Re: advice needed for Star Trek talk
On 19 Dec 2010, at 18:29, ronaldheld wrote: Jason I would think normally the implant should work as well. Being Bajorean, could the missing essence be the influence of the Prophets? Data and the EMH should be able to pass the Turing test. Maybe I am missing something. A matter human in a matter universe should function the same as an antimatter human in an antimatter universe, AFAIK How do you know that? Of course it is a consequence of comp + the level is enough high to allow electron to to be substituted by positron, etc. But if comp is false, then you need an explicit hypothesis of invariance for the matter/antimatter change. And from a logical point of view, we can make a comp theory of mind with the matter/antimatter change no more working (using string theory, for example). Comp, or digital mechanism assumes that there is a substitution level, not that we can know what is that level. Indeed, it can be shown that if we are machine, then we cannot know which machine we are, but can infer it with some degree of plausibility from the observable reality. Saying yes to the doctor asks for a leap of faith. Of course we have biological reasons/observations to assume that the level is probably much higher than the internal working of particles and strings. Bruno Ronald On Dec 18, 12:57 pm, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Ronald, I remember that episode. I thought it was quite a departure from the atheistic slant that was usual to star trek. ( For those not familiar with the scene:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ihdI8U9eS4c#t =2m30s) They seemed to suggest in the episode that the operation failed not because of a defect in the artificial brain but because there was something more to the mind that the machine didn't capture, some soul or some essence that couldn't be copied. This is contrary to the frequent use of transporters throughout the series, unless you accept something like biological naturalism (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biological_naturalism), the idea that only biochemistry has the right stuff or can do the right things to create consciousness. I don't think the writers of that episode were well versed in philosophy of mind, so I wouldn't put too much stock in the ideas they promote. For that episode to make sense you either have to accept dualism or biological naturalism (which is almost like a form of dualism). Do you think that Commander Data, whose entire brain is positronic, lacks consciousness? I like the argument Picard gave for Data's sentience:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YWNPeNEvMN4 You mentioned that you had no problem with the idea of a person made from anti-matter particles. What if scientists invented tiny machines that were not atoms but operated all the same, would you accept that you could build a person using these? Taking the idea slightly further, lets say these little faux-atoms were expensive, so scientists decided to model the machines in a computer rather than make them. Simulating a small number of them together they could predict how nano-machines behaved. If the scientists modeled a much larger collection of these atoms, organized in the same way as in a person, do you think any of the complexity is lost? Jason On Sat, Dec 18, 2010 at 8:05 AM, ronaldheld ronaldh...@gmail.com wrote: Bruno and Jason The complexity issue concerns me, perhaps because of the Deep space 9 episode:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Life_Support_(Star_Trek:_Deep_Space_Nine) Ronald On Dec 16, 11:39 am, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: On Wed, Dec 15, 2010 at 7:57 AM, ronaldheld ronaldh...@gmail.com wrote: Jason: I do not think a neutron take more trhan a finite amount of voltage to be able to fire. I do wonder if merely replacing the bio parts by processing hardware, do you lose the part of the complexity of the mind? Np problem with an antimatter man and mind. If the mechanical replacements have the same repertoire and behavior as the biological parts I don't see how the complexity would be lessened. Many people feel lessened to be thought of as a machine, but they probably don't fully appreciate just how complex of a machine the brain is. It has 100 billion neurons (about 1 for each stars in this galaxy) and close to 1 quintillion connections or 1,000,000,000,000,000 (about 1 connection for every cent of US debt). People aren't familiar with man-made machines anywhere near this level of complexity and so it is understandable that one could doubt a machine acting like a human. However, I think this is mainly a prejudice instilled by the types of (comparatively simple) machines we deal with on a daily basis. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To
Re: advice needed for Star Trek talk
On 20 Dec 2010, at 03:15, Jason Resch wrote: On Wed, Dec 15, 2010 at 4:39 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: But then a digital machine cannot see the difference between its brain emulated by a physical device, of by the true existence of the proof of the Sigma_1 relation which exists independently of us in arithmetic. Some will argue that a physical universe is needed, but either they add a magic, non comp-emulable, relation between mind and matter, or if that relation is emulable, they just pick up a special universal number (the physical universe) or introduce an ad hoc physical supervenience thesis. I think multiple realizability applies to mathematical objects as well. Arithmetic may be simple enough to support minds and explain what we see, but should we discount the possibility that more complex mathematical objects exist, or that they are valid substrates for consciousness? I think a computer existing in a mathematical universe performing computations is ultimately still representing mathematical relations. If this is true, does it makes the UDA less testable or formally definable? Once a computer exists in any mathematical structure, it will exist in the UD* (the UD deployment). But only the UD deployment can be defined in a way which does not depend on any choice of mathematical theory to describe it. Now, the measure of consciousness will depend on all mathematical structure, even if the measure bears only on the UD*, given that the measure pertains of first person experiences which are necessarily non computational. That is why the distinction between 3- ontology is 1-epistemology is very important. The true metamathematics of numbers is beyond numbers. The true theology of persons is beyond persons. I agree. But the consequence seems to be a big leap for many. Seems because the results are more ignored than criticized. The problem (for many) is that mechanism is used by materialists, but in fine mechanism is not compatible with materialism. Mechanism makes matter an emerging pattern from the elementary arithmetical truth seen from inside. That makes mechanism a testable hypothesis, and that can already explain many qualitative features of the observable worlds, like indeterminacy, non-locality, non-clonability of matter, and some more quantitative quantum tautologies. I thought non-locality is solved with Everett's interpretation, or do you mean the appearance of non-locality? *Quantum* non locality is solved in Everett, and made into an appearance, indeed. But here I was saying that such an appearance of non-locality is already a theorem of (classical) digital mechanism. Also, I am curious how mechanism accounts for the non-clonability of matter. By UDA, any piece of observable matter is determined in totality only by an infinity of computations. That is why the physical reality is NOT Turing emulable, and not describable by anything finite. To copy exactly any piece of matter, you would need to copy the results of the entire running of the UD (and extract the first person plural perception from it). Only your first person experience can interact with such piece of matter, but your digital mind always makes a digital truncation of that reality. That truncation leads to copiable things, but there are always approximation of the real physical reality, which is really an infinite sum of computations. That's the rough idea. Russell is correct, it is better to attach the mind to all the instantiation in the UD, and then consciousness is a differentiating flux emerging from the number relations. Observation = selection of infinities of universes/computations among an infinity of universes/ computations. A key idea not well understood is the difference between proof/ belief and computation/emulation. I will send a post on this. I look forward to this post. Searle can emulate (compute) the brain of a chinese. But Searle will not understand and live the conscious experience of that chinese (Searle category error, already well analysed by Dennett and Hofstadter in Mind's I). Likewise, PA cannot prove (believe) in its own consistency, but PA can emulate/compute completely the proof by ZF that PA is consistent. There is just no reason that PA begin to believe in the axiom of ZF. PA can emulate ZF, like Searle can emulate the chinese guy, but they keep different beliefs. Here RA = Robinson Arithmetic, PA = Peano Arithmetic, ZF = Zermelo- Fraenkel set theory, ZFC = ZF + axiom of choice, ZF+K = ZF + the axiom of existence of inaccessible cardinals. Emulation/computation is a universal notion, independent of any formal apparatus needed to describe those computations. But belief/proof is highly dependent of the system used. It is not because I can emulate Einstein's brain that I will have Einstein's beliefs. But I will have
is the Brain in a superfluid state? Physics of Consciousness
http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/1012/1012.3765v1.pdf I saw this and thought, Bruno. Ronald -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: advice needed for Star Trek talk
On Mon, Dec 20, 2010 at 6:07 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 20 Dec 2010, at 03:15, Jason Resch wrote: On Wed, Dec 15, 2010 at 4:39 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: But then a digital machine cannot see the difference between its brain emulated by a physical device, of by the true existence of the proof of the Sigma_1 relation which exists independently of us in arithmetic. Some will argue that a physical universe is needed, but either they add a magic, non comp-emulable, relation between mind and matter, or if that relation is emulable, they just pick up a special universal number (the physical universe) or introduce an ad hoc physical supervenience thesis. I think multiple realizability applies to mathematical objects as well. Arithmetic may be simple enough to support minds and explain what we see, but should we discount the possibility that more complex mathematical objects exist, or that they are valid substrates for consciousness? I think a computer existing in a mathematical universe performing computations is ultimately still representing mathematical relations. If this is true, does it makes the UDA less testable or formally definable? Once a computer exists in any mathematical structure, it will exist in the UD* (the UD deployment). But only the UD deployment can be defined in a way which does not depend on any choice of mathematical theory to describe it. Now, the measure of consciousness will depend on all mathematical structure, even if the measure bears only on the UD*, given that the measure pertains of first person experiences which are necessarily non computational. That is why the distinction between 3-ontology is 1-epistemology is very important. The true metamathematics of numbers is beyond numbers. The true theology of persons is beyond persons. But doesn't this change the relative proportions that exist for programs contributing to a mind, and therefore change the likelihood of what one might experience? For example, do you see any reason for a civilization to upload their minds onto computers? Would this not increase the likelihood that their future experiences extend into this new reality of their choosing? Why should we bother to do anything at all if our actions don't change the relative measures of different conscious experiences? I agree. But the consequence seems to be a big leap for many. Seems because the results are more ignored than criticized. The problem (for many) is that mechanism is used by materialists, but in fine mechanism is not compatible with materialism. Mechanism makes matter an emerging pattern from the elementary arithmetical truth seen from inside. That makes mechanism a testable hypothesis, and that can already explain many qualitative features of the observable worlds, like indeterminacy, non-locality, non-clonability of matter, and some more quantitative quantum tautologies. I thought non-locality is solved with Everett's interpretation, or do you mean the appearance of non-locality? *Quantum* non locality is solved in Everett, and made into an appearance, indeed. But here I was saying that such an appearance of non-locality is already a theorem of (classical) digital mechanism. I think I see what you are saying now. Consciousness can leap through space or time when instantiated elsewhere. Also, I am curious how mechanism accounts for the non-clonability of matter. By UDA, any piece of observable matter is determined in totality only by an infinity of computations. That is why the physical reality is NOT Turing emulable, and not describable by anything finite. To copy exactly any piece of matter, you would need to copy the results of the entire running of the UD (and extract the first person plural perception from it). Only your first person experience can interact with such piece of matter, but your digital mind always makes a digital truncation of that reality. That truncation leads to copiable things, but there are always approximation of the real physical reality, which is really an infinite sum of computations. That's the rough idea. Russell is correct, it is better to attach the mind to all the instantiation in the UD, and then consciousness is a differentiating flux emerging from the number relations. Observation = selection of infinities of universes/computations among an infinity of universes/computations. Okay. I had thought you meant conservation of mass/energy, rather than the infinite complexity of matter. A key idea not well understood is the difference between proof/belief and computation/emulation. I will send a post on this. I look forward to this post. Searle can emulate (compute) the brain of a chinese. But Searle will not understand and live the conscious experience of that chinese (Searle category error, already well analysed by Dennett and Hofstadter in Mind's I). I think Searle's mistake
Re: advice needed for Star Trek talk
On 12/20/2010 3:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 20 Dec 2010, at 03:15, Jason Resch wrote: On Wed, Dec 15, 2010 at 4:39 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: But then a digital machine cannot see the difference between its brain emulated by a physical device, of by the true existence of the proof of the Sigma_1 relation which exists independently of us in arithmetic. Some will argue that a physical universe is needed, but either they add a magic, non comp-emulable, relation between mind and matter, or if that relation is emulable, they just pick up a special universal number (the physical universe) or introduce an ad hoc physical supervenience thesis. I think multiple realizability applies to mathematical objects as well. Arithmetic may be simple enough to support minds and explain what we see, but should we discount the possibility that more complex mathematical objects exist, or that they are valid substrates for consciousness? I think a computer existing in a mathematical universe performing computations is ultimately still representing mathematical relations. If this is true, does it makes the UDA less testable or formally definable? Once a computer exists in any mathematical structure, it will exist in the UD* (the UD deployment). But only the UD deployment can be defined in a way which does not depend on any choice of mathematical theory to describe it. Now, the measure of consciousness will depend on all mathematical structure, even if the measure bears only on the UD*, given that the measure pertains of first person experiences which are necessarily non computational. That is why the distinction between 3-ontology is 1-epistemology is very important. The true metamathematics of numbers is beyond numbers. The true theology of persons is beyond persons. I agree. But the consequence seems to be a big leap for many. Seems because the results are more ignored than criticized. The problem (for many) is that mechanism is used by materialists, but in fine mechanism is not compatible with materialism. Mechanism makes matter an emerging pattern from the elementary arithmetical truth seen from inside. That makes mechanism a testable hypothesis, and that can already explain many qualitative features of the observable worlds, like indeterminacy, non-locality, non-clonability of matter, and some more quantitative quantum tautologies. I thought non-locality is solved with Everett's interpretation, or do you mean the appearance of non-locality? *Quantum* non locality is solved in Everett, and made into an appearance, indeed. But here I was saying that such an appearance of non-locality is already a theorem of (classical) digital mechanism. Also, I am curious how mechanism accounts for the non-clonability of matter. By UDA, any piece of observable matter is determined in totality only by an infinity of computations. That is why the physical reality is NOT Turing emulable, and not describable by anything finite. To copy exactly any piece of matter, you would need to copy the results of the entire running of the UD (and extract the first person plural perception from it). Only your first person experience can interact with such piece of matter, but your digital mind always makes a digital truncation of that reality. That truncation leads to copiable things, but there are always approximation of the real physical reality, which is really an infinite sum of computations. That's the rough idea. Russell is correct, it is better to attach the mind to all the instantiation in the UD, and then consciousness is a differentiating flux emerging from the number relations. Observation = selection of infinities of universes/computations among an infinity of universes/computations. A key idea not well understood is the difference between proof/belief and computation/emulation. I will send a post on this. I look forward to this post. Searle can emulate (compute) the brain of a chinese. But Searle will not understand and live the conscious experience of that chinese (Searle category error, already well analysed by Dennett and Hofstadter in Mind's I). Likewise, PA cannot prove (believe) in its own consistency, but PA can emulate/compute completely the proof by ZF that PA is consistent. There is just no reason that PA begin to believe in the axiom of ZF. PA can emulate ZF, like Searle can emulate the chinese guy, but they keep different beliefs. Here RA = Robinson Arithmetic, PA = Peano Arithmetic, ZF = Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, ZFC = ZF + axiom of choice, ZF+K = ZF + the axiom of existence of inaccessible cardinals. Emulation/computation is a universal notion, independent of any formal apparatus needed to describe those computations. But belief/proof is highly dependent of the system used. It is not because I can emulate
