Re: UDA query
2009/12/24 Nick Prince > Hi Bruno > > > >And here there is a famous difficulty, which is that physicists and > >logicians use very different if not opposite vocabulary. > >Logicians distinguish a theory (-usually a finite or recursive > >(mechanically decidable) thing, and its interpretation (usually an > >infinite mathematical structure. > > This must be difficult. How can any theory be interpreted without the > formalisms or some model. It is often said that with the many worlds > interpretation it is the mathematics which tends to give us the lead > on how to interpret Quantum Mechanics. It was this that made me tend > to agree with the many worlders. Can you give a simple example of > what you mean? > > > >In the comp frame, it is even more difficult, given that we are going > >through a metatheory, where both the theory and its interpretations > >are studied at the theory level, and then we have to consider the > >fixed point of the interpretation function. > >Intuitively, you can understand that with comp, we do confuse, > >purposefully, the map and the territory. You can see a brain as a > >theory of reality. But that reality contains a brain. So, at some > >point the brain will accept (or bet) that it is itself an object in > >that theory, and the computationalist practicers will have to bet that > >is "brain-theory" is well described (relatively to his neighborhood) > >by a finite thing (its own backup in such or that machine). > >It is not stranger that Brouwer fixed point in geometry or topology. > >After all, we know that if the map of a territory is continuously > >embedded in the territory, a point of the map will be confused with a > >point in the territory. It is the indexical "You are here" point of > >the map. Likewise, in computer science, the meaning of a program can > >be described by a fixed point of some universal transformation (like > >in Scott denotational semantics, for example). > > > A map is a kind of (mathematical) model of reality so although there > is a one to one correspondence between the points on the map to > reality I still can’t see the trick of how to get through your step > 8. Sorry if I am seeming stupid. > > > >To understand this well, it is necessary to NOT confuse a theory, with > >his mathematical interpretation, and to NOT confuse a mathematical > >interpretation with an interpretation in some reality. Physicists have > >not yet this level of sophistication. They usually confuse a theory > >(the SWE for example) with the mathematical (standard) interpretation > >(the wave function). This can lead to many misunderstanding of what > >the logicians are doing, especially in applied logic. > > > I’m struggling with this one as stated above. > > > >Concerning the existence of platonic Turing Universal Machine, it is > >equivalent with the platonic existence of the prime numbers, or the > >even numbers, etc. With Church thesis you can eliminate the "Turing" > >label. > > > >Bruno > > > > I can understand that numbers and arithmetic operations (as well as a > whole lot of other stuff) exist as some kind of objective reality > (called a platonic reality). These archetypal “things” are to me > clearly discovered by us rather than invented. But that our dynamic > world emerges somehow from this static ethereal repository seems very > difficult to see. > Would it be easier if I said that all of this came from bouncing particle of matter (whatever that is) ? What is important in all of this is the view point, the observer, what as been abstracted for too much time, what is central to the computationalist hyposthesis. What could you see *easily* that explain your view point ? the fact that you see the universe being Nick Prince and not being Quentin Anciaux ? Regards, Quentin > > I’m missing the trick here. Maybe its some kind of insight > restructured perception that I need. > I will try to read up some more to see if I can make some more > progress. > > Thank you very much for your kind replies. > > Happy Christmas > > Nick > > > On Dec 24, 9:26 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 24 Dec 2009, at 02:13, Nick Prince wrote: > > > > > Thanks Bruno > > > > > I want to have a good think about your answers and also the eighth > > > step in your paper. I think it is the most difficult for me and yet I > > > sense its somehow. Schmidhuber assumes a great programmer runs the UD > > > but you effectively dispense with him. If a universal turing machine > > > necessarilly exists platonically which is capable of running UD's that > > > can simulate our minds then our experience of reality follows. Yet I > > > still feel that somehow this will be confusing the map of the > > > territory with the "reality", the equations of physics with the > > > physically real. > > > > And here there is a famous difficulty, which is that physicists and > > logicians use very different if not opposite vocabulary. > > Logicians distinguish a theory (-usually a finite or recursive > > (m
Re: UDA query
Hi Bruno >And here there is a famous difficulty, which is that physicists and >logicians use very different if not opposite vocabulary. >Logicians distinguish a theory (-usually a finite or recursive >(mechanically decidable) thing, and its interpretation (usually an >infinite mathematical structure. This must be difficult. How can any theory be interpreted without the formalisms or some model. It is often said that with the many worlds interpretation it is the mathematics which tends to give us the lead on how to interpret Quantum Mechanics. It was this that made me tend to agree with the many worlders. Can you give a simple example of what you mean? >In the comp frame, it is even more difficult, given that we are going >through a metatheory, where both the theory and its interpretations >are studied at the theory level, and then we have to consider the >fixed point of the interpretation function. >Intuitively, you can understand that with comp, we do confuse, >purposefully, the map and the territory. You can see a brain as a >theory of reality. But that reality contains a brain. So, at some >point the brain will accept (or bet) that it is itself an object in >that theory, and the computationalist practicers will have to bet that >is "brain-theory" is well described (relatively to his neighborhood) >by a finite thing (its own backup in such or that machine). >It is not stranger that Brouwer fixed point in geometry or topology. >After all, we know that if the map of a territory is continuously >embedded in the territory, a point of the map will be confused with a >point in the territory. It is the indexical "You are here" point of >the map. Likewise, in computer science, the meaning of a program can >be described by a fixed point of some universal transformation (like >in Scott denotational semantics, for example). A map is a kind of (mathematical) model of reality so although there is a one to one correspondence between the points on the map to reality I still can’t see the trick of how to get through your step 8. Sorry if I am seeming stupid. >To understand this well, it is necessary to NOT confuse a theory, with >his mathematical interpretation, and to NOT confuse a mathematical >interpretation with an interpretation in some reality. Physicists have >not yet this level of sophistication. They usually confuse a theory >(the SWE for example) with the mathematical (standard) interpretation >(the wave function). This can lead to many misunderstanding of what >the logicians are doing, especially in applied logic. I’m struggling with this one as stated above. >Concerning the existence of platonic Turing Universal Machine, it is >equivalent with the platonic existence of the prime numbers, or the >even numbers, etc. With Church thesis you can eliminate the "Turing" >label. >Bruno I can understand that numbers and arithmetic operations (as well as a whole lot of other stuff) exist as some kind of objective reality (called a platonic reality). These archetypal “things” are to me clearly discovered by us rather than invented. But that our dynamic world emerges somehow from this static ethereal repository seems very difficult to see. I’m missing the trick here. Maybe its some kind of insight restructured perception that I need. I will try to read up some more to see if I can make some more progress. Thank you very much for your kind replies. Happy Christmas Nick On Dec 24, 9:26 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: > On 24 Dec 2009, at 02:13, Nick Prince wrote: > > > Thanks Bruno > > > I want to have a good think about your answers and also the eighth > > step in your paper. I think it is the most difficult for me and yet I > > sense its somehow. Schmidhuber assumes a great programmer runs the UD > > but you effectively dispense with him. If a universal turing machine > > necessarilly exists platonically which is capable of running UD's that > > can simulate our minds then our experience of reality follows. Yet I > > still feel that somehow this will be confusing the map of the > > territory with the "reality", the equations of physics with the > > physically real. > > And here there is a famous difficulty, which is that physicists and > logicians use very different if not opposite vocabulary. > Logicians distinguish a theory (-usually a finite or recursive > (mechanically decidable) thing, and its interpretation (usually an > infinite mathematical structure. > > In the comp frame, it is even more difficult, given that we are going > through a metatheory, where both the theory and its interpretations > are studied at the theory level, and then we have to consider the > fixed point of the interpretation function. > > Intuitively, you can understand that with comp, we do confuse, > purposefully, the map and the territory. You can see a brain as a > theory of reality. But that reality contains a brain. So, at some > point the brain will accept (or bet) that it is itself an obj
Re: UDA query
On 24 Dec 2009, at 02:13, Nick Prince wrote: > Thanks Bruno > > I want to have a good think about your answers and also the eighth > step in your paper. I think it is the most difficult for me and yet I > sense its somehow. Schmidhuber assumes a great programmer runs the UD > but you effectively dispense with him. If a universal turing machine > necessarilly exists platonically which is capable of running UD's that > can simulate our minds then our experience of reality follows. Yet I > still feel that somehow this will be confusing the map of the > territory with the "reality", the equations of physics with the > physically real. And here there is a famous difficulty, which is that physicists and logicians use very different if not opposite vocabulary. Logicians distinguish a theory (-usually a finite or recursive (mechanically decidable) thing, and its interpretation (usually an infinite mathematical structure. In the comp frame, it is even more difficult, given that we are going through a metatheory, where both the theory and its interpretations are studied at the theory level, and then we have to consider the fixed point of the interpretation function. Intuitively, you can understand that with comp, we do confuse, purposefully, the map and the territory. You can see a brain as a theory of reality. But that reality contains a brain. So, at some point the brain will accept (or bet) that it is itself an object in that theory, and the computationalist practicers will have to bet that is "brain-theory" is well described (relatively to his neighborhood) by a finite thing (its own backup in such or that machine). It is not stranger that Brouwer fixed point in geometry or topology. After all, we know that if the map of a territory is continuously embedded in the territory, a point of the map will be confused with a point in the territory. It is the indexical "You are here" point of the map. Likewise, in computer science, the meaning of a program can be described by a fixed point of some universal transformation (like in Scott denotational semantics, for example). To understand this well, it is necessary to NOT confuse a theory, with his mathematical interpretation, and to NOT confuse a mathematical interpretation with an interpretation in some reality. Physicists have not yet this level of sophistication. They usually confuse a theory (the SWE for example) with the mathematical (standard) interpretation (the wave function). This can lead to many misunderstanding of what the logicians are doing, especially in applied logic. Concerning the existence of platonic Turing Universal Machine, it is equivalent with the platonic existence of the prime numbers, or the even numbers, etc. With Church thesis you can eliminate the "Turing" label. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: paper on view of reality
On 19 Dec 2009, at 18:08, John Mikes wrote: > Reality versions(?) continued... > > In his post Benjamin Jakubik wrote: > "Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > >> Honestly I think you are a bit dishonest to yourself here, since > you > >> already presume the appearance of matter, > > > > I assume nowhere primitive matter. I do assume "consensual reality". > > If not, I would not post message on a list. > Well, that was my point. So indeed numbers don't make sense > independent of > that, because..." > -- > > IMO to 'presume' the appearance of matter is not more than what I > call (Colin's) perceived reality - our own figment at the mental > level we can and do muster. > > Bruno's (nowhere(!) assumed) "primitive matter" would transcend the > 'perceived' - so it seems irrelevant in this respect, however... he > assumes a "consensual reality" . I borrow the term "consensual reality" from the salvia divinorum user community, mainly to refer to the kind of reality you come back too after an experience. I do believe in such reality, although not in it being fundamental. I have to believe in it to just decide to answer a post. If I was not "pretty sure" it does exist, given that I cannot doubt my consciousness, I would become a solipsist. So I do believe in things like UK, Obama, trees, bosons and galaxies. Those are mind constructs, with hopefully some referents. Then, assuming comp, and thus elementary arithmetic, Mechanism can explain where such beliefs come from, and why numbers get through a befuddling path with discourses on "matter", "time" and "consciousness" etc. A philosopher who would stop to believe in consensus reality would stop to publish or posting anything. > In whch case a 'consensual' would be even weaker than a 'perceived' > - this being a > "one-person" mindset and does not require (consensual) agreement > from many. Yes. > I still feel that 'numbers' lurk somewhere in these - non primary - > hills(as not 'primitives'!) - no matter how imaginative it would > be to 'express' anything with long-enough series of them. > My ceterum censeo (sorry, Bruno) You are welcome, Best, Bruno > On Fri, Dec 18, 2009 at 3:08 PM, John Mikes wrote: > Ronald: > WHAT is reality? 'physical' is one degree weaker, it is most likely > based on observations we call 'physical' in the figment: physical > world(view) - the poorly understood/explainable - as the article > puts it: 'ontological in science' - explanatory figment. > John M > > On Fri, Dec 18, 2009 at 7:18 AM, ronaldheld > wrote: > http://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/0912/0912.3433.pdf > any comments on this? >Ronald > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > . > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en > . > > > > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > . > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en > . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
