Bruno Marchal wrote:

At 16:13 07/05/04 -0700, George Levy wrote:


Bruno Marchal wrote:

My view is that the "observer-experience" simply consists in the (virtual) transitions from one "observer-moment" to another where the transition is filtered by having to be consistent with the "observer-state." Note how the observer bootstraps himself into consciousness out of the plenitude. So maybe my UD is the "nul UD" : it is the maximally dumb UD.

A "maximally dumb" UD? I am not sure I understand.

This may be the crux of our misunderstanding. I think that an observer can emerge out of the penitude without a UD. The maximally dumb UD is the Null-UD.

But you agree there is no plenitude without an UD.

No I don't agree. I don't agree that the UD is the origin of all things. This is typical classical thinking. To paraphrase:

"In the beginning there was the UD (eg. x=x+1). And the UD generated the Plenitude (eg. 0, 1, 2, 3, ...). Out of the plenitude came out different worlds. Out of some of these worlds conscious creatures emerged. We are some of these creatures."

This is 3rd person thinking. It leads to the mind-body problem.

I resolve the mind-body problem at the outset by using the observer as a starting point. The "I" is both an observable fact and an axiom. "I" can observe that "I" am capable of logical thinking and that my thoughts are consistent. ( I will leave to you the detail regarding what kind of logic applies) My logical ability leads me to the principle of sufficient reason One way to phrase this principle is "If there is no reason for something not to be then it must be. Since I am in a particular state and there is no reason for me not to be in any other state, then I must also be in those states. This leads me to think that there are other observers beside myself, in fact, all possible observers.

I can also apply this same principle to the world that I observe. If the world is in a particular state, and there are no reasons for this world to be in this particular state, then in must be in all possible states. This leads me to the plenitude. Thus the plenitude includes all possible worlds.

The indistinguishability of which observer I am and (conjugately?) which world I occupy leads to first person indeterminacy.

If not recall me what you mean by the plenitude. Remember also that from a machine's point of view (1 or 3 whatever) the plenitude is given by the the UD, or more exactly its complete execution (UD*).

I suppose "I" am the UD. Or maybe "I*" am the UD??? I don't know if this makes sense.

First person (relative or relativistic) experience is the only one that matters. The world(s) he perceives is the portion of the plenitude consistent with himself. (The body must be consistent with the mind)

I agree.

It may be possible that the need to invoke a UD originates from classical 3rd person (objective or absolute) thinking in which several separate physical worlds are simulated.

I disagree, or I don't understand. I don't think there
is a *need* to *invoke* a UD. It is just
that the UD is there, and we cannot make it
disappears by simple wish (without
abandoning the comp hyp).

As I said I think the UD is a remnant of 3rd person thinking. The comp hypothesis may be better off without a UD simply because it is possible to derive the plenitude without a UD. And should you refuse to accept the observer as a starting point, you could assume the plenitude as a starting pont axiom. It is "simpler" to assume the plenitude as an axiom than an arbitrary UD. At least there is nothing arbitrary about the plenitude.

And a priori the
UD is a big problem because it contains too
many histories/realities (the white rabbits),
and a priori it does not contain obvious mean
to force those aberrant histories into
a destructive interference process (unlike
Feynman histories).

It may be that using the observer as starting points will force White Rabbits to be filtered out of the observable world


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