Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?
At 16:13 07/05/04 -0700, George Levy wrote: Bruno, Bruno Marchal wrote: My view is that the observer-experience simply consists in the (virtual) transitions from one observer-moment to another where the transition is filtered by having to be consistent with the observer-state. Note how the observer bootstraps himself into consciousness out of the plenitude. So maybe my UD is the nul UD : it is the maximally dumb UD. A maximally dumb UD? I am not sure I understand. This may be the crux of our misunderstanding. I think that an observer can emerge out of the penitude without a UD. The maximally dumb UD is the Null-UD. But you agree there is no plenitude without an UD. If not recall me what you mean by the plenitude. Remember also that from a machine's point of view (1 or 3 whatever) the plenitude is given by the the UD, or more exactly its complete execution (UD*). First person (relative or relativistic) experience is the only one that matters. The world(s) he perceives is the portion of the plenitude consistent with himself. (The body must be consistent with the mind) I agree. It may be possible that the need to invoke a UD originates from classical 3rd person (objective or absolute) thinking in which several separate physical worlds are simulated. I disagree, or I don't understand. I don't think there is a *need* to *invoke* a UD. It is just that the UD is there, and we cannot make it disappears by simple wish (without abandoning the comp hyp). And a priori the UD is a big problem because it contains too many histories/realities (the white rabbits), and a priori it does not contain obvious mean to force those aberrant histories into a destructive interference process (unlike Feynman histories). And so apparently comp is false, and then my work points on the fact that we cannot yet conclude to the falsity of comp because, by interviewing self-referentially correct machines on the 1-possible histories, the machine does propose a highly non trivial quantum geometry so that destructive interference of too complex histories remains possible (without a priori priors). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?
Bruno, Bruno Marchal wrote: At 16:13 07/05/04 -0700, George Levy wrote: Bruno, Bruno Marchal wrote: My view is that the observer-experience simply consists in the (virtual) transitions from one observer-moment to another where the transition is filtered by having to be consistent with the observer-state. Note how the observer bootstraps himself into consciousness out of the plenitude. So maybe my UD is the nul UD : it is the maximally dumb UD. A maximally dumb UD? I am not sure I understand. This may be the crux of our misunderstanding. I think that an observer can emerge out of the penitude without a UD. The maximally dumb UD is the Null-UD. But you agree there is no plenitude without an UD. No I don't agree. I don't agree that the UD is the origin of all things. This is typical classical thinking. To paraphrase: In the beginning there was the UD (eg. x=x+1). And the UD generated the Plenitude (eg. 0, 1, 2, 3, ...). Out of the plenitude came out different worlds. Out of some of these worlds conscious creatures emerged. We are some of these creatures. This is 3rd person thinking. It leads to the mind-body problem. I resolve the mind-body problem at the outset by using the observer as a starting point. The I is both an observable fact and an axiom. I can observe that I am capable of logical thinking and that my thoughts are consistent. ( I will leave to you the detail regarding what kind of logic applies) My logical ability leads me to the principle of sufficient reason One way to phrase this principle is If there is no reason for something not to be then it must be. Since I am in a particular state and there is no reason for me not to be in any other state, then I must also be in those states. This leads me to think that there are other observers beside myself, in fact, all possible observers. I can also apply this same principle to the world that I observe. If the world is in a particular state, and there are no reasons for this world to be in this particular state, then in must be in all possible states. This leads me to the plenitude. Thus the plenitude includes all possible worlds. The indistinguishability of which observer I am and (conjugately?) which world I occupy leads to first person indeterminacy. If not recall me what you mean by the plenitude. Remember also that from a machine's point of view (1 or 3 whatever) the plenitude is given by the the UD, or more exactly its complete execution (UD*). I suppose I am the UD. Or maybe I* am the UD??? I don't know if this makes sense. First person (relative or relativistic) experience is the only one that matters. The world(s) he perceives is the portion of the plenitude consistent with himself. (The body must be consistent with the mind) I agree. It may be possible that the need to invoke a UD originates from classical 3rd person (objective or absolute) thinking in which several separate physical worlds are simulated. I disagree, or I don't understand. I don't think there is a *need* to *invoke* a UD. It is just that the UD is there, and we cannot make it disappears by simple wish (without abandoning the comp hyp). As I said I think the UD is a remnant of 3rd person thinking. The comp hypothesis may be better off without a UD simply because it is possible to derive the plenitude without a UD. And should you refuse to accept the observer as a starting point, you could assume the plenitude as a starting pont axiom. It is simpler to assume the plenitude as an axiom than an arbitrary UD. At least there is nothing arbitrary about the plenitude. And a priori the UD is a big problem because it contains too many histories/realities (the white rabbits), and a priori it does not contain obvious mean to force those aberrant histories into a destructive interference process (unlike Feynman histories). It may be that using the observer as starting points will force White Rabbits to be filtered out of the observable world George
Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?
On Mon, May 10, 2004 at 03:51:34PM -0700, George Levy wrote: But you agree there is no plenitude without an UD. No I don't agree. I don't agree that the UD is the origin of all things. This is typical classical thinking. To paraphrase: In the beginning there was the UD (eg. x=x+1). And the UD generated the Plenitude (eg. 0, 1, 2, 3, ...). Out of the plenitude came out different worlds. Out of some of these worlds conscious creatures emerged. We are some of these creatures. This is 3rd person thinking. It leads to the mind-body problem. I resolve the mind-body problem at the outset by using the observer as a starting point. The I is both an observable fact and an axiom. I can observe that I am capable of logical thinking and that my thoughts are consistent. ( I will leave to you the detail regarding what kind of logic applies) My logical ability leads me to the principle of sufficient reason One way to phrase this principle is If there is no reason for something not to be then it must be. Since I am in a particular state and there is no reason for me not to be in any other state, then I must also be in those states. This leads me to think that there are other observers beside myself, in fact, all possible observers. ... It may be that using the observer as starting points will force White Rabbits to be filtered out of the observable world George I think this email is quite profound. I find myself in agreement with George's statement, and I basically say the same thing (in a more clumsy way) in Why Occam's Razor. However, the mind-body problem doesn't completely disappear - rather it is transformed into Why the Anthropic Principle?. See Bruno's critique of my paper, circa early 2000. The AP demands that our observed universe contains an instantiation of our consciousness. This is needed, as otherwise we will only see trivial worlds, contrary to observation. My guess is that the AP is a reflection of some deep principle of consciousness that we haven't unravelled - something necessarily self-reflexive. Cheers A/Prof Russell Standish Director High Performance Computing Support Unit, Phone 9385 6967, 8308 3119 (mobile) UNSW SYDNEY 2052 Fax 9385 6965, 0425 253119 () Australia[EMAIL PROTECTED] Room 2075, Red Centrehttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 pgp0.pgp Description: PGP signature
