Re: SV: computationalism and supervenience
Lennart Nilsson wrote: ... But my point is that this may come down to what we would mean by a computer being conscious. Bruno has an answer in terms of what the computer can prove. Jaynes (and probably John McCarthy) would say a computer is conscious if it creates a narrative of its experience which it can access as memory. Brent Meeker Humphrey says it has to have an evolutionary past. LN I've read some of Humphrey's books, but I don't recall that. What's his argument? Whats the citation? Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: computationalism and supervenience
Peter Jones writes: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Like Bruno, I am not claiming that this is definitely the case, just that it is the case if computationalism is true. Several philosophers (eg. Searle) have used the self-evident absurdity of the idea as an argument demonstrating that computationalism is false - that there is something non-computational about brains and consciousness. I have not yet heard an argument that rejects this idea and saves computationalism. [ rolls up sleaves ] The idea is easilly refuted if it can be shown that computation doesn't require interpretation at all. It can also be refuted more circuitously by showing that computation is not entirely a matter of intepretation. In everythingism , eveything is equal. If some computations (the ones that don't depend on interpretation) are more equal than others, the way is still open for the Somethinginst to object that interpretation-independent computations are really real, and the others are mere possibilities. The claim has been made that computation is not much use without an interpretation. Well, if you define a computer as somethin that is used by a human, that is true. It is also very problematic to the computationalist claim that the human mind is a computer. Is the human mind of use to a human ? Well, yes, it helps us stay alive in various ways. But that is more to do with reacting to a real-time environment, than performing abstract symbolic manipulations or elaborate re-interpretations. (Computationalists need to be careful about how they define computer. Under some perfectly reasonable definitions -- for instance, defining a computer as a human invention -- computationalism is trivially false). I don't mean anything controversial (I think) when I refer to interpretation of computation. Take a mercury thermometer: it would still do its thing if all sentient life in the universe died out, or even if there were no sentient life to build it in the first place and by amazing luck mercury and glass had come together in just the right configuration. But if there were someone around to observe it and understand it, or if it were attached to a thermostat and heater, the thermometer would have extra meaning - the same thermometer, doing the same thermometer stuff. Now, if thermometers were conscious, then part of their thermometer stuff might include knowing what the temperature was - all by themselves, without benefit of external observer. Furthermore, if thermometers were conscious, they might be dreaming of temperatures, or contemplating the meaning of consciousness, again in the absence of external observers, and this time in the absence of interaction with the real world. This, then, is the difference between a computation and a conscious computation. If a computation is unconscious, it can only have meaning/use/interpretation in the eyes of a beholder or in its interaction with the environment. If a computation is conscious, it may have meaning/use/interpretation in interacting with its environment, including other conscious beings, and for obvious reasons all the conscious computations we encounter will fall into that category; but a conscious computation can also have meaning all by itself, to itself. You might argue, as Brent Meeker has, that a conscious being would quickly lose consciousness if environmental interaction were cut off, but I think that is just a contingent fact about brains, and in any case, as Bruno Marchal has pointed out, you only need a nanosecond of consciousness to prove the point. It is of course true that the output of a programme intended to do one thing (system S, say) could be re-interpeted as something else. But what does it *mean* ? If computationalism is true whoever or whatever is doing the interpreting is another computational process. SO the ultimate result is formed by system S in connjunction with another systen. System S is merely acting as a subroutine. The Everythingist's intended conclusion is that every physical system implements every computation. That's what I'm saying, but I certainly don't think everyone agrees with me on the list, and I'm not completely decided as to which of the three is more absurd: every physical system implements every conscious computation, no physical system implements any conscious computation (they are all implemented non-physically in Platonia), or the idea that a computation can be conscious in the first place. But the evidence -- the re-interpretation scenario -- only supports the idea that any computational system could become part of a larger system that is doing something else. System S cannot be said to be simultaneously perforiming every possible computation *itself*. The multiple-computaton -- i.e multiple-interpretation -- scenario is dependent on a n intepreter. Having made computation dependent on interpretation,
RE : computationalism and supervenience
Brent Meeker wrote (through many posts): I won't insist, because you might be right, but I don't think that is proven. It may be that interaction with the environment is essential to continued consciousness. Assuming comp, I think that this is a red herring. To make this clear I use a notion of generalized brain in some longer version of the UDA. See perhaps: http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/browse_frm/thread/ 4c995dee307def3b/9f94f4d49cb2b9e6? q=universal+dovetailerrnum=1#9f94f4d49cb2b9e6 The generalized brain is by definition the portion of whatever you need to turing-emulate to experience nothing or to survive in the relative way addressed through comp. It can contain any part of the environment. Note that in that case, assuming comp, such a part has to be assumed turing-emulable, or comp is just false. Of course, if the generalized brain is the entire multiverse, the thought experiment with the doctor is harder to figure out, certainly. But already at the seventh step of the 8-steps-version of the UDA, you can understand that in front of the infinitely (even just potentially from all actual views) running UD, comp makes all your continuations UD-accessed. It would just mean, in that case, that there is a unique winning program with respect of building you. I doubt that, but that is not the point. By the same token, it is also not difficult to get the evolution of brain into the notion of generalized brain, so that evolution is also a red herring when used as a critics of comp, despite the possibility of non computationnal aspect of evolution like geographical randomization à-la Washington/Moscow. I would bet on computationalism too. But I still think the conclusion that every physical process, even the null one, necessarily implements all possible consciousness is absurd. OK, but the point is just that comp implies that physical processes does not implement per se consciousness. They implements consciousness only as far as making that consciousness able to manifest itself relatively to its most probable computational history (among a continuum). Reductio ad absurdum of what? Comp or (weak) Materialism? Bruno Dunno. A reductio doesn't tell you which premise is wrong. Nice. So you seem to agree with the UDA+movie-graph argument, we have: not comp v not physical-supervenience. This is equivalent to both: comp - not physical supervenience, and physical supervenience - not comp Now I agree that at this stage(after UDA) it would be natural to abandon comp but then computer science and the translation of the UDA in the language of a universal turing machine (sufficiently rich, or lobian) such an abandonment could be premature (to say the least). Incompleteness should make us skeptical in front of any intuitive and too rapid conclusion. That's generally useful; but when we understand little about something, such as consciousness, we should be careful about assuming what's theoretically possible; particularly when it seems to lead to absurdities. Mmh If we assume theoretical possibilities and then are led to absurdities, then we have learned something: evidences against the theoretical assumptions. If the absurdities can be transform into clear contradiction, perhaps by making the theoretical assumptions clearer, then we have prove something: the falsity of the assumptions. I think you know that, and you were just quick, isn't' it? Stathis: In discussing Tim Maudlin's paper, Bruno has concluded that either computationalism is false or the supervenience theory is false. As I understand it Bruno would say that physics supervenes on number theory and consciousness supervenes on physics. So physics is eliminable. Note that Maudlin's arrives at the same conclusion than me: NOT comp OR NOT physical-supervenience. Mauldin's concludes then, assuming sup-phys, that comp is problematic (although he realized that not-comp is yet still more problematic). I conclude, just because I keep comp at this stage, that sup-phys is false, and this makes primary matter eliminable. Physics as a field is not eliminate of course, but is eliminated as a fundamental field. It is not so astonishing given that physics does not often seriously address the mind/body puzzle, and when it does (cf Bunge) it still uses the aristotle means to put the problem under the rug. That interpretation can be reduced to computation is implicit in computationalism. The question is what, if anything, is unique about those computations that execute interpretation. Interpretation are done by interpreter, that is *universal* (turing) machine. Perhaps we should agree on a definition, at least for the 3-notions: a 3-interpretation can be encoded through a (in general infinite) trace of a computation. With the [Fi, ...] and Fu being an universal function, and
Re: ROADMAP (SHORT)
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: - Original Message - From: Tom Caylor [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Wednesday, September 06, 2006 3:23 PM Subject: Re: ROADMAP (SHORT) You wrote: What is the non-mathematical part of UDA? The part that uses Church Thesis? When I hear non-mathematical I hear non-rigor. Define rigor that is non-mathematical. I guess if you do then you've been mathematical about it. I don't understand. Tom -- Smart: whatever I may come up with, as a different type of vigor (btw is this term well identified?) you will call it math - just a different type. John M --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ The root of the word math means learning, study, or science. Math is the effort to make things precise. So in my view applied math would be taking actual information and trying to make the science precise in order to further our learning and quest of the truth in the most efficient manner possible. I think that this is the concept that is captured by the term rigor. But what's in a name? I call it math and I think that a good many people would agree, but others might call it something else, like rigor. I think that it's an intuitive concept limited by our finite capabilities, as you so many times point out, John. Tom --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: ROADMAP (SHORT)
Tom, thanks, you said it as I will try to spell it out interjected in your reply. John - Original Message - From: Tom Caylor [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Monday, September 11, 2006 12:21 PM Subject: Re: ROADMAP (SHORT) [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: - Original Message - From: Tom Caylor [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Wednesday, September 06, 2006 3:23 PM Subject: Re: ROADMAP (SHORT) You wrote: What is the non-mathematical part of UDA? The part that uses Church Thesis? When I hear non-mathematical I hear non-rigor. Define rigor that is non-mathematical. I guess if you do then you've been mathematical about it. I don't understand. Tom -- Smart: whatever I may come up with, as a different type of vigor (btw is this term well identified?) you will call it math - just a different type. John M --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ The root of the word math means learning, study, or science. Math is the effort to make things precise. So in my view applied math would be taking actual information and trying to make the science precise in order to further our learning and quest of the truth in the most efficient manner possible. Applied math is a sore point for me. As long as I accept (theoretical) Math as a language of logical thinking (IMO a one-plane one, but it is not the point now) I cannot condone the APPLIED math version, (math) using the results of Math for inrigorating (oops!) the imprecise model-values (reductionist) 'science' is dealing with. Precise it will be, right it won't, because it is based on a limited vue within the boundaries of (topical) science observations. It makes the imprecise value-system looking precise. I think that this is the concept that is captured by the term rigor. But what's in a name? I call it math and I think that a good many people would agree, but others might call it something else, like rigor. I think that it's an intuitive concept limited by our finite capabilities, as you so many times point out, John. I did, indeed and am glad that someone noticed. Your term 'rigor' is pretty wide, you call it 'math' (if not Math) including all those qualia-domains which are under discussion to be 'numbers(?) or not'. OK, I don't deny your godfatherish right to call anything by any name, but then - please - tell me what name to call the old mathematical math? (ie. churning conventional numbers like 1,2,3) by? Tom John --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: ROADMAP (SHORT)
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Tom, thanks, you said it as I will try to spell it out interjected in your reply. John - Original Message - From: Tom Caylor [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Monday, September 11, 2006 12:21 PM Subject: Re: ROADMAP (SHORT) [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: - Original Message - From: Tom Caylor [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Wednesday, September 06, 2006 3:23 PM Subject: Re: ROADMAP (SHORT) You wrote: What is the non-mathematical part of UDA? The part that uses Church Thesis? When I hear non-mathematical I hear non-rigor. Define rigor that is non-mathematical. I guess if you do then you've been mathematical about it. I don't understand. Tom -- Smart: whatever I may come up with, as a different type of vigor (btw is this term well identified?) you will call it math - just a different type. John M --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ The root of the word math means learning, study, or science. Math is the effort to make things precise. So in my view applied math would be taking actual information and trying to make the science precise in order to further our learning and quest of the truth in the most efficient manner possible. Applied math is a sore point for me. As long as I accept (theoretical) Math as a language of logical thinking (IMO a one-plane one, but it is not the point now) I cannot condone the APPLIED math version, (math) using the results of Math for inrigorating (oops!) the imprecise model-values (reductionist) 'science' is dealing with. Precise it will be, right it won't, because it is based on a limited vue within the boundaries of (topical) science observations. It makes the imprecise value-system looking precise. I think that this is the concept that is captured by the term rigor. But what's in a name? I call it math and I think that a good many people would agree, but others might call it something else, like rigor. I think that it's an intuitive concept limited by our finite capabilities, as you so many times point out, John. I did, indeed and am glad that someone noticed. Your term 'rigor' is pretty wide, you call it 'math' (if not Math) including all those qualia-domains which are under discussion to be 'numbers(?) or not'. OK, I don't deny your godfatherish right to call anything by any name, but then - please - tell me what name to call the old mathematical math? (ie. churning conventional numbers like 1,2,3) by? Tom John That is called arithmetic. I don't really want to pursue a discussion on terminology, but thanks for your thoughts. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: computationalism and supervenience
Brent Meeker writes: Why not? Can't we map bat conscious-computation to human conscious-computation; since you suppose we can map any computation to any other. But, you're thinking, since there a practical infinity of maps (even a countable infinity if you allow one-many) there is no way to know which is the correct map. There is if you and the bat share an environment. You're right that the correct mapping is the one in which you and the bat share the environment. That is what interaction with the environment does: forces us to choose one mapping out of all the possible ones, whether that involves talking to another person or using a computer. However, that doesn't mean I know everything about bats if I know everything about bat-computations. If it did, that would mean there was no difference between zombie bats and conscious bats, no difference between first person knowledge and third person or vicarious knowledge. Stathis Papaioannou I don't find either of those conclusions absurd. Computationalism is generally thought to entail both of them. Bruno's theory that identifies knowledge with provability is the only form of computationalism that seems to allow the distinction in a fundamental way. The Turing test would seem to imply that if it behaves like a bat, it has the mental states of a bat, and maybe this is a good practical test, but I think we can keep computationalism/strong AI and allow that it might have different mental states and still behave the same. A person given an opiod drug still experiences pain, although less intensely, and would be easily able to fool the Turing tester into believing that he is experiecing the same pain as in the undrugged state. By extension, it is logically possible, though unlikely, that the subject may have no conscious experiences at all. The usual argument against this is that by the same reasoning we cannot be sure that our fellow humans are conscious. This is strictly true, but we have two reasons for assuming other people are conscious: they behave like we do and their brains are similar to ours. I don't think it would be unreasonable to wonder whether a digital computer that behaves like we do really has the same mental states as a human, while still believing that it is theoretically possible that a close enough analogue of a human brain would have the same mental states. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: computationalism and supervenience
Brent Meeker writes: I think it goes against standard computationalism if you say that a conscious computation has some inherent structural property. Opponents of computationalism have used the absurdity of the conclusion that anything implements any conscious computation as evidence that there is something special and non-computational about the brain. Maybe they're right. Stathis Papaioannou Why not reject the idea that any computation implements every possible computation (which seems absurd to me)? Then allow that only computations with some special structure are conscious. It's possible, but once you start in that direction you can say that only computations implemented on this machine rather than that machine can be conscious. You need the hardware in order to specify structure, unless you can think of a God-given programming language against which candidate computations can be measured. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: computationalism and supervenience
-Original Message- Stathis Papaioannou Brent Meeker writes: Why not? Can't we map bat conscious-computation to human conscious- computation; since you suppose we can map any computation to any other. But, you're thinking, since there a practical infinity of maps (even a countable infinity if you allow one-many) there is no way to know which is the correct map. There is if you and the bat share an environment. You're right that the correct mapping is the one in which you and the bat share the environment. That is what interaction with the environment does: forces us to choose one mapping out of all the possible ones, whether that involves talking to another person or using a computer. However, that doesn't mean I know everything about bats if I know everything about bat-computations. If it did, that would mean there was no difference between zombie bats and conscious bats, no difference between first person knowledge and third person or vicarious knowledge. Stathis Papaioannou I don't find either of those conclusions absurd. Computationalism is generally thought to entail both of them. Bruno's theory that identifies knowledge with provability is the only form of computationalism that seems to allow the distinction in a fundamental way. The Turing test would seem to imply that if it behaves like a bat, it has the mental states of a bat, and maybe this is a good practical test, but I think we can keep computationalism/strong AI and allow that it might have different mental states and still behave the same. A person given an opiod drug still experiences pain, although less intensely, and would be easily able to fool the Turing tester into believing that he is experiecing the same pain as in the undrugged state. By extension, it is logically possible, though unlikely, that the subject may have no conscious experiences at all. The usual argument against this is that by the same reasoning we cannot be sure that our fellow humans are conscious. This is strictly true, but we have two reasons for assuming other people are conscious: they behave like we do and their brains are similar to ours. I don't think it would be unreasonable to wonder whether a digital computer that behaves like we do really has the same mental states as a human, while still believing that it is theoretically possible that a close enough analogue of a human brain would have the same mental states. Stathis Papaioannou I am so glad to here this come onto the list, Stathis. Your argument is logically equivalentI took this argument (from the recent thread) over to the JCS-ONLINE forum and threw it in there to see what would happen. As a result I wrote a short paper ostensibly to dispose of the solipsism argument once and for all by demonstrating empirical proof of the existence of consciousness, (if not any particular details within it). In it is some of the stuff from the thread...and acknowledgement to the list. I expect it will be rejected as usual... regardless...it's encouraging to at least see a little glimmer of hope that some of the old arguments that get trotted out are getting a little frayed around the edges.. If anyone wants to see it they are welcome... just email me. Or perhaps I could put it in the google forum somewhere... it can do that, can't it? BTW: The 'what it is like' of a Turing machine = what it is like to be a tape and tape reader, regardless of what is on the tape. 'tape_reader_ness', I assume... :-) Regards, Colin Hales --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: computationalism and supervenience
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent Meeker writes: Why not? Can't we map bat conscious-computation to human conscious-computation; since you suppose we can map any computation to any other. But, you're thinking, since there a practical infinity of maps (even a countable infinity if you allow one-many) there is no way to know which is the correct map. There is if you and the bat share an environment. You're right that the correct mapping is the one in which you and the bat share the environment. That is what interaction with the environment does: forces us to choose one mapping out of all the possible ones, whether that involves talking to another person or using a computer. However, that doesn't mean I know everything about bats if I know everything about bat-computations. If it did, that would mean there was no difference between zombie bats and conscious bats, no difference between first person knowledge and third person or vicarious knowledge. Stathis Papaioannou I don't find either of those conclusions absurd. Computationalism is generally thought to entail both of them. Bruno's theory that identifies knowledge with provability is the only form of computationalism that seems to allow the distinction in a fundamental way. The Turing test would seem to imply that if it behaves like a bat, it has the mental states of a bat, and maybe this is a good practical test, but I think we can keep computationalism/strong AI and allow that it might have different mental states and still behave the same. A person given an opiod drug still experiences pain, although less intensely, and would be easily able to fool the Turing tester into believing that he is experiecing the same pain as in the undrugged state. By extension, it is logically possible, though unlikely, that the subject may have no conscious experiences at all. The usual argument against this is that by the same reasoning we cannot be sure that our fellow humans are conscious. This is strictly true, but we have two reasons for assuming other people are conscious: they behave like we do and their brains are similar to ours. I don't think it would be unreasonable to wonder whether a digital computer that behaves like we do really has the same mental states as a human, while still believing that it is theoretically possible that a close enough analogue of a human brain would have the same mental states. Stathis Papaioannou I agree with that. It would be hard to say whether a robot whose computation was via a digital computer implementing something like a production system was conscious or not even if its behavoir were very close to human. On the other hand it would also be hard to say that another robot, whose computation was by digital simulation of a neural network modeled on a mammalian brain and whose behavoir was very close to human, was *not* conscious. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: computationalism and supervenience
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent Meeker writes: I think it goes against standard computationalism if you say that a conscious computation has some inherent structural property. Opponents of computationalism have used the absurdity of the conclusion that anything implements any conscious computation as evidence that there is something special and non-computational about the brain. Maybe they're right. Stathis Papaioannou Why not reject the idea that any computation implements every possible computation (which seems absurd to me)? Then allow that only computations with some special structure are conscious. It's possible, but once you start in that direction you can say that only computations implemented on this machine rather than that machine can be conscious. You need the hardware in order to specify structure, unless you can think of a God-given programming language against which candidate computations can be measured. I regard that as a feature - not a bug. :-) Disembodied computation doesn't quite seem absurd - but our empirical sample argues for embodiment. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: computationalism and supervenience
Brent meeker writes: I could make a robot that, having suitable thermocouples, would quickly withdraw it's hand from a fire; but not be conscious of it. Even if I provide the robot with feelings, i.e. judgements about good/bad/pain/pleasure I'm not sure it would be conscious. But if I provide it with attention and memory, so that it noted the painful event as important and necessary to remember because of it's strong negative affect; then I think it would be conscious. It's interesting that people actually withdraw their hand from the fire *before* they experience the pain. The withdrawl is a reflex, presumably evolved in organisms with the most primitive central nervour systems, while the pain seems to be there as an afterthought to teach us a lesson so we won't do it again. Thus, from consideration of evolutionary utility consciousness does indeed seem to be a side-effect of memory and learning. Even more curious, volitional action also occurs before one is aware of it. Are you familiar with the experiments of Benjamin Libet and Grey Walter? These experiments showed that in apparently voluntarily initiated motion, motor cortex activity actually preceded the subject's awareness of his intention by a substantial fraction of a second. In other words, we act first, then decide to act. These studies did not examine pre-planned action (presumably that would be far more technically difficult) but it is easy to imagine the analogous situation whereby the action is unconsciously planned before we become aware of our decision. In other words, free will is just a feeling which occurs after the fact. This is consistent with the logical impossibility of something that is neither random nor determined, which is what I feel my free will to be. I also think that this is an argument against zombies. If it were possible for an organism to behave just like a conscious being, but actually be unconscious, then why would consciousness have evolved? An interesting point - but hard to give any answer before pinning down what we mean by consciousness. For example Bruno, Julian Jaynes, and Daniel Dennett have explanations; but they explain somewhat different consciousnesses, or at least different aspects. Consciousness is the hardest thing to explain but the easiest thing to understand, if it's your own consciousness at issue. I think we can go a long way discussing it assuming that we do know what we are talking about even though we can't explain it. The question I ask is, why did people evolve with this consciousness thing, whatever it is? The answer must be, I think, that it is a necessary side-effect of the sort of neural complexity that underpins our behaviour. If it were not, and it were possible that beings could behave exactly like humans and not be conscious, then it would have been wasteful of nature to have provided us with consciousness. This is not necessarily so. First, evolution is constrained by what goes before. Its engineering solutions often seem rube-goldberg, e.g. backward retina in mammals. Sure, but vision itself would not have evolved unnecessarily. Second, there is selection against some evolved feature only to the extent it has a (net) cost. For example, Jaynes explanation of consciousness conforms to these two criteria. I think that any species that evolves intelligence comparable to ours will be conscious for reasons somewhat like Jaynes theory. They will be social and this combined with intelligence will make language a good evolutionary move. Once they have language, remembering what has happened, in order to communicate and plan, in symbolic terms will be a easy and natural evolvement. Whether that leads to hearing your own narrative in your head, as Jaynes supposes, is questionable; but it would be consistent with evolution. It takes advantage of existing structure and functions to realize a useful new function. Agreed. So consciousness is either there for a reason or it's a necessary side-effect of the sort of brains we have and the way we have evolved. It's still theoretically possible that if the latter is the case, we might have been unconscious if we had evolved completely different kinds of brains, but similar behaviour - although I think it unlikely. This does not necessarily mean that computers can be conscious: maybe if we had evolved with electronic circuits in our heads rather than neurons consciousness would not have been a necessary side-effect. But my point is that this may come down to what we would mean by a computer being conscious. Bruno has an answer in terms of what the computer can prove. Jaynes (and probably John McCarthy) would say a computer is conscious if it creates a narrative of its experience
RE: computationalism and supervenience
Stathis Papaioannou snip Maybe this is a copout, but I just don't think it is even logically possible to explain what consciousness *is* unless you have it. It's like the problem of explaining vision to a blind man: he might be the world's greatest scientific expert on it but still have zero idea of what it is like to see - and that's even though he shares most of the rest of his cognitive structure with other humans, and can understand analogies using other sensations. Knowing what sort of program a conscious computer would have to run to be conscious, what the purpose of consciousness is, and so on, does not help me to understand what the computer would be experiencing, except by analogy with what I myself experience. Stathis Papaioannou Please consider the plight of the zombie scientist with a huge set of sensory feeds and similar set of effectors. All carry similar signal encoding and all, in themselves, bestow no experiential qualities on the zombie. Add a capacity to detect regularity in the sensory feeds. Add a scientific goal-seeking behaviour. Note that this zombie... a) has the internal life of a dreamless sleep b) has no concept or percept of body or periphery c) has no concept that it is embedded in a universe. I put it to you that science (the extraction of regularity) is the science of zombie sensory fields, not the science of the natural world outside the zombie scientist. No amount of creativity (except maybe random choices) would ever lead to any abstraction of the outside world that gave it the ability to handle novelty in the natural world outside the zombie scientist. No matter how sophisticated the sensory feeds and any guesswork as to a model (abstraction) of the universe, the zombie would eventually find novelty invisible because the sensory feeds fail to depict the novelty .ie. same sensory feeds for different behaviour of the natural world. Technology built by a zombie scientist would replicate zombie sensory feeds, not deliver an independently operating novel chunk of hardware with a defined function(if the idea of function even has meaning in this instance). The purpose of consciousness is, IMO, to endow the cognitive agent with at least a repeatable (not accurate!) simile of the universe outside the cognitive agent so that novelty can be handled. Only then can the zombie scientist detect arbitrary levels of novelty and do open ended science (or survive in the wild world of novel environmental circumstance). In the absence of the functionality of phenomenal consciousness and with finite sensory feeds you cannot construct any world-model (abstraction) in the form of an innate (a-priori) belief system that will deliver an endless ability to discriminate novelty. In a very Godellian way eventually a limit would be reach where the abstracted model could not make any prediction that can be detected. The zombie is, in a very real way, faced with 'truths' that exist but can't be accessed/perceived. As such its behaviour will be fundamentally fragile in the face of novelty (just like all computer programs are). --- Just to make the zombie a little more real... consider the industrial control system computer. I have designed, installed hundreds and wired up tens (hundreds?) of thousands of sensors and an unthinkable number of kilometers of cables. (NEVER again!) In all cases I put it to you that the phenomenal content of sensory connections may, at best, be characterised as whatever it is like to have electrons crash through wires, for that is what is actually going on. As far as the internal life of the CPU is concerned... whatever it is like to be an electrically noisy hot rock, regardless of the programalthough the character of the noise may alter with different programs! I am a zombie expert! No that didn't come out right...erm perhaps... I think I might be a world expert in zombies yes, that's better. :-) Colin Hales --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: computationalism and supervenience
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent meeker writes: I could make a robot that, having suitable thermocouples, would quickly withdraw it's hand from a fire; but not be conscious of it. Even if I provide the robot with feelings, i.e. judgements about good/bad/pain/pleasure I'm not sure it would be conscious. But if I provide it with attention and memory, so that it noted the painful event as important and necessary to remember because of it's strong negative affect; then I think it would be conscious. It's interesting that people actually withdraw their hand from the fire *before* they experience the pain. The withdrawl is a reflex, presumably evolved in organisms with the most primitive central nervour systems, while the pain seems to be there as an afterthought to teach us a lesson so we won't do it again. Thus, from consideration of evolutionary utility consciousness does indeed seem to be a side-effect of memory and learning. Even more curious, volitional action also occurs before one is aware of it. Are you familiar with the experiments of Benjamin Libet and Grey Walter? These experiments showed that in apparently voluntarily initiated motion, motor cortex activity actually preceded the subject's awareness of his intention by a substantial fraction of a second. In other words, we act first, then decide to act. These studies did not examine pre-planned action (presumably that would be far more technically difficult) but it is easy to imagine the analogous situation whereby the action is unconsciously planned before we become aware of our decision. In other words, free will is just a feeling which occurs after the fact. This is consistent with the logical impossibility of something that is neither random nor determined, which is what I feel my free will to be. I also think that this is an argument against zombies. If it were possible for an organism to behave just like a conscious being, but actually be unconscious, then why would consciousness have evolved? An interesting point - but hard to give any answer before pinning down what we mean by consciousness. For example Bruno, Julian Jaynes, and Daniel Dennett have explanations; but they explain somewhat different consciousnesses, or at least different aspects. Consciousness is the hardest thing to explain but the easiest thing to understand, if it's your own consciousness at issue. I think we can go a long way discussing it assuming that we do know what we are talking about even though we can't explain it. The question I ask is, why did people evolve with this consciousness thing, whatever it is? The answer must be, I think, that it is a necessary side-effect of the sort of neural complexity that underpins our behaviour. If it were not, and it were possible that beings could behave exactly like humans and not be conscious, then it would have been wasteful of nature to have provided us with consciousness. This is not necessarily so. First, evolution is constrained by what goes before. Its engineering solutions often seem rube-goldberg, e.g. backward retina in mammals. Sure, but vision itself would not have evolved unnecessarily. Second, there is selection against some evolved feature only to the extent it has a (net) cost. For example, Jaynes explanation of consciousness conforms to these two criteria. I think that any species that evolves intelligence comparable to ours will be conscious for reasons somewhat like Jaynes theory. They will be social and this combined with intelligence will make language a good evolutionary move. Once they have language, remembering what has happened, in order to communicate and plan, in symbolic terms will be a easy and natural evolvement. Whether that leads to hearing your own narrative in your head, as Jaynes supposes, is questionable; but it would be consistent with evolution. It takes advantage of existing structure and functions to realize a useful new function. Agreed. So consciousness is either there for a reason or it's a necessary side-effect of the sort of brains we have and the way we have evolved. It's still theoretically possible that if the latter is the case, we might have been unconscious if we had evolved completely different kinds of brains, but similar behaviour - although I think it unlikely. This does not necessarily mean that computers can be conscious: maybe if we had evolved with electronic circuits in our heads rather than neurons consciousness would not have been a necessary side-effect. But my point is that this may come down to what we would mean by a computer being conscious. Bruno has an answer in terms of what the computer can prove. Jaynes (and probably John McCarthy) would say a computer is conscious if it creates a narrative of its experience which it can access as memory. Maybe this is a copout, but I just don't think it is even
Re: computationalism and supervenience
Colin Hales wrote: Stathis Papaioannou snip Maybe this is a copout, but I just don't think it is even logically possible to explain what consciousness *is* unless you have it. It's like the problem of explaining vision to a blind man: he might be the world's greatest scientific expert on it but still have zero idea of what it is like to see - and that's even though he shares most of the rest of his cognitive structure with other humans, and can understand analogies using other sensations. Knowing what sort of program a conscious computer would have to run to be conscious, what the purpose of consciousness is, and so on, does not help me to understand what the computer would be experiencing, except by analogy with what I myself experience. Stathis Papaioannou Please consider the plight of the zombie scientist with a huge set of sensory feeds and similar set of effectors. All carry similar signal encoding and all, in themselves, bestow no experiential qualities on the zombie. Add a capacity to detect regularity in the sensory feeds. Add a scientific goal-seeking behaviour. Note that this zombie... a) has the internal life of a dreamless sleep b) has no concept or percept of body or periphery c) has no concept that it is embedded in a universe. I put it to you that science (the extraction of regularity) is the science of zombie sensory fields, not the science of the natural world outside the zombie scientist. No amount of creativity (except maybe random choices) would ever lead to any abstraction of the outside world that gave it the ability to handle novelty in the natural world outside the zombie scientist. No matter how sophisticated the sensory feeds and any guesswork as to a model (abstraction) of the universe, the zombie would eventually find novelty invisible because the sensory feeds fail to depict the novelty .ie. same sensory feeds for different behaviour of the natural world. Technology built by a zombie scientist would replicate zombie sensory feeds, not deliver an independently operating novel chunk of hardware with a defined function(if the idea of function even has meaning in this instance). The purpose of consciousness is, IMO, to endow the cognitive agent with at least a repeatable (not accurate!) simile of the universe outside the cognitive agent so that novelty can be handled. Only then can the zombie scientist detect arbitrary levels of novelty and do open ended science (or survive in the wild world of novel environmental circumstance). Almost all organisms have become extinct. Handling *arbitrary* levels of novelty is probably too much to ask of any species; and it's certainly more than is necessary to survive for millenia. In the absence of the functionality of phenomenal consciousness and with finite sensory feeds you cannot construct any world-model (abstraction) in the form of an innate (a-priori) belief system that will deliver an endless ability to discriminate novelty. In a very Godellian way eventually a limit would be reach where the abstracted model could not make any prediction that can be detected. So that's how we got string theory! The zombie is, in a very real way, faced with 'truths' that exist but can't be accessed/perceived. As such its behaviour will be fundamentally fragile in the face of novelty (just like all computer programs are). How do you know we are so robust. Planck said, A new idea prevails, not by the conversion of adherents, but by the retirement and demise of opponents. In other words only the young have the flexibility to adopt new ideas. Ironically Planck never really believed quantum mechanics was more than a calculational trick. --- Just to make the zombie a little more real... consider the industrial control system computer. I have designed, installed hundreds and wired up tens (hundreds?) of thousands of sensors and an unthinkable number of kilometers of cables. (NEVER again!) In all cases I put it to you that the phenomenal content of sensory connections may, at best, be characterised as whatever it is like to have electrons crash through wires, for that is what is actually going on. As far as the internal life of the CPU is concerned... whatever it is like to be an electrically noisy hot rock, regardless of the programalthough the character of the noise may alter with different programs! That's like say whatever it is like to be you, it is at best some waves of chemical potential. You don't *know* that the control system is not conscious - unless you know what structure or function makes a system conscious. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more
