategies, and which usually work by creating 
>>a false cycle; and those which work when there is no CW among the other 
>>voters, which I will call "defensive".
>>3. I consider that a method with no "offensive" FBC violations is good 
>>enough. That's why I've used those labels: why would "defensive" strategies 
>>be a problem if "offensive" ones weren't?
>
>
Having some problems understanding where you're coming from. A defensive 
FBC-violating strategy isn't likely going to be 
provoked by an offensive FBC-violating strategy. I would expect it to be 
provoked by the truncation of other voters.

If you want to say that it's enough for methods to not be suspectible to 
strategies that would necessitiate defensive compromise
from other voters, then I might agree, but that is almost the same thing, in 
practice, as saying the method should satisfy FBC.

Kevin
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

[EM] Re : An ABE solution

Hi Forest,


De : "fsimm...@pcc.edu" 
>>À : Chris Benham  
>>Cc : EM  
>>Envoyé le : Mercredi 23 Novembre 2011 19h47
>>Objet : Re: [EM] An ABE solution
>>


The latter is correct, because I used Woodall's scheme. By definition an 
election method doesn't use
approval ballots. You have to evaluate a rank ballot method that gives the same 
results (and there is more
than one way to do that with Approval).

The thing with three slots and three candidates, and the proof attempt, is just 
that it's probably possible to
convert the method into a rank method.

Kevin
This last statement is the one I referred to.  In the case of Approval the 
winner can be determined soley 
from the pairwise matrix, so Approval satisfies this condition.  It also 
satisfies the FBC, so the "proof" is 
either wrong or it makes other tacit assumptions that somehow rule out Approval.
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Re: [EM] More non-altruistic attacks on IRV usage.

2011-11-24 Thread Dave Ketchum

On Nov 24, 2011, at 3:50 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:

On 11/24/11 2:20 PM, David L Wetzell wrote:
Let me start off by saying that I'm thankful for this list-serve of
people passionate about electoral reform
and that you put together a working consensus statement. I'm
trying to work it some more...

My belief is that the US's system makes it necessary to frame
electoral reform simply and to limit the options proffered.

but they should be *good* options. limiting the proffered options
to IRV is proven by our experience in Vermont to eventually fail.

That justifies promoting Condorcet - see below. Others deserve
arguing against:
FPTP- can only vote for one - why we are considering what to
promote.
Approval - can vote for more, but does not support expressing
unequal liking.
Range/score - demands expressing (in an amount understandable)
how much better one candidate is than another.
IRV or IRV3 - good voting, but counting does not promise to be
complete (see Burlington).
PR - that deserves promoting for such as legislators - but here
we are thinking of electing single officers such as mayors and
governors.

This is what FairVote does and they do it well.

no they don't. FairVote sells ranked-choice voting and the IRV/STV
method of tabulating the ranked ballots as if they are the same
thing. i.e., once they convince voters, city councilors, and
legislators that ranked-choice voting is a good thing (by accurately
pointing out what is wrong with FPTP in a multiparty context and/or
viable independent candidates), they present IRV as it is the only
solution. that backfired BIG TIME here in Burlington Vermont.

If you're going to undercut their marketing strategy then
ethically the burden of proof is on you wrt providing a clear-cut
alternative to IRV3.

Condorcet.

which Condorcet method i am not so particular about, but simplicity
is good. Schulze may be the best from a functional POV (resistance
to strategy) but, while i have a lot of respect for Markus, the
Schulze method appears complicated and will be a hard sell. i also
do not think that cycles will be common in governmental elections
and am convinced that when a cycle rarely occurs, it will never
involve more than 3 candidates in the Smith set. given a bunch of
Condorcet-compliant methods that all pick the same winner in the 3-
candidate Smith set, the simplest method should be the one marketed
to the public and to legislators.

The ranking offers a bit of power that is easy to express - rank as
many candidates as you approve of, showing for each pair whether you
see them as A>B, A=B, or Amuch the better exceeds the weaker (note that ranking a candidate you
do not approve of risks helping that reject win).
It is in ranking multiple candidates that we lead to voting for
more than two parties for we can vote among those parties plus our
true desire.

The voting is much like IRV's, except also permitting A=B. The vote
counting, unlike IRV's, considers all the ranking you vote.

While you can use as many ranks as the ballot permits, you are not
required to do more than express your desires - ranking one as in
FPTP, or more as equal as in Approval, is fine if that expresses your
thoughts (especially if you only wish the leader to win or lose).

To get a cycle you have to have three or more near tied candidates in
which each beats at least one of its competitors. Resolving such
requires a bit of fairness, but requires little more than that, since
we got there by being near to ties.

Dave Ketchum

r b-j r...@audioimagination.com

"Imagination is more important than knowledge."

Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

[EM] Re : An ABE solution

Hi,


De : Jameson Quinn 
>>À : Chris Benham  
>>Cc : EM ; "fsimm...@pcc.edu" 
>> 
>>Envoyé le : Mercredi 23 Novembre 2011 7h43
>>Objet : Re: [EM] An ABE solution
>>
>I don't agree that "Sincere Favorite" is practically equivalent to the FBC. 
>The FBC is about not having to lower your one favorite candidate; it is not 
>about not having to pick a single favorite from your favorite set. As a voter, 
>I'd regard the former as a serious dilemma, and the latter as a trivial detail.
>>
>>
>>Jameson

Can anyone explain this to me? I haven't understood it yet.

Obviously the reason I test whether lowering any "favorite" causes a desired 
result is the fact that any one of those candidates
actually might be the sincere favorite.

I will read the other messages again but I am not sure how you will make a 
better votes-only definition without doing something
similar to this. The FBC of course theoretically is passed by a lot of methods 
that would not pass the votes-only version. But
I don't believe it's likely that, in those cases, the methods are really 
providing a valuable guarantee.

Kevin

Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] An ABE solution

2011-11-24 Thread Chris Benham



Jameson,
 
"Your range scores are a little bit wrong,.."

I've re-checked them and I don't see how. I gave each candidate 2 points for a 
top-rating, 1 for a middle-rating
and zero for a bottom rating (or truncation).
 
So in the initial "sincere" scenario for example C has 9 top-ratings and 1 
middle-rating to make a score of  19,
B has 8 top-ratings and 1 middle-rating to make a score of  17, and A has 5 
top-ratings and 2 middle-ratings
to make a score of 12.

Chris  Benham
 


From: Jameson Quinn 
Sent: Friday, 25 November 2011 5:39 AM
Subject: Re: An ABE solution


Chris: 

Your range scores are a little bit wrong, so you have to add half a B vote for 
the example to work (or double all factions and add one B vote if you 
discriminate against fractional people), but yes, this is at heart a valid 
example where the method fails FBC. 

Note that in my tendentious terminology this is only a "defensive" failure, 
that is, it starts from a position of a sincere condorcet cycle, which I 
believe will be rare enough in real elections to be discountable. In 
particular, this failure does not result in a stable 
two-party-lesser-evil-strategy self-reinforcing equilibrium. 

Jameson


2011/11/24 Chris Benham 

Forest,
>
>In reference to your new Condorcet method suggestion (pasted at the bottom), 
>which elects an
>uncovered candidate and if there is none one-at-time disqualifies the Range 
>loser until a remaining
>candidate X covers all the other remaining candidates and then elects X, you 
>wrote:
>
>"Indeed, the three slot case does appear to satisfy the FBC..".
>
>No. Here is my example, based on that Kevin Venke proof you didn't like.
> 
>Say sincere is
> 
>3: B>A
>3: A=C
>3: B=C
>2: A>C
>2: B>A
>2: C>B
>1: C
> 
>Range (0,1,2) scores: C19,   B17,   A12.
>
>C>B 8-5,   B>A 10-5,   A>C  7-6.
> 
>C wins.
> 
>Now we focus on the 3 B>A preferrers. Suppose (believing the method meets the 
>FBC)
>they vote B=A.
> 3: B=A  (sincere is B>A)
>3: A=C
>3: B=C
>2: A>C
>2: B>A
>2: C>B
>1: C
> Range (0,1,2) scores: C19,   B17,   A15.
>
>
>C>B 8-5,   B>A 7-5,   A>C  7-6.
> 
>C still wins.
> 
>Now suppose they instead rate their sincere favourite Middle:
> 
>3: A>B  (sincere is B>A)
>3: A=C
>3: B=C
>2: A>C
>2: B>A
>2: C>B
>1: C
> Range (0,1,2) scores: C19,   A15,   B12.
>
>A>B  8-7,   A>C  7-6,    C>B  8-5
> 
>Now those 3 voters get a result they prefer, the election of their compromise
>candidate A. Since it is clear they couldn't have got a result for themselves 
>as
>good or better by voting  B>A or B=A or B or B>C or B=C this is a failure
>of the FBC.
> 
>Chris Benham
> 
> 
>
>
>From: "fsimm...@pcc.edu" 
>Sent: Wednesday, 23 November 2011 9:01 AM 
>
>Subject: Re: An ABE solution
>
>
>You are right that although the method is defined for any number of slots, I 
>suggested three slots as 
>most practical.
>
>So my example of two slots was only to disprove the statement the assertion 
>that the method cannot be 
>FBC compliant, since it is obviously compliant in that case.  
>
>Furthermore something must be wrong with the quoted proof (of the 
>incompatibility of the FBC and the 
>CC) because the winner of the two slot case can be found entirely on the basis 
>of the pairwise matrix.  
>The other escape hatch is to say that two slots are not enough to satisfy 
>anything but the voted ballots 
>version of the Condorcet Criterion.  But this applies equally well to the 
>three slot case.
>
>Either way the cited "therorem" is not good enough to rule out compliance with 
>the FBC by this new 
>method.
>
>Indeed, the three slot case does appear to satisfy the FBC as well.  It is an 
>open question.  I did not 
>assert that it does.  But I did say that "IF" it is strategically equivalent 
>to Approval (as Range is, for 
>example) then for "practical purposes" it satisfies the FBC.  Perhaps not the 
>letter of the law, but the 
>spirit of the law.  Indeed, in a non-stratetgical environment nobody worries 
>about the FBC, i.e. only 
>strategic voters will betray their favorite. If optimal strategy is approval 
>strategy, and approval strategy 
>requires you to top rate your favorite, then why would you do otherwise?
>
>Forest
>
>- Original Message -
>From: Chris Benham 
>
>Forest,
> 
>"When the range ballots have only two slots, the method is  simply Approval, 
>which does satisfy the 
>FBC."
>  
>When you introduced the method you suggested that 3-slot ballots be used "for 
>simplicity".
> I thought you might be open to say 4-6 slots, but a complicated algorithm on 
>2-slot ballots
> that is equivalent to Approval ??
>  
>"Now consider the case of range ballots with three slots: and  suppose that 
>optimal strategy requires the  
>voters to avoid the middle slot.  Then the method reduces to Approval, which 
>does satisfy the FBC."
>  
>The FBC doesn't stipulate that all the voters use "optimal  strategy", so that 
>isn't relavent.
> 
>http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/FBC
>  
>http://nodesie

[EM] Re : An ABE solution

Hi Chris,


De : Chris Benham 
>>À : "fsimm...@pcc.edu"  
>>Cc : EM  
>>Envoyé le : Mercredi 23 Novembre 2011 7h08
>>Objet : [EM] An ABE solution
>>
It is certainly a clear proof of the incompatibilty of  the Condorcet criterion 
and Kevin's later
>>suggested "variation" of  the FBC, "Sincere Favorite":
>> Suppose a subset of the ballots, all identical, rank every candidate in S 
>>(where S contains at least two candidates) equal to each other, and above 
>>every other candidate. Then, arbitrarily lowering some candidate X from S on 
>>these ballots must not increase the probability that the winner comes from S.
>>A simpler way to word this would be: You should never be able to help your 
>>favorites by lowering one of them.
>> 
>>http://nodesiege.tripod.com/elections/#critfbc
>>
>>I can't see any real difference between this and regular FBC, which probably 
>>partly explains
>>why it didn't catch on.
 
Sincere Favorite is supposed to be a votes-only translation of FBC. It should 
clarify what I am doing when I
check whether a method satisfies FBC. It's possible that a method can satisfy 
FBC without satisfying Sincere
Favorite, but it would be hard to design a method to do so, I think.
 
Besides the issue you mention, there are also the facts that I rarely use the 
"sincere favorite" name myself and 
that the SF acronym would be confusing given the "Strategy-Free" criterion with 
the same initials.
 
Kevin

Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] More non-altruistic attacks on IRV usage.

On Thu, Nov 24, 2011 at 8:27 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:

>
>>  You can't end FPTP without following its logic and that entails the
>> sort of activism mastered by FairVote
>>
>> And it's going to get easier to push for electoral reforms in the coming
>> year thanks to #OWS 
>>
>
> #OWS embraces consensus logic, the polar opposite of plurality logic. And
> yet it is succeeding in moving the debate in a way that many things which
> preceded it did not.
>

dlw: #OWS is about changing the political culture.  This is more crucial
than to change the literal rules in place but to change such rules will
require an adaptation to plurality logic so that we pick a target and fix
it.

>
> JQ:I believe that cautious reformism is as much of a dead-end as dreamy
> utopianism. We need to plan to take over the world, because right now the
> feasible and the necessary are non-overlapping sets. You don't get where we
> need to go without the tough work of solidarity and consensus (including
> swallowing your pride); you don't get there by seeing the logic of what
> precedes you as an inevitable crutch to the future; and you don't get there
> by over-valuing the sunk costs of past activism.
>

dlw: IRV alone is cautious reformism.  IRV+PR + the politics of
Gandhi/MLKjr is not.  When we put most of our chips on the politics of
Gandhi/MLKjr/#OWS to make feasible the changes that we need then we can
afford to play our cards smart on electoral reform.

dlw

>
> Jameson
>

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Re: [EM] More non-altruistic attacks on IRV usage.

>
>
>  You can't end FPTP without following its logic and that entails the
> sort of activism mastered by FairVote
>
> And it's going to get easier to push for electoral reforms in the coming
> year thanks to #OWS 
>

#OWS embraces consensus logic, the polar opposite of plurality logic. And
yet it is succeeding in moving the debate in a way that many things which
preceded it did not.

I believe that cautious reformism is as much of a dead-end as dreamy
utopianism. We need to plan to take over the world, because right now the
feasible and the necessary are non-overlapping sets. You don't get where we
need to go without the tough work of solidarity and consensus (including
swallowing your pride); you don't get there by seeing the logic of what
precedes you as an inevitable crutch to the future; and you don't get there
by over-valuing the sunk costs of past activism.

Jameson

Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Re: [EM] Robert Bristow-Johnson

> -- Forwarded message --
> From: robert bristow-johnson 
> To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
> Date: Thu, 24 Nov 2011 15:50:02 -0500
> Subject: Re: [EM] More non-altruistic attacks on IRV usage.
> On 11/24/11 2:20 PM, David L Wetzell wrote:
>
>> Let me start off by saying that I'm thankful for this list-serve of
>> people passionate about electoral reform
>> and that you put together a working consensus statement.  I'm trying to
>> work it some more...
>>
>> My belief is that the US's system makes it necessary to frame electoral
>> reform simply and to limit the options proffered.
>>
>
> but they should be *good* options.  limiting the proffered options to IRV
> is proven by our experience in Vermont to eventually fail.
>

dlw: That is a huge non sequitur.  Vermont proved nothing, other than the
need to prepare for counter-IRV activism.   We face the problem of
induction and the hazard of drawing strong inference in the face of small
sample sizes ;-).

>
>   This is what FairVote does and they do it well.
>>
>
> no they don't.  FairVote sells ranked-choice voting and the IRV/STV method
> of tabulating the ranked ballots as if they are the same thing.  i.e., once
> they convince voters, city councilors, and legislators that ranked-choice
> voting is a good thing (by accurately pointing out what is wrong with FPTP
> in a multiparty context and/or viable independent candidates), they present
> IRV as it is the only solution.  that backfired BIG TIME here in Burlington
> Vermont.
>

dlw: I see, you're from Burlington...  The counter IRV campaign may have
won, but we are too close to the event to judge rightly its wider
significance.  The bigger story is that democracy remains an ongoing
experiment.

>
>   If you're going to undercut their marketing strategy then ethically the
>> burden of proof is on you wrt providing a clear-cut alternative to IRV3.
>>
>
> Condorcet.
>

b.s.
In a world full of low-info voters and fuzzy-choices among political
candidates, rankings don't have the weight that rational choice theorists
purport for them.

>
> which Condorcet method i am not so particular about, but simplicity is
> good.  Schulze may be the best from a functional POV (resistance to
> strategy) but, while i have a lot of respect for Markus, the Schulze method
> appears complicated and will be a hard sell.  i also do not think that
> cycles will be common in governmental elections and am convinced that when
> a cycle rarely occurs, it will never involve more than 3 candidates in the
> Smith set.  given a bunch of Condorcet-compliant methods that all pick the
> same winner in the 3-candidate Smith set, the simplest method should be the
> one marketed to the public and to legislators.
>

What works best for wines among wine connoisseurs will not work best for
politicians among hacks.

dlw

>
>
>

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Re: [EM] More non-altruistic attacks on IRV usage.

On Thu, Nov 24, 2011 at 4:16 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:

> I think it would be great if we could unite all the activists, theorists,
> and academics behind a single plan for system-wide election reform. I would
> get behind such a plan in a heartbeat, even if I thought it was flawed in
> its details.
>
> But that is, demonstrably, not happening.
>

It has not happened *yet*.  There is a strong majority of electoral reform
or progressive activists in favor of IRV+PR.  It's the electoral theorists
who don't like IRV.  I'd like to think that if we take into account more
realistic models of voter behavior that it'll help us to build more unity.
Likewise, with the need to push for PR usages that handicap the rivalry
between the two major parties et al. , rather than end two-party domination
of US politics.  Successful electoral reform advocacy has had to choose its
battles with the status quo.  It has not been driven by theory, it has used
it as a tool.  This list tends to elevate the role of electoral theory
beyond what is meant for it.

>
> David, you do not have a choice between a world where you agree with
> others, and a world where they agree with you. You have a choice between a
> world where you agree with others, and a world where you don't. That's the
> only part you get to decide.
>
> I honestly believe that the statement, as it is, is going to bring the
> broadest possible consensus. To convince me to favor changing it, you'd
> have to convince me otherwise.
>

If a political reform statement is not supported institutionally, it's
going to swim upstream to influence things.  I have learned this the hard
way and it is why I view myself as a foot-soldier ally of FairVote.

>
> Why do I care more about the breadth of consensus than about which reforms
> are most likely to pass in the short term? Because I think that short-term
> thinking is, well, shortsighted. Fairvote has some hard-won accomplishments
> behind it, yes. But honestly, the distance they've come is a small fraction
> of the total effort it's going to take to reform the whole voting system in
> the US (or Guatemala where I live, or the UK, or...). Given where we are in
> that larger context, I think that the most effective I can possibly be is
> by trying to promote the broadest consensus possible.
>

We agree that a FPTP dominated system really sucks.  However, it is the
system of my country(I don't know about Guatemala).  As such, it dictates
that we act strategically(as opposed to consensually).  You can't end FPTP
without following its logic and that entails the sort of activism mastered
by FairVote.  So when we snipe at FairVote and IRV, we make it easier for
others to muddy the waters and we risk holding up electoral reform.

And it's going to get easier to push for electoral reforms in the coming
year thanks to #OWS and unhappiness with both major parties(especially when
people wake up to how hard it is to get and enforce effective CFR).  But I
think we need to respect FairVote's leadership role and the first-mover and
marketing advantage of IRV to take advantage of this time.
dlw

> Jameson
>
> 2011/11/24 David L Wetzell 
>
>> Let me start off by saying that I'm thankful for this list-serve of
>> people passionate about electoral reform
>> and that you put together a working consensus statement.  I'm trying to
>> work it some more...
>>
>> My belief is that the US's system makes it necessary to frame electoral
>> reform simply and to limit the options proffered.  This is what FairVote
>> does and they do it well.  If you're going to undercut their marketing
>> strategy then ethically the burden of proof is on you wrt providing a
>> clear-cut alternative to IRV3.  Your statement provide several solutions.
>> This is not a clear-cut alternative.  I argue for IRV3/AV3 as such an
>> alternative, for it addresses your critiques.  It also could be pitched in
>> such a way as permits FairVote to save face and retain its leadership role
>> in electoral reform in the US, which increases the chances that they and
>> others switch to it.
>>
>> And so what about IRV3/AV3?  Is that not worth at least including in your
>> statement, along with the phrase "American forms of Proportional
>> Representation", which is likely going to be getting big due to the
>> leadership of FairVote in this coming year?
>>
>> I'll likely sign it, but I feel conflicted because of the reasons I
>> mention above, and want some due process over these ideas first.
>>
>> dlw
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Nov 24, 2011 at 4:52 AM, Jameson Quinn 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> I absolutely agree. We should not waste energy fighting over which
>>> election system is the ideal. For instance, if we are given the opportunity
>>> to sign a statement which clearly states some of the problems with the
>>> current system and supports several solutions we believe would help,
>>> including giving weak support to the solutions we consider best, we should
>>> sign it, not waste our energy criticizing the

Re: [EM] More non-altruistic attacks on IRV usage.

I think it would be great if we could unite all the activists, theorists,
and academics behind a single plan for system-wide election reform. I would
get behind such a plan in a heartbeat, even if I thought it was flawed in
its details.

But that is, demonstrably, not happening.

David, you do not have a choice between a world where you agree with
others, and a world where they agree with you. You have a choice between a
world where you agree with others, and a world where you don't. That's the
only part you get to decide.

I honestly believe that the statement, as it is, is going to bring the
broadest possible consensus. To convince me to favor changing it, you'd
have to convince me otherwise.

Why do I care more about the breadth of consensus than about which reforms
are most likely to pass in the short term? Because I think that short-term
thinking is, well, shortsighted. Fairvote has some hard-won accomplishments
behind it, yes. But honestly, the distance they've come is a small fraction
of the total effort it's going to take to reform the whole voting system in
the US (or Guatemala where I live, or the UK, or...). Given where we are in
that larger context, I think that the most effective I can possibly be is
by trying to promote the broadest consensus possible.

Jameson

2011/11/24 David L Wetzell 

> Let me start off by saying that I'm thankful for this list-serve of people
> passionate about electoral reform
> and that you put together a working consensus statement.  I'm trying to
> work it some more...
>
> My belief is that the US's system makes it necessary to frame electoral
> reform simply and to limit the options proffered.  This is what FairVote
> does and they do it well.  If you're going to undercut their marketing
> strategy then ethically the burden of proof is on you wrt providing a
> clear-cut alternative to IRV3.  Your statement provide several solutions.
> This is not a clear-cut alternative.  I argue for IRV3/AV3 as such an
> alternative, for it addresses your critiques.  It also could be pitched in
> such a way as permits FairVote to save face and retain its leadership role
> in electoral reform in the US, which increases the chances that they and
> others switch to it.
>
> And so what about IRV3/AV3?  Is that not worth at least including in your
> statement, along with the phrase "American forms of Proportional
> Representation", which is likely going to be getting big due to the
> leadership of FairVote in this coming year?
>
> I'll likely sign it, but I feel conflicted because of the reasons I
> mention above, and want some due process over these ideas first.
>
> dlw
>
>
>
>
> On Thu, Nov 24, 2011 at 4:52 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>
>> I absolutely agree. We should not waste energy fighting over which
>> election system is the ideal. For instance, if we are given the opportunity
>> to sign a statement which clearly states some of the problems with the
>> current system and supports several solutions we believe would help,
>> including giving weak support to the solutions we consider best, we should
>> sign it, not waste our energy criticizing the precise levels of support it
>> gives to the various options.
>>
>> The statement is supportive of PR, and it also clearly says that IRV has
>> advantages over plurality.
>>
>> Jameson
>>
>>
>> 2011/11/23 David L Wetzell 
>>
>>> The variations in "x", particularly among low-info voters as we
>>> predominantly have in the USA, are too small to put a lot of time/energy
>>> into trying to get it perfect.  It just lowers the p because of the
>>> proliferation of election rules trying to become numero uno.
>>>
>>> But how else do we make "more local" elections become  competitive and
>>> interesting than thru the use of multi-winner PR elections?
>>>
>>> dlw
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wed, Nov 23, 2011 at 5:58 PM, Jameson Quinn 
>>> wrote:
>>>


>> If I've read you correctly here, it seems to me that you should sign
>> the statement. You agree with everything it says, even if you wish it 
>> said
>> some other things. And if you're truly being open-minded about this, you
>> will want to avoid the circular logic involved in not signing. ("I won't
>> sign it because it doesn't have wide enough support.")
>>
>
> dlw: Ah, but I can't support giving a lot of attention to
> single-winner reforms when the empirical evidence suggests that it's the
> mix of multi-winner and single-winner that is of far greater import.
>
>
 Seriously? You won't eat our chips and fish, because that's the wrong
 way around?

 Jameson

>>>
>>>
>>
>

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Re: [EM] More non-altruistic attacks on IRV usage.

2011-11-24 Thread robert bristow-johnson


On 11/24/11 2:20 PM, David L Wetzell wrote:
Let me start off by saying that I'm thankful for this list-serve of 
people passionate about electoral reform
and that you put together a working consensus statement.  I'm trying 
to work it some more...


My belief is that the US's system makes it necessary to frame 
electoral reform simply and to limit the options proffered.


but they should be *good* options.  limiting the proffered options to 
IRV is proven by our experience in Vermont to eventually fail.



  This is what FairVote does and they do it well.


no they don't.  FairVote sells ranked-choice voting and the IRV/STV 
method of tabulating the ranked ballots as if they are the same thing.  
i.e., once they convince voters, city councilors, and legislators that 
ranked-choice voting is a good thing (by accurately pointing out what is 
wrong with FPTP in a multiparty context and/or viable independent 
candidates), they present IRV as it is the only solution.  that 
backfired BIG TIME here in Burlington Vermont.


  If you're going to undercut their marketing strategy then ethically 
the burden of proof is on you wrt providing a clear-cut alternative to 
IRV3.


Condorcet.

which Condorcet method i am not so particular about, but simplicity is 
good.  Schulze may be the best from a functional POV (resistance to 
strategy) but, while i have a lot of respect for Markus, the Schulze 
method appears complicated and will be a hard sell.  i also do not think 
that cycles will be common in governmental elections and am convinced 
that when a cycle rarely occurs, it will never involve more than 3 
candidates in the Smith set.  given a bunch of Condorcet-compliant 
methods that all pick the same winner in the 3-candidate Smith set, the 
simplest method should be the one marketed to the public and to legislators.


--

r b-j  r...@audioimagination.com

"Imagination is more important than knowledge."



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Re: [EM] More non-altruistic attacks on IRV usage.

Let me start off by saying that I'm thankful for this list-serve of people
passionate about electoral reform
and that you put together a working consensus statement.  I'm trying to
work it some more...

My belief is that the US's system makes it necessary to frame electoral
reform simply and to limit the options proffered.  This is what FairVote
does and they do it well.  If you're going to undercut their marketing
strategy then ethically the burden of proof is on you wrt providing a
clear-cut alternative to IRV3.  Your statement provide several solutions.
This is not a clear-cut alternative.  I argue for IRV3/AV3 as such an
alternative, for it addresses your critiques.  It also could be pitched in
such a way as permits FairVote to save face and retain its leadership role
in electoral reform in the US, which increases the chances that they and
others switch to it.

And so what about IRV3/AV3?  Is that not worth at least including in your
statement, along with the phrase "American forms of Proportional
Representation", which is likely going to be getting big due to the
leadership of FairVote in this coming year?

I'll likely sign it, but I feel conflicted because of the reasons I mention
above, and want some due process over these ideas first.

dlw

On Thu, Nov 24, 2011 at 4:52 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:

> I absolutely agree. We should not waste energy fighting over which
> election system is the ideal. For instance, if we are given the opportunity
> to sign a statement which clearly states some of the problems with the
> current system and supports several solutions we believe would help,
> including giving weak support to the solutions we consider best, we should
> sign it, not waste our energy criticizing the precise levels of support it
> gives to the various options.
>
> The statement is supportive of PR, and it also clearly says that IRV has
> advantages over plurality.
>
> Jameson
>
>
> 2011/11/23 David L Wetzell 
>
>> The variations in "x", particularly among low-info voters as we
>> predominantly have in the USA, are too small to put a lot of time/energy
>> into trying to get it perfect.  It just lowers the p because of the
>> proliferation of election rules trying to become numero uno.
>>
>> But how else do we make "more local" elections become  competitive and
>> interesting than thru the use of multi-winner PR elections?
>>
>> dlw
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Nov 23, 2011 at 5:58 PM, Jameson Quinn 
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
> If I've read you correctly here, it seems to me that you should sign
> the statement. You agree with everything it says, even if you wish it said
> some other things. And if you're truly being open-minded about this, you
> will want to avoid the circular logic involved in not signing. ("I won't
> sign it because it doesn't have wide enough support.")
>

 dlw: Ah, but I can't support giving a lot of attention to single-winner
 reforms when the empirical evidence suggests that it's the mix of
 multi-winner and single-winner that is of far greater import.

>>> Seriously? You won't eat our chips and fish, because that's the wrong
>>> way around?
>>>
>>> Jameson
>>>
>>
>>
>

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Re: [EM] An ABE solution

Chris:

Your range scores are a little bit wrong, so you have to add half a B vote
for the example to work (or double all factions and add one B vote if you
discriminate against fractional people), but yes, this is at heart a valid
example where the method fails FBC.

Note that in my tendentious terminology this is only a "defensive" failure,
that is, it starts from a position of a sincere condorcet cycle, which I
believe will be rare enough in real elections to be discountable. In
particular, this failure does not result in a stable
two-party-lesser-evil-strategy self-reinforcing equilibrium.

Jameson

2011/11/24 Chris Benham 

> Forest,
> In reference to your new Condorcet method suggestion (pasted at the
> bottom), which elects an
> uncovered candidate and if there is none one-at-time disqualifies the
> Range loser until a remaining
> candidate X covers all the other remaining candidates and then elects X,
> you wrote:
> "Indeed, the three slot case does appear to satisfy the FBC..".
>
> No. Here is my example, based on that Kevin Venke proof you didn't like.
>
> Say sincere is
>
> 3: B>A
> 3: A=C
> 3: B=C
> 2: A>C
> 2: B>A
> 2: C>B
> 1: C
>
> Range (0,1,2) scores: C19,   B17,   A12.
> C>B 8-5,   B>A 10-5,   A>C  7-6.
>
> C wins.
>
> Now we focus on the 3 B>A preferrers. Suppose (believing the method meets
> the FBC)
> they vote B=A.
>
> 3: B=A  (sincere is B>A)
> 3: A=C
> 3: B=C
> 2: A>C
> 2: B>A
> 2: C>B
> 1: C
>
> Range (0,1,2) scores: C19,   B17,   A15.
>
> C>B 8-5,   B>A 7-5,   A>C  7-6.
>
> C still wins.
>
> Now suppose they instead rate their sincere favourite Middle:
>
> 3: A>B  (sincere is B>A)
> 3: A=C
> 3: B=C
> 2: A>C
> 2: B>A
> 2: C>B
> 1: C
>
> Range (0,1,2) scores: C19,   A15,   B12.
>
> A>B  8-7,   A>C  7-6,C>B  8-5
>
> Now those 3 voters get a result they prefer, the election of their
> compromise
> candidate A. Since it is clear they couldn't have got a result for
> themselves as
> good or better by voting B>A or  B>C or B this is a failure of the FBC.
>
>
> Chris Benham
>
>
>
>   *From:* "fsimm...@pcc.edu" 
> *Sent:* Wednesday, 23 November 2011 9:01 AM
>
> *Subject:* Re: An ABE solution
>
> You are right that although the method is defined for any number of slots,
> I suggested three slots as
> most practical.
>
> So my example of two slots was only to disprove the statement the
> assertion that the method cannot be
> FBC compliant, since it is obviously compliant in that case.
>
> Furthermore something must be wrong with the quoted proof (of the
> incompatibility of the FBC and the
> CC) because the winner of the two slot case can be found entirely on the
> basis of the pairwise matrix.
> The other escape hatch is to say that two slots are not enough to satisfy
> anything but the voted ballots
> version of the Condorcet Criterion.  But this applies equally well to the
> three slot case.
>
> Either way the cited "therorem" is not good enough to rule out compliance
> with the FBC by this new
> method.
>
> Indeed, the three slot case does appear to satisfy the FBC as well.  It is
> an open question.  I did not
> assert that it does.  But I did say that "IF" it is strategically
> equivalent to Approval (as Range is, for
> example) then for "practical purposes" it satisfies the FBC.  Perhaps not
> the letter of the law, but the
> spirit of the law.  Indeed, in a non-stratetgical environment nobody
> worries about the FBC, i.e. only
> strategic voters will betray their favorite. If optimal strategy is
> approval strategy, and approval strategy
> requires you to top rate your favorite, then why would you do otherwise?
>
> Forest
>
> - Original Message -
> From: Chris Benham
>
> Forest,
>
> "When the range ballots have only two slots, the method is  simply
> Approval, which does satisfy the
> FBC."
>
> When you introduced the method you suggested that 3-slot ballots be used
> "for simplicity".
>  I thought you might be open to say 4-6 slots, but a complicated algorithm
> on 2-slot ballots
>  that is equivalent to Approval ??
>
> "Now consider the case of range ballots with three slots: and  suppose
> that optimal strategy requires the
>  voters to avoid the middle slot.  Then the method reduces to Approval,
> which does satisfy the FBC."
>
> The FBC doesn't stipulate that all the voters use "optimal  strategy", so
> that isn't relavent.
>
> http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/FBC
>
> http://nodesiege.tripod.com/elections/#critfbc
>
> Chris  Benham
> Forest Simmons wrote (17 Nov 2011):
>
> Here’s my current favorite deterministic proposal: Ballots are Range
> Style, say three slot for simplicity.
>
> When the ballots are collected, the pairwise win/loss/tie relations are
> determined among the candidates.
>
> The covering relations are also determined.  Candidate X covers candidate
> Y if X
> beats Y as well as every candidate that Y beats.  In other words row X of
> the
> win/loss/tie matrix dominates row Y.
>
> Then starting with the candidates with the lowest Range scores, they are

Re: [EM] An ABE solution

2011-11-24 Thread Chris Benham

Forest,

In reference to your new Condorcet method suggestion (pasted at the bottom), 
which elects an
uncovered candidate and if there is none one-at-time disqualifies the Range 
loser until a remaining
candidate X covers all the other remaining candidates and then elects X, you 
wrote:

"Indeed, the three slot case does appear to satisfy the FBC..".

No. Here is my example, based on that Kevin Venke proof you didn't like.
 
Say sincere is
 
3: B>A
3: A=C
3: B=C
2: A>C
2: B>A
2: C>B
1: C
 
Range (0,1,2) scores: C19,   B17,   A12.

C>B 8-5,   B>A 10-5,   A>C  7-6.
 
C wins.
 
Now we focus on the 3 B>A preferrers. Suppose (believing the method meets the 
FBC)
they vote B=A.
 3: B=A  (sincere is B>A)
3: A=C
3: B=C
2: A>C
2: B>A
2: C>B
1: C
 Range (0,1,2) scores: C19,   B17,   A15.


C>B 8-5,   B>A 7-5,   A>C  7-6.
 
C still wins.
 
Now suppose they instead rate their sincere favourite Middle:
 
3: A>B  (sincere is B>A)
 
3: A=C
3: B=C
2: A>C
2: B>A
2: C>B
1: C
 Range (0,1,2) scores: C19,   A15,   B12.

A>B  8-7,   A>C  7-6,    C>B  8-5
 
Now those 3 voters get a result they prefer, the election of their compromise
candidate A. Since it is clear they couldn't have got a result for themselves as
good or better by voting B>A or  B>C or B this is a failure of the FBC.
 
 
Chris Benham 




From: "fsimm...@pcc.edu" 
Sent: Wednesday, 23 November 2011 9:01 AM
Subject: Re: An ABE solution

voters to avoid the middle slot.  Then the method reduces to Approval, which 
does satisfy the FBC."
  
The FBC doesn't stipulate that all the voters use "optimal  strategy", so that 
isn't relavent.
 
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/FBC
  
http://nodesiege.tripod.com/elections/#critfbc
 
Chris  Benham

Forest Simmons wrote (17 Nov 2011):

Here’s my current favorite deterministic proposal: Ballots are Range Style, say 
three slot for simplicity.

When the ballots are collected, the pairwise win/loss/tie relations are
determined among the candidates.

The covering relations are also determined.  Candidate X covers candidate Y if X
beats Y as well as every candidate that Y beats.  In other words row X of the
win/loss/tie matrix dominates row Y.

Then starting with the candidates with the lowest Range scores, they are
disqualified one by one until one of the remaining candidates X covers any other
candidates that might remain.  Elect X.


You are right that although the method is defined for any number of slots, I 
suggested three slots as 
most practical.

So my example of two slots was only to disprove the statement the assertion 
that the method cannot be 
FBC compliant, since it is obviously compliant in that case.  

Furthermore something must be wrong with the quoted proof (of the 
incompatibility of the FBC and the 
CC) because the winner of the two slot case can be found entirely on the basis 
of the pairwise matrix.  
The other escape hatch is to say that two slots are not enough to satisfy 
anything but the voted ballots 
version of the Condorcet Criterion.  But this applies equally well to the three 
slot case.

Either way the cited "therorem" is not good enough to rule out compliance with 
the FBC by this new 
method.

Indeed, the three slot case does appear to satisfy the FBC as well.  It is an 
open question.  I did not 
assert that it does.  But I did say that "IF" it is strategically equivalent to 
Approval (as Range is, for 
example) then for "practical purposes" it satisfies the FBC.  Perhaps not the 
letter of the law, but the 
spirit of the law.  Indeed, in a non-stratetgical environment nobody worries 
about the FBC, i.e. only 
strategic voters will betray their favorite. If optimal strategy is approval 
strategy, and approval strategy 
requires you to top rate your favorite, then why would you do otherwise?

Forest

- Original Message -
From: Chris Benham 

Forest,
 
"When the range ballots have only two slots, the method is  simply Approval, 
which does satisfy the 
FBC."
  
When you introduced the method you suggested that 3-slot ballots be used "for 
simplicity".
 I thought you might be open to say 4-6 slots, but a complicated algorithm on 
2-slot ballots
 that is equivalent to Approval ??
  
"Now consider the case of range ballots with three slots: and  suppose that 
optimal strategy requires the  
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Re: [EM] More non-altruistic attacks on IRV usage.