Re: Let There Be Something
Le 29-oct.-05, à 00:57, Hal Finney a écrit : I would suggest that the multiverse concept is better thought of in somewhat different terms. It's goal is not really to explain where the universe comes from. (In fact, that question does not even make sense to me.) I think we should not confuse the problem of the selection of a (apparant) universe/history from the assumption of a multiverse (like the quantum hypothesis) with the question of explaining the appearances of a multiverse itself. Godelian self-reference can explain both from numbers and their nameable and unameable relations. BTW, although I knew this from the beginning I think I got the tools for making this more precise. What? That my reasoning goes though ... without comp! Comp makes it just more simple. But, actually comp is just Sigma_1 comp, and comp can be generalized to any degrees of unsolvability, but also by relativizing it to almost any well chosen mathematical structure. The nice thinks is that the modal logics of self-reference remains sound and complete for many of those alpha-comp, when alpha is not a too much non constructive object. But if alpha is non constructive, G and G* remains sound (and different, so the theaetetic variants THEAE still makes sense!). And G can be apparently extended as Solovay did already show. So my proof does not only give a test for testing comp. It gives a tool for measuring our degree of non-computationality. In case of non-comp. Mathematically it is a functor from some category of consistent alpha-computer sciences (note the plural) into a category of possible physical sciences. Technically remember comp-phys (the physics extracted by comp) is equal to the composition of three modal transformations SOL ° THEAE ° COMP to the logic G. If the real physics (still unknown but probably LOOP GRAVITY or M THEORY, or some other quantum theory) appears only when the functor SOL ° THEAE ° COMP is applied to an extension of G, then we would have an empirical case for non-comp! Hope I'm not to technical. I do think that if QM is the science of our apparent multiverse then Modal Logic is really the sciences of the multiverses in general. A physical theory is a set of rules which remains invariant for the transformations allowed in a multiverse. And comp or its generalization makes our apparent multiverse the result of the interference of the possible (with respect the the comp hyp chosen) multiverses. This is just the Everett move, done in mathematics. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: Quantum Immortality (was Re: Quantum Suicide)
Le 28-oct.-05, à 17:54, GottferDamnt a écrit (for-list): Hi, I would like talk about this quote from an old topic: This is a rather shocking conclusion. We are conscious here and now because our (computational state) belongs to aleph_1 (or 2^aleph_0 for those who doesn't want to rely on Cantor's continuum hypothesis) infinite computational histories ! Remember Brice deWitt shock when he realised that at each instant he is multiplied by 10^100. Now it seems that we are multiplied by the continuum (!) (Moreover this is coherent with the Z modal logics). So it seems you are completely right Bob (at least formally), and Russell Standish is also right when he said :Therefore QTI and the existence of cul-de-sac branches are a mutual contradiction. The pruning of dead-end corresponds to the adding of consistency (the modal diamond ) in the modal definition of observation. Bruno What about these cul-de-sac branches? Is It definitely that dead-end branches can exist with the quantum theory of immortality (for example, a state of consciousness which can't be follow)? And how comp' Bruno theory manage these cul-de-sac branches? I believe that the quantum theory does not allow cul-de-sac branches. I also believe that the Godel-Lob theory of self-reference not only allow cul-de-sac branches, but it imposes them everywhere: from all alive states you can reach a dead end. The Universal Dovetailer Argument shows that the physics (which has no dead ends) should be given by the self-reference logics (with reachable dead end everywhere). I have been stuck in that contradiction a very long time ... ... until I realized the absolute necessity of distinguishing the first and third person point of views. That necessity is implied itself by the incompleteness phenomena, but that is technical (ask me on the everything-list if interested). The intuitive point here is that you cannot have a first person point of view on your own death: 1-death is not an event, and should be kept out of the domain of verification of probabilistic statements. Another intuition: the finite histories are of measure null among the collection of all histories (the continuum). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: Let There Be Something
My phrase something from nothing was not meant to restrict my inquiry to origins, in the sense of time or causality, but can be viewed in terms of information in general. It seems that the discussion has not contradicted my initial idea that, when it comes to explaining why things are the way they are, the multiverse is on the same level playing field as one universe. Hal Finney simply states that this is not true without supporting it: [The multiverse + AP is] a very different kind of argument than you get with a single universe model. Anthropic reasoning is only explanatory if you assume the actual existence of an ensemble of universes, as multiverse models do. The multiverse therefore elevates anthropic reasoning from something of a tautology, a form of circular reasoning, up to an actual explanatory principle that has real value in helping us understand why the world is as we see it. I believe that my statement before: ...simply bringing in the hypothetical set of all unobservable things doesn't explain rationally in any way (deeper than our direct experience) the existence of observable things. applies to the multiverse as well, since the multiverse = observable things + unobservable things and equivalently the multiverse = this universe + unobservable things I believe my reasoning applies to all selection principles, not just the AP. Also, Bruno wrote: I think we should not confuse the problem of the selection of a (apparant) universe/history from the assumption of a multiverse (like the quantum hypothesis) with the question of explaining the appearances of a multiverse itself. Godelian self-reference can explain both from numbers and their nameable and unameable relations A physical theory is a set of rules which remains invariant for the transformations allowed in a multiverse. And comp or its generalization makes our apparent multiverse the result of the interference of the possible (with respect the the comp hyp chosen) multiverses. I see the problem of explaining what the multiverse is in the first place (Bruno's second problem) as covered by my inquiry. Selecting a smaller initial multiverse from the set of all possible multiverses (or that could be The Multiverse) is equally an unsupportable selection process, outside of the realm of rationality. So Bruno claims to be able to explain it. So far I haven't been satisfied with his UDA. It seems that his assumptions restrict the multiverse in an equally unsupported way. It must be a necessary premise, equal in validity to the premise of just one universe, or what we see is what we get. Tom
Re: Quantum Immortality (was Re: Quantum Suicide)
Bruno, So why is it that from the 3rd person point of view everyone dies? Also along the lines of the Let There Be Something thread, isn't it also true that a finite set of finite histories, or even a countable set of infinite histories, is of measure zero in the continuum? If this is the type of selection that is being made from The Multiverse (whose measure = measure(continuum)) to the initial multiverse(s) of your and others' theories, then by the same argument that you use to show that the probability of dying is zero, doesn't this imply that the probability of having such an initial multiverse is zero? I may be in over my head, but if my Let There Be Something inquiry is correct, then we're all in over our head. Tom -Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: Everything-List List everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Tue, 1 Nov 2005 13:27:27 +0100 Subject: Re: Quantum Immortality (was Re: Quantum Suicide) Le 28-oct.-05, à 17:54, GottferDamnt a écrit (for-list): Hi, I would like talk about this quote from an old topic: This is a rather shocking conclusion. We are conscious here and now because our (computational state) belongs to aleph_1 (or 2^aleph_0 for those who doesn't want to rely on Cantor's continuum hypothesis) infinite computational histories ! Remember Brice deWitt shock when he realised that at each instant he is multiplied by 10^100. Now it seems that we are multiplied by the continuum (!) (Moreover this is coherent with the Z modal logics). So it seems you are completely right Bob (at least formally), and Russell Standish is also right when he said :Therefore QTI and the existence of cul-de-sac branches are a mutual contradiction. The pruning of dead-end corresponds to the adding of consistency (the modal diamond ) in the modal definition of observation. Bruno What about these cul-de-sac branches? Is It definitely that dead-end branches can exist with the quantum theory of immortality (for example, a state of consciousness which can't be follow)? And how comp' Bruno theory manage these cul-de-sac branches? I believe that the quantum theory does not allow cul-de-sac branches. I also believe that the Godel-Lob theory of self-reference not only allow cul-de-sac branches, but it imposes them everywhere: from all alive states you can reach a dead end. The Universal Dovetailer Argument shows that the physics (which has no dead ends) should be given by the self-reference logics (with reachable dead end everywhere). I have been stuck in that contradiction a very long time ... ... until I realized the absolute necessity of distinguishing the first and third person point of views. That necessity is implied itself by the incompleteness phenomena, but that is technical (ask me on the everything-list if interested). The intuitive point here is that you cannot have a first person point of view on your own death: 1-death is not an event, and should be kept out of the domain of verification of probabilistic statements. Another intuition: the finite histories are of measure null among the collection of all histories (the continuum). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: Quantum Immortality (was Re: Quantum Suicide)
I should have said a countable set of countable histories. Tom -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Tue, 01 Nov 2005 15:05:39 -0500 Subject: Re: Quantum Immortality (was Re: Quantum Suicide) Bruno, So why is it that from the 3rd person point of view everyone dies? Also along the lines of the Let There Be Something thread, isn't it also true that a finite set of finite histories, or even a countable set of infinite histories, is of measure zero in the continuum? If this is the type of selection that is being made from The Multiverse (whose measure = measure(continuum)) to the initial multiverse(s) of your and others' theories, then by the same argument that you use to show that the probability of dying is zero, doesn't this imply that the probability of having such an initial multiverse is zero? I may be in over my head, but if my Let There Be Something inquiry is correct, then we're all in over our head. Tom -Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: Everything-List List everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Tue, 1 Nov 2005 13:27:27 +0100 Subject: Re: Quantum Immortality (was Re: Quantum Suicide) Le 28-oct.-05, à 17:54, GottferDamnt a écrit (for-list): Hi, I would like talk about this quote from an old topic: This is a rather shocking conclusion. We are conscious here and now because our (computational state) belongs to aleph_1 (or 2^aleph_0 for those who doesn't want to rely on Cantor's continuum hypothesis) infinite computational histories ! Remember Brice deWitt shock when he realised that at each instant he is multiplied by 10^100. Now it seems that we are multiplied by the continuum (!) (Moreover this is coherent with the Z modal logics). So it seems you are completely right Bob (at least formally), and Russell Standish is also right when he said :Therefore QTI and the existence of cul-de-sac branches are a mutual contradiction. The pruning of dead-end corresponds to the adding of consistency (the modal diamond ) in the modal definition of observation. Bruno What about these cul-de-sac branches? Is It definitely that dead-end branches can exist with the quantum theory of immortality (for example, a state of consciousness which can't be follow)? And how comp' Bruno theory manage these cul-de-sac branches? I believe that the quantum theory does not allow cul-de-sac branches. I also believe that the Godel-Lob theory of self-reference not only allow cul-de-sac branches, but it imposes them everywhere: from all alive states you can reach a dead end. The Universal Dovetailer Argument shows that the physics (which has no dead ends) should be given by the self-reference logics (with reachable dead end everywhere). I have been stuck in that contradiction a very long time ... ... until I realized the absolute necessity of distinguishing the first and third person point of views. That necessity is implied itself by the incompleteness phenomena, but that is technical (ask me on the everything-list if interested). The intuitive point here is that you cannot have a first person point of view on your own death: 1-death is not an event, and should be kept out of the domain of verification of probabilistic statements. Another intuition: the finite histories are of measure null among the collection of all histories (the continuum). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: Let There Be Something
Tom Caylor writes: I believe that my statement before: ...simply bringing in the hypothetical set of all unobservable things doesn't explain rationally in any way (deeper than our direct experience) the existence of observable things. applies to the multiverse as well, since the multiverse = observable things + unobservable things and equivalently the multiverse = this universe + unobservable things Are you saying that you don't agree that the anthropic principle applied to an ensemble of instances has greater explanatory power than when applied to a single instance? Hal Finney
Re: Let There Be Something
Hi, as I said before I don't think/feel that single universe is on the same level as multiverse... Just by using absurd feeling I was talking about. If there is a single reality, you have to anwser why this one ? why like this ? what is the ultimate reason for the reality to be limited to this subset ? If you take the multiverse(everything) theory this is easily explained. On the other hand, multiverse theory by now could not answer why you're experiencing this precise reality among all possible that are in the multiverse. Regards, Quentin Le Mardi 01 Novembre 2005 20:49, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : My phrase something from nothing was not meant to restrict my inquiry to origins, in the sense of time or causality, but can be viewed in terms of information in general. It seems that the discussion has not contradicted my initial idea that, when it comes to explaining why things are the way they are, the multiverse is on the same level playing field as one universe. Hal Finney simply states that this is not true without supporting it: [The multiverse + AP is] a very different kind of argument than you get with a single universe model. Anthropic reasoning is only explanatory if you assume the actual existence of an ensemble of universes, as multiverse models do. The multiverse therefore elevates anthropic reasoning from something of a tautology, a form of circular reasoning, up to an actual explanatory principle that has real value in helping us understand why the world is as we see it. I believe that my statement before: ...simply bringing in the hypothetical set of all unobservable things doesn't explain rationally in any way (deeper than our direct experience) the existence of observable things. applies to the multiverse as well, since the multiverse = observable things + unobservable things and equivalently the multiverse = this universe + unobservable things I believe my reasoning applies to all selection principles, not just the AP. Also, Bruno wrote: I think we should not confuse the problem of the selection of a (apparant) universe/history from the assumption of a multiverse (like the quantum hypothesis) with the question of explaining the appearances of a multiverse itself. Godelian self-reference can explain both from numbers and their nameable and unameable relations A physical theory is a set of rules which remains invariant for the transformations allowed in a multiverse. And comp or its generalization makes our apparent multiverse the result of the interference of the possible (with respect the the comp hyp chosen) multiverses. I see the problem of explaining what the multiverse is in the first place (Bruno's second problem) as covered by my inquiry. Selecting a smaller initial multiverse from the set of all possible multiverses (or that could be The Multiverse) is equally an unsupportable selection process, outside of the realm of rationality. So Bruno claims to be able to explain it. So far I haven't been satisfied with his UDA. It seems that his assumptions restrict the multiverse in an equally unsupported way. It must be a necessary premise, equal in validity to the premise of just one universe, or what we see is what we get. Tom
Re: Let There Be Something
Unfortunately lately I do not have the time to read and think through each post but I would like to briefly point out that my approach has the Godelian ingredients of completeness/incompleteness, consistency/inconsistency and self reference. The power set of divisions of the list provides [I think] an uncountable infinity of universes of any given category. The self reference infinitely nests the system. I suppose that one could think of this last as either infinite regression or a system that eats its own tail [a termination of a causal chain. So as in the case of my Nothing and my All it seems the apex of causation may be neither infinite regression or termination but rather both [an and]. Hal Ruhl
Re: Let There Be Something
Hi Tom, I second Russell on this and would add that Leibniz's question why this and not some other (or whatever the exact quote is) really bring the question to a head. I would also point out that the so called initial conditions and fine tuning problem is a version of this. Personally, I think that we should take any anthropic principle as a constraint on the 1st person aspect, not on any notion of 3rd person. Onward! Stephen - Original Message - From: Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Tuesday, November 01, 2005 3:23 PM Subject: Re: Let There Be Something
