Re: Numbers + ref UDA
Le 27-mars-06, à 23:13, Brent Meeker a écrit : The links on your web page relating to the UDA still take one to http://apps5.oingo.com/apps/domainpark/domainpark.cgi? client=netw8744s=ESCRIBE.COM a seller of DVD's for old American TV shows. I am really sorry about that. On my machine I just get nothing, because the addresses are those of the old escribe which seems dead now. I will search the new addresses of the corresponding posts. Meanwhile, I suggest that people who want read the UDA argument consult my paper here (readable online and/or through the pdf). I think it is probably the simplest and clearest presentation. Don't hesitate to ask questions. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/ SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Solipsism (was: Numbers)
Le 17-mars-06, à 20:27, Hal Finney a écrit : Here is where I may depart from Bruno, although I am not sure. I argue that you can in fact set up a probability distribution over all of the places in the UD where your mind exists, and it is based roughly on the size of the part of the UD program that creates that information pattern. Recall that the UD in effect runs all programs at once. But some programs are shorter than others. I use the notion of algorithmic complexity and the associated measure, which is called the Universal Distribution (an unfortunate collision of the UD acronym). Basically this says that the measure of the output of a given UD program of n bits is 1/2^n. What remains to be explained here is how you attach the first person indeterminacy, (which is relative to any member of the class of the third person describable states occuring anywhere in the universal deployment) and the measure coming from your Universal Distribution. Given that a first person cannot be aware of any delays of reconstitution of himself in the deployment, it seems to me you need to provide more motivation for your distribution (which is also based on comp). How to avoid the inescapable redundancy of states and histories generated by the UD, and the fact that the delay-invariance indeterminacy forces us to take into account all finite portion of the deployment. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Smullyan Shmullyan, give me a real example
Le 27-mars-06, à 06:09, George Levy a écrit : I am looking forward to being diagonalized. I hope it won't hurt too much. Asap. Meanwhile you could already medidate on my first diagonalization post here. You can ask (out or online) any question including about notations or definitions: http://www.mail-archive.com/everything-list@eskimo.com/msg01561.html If you find that unreadable, tell me and I will think about other ways to present it, or links ... Also: did you grasp in FU the notions of: reasoner of type 1 reasoner of type 1* reasoner of type 2 reasoner of type 3 reasoner of type 4 and reasoner of type G ? Bruno x-tad-bigger /x-tad-biggerhttp://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
Le 27-mars-06, à 20:34, 1Z (Peter D Jones) a écrit : You think matter is different tostuff ? When I define matter by what is observable, I don't necessarily consider it as a primary stuffy thing indeed. Given that arithmetical truth already emulate all video-games with internal observers incapable of testing the stuffiness of their environment, you can easily conceive the consistency of the idea that we don't need to postulate more than arithmetical truth. I suppose so. But you stlll haven' t explained why physics is all about matter doesn't equate to physics is all about stuff. Don't put to much literal interpretation on words. If by matter or stuff you mean electron, or whatever that makes the needles of some apparatus here or there, again I believe that the electron exists, but this has nothing to do with the idea that the electron or the string or whatever physical is primitive or not. My point is that we cannot believe at the same time in the primitiveness of matter and in the computationalist hypothesis (or incredibly weaker as I have discovered and made precise after the comp PhD). nor do they postulate it with the notable exception of Aristotle, and of those moderns who show that a boolean conception of matter is contradicted by the facts and/or the QM theory. If a boolean concept of matter is wrong , then a boolean concept of matter is wrong. That does not mean that matter itself is non-existent. I have never said that matter is non-existent. I say only that matter is not a primitive concept. That the existence of matter emerge from average of observer/machine points of views. Your second sentence does not support your first. Something may be observationally, theoretically and epistemically comples and still be ontologically simple. The fact that the scientific concept of matter doesn't *seem* particularly obvious or intuitive to humans just means we are not born with apriori knowlede of the world. The problem , if there is one, is with us, not with matter. If matter exists. Do you agree that this is not obvious. (here again I mean by matter a notion of primitive matter, not just physical theories and possible interpretation of it). Can you doubt about the existence of primitive matter. What is your conception of matter? Strings living in a space-time? Loop gravity. What is your interpretation of QM. I mean matter is less clear today than yesterday (even if yesterday matter was already unclear for those who believe in consciousness). Even Descartes was already aware that if the world was explainable in a mechanist way, no observation could provide a definite evidence of the existence of matter. But Descartes believed in matter and to justify it---keeping the mechanist hypothesis---he was forced to invoke the transcendental goodness of a God. Only the putative stuffy Aristotelian matter disappears. I don't know of any other kind of matter. But even physicist can sometimes imagine that. That would be the case if all units disappear in some fundamental equation. But then if you want a concrete model of palpable but immaterial matter, just study the UDA (or even some other proposal in this list). Oh, I think I will send asap some other immaterialist TOE (not based on comp for a change). What you are presumably saying is that a solipsistic perceived world will seem to be a material world. But do you really have an explanation for that ? Well, with comp, it is enough to understand that numbers can dream, in a sense which is not so easy to explain concisely of course. But my url contains links to my papers (and to the list but those needs to be updated). Or are you just assuming that a computational multiverse will conveniently behave like a quantum multiverse ? Well, a priori, with comp, we get to many universes in the comp multiverse, but then the simple argument showing there are too much comp-universes is put under highly non trivial constraints once we add conditions of consistency. This is due to the non trivial consequences of the incompleteness phenomena. And indeed I got from that a begining of explanation of why those universes interfere and why probabilities behaves in some weird way. Then I am stuck in mathematical conjectures (meaning more works remain to be done, but that is hardly astonishing). On the contrary, the physical laws (the math of the observable) should be made more solid as arising from purely number theoretical relations, as seen and glued together by an infinite union of first person point of view. That's not explaining matter as such -- as stuff -- that's explaining physics phenomenologically/instrumentally/solipsistically. If me or someone else derive QM string or loop theory without invoking stuff, I think we will say that we don't need no more the hypothesis of stuff. Nobody has succeed in defining stuff or justifying it exists.
Re: Numbers
There is also the issue of scientific prediction or induction, the prediction that someone who has murdered is more likely to murder again. I think this is more important that memory when it comes to the issue of the practical societal definition guilt. How can we predict that I might murder in the future, if I haven't yet murdered but a parallel version of me has? I think this gets down to the key question raised here before on measure across the multiverse. This is broader than the issue of personal identity, and makes the multiverse in my view very problematic. To hypothesize a multiverse in order to solve the issue of personal identity is only to complicate the matter. Tom -Original Message- From: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Tue, 28 Mar 2006 17:12:42 +1000 Subject: Re: Numbers Georges, Peter: Arriving at a consistent and reasonable-sounding theory of personal identity in the multiverse is difficult, to say the least. Some list members in the past have argued that all copies of a person have an equal claim to that person's identity, so that we should feel responsible for the actions of even those parallel copies whose memories we will never share. I object to this on the grounds that it is unfair (it's not my fault if a parallel copy commits a crime, nor do I benefit in any way if a parallel copy has a rewarding experience), and also because any criterion for how similar two individuals have to be in order to be considered copies is ultimately arbitrary. I think the clearest way to talk about these matters is to relinquish the notion that two copies could be the same person in any objective or absolute sense. This naturally leads to the smallest possible unit of personhood, delimited in time, space and multiverse, and loosely analogous to the (somewhat controvesial) observer moment or observer-moment. In other words, if you say that it was Joe Bloggs at a specific time, place and multiverse branch who did the murder, there can be no argument about the identity of the accused. But if you then ask if this is the same Joe Bloggs a day or a year before or after the murder, the old philosophical arguments about personal identity all arise, and we have to answer that *by convention*, it is, and *by convention*, the older Joe Bloggs in those multiverse branches where he recalls committing the crime, but not the younger Joe Bloggs, and not the older Joe Bloggs in those multiverse branches where (in the absence of a memory disorder) he does not recall committing the crime, deserves to be punished. Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Georges Quenot wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : Georges Quenot wrote: If you are a being that have never observed magical events any duplicate of you will never have observed any magical event either (otherwise you would differ and no longer be true duplicates). That doesn't work the other way round. A duplicate of me up to 16:51 GMT 20 mar 2006 could suddenly start observing them. Your duplicate will know. Not You. And he will no longer be your duplicate. I am, conventionally, the same person as my previous selves. I have their memories. No. You may have lost some of them, acquired some new ones and still share most of them (if the previous self you consider is not too far in the past). In some sense, you are the same person and in some sense you are a different person. My duplicate will have my memories. Your duplicate will have the same memories as you. This is not the same thing. Once your duplicate experience something different of what you do, his acquired (and possibly his lost) memories will differ from yours. He will still share most of your previous common memories but he will not know your new ones and you will not know his new ones. If he evenutally encoutered Harry Potter and you do not, whatever memories you shared before, you will not share these ones. Or are you saying that I am not the same person as my previous selves ? As I said above, in some sense, you are the same person and in some sense you are a different person. I feel I am the same person as I was 25 years ago and meanwhile I also feel very different. Maybe you also experienced something similar. Georges. _ New year, new job - there's more than 100,00 jobs at SEEK http://a.ninemsn.com.au/b.aspx?URL=http%3A%2F%2Fninemsn%2Eseek%2Ecom%2Eau _t=752315885_r=Jan05_tagline_m=EXT --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Ontological closure
On Fri, Mar 24, 2006 at 09:40:30AM -0500, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Of course, we can't be sure when we close ourselves in from any explanation that is meaningless. I'm not so concerned with meaningless. However it must be consistent both with our observations and with itself. That is still an open question. All other proposed mechanisms of ontological closure - eg the God hypothesis are fundamentally meaningless, so there is no loss here. -- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile) Mathematics0425 253119 () UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Fw: Numbers
On Fri, Mar 24, 2006 at 07:20:20AM -0800, 1Z wrote: Russell Standish wrote: This is the way I put the argument in my upcoming book. You can also read the Universal Dovetailer Argument in Bruno Marchal's SANE04 paper. \item That a description logically capable of observing itself is enough to bootstrap itself into existence. Let me speak to this by means of an example: The C programming language is a popular language for computer applications. To convert a program written in C into machine instructions that can execute on the computer, one uses another program called a compiler. Many C compilers are available, but a popular compiler is the GNU C compiler, or gcc. Gcc is itself a C language program, you can download the program source code from http://www.gnu.org, and compile it yourself, if you already have a working C compiler. Once you have compiled gcc, you can then use gcc to compile itself. Thus gcc has bootstrapped itself onto your computer, and all references to any preexisting compiler forgotten. No, gcc chasn't bootstrapped **itself** -- it has been bootstrapped by another compiler (if you already have a working C compiler). You can use gcc to compile itself only if it has already been compiled. Gcc cannot bootstrap itself on a computer without a compiler. what you have said serves a loose illustration of self-bootsrapping, but it is not an actual expample of it. In fact there are no strict examples of self-bootstrapping -- of something starting up ex nihilo. if it is possible for systems to bootstap themselves (or for simulations to be equivalent to realities) we should be able to observe it, and we don't. That is equally true even if we assume the observed world is already a simulation -- simulations (ie second-order simulations-within-the-Great-Simulation) don't become real (ie first-order simulations) The trouble is, I don't really know what you mean. It doesn't matter what the original compiler is to bootstrap gcc. Therefore a Plenitude of compilers will surely bootstrap gcc - or more fully gcc is bootstrapped on all of them. The problem comes in trying to distinguish reality from simulation. It just can't be done. -- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile) Mathematics0425 253119 () UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 27-mars-06, à 20:34, 1Z (Peter D Jones) a écrit : You think matter is different tostuff ? When I define matter by what is observable, I don't necessarily consider it as a primary stuffy thing indeed. AFAIC that only means that you should not describe matter as something that is observable -- it is not any colour or shape. It is why one particualr colour or shape exists and another does not. Given that arithmetical truth already emulate all video-games with internal observers incapable of testing the stuffiness of their environment, you can easily conceive the consistency of the idea that we don't need to postulate more than arithmetical truth. Providing arithemtical truth can account for consciousness and and time, and overlooking HP problems. I suppose so. But you stlll haven' t explained why physics is all about matter doesn't equate to physics is all about stuff. Don't put to much literal interpretation on words. If by matter or stuff you mean electron, or whatever that makes the needles of some apparatus here or there, again I believe that the electron exists, but this has nothing to do with the idea that the electron or the string or whatever physical is primitive or not. My point is that we cannot believe at the same time in the primitiveness of matter and in the computationalist hypothesis (or incredibly weaker as I have discovered and made precise after the comp PhD). The computationalist hypothsis is about the ability of one material system to emulate another; it does not warrant dispensing with any idea of matter. nor do they postulate it with the notable exception of Aristotle, and of those moderns who show that a boolean conception of matter is contradicted by the facts and/or the QM theory. If a boolean concept of matter is wrong , then a boolean concept of matter is wrong. That does not mean that matter itself is non-existent. I have never said that matter is non-existent. I say only that matter is not a primitive concept. That the existence of matter emerge from average of observer/machine points of views. Your second sentence does not support your first. Something may be observationally, theoretically and epistemically comples and still be ontologically simple. The fact that the scientific concept of matter doesn't *seem* particularly obvious or intuitive to humans just means we are not born with apriori knowlede of the world. The problem , if there is one, is with us, not with matter. If matter exists. Do you agree that this is not obvious. (here again I mean by matter a notion of primitive matter, not just physical theories and possible interpretation of it). Can you doubt about the existence of primitive matter. What is your conception of matter? Strings living in a space-time? Loop gravity. What is your interpretation of QM. I mean matter is less clear today than yesterday (even if yesterday matter was already unclear for those who believe in consciousness) I have given a definiton of matter which is quite delibarately, completely general -- ie it applies to any kind of physics. Philosophically, it makes no differnce to me whether m-theory or LQG is correct. . Even Descartes was already aware that if the world was explainable in a mechanist way, no observation could provide a definite evidence of the existence of matter. What provides evidence for the existence of matter as I have defined it is the non-appearance of logically possible HP worlds. But Descartes believed in matter and to justify it---keeping the mechanist hypothesis---he was forced to invoke the transcendental goodness of a God. Only the putative stuffy Aristotelian matter disappears. I don't know of any other kind of matter. But even physicist can sometimes imagine that. That would be the case if all units disappear in some fundamental equation. But then if you want a concrete model of palpable but immaterial matter, just study the UDA (or even some other proposal in this list). Oh, I think I will send asap some other immaterialist TOE (not based on comp for a change). None, of that is matter, it is just appearances , the usual solipsist/idealist substitute for matter. That kind of explanation is really elimination. What you are presumably saying is that a solipsistic perceived world will seem to be a material world. But do you really have an explanation for that ? Well, with comp, it is enough to understand that numbers can dream, in a sense which is not so easy to explain concisely of course. But my url contains links to my papers (and to the list but those needs to be updated). The computationalist hypothsis is about the ability of one material system to emulate another; it does not warrant dispensing with any idea of matter. Or are you just assuming that a computational multiverse will conveniently behave like a quantum multiverse ?
Re: Fw: Numbers
Russell Standish wrote: On Fri, Mar 24, 2006 at 07:20:20AM -0800, 1Z wrote: Russell Standish wrote: This is the way I put the argument in my upcoming book. You can also read the Universal Dovetailer Argument in Bruno Marchal's SANE04 paper. \item That a description logically capable of observing itself is enough to bootstrap itself into existence. Let me speak to this by means of an example: The C programming language is a popular language for computer applications. To convert a program written in C into machine instructions that can execute on the computer, one uses another program called a compiler. Many C compilers are available, but a popular compiler is the GNU C compiler, or gcc. Gcc is itself a C language program, you can download the program source code from http://www.gnu.org, and compile it yourself, if you already have a working C compiler. Once you have compiled gcc, you can then use gcc to compile itself. Thus gcc has bootstrapped itself onto your computer, and all references to any preexisting compiler forgotten. No, gcc chasn't bootstrapped **itself** -- it has been bootstrapped by another compiler (if you already have a working C compiler). You can use gcc to compile itself only if it has already been compiled. Gcc cannot bootstrap itself on a computer without a compiler. what you have said serves a loose illustration of self-bootsrapping, but it is not an actual expample of it. In fact there are no strict examples of self-bootstrapping -- of something starting up ex nihilo. if it is possible for systems to bootstap themselves (or for simulations to be equivalent to realities) we should be able to observe it, and we don't. That is equally true even if we assume the observed world is already a simulation -- simulations (ie second-order simulations-within-the-Great-Simulation) don't become real (ie first-order simulations) The trouble is, I don't really know what you mean. I mean that you do not fulfil the promise of the first sentence: that a description logically capable of observing itself is enough to bootstrap ITSELF into existence. The examples you give are not examples of programmes bootstrapping themselves, in any strict sense; they are of programmes being boostrapped by other programmes, or by other copies of themselves. It doesn't matter what the original compiler is to bootstrap gcc. If it's not gcc, gcc is not bootstrapping itself. Therefore a Plenitude of compilers will surely bootstrap gcc - or more fully gcc is bootstrapped on all of them. If a Plenitude exists, nothing needs to be bootstrapped. But that is in any case assuming what needs to be proved. The problem comes in trying to distinguish reality from simulation. It just can't be done. Assuming that I am real, I can easily tell what is a simulation relative to me. Even if I am a simulation, my Sim City is clearly a simulation-within-a-simulation.The relative difference is obvious. Perhaps you mean that I cannot tell absolutely that I am real. Well, I could always employ the idealists favourite weapon: Occam's razor. - A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile) Mathematics 0425 253119 () UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Fw: Numbers
On Tue, Mar 28, 2006 at 04:37:06PM -0800, 1Z wrote: I mean that you do not fulfil the promise of the first sentence: that a description logically capable of observing itself is enough to bootstrap ITSELF into existence. ... Therefore a Plenitude of compilers will surely bootstrap gcc - or more fully gcc is bootstrapped on all of them. If a Plenitude exists, nothing needs to be bootstrapped. But that is in any case assuming what needs to be proved. I do so assume. It is one of the main working hypotheses of my book. The reason for considering bootstrapping is to see why observers must be their own interpreter - as otherwise there must be another interpreter running in the background which breaks ontological closure. Its a subtle point - in ontology, there can only be 3 possible types of causality: 1) Terminal cause. The chain of causality is broken at a first cause (eg God), although a final cause will also do. The only difference between first and final cause relates to temporal priority, rather than logical priority 2) Infinite regress: There is no first cause - the chain a because b because c has no end 3) Causal loop: A because B because A Obviously option 1) is very popular. The notion of stuffy matter as Bruno calls it, fits into this category. However I find it unsatisfactory from an Occam's razor point of view. I'm promoting option 3), which is ontologically closed with nothing further to explain. The gcc story is, obviously, in the form of a metaphor to explain the full situation. I'm not sure option 2) has much going for it, but I will certainly listen to someone try to defend it. It is usually derided as turtles all the way down. The problem comes in trying to distinguish reality from simulation. It just can't be done. Assuming that I am real, I can easily tell what is a simulation relative to me. Really? Even simulations as good as that featured in the Matrix? Perhaps you say that such virtual realities are impossible - that position is at least compatible with evidence, but nor is there a good reason why such simulations aren't possible either. Even if I am a simulation, my Sim City is clearly a simulation-within-a-simulation.The relative difference is obvious. Perhaps you mean that I cannot tell absolutely that I am real. Well, I could always employ the idealists favourite weapon: Occam's razor. Elaborate please... -- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile) Mathematics0425 253119 () UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers
Tom Caylor writes: There is also the issue of scientific prediction or induction, the prediction that someone who has murdered is more likely to murder again. I think this is more important that memory when it comes to the issue of the practical societal definition guilt. How can we predict that I might murder in the future, if I haven't yet murdered but a parallel version of me has? This is actually my point: the issue of personal identity as it pertains to responsibility for past actions etc. is decided as a matter of evolutionary or social utility, not as a matter of empirical fact. That a certain person murdered someone at a certain time and place is a matter of empirical fact, safe from the scrutiny of philosophers. That this is the same person years later, deserving of punishment when he is caught and finally confesses, is philosophically problematic, even in a single world cosmology. Thought experiments involving copies are a common device used in the philosophical literature to make the issues easier to see - eg. Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons, in which he also discusses the ethical implications. I think this gets down to the key question raised here before on measure across the multiverse. This is broader than the issue of personal identity, and makes the multiverse in my view very problematic. To hypothesize a multiverse in order to solve the issue of personal identity is only to complicate the matter. I don't understand what you are getting at here. Has someone proposed that the postulated multiverse solve[s] the issue of personal identity? I agree that the multiverse just makes it more complicated. Stathis Papaioannou Georges, Peter: Arriving at a consistent and reasonable-sounding theory of personal identity in the multiverse is difficult, to say the least. Some list members in the past have argued that all copies of a person have an equal claim to that person's identity, so that we should feel responsible for the actions of even those parallel copies whose memories we will never share. I object to this on the grounds that it is unfair (it's not my fault if a parallel copy commits a crime, nor do I benefit in any way if a parallel copy has a rewarding experience), and also because any criterion for how similar two individuals have to be in order to be considered copies is ultimately arbitrary. I think the clearest way to talk about these matters is to relinquish the notion that two copies could be the same person in any objective or absolute sense. This naturally leads to the smallest possible unit of personhood, delimited in time, space and multiverse, and loosely analogous to the (somewhat controvesial) observer moment or observer-moment. In other words, if you say that it was Joe Bloggs at a specific time, place and multiverse branch who did the murder, there can be no argument about the identity of the accused. But if you then ask if this is the same Joe Bloggs a day or a year before or after the murder, the old philosophical arguments about personal identity all arise, and we have to answer that *by convention*, it is, and *by convention*, the older Joe Bloggs in those multiverse branches where he recalls committing the crime, but not the younger Joe Bloggs, and not the older Joe Bloggs in those multiverse branches where (in the absence of a memory disorder) he does not recall committing the crime, deserves to be punished. Stathis Papaioannou _ mycareer.com.au: http://www.mycareer.com.au/?s_cid=213596 Land the Job --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
