At 16:13 07/05/04 -0700, George Levy wrote:

Bruno Marchal wrote:

My view is that the "observer-experience" simply consists in the (virtual) transitions from one "observer-moment" to another where the transition is filtered by having to be consistent with the "observer-state." Note how the observer bootstraps himself into consciousness out of the plenitude. So maybe my UD is the "nul UD" : it is the maximally dumb UD.

A "maximally dumb" UD? I am not sure I understand.

This may be the crux of our misunderstanding. I think that an observer can emerge out of the penitude without a UD. The maximally dumb UD is the Null-UD.

But you agree there is no plenitude without an UD.
If not recall me what you mean by
the plenitude.
Remember also that from a machine's point
of view (1 or 3 whatever) the plenitude
is given by the the UD, or more exactly its
complete execution (UD*).

First person (relative or relativistic) experience is the only one that matters. The world(s) he perceives is the portion of the plenitude consistent with himself. (The body must be consistent with the mind)

I agree.

It may be possible that the need to invoke a UD originates from classical 3rd person (objective or absolute) thinking in which several separate physical worlds are simulated.

I disagree, or I don't understand. I don't think there is a *need* to *invoke* a UD. It is just that the UD is there, and we cannot make it disappears by simple wish (without abandoning the comp hyp). And a priori the UD is a big problem because it contains too many histories/realities (the white rabbits), and a priori it does not contain obvious mean to force those aberrant histories into a destructive interference process (unlike Feynman histories). And so apparently comp is false, and then my work points on the fact that we cannot yet conclude to the falsity of comp because, by interviewing self-referentially correct machines on the 1-possible histories, the machine does propose a highly non trivial "quantum" geometry so that destructive interference of too complex histories remains possible (without a priori priors).


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