Re: Maudlin's argument
Russell Standish wrote: Most ensemble theories of everything would postulate that all possible observer moments are already there in the ensemble. This is certainly true of my construction, as Bruno's and Deutsch's Multiverse. It is debatable in Schmidhuber's though, as he seems to have some notion of time that his Great Programmer lives in. I'm not sure what the status of Tegmark's ensemble is, but I doubt there is any external temporality in that. I suspect in that case you would disagree with most of the ensemble theories discussed here then. Right. The Multiverse does exist but it's just a bunch of meaningless Shannon information. It is actually quite trival to see that the observer moments can't be fully inside that ensemble. An 'Observer moment' is a *cognitve interpretation* or *meaning* which is ascribed to the Shannon information in the ensemble and this meaning is not a fixed pre-existing thing. OTOH, if we're looking at it in terms of an emergent duality picture like I suggested, the observer moments do exist in the block multiverse, but when asking about appearances this is irrelevant, and one can only ask the question what is the probability distribution of my next observer moment. This is the RSSA. Cheers Again, the phrase 'probability distribution of next observer moment' is in my view incoherent, since it presupposes that all observer moments are already laid down inside the ensemble. To reason about 'Observer Moment's' properly requires a new kind of quantatative measure defined in terms of *degree of reflection*, not *probability*. Probability theory just isn't up to the job. That's why neither Nick Bostrom nor any-one else can resolve puzzles of anthropic reasoning such as the Doomsday argument or the Simulation argument --- '...he (Geddes) grabbed the book (of nature/the universe) and turned to one of the spells... He concentrated on the symbols and recited the spell - reading the old (math) symbols easily now, as if it were a children's book.' --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Maudlin's argument
Marc Geddes writes: The implicit assumption in anthropic reasoning is that the observer moments are in some sense *already there* (i.e the future and past are already layed down in the block universe). This is what I waas disputing. If the observer moments do *not* in fact pre-exist in a fully formed or consistent fashion, then you cannot apply standard statistical reasoning about the chances of an 'observer moment' being instantiated. Re-read what I said. I was disputing the block universe as reagrds observer moments. If Observer moments don't actually exist until we come to them via the river of time, then they cannot be reasoned about using standard statistical methods to talk about pre-existing frequencies. Do you believe there is a difference between the experience of a being living in a model block universe, such as having the observer moments of its life running simultaneously on different machines or as separate processes run in parallel on the one machine, and the experience of a being running in a linear simulation as per the traditional view of time? Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's argument
On Fri, Oct 13, 2006 at 06:02:01AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Russell Standish wrote: Most ensemble theories of everything would postulate that all possible observer moments are already there in the ensemble. This is certainly true of my construction, as Bruno's and Deutsch's Multiverse. It is debatable in Schmidhuber's though, as he seems to have some notion of time that his Great Programmer lives in. I'm not sure what the status of Tegmark's ensemble is, but I doubt there is any external temporality in that. I suspect in that case you would disagree with most of the ensemble theories discussed here then. Right. The Multiverse does exist but it's just a bunch of meaningless Shannon information. It is actually quite trival to see that the observer moments can't be fully inside that ensemble. An 'Observer moment' is a *cognitve interpretation* or *meaning* which is ascribed to the Shannon information in the ensemble and this meaning is not a fixed pre-existing thing. The Multiverse is defined as the set of consistent histories described by the Schroedinger equation. I make the identification that a quantum state is an observer moment, and the set of consistent quantum histories is the set of observer histories. As such all observer moments are in the Multiverse. But I appreciate this is not a widely held interpretation... -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Maudlin's argument
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Do you believe there is a difference between the experience of a being living in a model block universe, such as having the observer moments of its life running simultaneously on different machines or as separate processes run in parallel on the one machine, and the experience of a being running in a linear simulation as per the traditional view of time? Stathis Papaioannou This is a 'philosophical leading question' ;) If my theories are right you *can't* have a being experiencing things living in a model block universe. I suspect that if you tried to actually carry out the thought experiements you mention (observer moments being simulated simultaneously), you couldn't be certain of simulating a being with a fixed identity. So perhaps I should answer: 'Yes I believe there is a difference. The being whose observer moments one is trying to simulate simultaneouly cannot be garanteed to be the same being as the being simulated linearly'. The problem lies in the meaning ascribed to symbols. The same computation can mean any number of different things depending on the encoding system used. For example the following two bytyes: 45, 65 mean two different things depening on whether ASCII or EBCDIC was used to encode the meaning of the bytes. Could one be sure that the same computations run simultaneously *mean* (i.e encode) the same thing as computations run linearly? I maintain you cannot. Also see my reply to Russell below: Russell Standish The Multiverse is defined as the set of consistent histories described by the Schroedinger equation. I make the identification that a quantum state is an observer moment, and the set of consistent quantum histories is the set of observer histories. As such all observer moments are in the Multiverse. But I appreciate this is not a widely held interpretation... Indeed so. And there's a good reason why it isn't a widely held interpretation, as J.barbour explained in 'The End Of Time'. In order to define 'the Multiverse' in terms of QM one needs a *static* wave-function solution for the entire universe (one which doesn't change) , whereas conventional QM solutions to real world problems are *dynamic* wave-function solutions (wave functions which evolve with time). No one has yet succeeded in demonstrating a static wave-function solution for the entire universe. See what I said above. If the *same* QM state could be associated with *different* observer moments, then observer moments would not be reducible to QM states and the set of consistent quantum histories could not be said to be fully identified with the set of observer histories. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
David Nyman wrote: On Oct 13, 1:52 am, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: You know you can, of course. But what you are communicating is information derived from your 'seeing a square' in order for others to instantiate something analogous, as 1-person experiences of their own.I disagree. Squareness is fully expressible in language. Make your mind up. You said 'see a square' not 'squareness'. Squareness is fully expressinle, so instantiation doesn't matter in that case. Yes, fine, no problem of course, so why discuss this example? It shows that experiences had by persons are not necessarily incommunicable. Thus, whatever the pronblem is with qualia, it is not about personhood per se. I specifically said '1-person experience', and in the case of 'see a square' (your choice) let's try the hard one - i.e. communicate the experience of seeing a particular square, not the concept of squareness. So, for example, you can say 'look at that square', I look at it, I see the square, I instantiate it, I have an analogous 1-person experience. OK? Come to think of it, even in your example of squareness, I have to instantiate *something*, otherwise your explanation won't register with me. Are you sure? mathematicians can comunicate higher-dimensional spaces that they cannot visualise. And this something is *my* private something, as it happens *derived* from your communication - it isn't literally what you 'had in mind', because this is private to *you*. You are playing on two senses of the same. It may be an exact duplicate, rather than the very same individual, but if it is an *exact* duplicate,there is no incommunicability or ineffability. Frankly, I think if you quibble about this, you must have some other notion of 1-person in mind. But will we ever know? David David Nyman wrote: On Oct 11, 11:17 pm, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: It may be impossible in principle (i.e. 1-person experience is ex-hypothesi incommunicable) and we certainly don't know how to.So if I see a square, I can't communicate it? You know you can, of course. But what you are communicating is information derived from your 'seeing a square' in order for others to instantiate something analogous, as 1-person experiences of their own.I disagree. Squareness is fully expressible in language. Your 1-person experience per se is incommunicable,That's just my point. It's not the fact that is is an experience, or that it is had by a person that makes something inexpressible. and consequently you have no direct evidence of (although you may be jusified in your beliefs concerning) what others have instantiated as a result of your communication.Squareness is fully expressinle, so instantiation doesn't matter in that case. David David Nyman wrote: On Oct 11, 5:11 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: But it isn't possible to determine by inspection that they are conscious.Are you claiming it's impossible in principle, or just that we don't know how? It may be impossible in principle (i.e. 1-person experience is ex-hypothesi incommunicable) and we certainly don't know how to.So if I see a square, I can't communicate it? Colours and Shapes: Exactly What Qualifies as a Quale ? Because qualia are so often used to argue against physicalism (or at least physical communicability), it is often assumed that they must be mysterious by definition. However Lewis's original definition pins qualia to the way external objects appear, and it least some of those features are throughly unmysterious,such as the shapes of objects. A red square seems to divide into a mysterious redness and an unmysterious squareness. This does not by itself remove any of the problems associated with qualia; the problem is that some qualia are mysterious. not that some are not.. There is another, corresponding issue; not all mysterious, mental contents are the appearances of external objects. There a re phenomenal feels attached to emotions, sensations and so on. Indeed, we often use the perceived qualaities of objects as metaphors for them -- sharp pains, warm or cool feelings towards another person, and so on. The main effect of this issue on the argument is to hinder the physicalist project of reducing qualia to the phsycally-defined properties of external objects, since in the case of internal sensations and emotional feelings, there are not suitable external objects. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list
Re: Maudlin's argument
On Fri, Oct 13, 2006 at 07:03:18AM -, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Also see my reply to Russell below: Russell Standish The Multiverse is defined as the set of consistent histories described by the Schroedinger equation. I make the identification that a quantum state is an observer moment, and the set of consistent quantum histories is the set of observer histories. As such all observer moments are in the Multiverse. But I appreciate this is not a widely held interpretation... Indeed so. And there's a good reason why it isn't a widely held interpretation, as J.barbour explained in 'The End Of Time'. In order to define 'the Multiverse' in terms of QM one needs a *static* wave-function solution for the entire universe (one which doesn't change) , whereas conventional QM solutions to real world problems are *dynamic* wave-function solutions (wave functions which evolve with time). No one has yet succeeded in demonstrating a static wave-function solution for the entire universe. I haven't read Barbour's book, but if that is what he is saying, he would be wrong. Consider a universe of a single electron living in a potential well V(x)=|x|^2, x\in R^3. There is a well defined solution \psi(t,x) = \sum_j \psu_0|jj| exp(-iE_j t) given the initial condition \psi_0. The function \psi: R x R^3 - C is a static (time independent) mathematical object (I wrote it the mathematicians write to emphasize this point). Why wouldn't you identify this with the Multiverse of that electron? Now I am aware that several people (Hawking included I gather) have proposed various wave functions of the universe, which tend to be solutions of the Wheeler de Witt equation, which is a time independent equation. However, I'm not so interested in following that literature. See what I said above. If the *same* QM state could be associated with *different* observer moments, then observer moments would not be reducible to QM states and the set of consistent quantum histories could not be said to be fully identified with the set of observer histories. If the same QM state is associated with different observer moments, you must be talking about some non-functionalist approach to consciousness. The QM state, by definition, contains all information that can be extracted from observation. Cheers -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: To observe is to......
snip [Colin Hales] No, it's better visualised as 'being a not-mirror' :-) Imagine you embedded a mirror in your head, but you were only interested in everything the mirror was not. That is, the image in the mirror is manipulating the space intimately adjacent to the reflecting surface. Keep the space, throw the reflecting surface and glass away. What you are interested in is 'being' that space, not the mirror. When you do that the 'movie screen' that is the experiential field becomes part of you. Yes it's a play, only 1 viewer who literally 'is' the theatre, no regressing homunculi. [David Nyman] Oddly, I think I *see* what you mean (and I use the term advisedly). One of the problems we experience in discussing these issues (certainly I do, anyway) is the lack of a really effective way to share powerful *visualisations* of what we're proposing. Not everything we're trying to express is formalisable (at this stage anyway) in mathematical or strictly logical terms. I've tried to express before this image of the relationship between what-is-functioning-as-perceiver and what-is-functioning-as-percept, and the picture in my head was always something like you describe. And the key aspect is that you *are* this relationship, your grasp of the situation is unmediated, there is no regress. For me, this is the primary intension of 'exists', and it lies at the heart of what I confusingly referred to as 1-person primacy - meaning only that you can't come by any of this unless you *are* the entity in question. The commitment is total - there is no way of climbing outside of this to study the situation 'objectively'. [Colin Hales] Glad to 'see' that you 'see'. :-) It is very interesting to see how much trouble people have with this and it is very ironic because it is the position we naturally inhabit (all observation is subjectivity), yet the subjectivity delivers the capacity to behave objectively so brilliantly we think we have actually stepped back from it... but as you say... there is no way of climbing outside of this to study the situation 'objectively' Yet that is what we scientists insist we are doing! Without subjectivity there's no 'objectivity' (in the form of an 'as-if' or virtual objectivity) to be had. The descriptions we define as 'objective' and describe 'objectively' are merely generalisations in respect of appearances of what bruno would call 'objective' (actual) reality...what it is that is actually there, whatever it is that is the 'underlying reality'. That also delivers the appearances into your brain/via your brain, which as actually made of the underlying reality, not of anything we divine through the appearances it delivers. Indeed I would hold that our subjective experience (subjectivity)is our one and only intimate and complete connection to the underlying reality and it is the existence of it (subjectivity) 'at all' which is most telling/instructive of the true nature/structure of the underlying reality, not the appearances thus delivered by subjectivity. As I think I have said before: 'seeing' is evidence of the underlying reality and its capcity to deliver 'that which is seen'. The latter delivers two sorts of evidence a) more evidence of the organisation of the underlying reality b) what we regard as objective evidence used by scientists in formulations of emopirical laws that organise the appearances but tell us nothing about the underlying reality because we throw (a) away for no reason other than it is our culture to do so. There's a lot more to observation than merely 'that which is seen'. The act of seeing at all is also observation. Metaphorically... if you hear X is true being said you get 2 lots of evidence, not one: c) some evidence in support of the proposition that X is true d) more definite evidence of the proposition somebody said something 'that which is seen' corresponds to X is true The underlying reality is the 'somebody' Science calls any consideration of the 'somebody' as evidenceless non-scientific metaphysics and spurns/eschews it when is is actually _more_ evidenced! in that (d) is a better supported claim than (c) That's about the lot on 'observation' except to wonder when mainstream science (in particular cosmology and neuroscience) finally 'get it'. This simple cultural foible hides the key to 'everything'. The belief that the 'underlying reality is actually made of quantum mechanics (as opposed to being merely described by it) to me looks like a mass delusion of the most bizarre kind. Thomas Kuhn should be marching up and down with placard saying NO MORE EVIDENCE-ISM EVIDENCE DISCRIMINATION UNFAIR TO UNDERLYING REALITY. :-) cheers, Colin Hales --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
