Re: R/ASSA query

[Nick Prince]

Hi Stahis

You brought up the point of personal identity.

When someone goes to sleep they lose consciousness (I am assuming so
anyway - perhaps during deep sleep rather than REM). OK, so some
people say that because they wake up again there is always a branch
where they wake up.  But suppose somebody goes into a deep coma, then
at the time they lose consciousness then that consciousness may find a
consistent extension in another branch but what about the vegetative
"person" left behind.  Are they to be considered as vegetable rather
than person? I wondered whether this was a cul se sac situation but
then re-considered as below.

If there are gradations of consciousness which can decay then at any
time or level of our consciousness, as the universe splits then
consistent extensions will always exist to carry whatever level of
consciousnes we have through into another branch.  This would keep on
until there was no consciousness left in some branch. I know that what
is actually going on during sleep is probably very uncertain but based
on this gradational assumption would you agree with my conclusions?

Best wishes

Nick Prince

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Re: on consciousness levels and ai

[Brent Meeker]

Bruno Marchal wrote:

Hi John,

On 21 Jan 2010, at 22:19, John Mikes wrote:


Dear Bruno,
you took extra pain to describe (in your vocabulary) what I stand for 
(using MY vocabulary).

-
On Thu, Jan 21, 2010 at 2:17 PM, Bruno Marchal > wrote:


John,

What makes you think that a brain is something material?  I mean
/primitively/ material.

 
JM:
I refer to 'matter' as a historically developed */figment/* as used 
in "physical worldview" (I think in parentheses _by both of us_). 
Nothing (materially) PRIMITIVE, it is an 'explanation' of poorly 
understood and received observations at the various levels of the 
evolving human mindset (~actual enriching epistemic cognitive 
inventory and the pertinent (at that level) application of relational 
changing (=function??).


I think we agree on that.



 


You know (I hope) that I pretend (at least) to have shown that
*IF* we are machine, and thus if our (generalized) brain is a
machine, (for example: we say "yes" to the doctor) *THEN* "we"
are immaterial, and eventually matter itself emerges from the
statistical interference of computations. The term computation is
taken in its original mathematical (and unphysical, immaterial)
sense (of Church, Turing, Post, ...)

Remember that  "comp" is the belief (axiom, theory, hypothesis,
faith) that we can survive with an artificial digital (a priori
primitively material for the aristotelian) brain. Then I show
that if we believe furthemore that matter is primitive, like
99,999%of the Aristotelians, we get a contradiction.

 
JM:
"you have shown..."  - your *_DESCRIPTION_ of comp* and I do not 
throw out my belief to accept yours;



"Mine" is just the usual one, make enough pecise to prove theorems 
from it. But it is really just Descartes, update with the discovery of 
the universal machine.




first of all  I carry a close, but different term for 'machine' 
because IMO numbers are not "god-made" primitives.



I can prove that no theory can prove the existence of the natural 
numbers without postulating them (or equivalent things).






They are the inventions in human speculation (cf: D. Bohm)


Of course I differ here. It is the notion of "humans" which is a 
speculation by the numbers/machines.


Yet above you note that numbers can only be postulated.  Isn't this an 
example of misplacing the concrete?  You point out that arithmetic is 
not only almost all unknown but is, ex hypothesi, unknowable.  ISTM that 
can be read as a reductio against the reality of arithmetic.  So why not 
suppose that the natural numbers are just a model of perceptual 
counting; and their potential infinity is a convenient fiction whereby 
we avoid having to worry about where we might run out of numbers to 
count with?


Brent

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Re: on consciousness levels and ai

[Bruno Marchal]

Hi John,

On 21 Jan 2010, at 22:19, John Mikes wrote:


Dear Bruno,
you took extra pain to describe (in your vocabulary) what I stand  
for (using MY vocabulary).

-
On Thu, Jan 21, 2010 at 2:17 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:

John,

What makes you think that a brain is something material?  I mean  
primitively material.



JM:
I refer to 'matter' as a historically developed figment as used in  
"physical worldview" (I think in parentheses by both of us). Nothing  
(materially) PRIMITIVE, it is an 'explanation' of poorly understood  
and received observations at the various levels of the evolving  
human mindset (~actual enriching epistemic cognitive inventory and  
the pertinent (at that level) application of relational changing  
(=function??).


I think we agree on that.





You know (I hope) that I pretend (at least) to have shown that IF we  
are machine, and thus if our (generalized) brain is a machine, (for  
example: we say "yes" to the doctor) THEN "we" are immaterial, and  
eventually matter itself emerges from the statistical interference  
of computations. The term computation is taken in its original  
mathematical (and unphysical, immaterial) sense (of Church, Turing,  
Post, ...)


Remember that  "comp" is the belief (axiom, theory, hypothesis,  
faith) that we can survive with an artificial digital (a priori  
primitively material for the aristotelian) brain. Then I show that  
if we believe furthemore that matter is primitive, like 99,999%of  
the Aristotelians, we get a contradiction.


JM:
"you have shown..."  - your DESCRIPTION of comp and I do not throw  
out my belief to accept yours;



"Mine" is just the usual one, make enough pecise to prove theorems  
from it. But it is really just Descartes, update with the discovery of  
the universal machine.




first of all  I carry a close, but different term for 'machine'  
because IMO numbers are not "god-made" primitives.



I can prove that no theory can prove the existence of the natural  
numbers without postulating them (or equivalent things).






They are the inventions in human speculation (cf: D. Bohm)


Of course I differ here. It is the notion of "humans" which is a  
speculation by the numbers/machines.






because by simply observing nature you do not get TO numbers.


Indeed. I do expect we need to believe (may be implicitly, or  
unconsciously) in numbers to be able to observe things, or even just  
to develop the very idea of "things".






Arithmetic is the 2nd step in accepting numbers.


For "Aritmetic" = the theory, I agree. But for "Arithmetic" =  
arithmetical truth, as you know, I consider it as independent of  
anything, be it humans, or universes.




I feel your "number = The Primitive" as a vocabulary entry for  
"God", what I have no place for in my worldview either.


I tend to use the term "God" in its old platonic science. It means the  
truth we are searching (not finding!). Then universal machine  
introspection leads to an arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus,  
which makes the analogy closer, and even testable experimentally.







I appreciated your extension of such term into ourselves (and also  
your earlier treatment of theology).


My point can be sum up in one sentence: mechanism is incompatible  
with weak materialism.


Weak materialism is the doctrine that matter exist primitively, or  
that physics, at least in its current naturalist and materialist  
paradigm, is fundamental.


What I say is that you cannot both believe that you are a machine,  
and that matter exists *primitively*.


JM:
the crux of my writings over the past years focussed on 'matter as  
figment' for physicalist views of the conventional (reductionist?)  
sciences. Weak, or strong. Thanks for including a definition of the  
'weak'. Fundmental is 'something we have no access to' except in  
occasional partial revelations - interpreted for acceptance in our  
individually different 'minds'
as "perceived reality" (in our 1st person mini-solipsism). I do not  
differentiate ideational from matterly, I think in 'relations' not  
encoded, closer to mental (?) if there is such a distinction.

The (our) specifications come from us.



Us the humans, or "us" the numbers? An 'enlightened' computationalist  
as a much larger notion of "us" than "humans".




The 'physical view' is a fantastic edifice of balanced (mostly by  
math) equilibria and concepts and is very practical for our  
technology. Not a religion (science, faith-based, materialistic, or  
else).


It may be a religion or theology, but then, if honest, as to be made  
in that way explicitly, for example by postulating a primitively  
material reality. If not it is pseudo-religion, authoritative arguments.






The new "fundamental science", becomes no more than elementary  
arithmetic, or any of its Sigma_1 complete little cousins. By  
defining an observer by a Löbian machine/number, we can recover the  
appearance