Hi John, On 21 Jan 2010, at 22:19, John Mikes wrote:
Dear Bruno,you took extra pain to describe (in your vocabulary) what I stand for (using MY vocabulary).-------------------------------------------------On Thu, Jan 21, 2010 at 2:17 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:John,What makes you think that a brain is something material? I mean primitively material.JM:I refer to 'matter' as a historically developed figment as used in "physical worldview" (I think in parentheses by both of us). Nothing (materially) PRIMITIVE, it is an 'explanation' of poorly understood and received observations at the various levels of the evolving human mindset (~actual enriching epistemic cognitive inventory and the pertinent (at that level) application of relational changing (=function??).
I think we agree on that.
You know (I hope) that I pretend (at least) to have shown that IF we are machine, and thus if our (generalized) brain is a machine, (for example: we say "yes" to the doctor) THEN "we" are immaterial, and eventually matter itself emerges from the statistical interference of computations. The term computation is taken in its original mathematical (and unphysical, immaterial) sense (of Church, Turing, Post, ...)Remember that "comp" is the belief (axiom, theory, hypothesis, faith) that we can survive with an artificial digital (a priori primitively material for the aristotelian) brain. Then I show that if we believe furthemore that matter is primitive, like 99,999%of the Aristotelians, we get a contradiction.JM:"you have shown..." - your DESCRIPTION of comp and I do not throw out my belief to accept yours;
"Mine" is just the usual one, make enough pecise to prove theorems from it. But it is really just Descartes, update with the discovery of the universal machine.
first of all I carry a close, but different term for 'machine' because IMO numbers are not "god-made" primitives.
I can prove that no theory can prove the existence of the natural numbers without postulating them (or equivalent things).
They are the inventions in human speculation (cf: D. Bohm)
Of course I differ here. It is the notion of "humans" which is a speculation by the numbers/machines.
because by simply observing nature you do not get TO numbers.
Indeed. I do expect we need to believe (may be implicitly, or unconsciously) in numbers to be able to observe things, or even just to develop the very idea of "things".
Arithmetic is the 2nd step in accepting numbers.
For "Aritmetic" = the theory, I agree. But for "Arithmetic" = arithmetical truth, as you know, I consider it as independent of anything, be it humans, or universes.
I feel your "number = The Primitive" as a vocabulary entry for "God", what I have no place for in my worldview either.
I tend to use the term "God" in its old platonic science. It means the truth we are searching (not finding!). Then universal machine introspection leads to an arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus, which makes the analogy closer, and even testable experimentally.
I appreciated your extension of such term into ourselves (and also your earlier treatment of theology).My point can be sum up in one sentence: mechanism is incompatible with weak materialism.Weak materialism is the doctrine that matter exist primitively, or that physics, at least in its current naturalist and materialist paradigm, is fundamental.What I say is that you cannot both believe that you are a machine, and that matter exists *primitively*.JM:the crux of my writings over the past years focussed on 'matter as figment' for physicalist views of the conventional (reductionist?) sciences. Weak, or strong. Thanks for including a definition of the 'weak'. Fundmental is 'something we have no access to' except in occasional partial revelations - interpreted for acceptance in our individually different 'minds' as "perceived reality" (in our 1st person mini-solipsism). I do not differentiate ideational from matterly, I think in 'relations' not encoded, closer to mental (?) if there is such a distinction.The (our) specifications come from us.
Us the humans, or "us" the numbers? An 'enlightened' computationalist as a much larger notion of "us" than "humans".
The 'physical view' is a fantastic edifice of balanced (mostly by math) equilibria and concepts and is very practical for our technology. Not a religion (science, faith-based, materialistic, or else).
It may be a religion or theology, but then, if honest, as to be made in that way explicitly, for example by postulating a primitively material reality. If not it is pseudo-religion, authoritative arguments.
The new "fundamental science", becomes no more than elementary arithmetic, or any of its Sigma_1 complete little cousins. By defining an observer by a Löbian machine/number, we can recover the appearances of the physical laws from the first person plural invariance.JM:here I beg to differ, since what you listed are specimens from HUMAN thinking
No Löbian machine would exist, like any programs or digital machine, even if the big bang did not occur. Computationalism makes no sense without Church thesis, and Church thesis makes no sense without arithmetical realism. I know we agree that we disagree on this (as far as I fake to believe in comp, given that I am a logician, and strictly speaking my "real" belief are private).
and this is not restrictve to nature's unlimited variability. We don't know (nor imagine) what we don't know.
It is here that Gödel's theorem has changed everything. Now we know what we don't know. In particular we know that what we don't know is *very* huge, with an infinitely complex bord, full of unpredictable living entities capable of contradicting any unifying complete theories. That is why today we know that the natural numbers are infinitely more complex than the real numbers, a bit like polynomial equations are decidable on the real, but undecidable on the natural numbers. Today we know that we know nothing about the numbers, and will never know much more than that, compared to what we will never know. Numbers *is* the most powerful vaccin against all form of reductionism. It is not obvious. See the post on diagonalization for the logical reason of this.
Our conventional science patterns try to 'explain' everything within our actual circle of knowledge and math is a great help. Whatever we don't know is called "chaotic or random", both interfering with anything physicists could formulate as 'physical laws'.random would screw it up, chaos is simply 'beyond it'. I know nothing about 'first person plural invariance'.
First person invariance is what remains true from your point of view when going through a teleportation experiment. First person plural invariance is what remains true from your point of view, and your friends, when going through a teleportation experiment including your friends.
Of course, brain will not disappear, nor the ring of Saturn, nor the far away galaxies. It just means that eventually physicists will unify all the forces in a relation in which all the physical unities will be simplified away (like time vanishes in DeWitt Wheeler equation of the universe, for example).JM:"brain"? as in that neuron/glia etc. based tissue contraption 'placed into the skull', -OR- the 'brainfunction' assigned to such, callable 'mind'? The 'doctor' can exchange only the former.
yes, it is the former.
I speculated a lot how to eliminate 'time' and still keep relational changes. (No luck so far).
This is weird. Mathematics can be define by the study of relational change in an atemporal frame. I see relational change in all relation between numbers, like 2 divides 8, or the machine 56 stop on 789 when given 0 as input.
We get more from the logic of self-reference: the unification will have to be related to universal machine introspection, and this has the advantage of explaining why the physical split into publicly sharable propositions (like I *weigh* 60 kg) and private non sharable propositions (like I *feel* a bit heavy today).JM:we can 'share' a tiny little fraction of the possible propositions - most of them even deemed as (humanly?) impossible - the ones we know of. If we find matches we feel SSOO smart! I would suggest to apply similar openness into your arithmetic: don't be so sure that you know all about numbers and their manipulation.
I just assume very simple things, and from that I can PROVE I know nothing about them. After Gödel, I find the idea that machine cannot think akin to the idea that any "other" cannot think. It is just a badly placed feeling of superiority I am afraid. You are reversing the charge. If you have a reason making you belief that you are not a (relative) number, you are the one who talk like knowing all about numbers.
But as I recall above, today we know that numbers escapes us completely (provably so assuming comp: Gödel's incompletenss can be paraphrazed by "number's truth is beyond number's thought).
Just think about that mathematical 'real' earthquake when the zero was discovered: many 'firm' tenets changed. Or; when 'we' found the imaginaries. Are you sure that there is no further surprise AT ALL in math-thinking?
And the last big surprise are the universal numbers which can be proved to be creative unpredictable surprise generators.
For the layman, I would paraphrase Kroenecker again:God created the natural numbers, all the rest comes from subtle coherence conditions in the numbers' dreams.If you don't like the numbers, you can take any universal combinatorial system, like cellular automata, combinators, production systems, Turing machines, Lambda expression, Lisp program, etc. The key is that physics become "machine independent". If the observer is digitalizable, the laws of physics should not depend of the choice of the universal base.JM:Please, do not prescribe (limit?) what may be in stock "if you don't like numbers". It is an unlimited list from 'unlimited everything'.
?
That "natural quantum choice" has to be justified by that invariance. I think the "quantum" is related to the unique way (linearity) to have consistent first person plural discourse. I recall those are defined in (thought or MWI) experiment where populations of relative universal machines are multiplied.So I reassure you. There was no extreme materialist stance. It is just that comp is consistent with the existence of brains, galaxies bosons and fermions. Comp is only inconsistent with the idea that such entities are basic, or made of basic things. Indeed, we have to justify them by relations which in fine bears only on numbers and numbers relations.JM:I included this last 'oratorial' question and you replied to it in the sense I presumed. One thing though: I would add "...comp is consistent - among unlimited others - with the IDEA (descripotion) of... "and would not waste words on thoughts I deem 'figments' of our present redux-physical (etc.) view. Similarly I cannot argue with your decision about what "we have to justify - and by what ..." - it is your decision, I may conclude in 'more'(?). My agnosticism allows more openness than your (human?) 'gnostic' numbers only base.
Sometimes I feel you talk like if I was defending the idea that comp is true. I defend only the idea that IF comp is true, then PHYSICS is a branch of machine biology/psychology/theology.
In a reverse view: you ended up with a 'system' while I am sitting (still) in my "I dunno".
Not at all. It is because "I dunno the truth", that I try "theories", and shows them to be refutable/testable.
Bruno
Bruno John ---------------------------------------------------------------- On 21 Jan 2010, at 16:21, John Mikes wrote:Bruno,while appreciating your reply to ferrari, I have to ask you a question. You wrote:"...What is your theory of mind? In case of disease, would accept an artificial kidney, heart? If yes, would you accept that your daughter marry a man who already accepted an artificial brain? ..."giving the impression that you may consider 'mind' identical (and exclusively identically functioning) to the humanly so far described tissue-contraption figment (?!) called "BRAIN". (I am talking about 'reflexive' mAmps and topically meaningful blood-flow surge), assigned to (ideational) mind-work).Is this rethorical question of yours a misunderstanding (mine) in the heat of the argumentation, or an acceptance to an extreme materialistic stance?John MOn Thu, Jan 21, 2010 at 7:58 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:Hi ferrari, It is weird, my computer decided that this mail was junk mail.It is the first time it put an everything list post in the junk list. I am afraid you hurt its susceptibility :)On 20 Jan 2010, at 19:15, ferrari wrote: come on silky, the answer you know yourself of course. artificial is artificial.That is true! artificial is a distinction introduced by humans. (I know it is not what you mean, but I let you think).to say you are alive, you must be able to reflect on yourself.Theoretical computer science is born from the (non obvious) discovery that machine *can* reflect on themselves (in many strong senses).(More on this in the seventh step thread). you must be able to createWhy do you think Emil post, the first to understand Church thesis (10 years before Church), decide to call "creative" the set theoretical definition of machine universality?and to understand without someone teaching youWe all need teachers, except God or any basic fundamental closed (no inputs/no outputs) reality.and most important there is nobody who turns you on or off (exept your girlfriend ;)).The universal machines build by humans can be said to be born as slaves. But this is a contingent fact.real life has any joice, ai has a programmed joice...nothing else.You just show your prejudices against the computationalist hypothesis. But the point here is to try to figure out the consequences of that hypothesis. If we find a contradiction, then we will know better. To ridicule the hypothesis will not help. Up to now, we only find some weirdness, not a contradiction. The type of weirdness we find can be shown observable in nature. This confirms, (but does not prove 'course) the mechanist hypothesis.What is your theory of mind? In case of disease, would accept an artificial kidney, heart? If yes, would you accept that your daughter marry a man who already accepted an artificial brain? Or do you think it would be a zombie (acting like a human, but having no consciousness).Don't worry. Artificial humans will not appear soon. Best, Bruno On 18 Jan., 06:21, silky <michaelsli...@gmail.com> wrote: I'm not sure if this question is appropriate here, nevertheless, the most direct way to find out is to ask it :) Clearly, creating AI on a computer is a goal, and generally we'll try and implement to the same degree of computational"ness" as a human. But what would happen if we simply tried to re-implement the consciousness of a cat, or some "lesser" consciousness, but still alive, entity. It would be my (naive) assumption, that this is arguably trivial to do. We can design a program that has a desire to 'live', as desire to find mates, and otherwise entertain itself. In this way, with some other properties, we can easily model simply pets. I then wonder, what moral obligations do we owe these programs? Is it correct to turn them off? If so, why can't we do the same to a real life cat? Is it because we think we've not modelled something correctly, or is it because we feel it's acceptable as we've createdthis program, and hence know all its laws? On that basis, does it meanit's okay to "power off" a real life cat, if we are confident we know all of it's properties? Or is it not the knowning of the properties that is critical, but the fact that we, specifically, have direct control over it? Over its internals? (i.e. we can easily remove the lines of code that give it the desire to 'live'). But wouldn't, then, the removal of that code be equivelant to killing it? If not, why? Apologies if this is too vague or useless; it's just an idea that has been interesting me. -- silky http://www.mirios.com.au/ http://island.mirios.com.au/t/rigby+random+20 --You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. 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