On Mon, Dec 20, 2010 at 6:07 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> On 20 Dec 2010, at 03:15, Jason Resch wrote:
> On Wed, Dec 15, 2010 at 4:39 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>> But then a digital machine cannot see the difference between its brain
>> emulated by a physical device, of by the true existence of the proof of the
>> Sigma_1 relation which exists independently of us in arithmetic. Some will
>> argue that a physical universe is needed, but either they add a magic, non
>> comp-emulable, relation between mind and matter, or if that relation is
>> emulable, they just pick up a special universal number (the physical
>> universe) or introduce an ad hoc physical supervenience thesis.
> I think multiple realizability applies to mathematical objects as well.
>  Arithmetic may be simple enough to support minds and explain what we see,
> but should we discount the possibility that more complex mathematical
> objects exist, or that they are valid substrates for consciousness?  I think
> a computer existing in a mathematical universe performing computations is
> ultimately still representing mathematical relations.  If this is true, does
> it makes the UDA less testable or formally definable?
> Once a computer exists in any mathematical structure, it will exist in the
> UD* (the UD deployment). But only the UD deployment can be defined in a way
> which does not depend on any choice of mathematical theory to describe it.
> Now, the measure of consciousness will depend on all mathematical structure,
> even if the measure bears only on the UD*, given that the measure pertains
> of first person experiences which are necessarily non computational. That is
> why the distinction between 3-ontology is 1-epistemology is very important.
> The true metamathematics of numbers is beyond numbers. The true theology of
> persons is beyond persons.
But doesn't this change the relative proportions that exist for programs
contributing to a mind, and therefore change the likelihood of what one
might experience?  For example, do you see any reason for a civilization to
upload their minds onto computers?  Would this not increase
the likelihood that their future experiences extend into this new reality of
their choosing?  Why should we bother to do anything at all if our actions
don't change the relative measures of different conscious experiences?

>> I agree. But the consequence seems to be a big leap for many. "Seems"
>> because the results are more ignored than criticized.
>> The problem (for many) is that mechanism is used by materialists, but in
>> fine mechanism is not compatible with materialism. Mechanism makes matter an
>> emerging pattern from the elementary arithmetical truth seen from inside.
>> That makes mechanism a testable hypothesis, and that can already explain
>> many qualitative features of the observable worlds, like indeterminacy,
>> non-locality, non-clonability of matter, and some more quantitative quantum
>> tautologies.
> I thought non-locality is solved with Everett's interpretation, or do you
> mean the appearance of non-locality?
> *Quantum* non locality is solved in Everett, and made into an appearance,
> indeed. But here I was saying that such an appearance of non-locality is
> already a theorem of (classical) digital mechanism.
I think I see what you are saying now.  Consciousness can leap through space
or time when instantiated elsewhere.

> Also, I am curious how mechanism accounts for the non-clonability of
> matter.
> By UDA, any piece of observable matter is determined in totality only by an
> infinity of computations. That is why the physical reality is NOT Turing
> emulable, and not describable by anything finite. To copy exactly any piece
> of matter, you would need to copy the results of the entire running of the
> UD (and extract the first person plural perception from it). Only your first
> person experience can interact with such piece of matter, but your digital
> mind always makes a digital truncation of that reality. That truncation
> leads to copiable things, but there are always approximation of the "real
> physical reality", which is really an infinite sum of computations. That's
> the rough idea.
> Russell is correct, it is better to attach the mind to all the
> instantiation in the UD, and then consciousness is a differentiating flux
> emerging from the number relations. Observation = selection of infinities of
> universes/computations among an infinity of universes/computations.
Okay.  I had thought you meant conservation of mass/energy, rather than the
infinite complexity of matter.

>> A key idea not well understood is the difference between proof/belief and
>> computation/emulation. I will send a post on this.
> I look forward to this post.
> Searle can emulate (compute) the brain of a chinese. But Searle will not
> understand and live the conscious experience of that chinese (Searle
> category error, already well analysed by Dennett and Hofstadter in Mind's
> I).

I think Searle's mistake (perhaps among many) is that he substitutes himself
in the place of the computer's processor, but this is like saying the
physics understands Chinese (because the laws of physics are processing all
the interactions in the Chinese speaker's brain).

> Likewise, PA cannot prove (believe) in its own consistency, but PA can
> emulate/compute completely the proof by ZF that PA is consistent. There is
> just no reason that PA begin to believe in the axiom of ZF. PA can emulate
> ZF, like Searle can emulate the chinese guy, but they keep different
> beliefs.
> Here RA = Robinson Arithmetic, PA = Peano Arithmetic, ZF = Zermelo-Fraenkel
> set theory, ZFC = ZF + axiom of choice, ZF+K = ZF + the axiom of existence
> of inaccessible cardinals.
> Emulation/computation is a universal notion, independent of any formal
> apparatus needed to describe those computations. But belief/proof is highly
> dependent of the system used. It is not because I can emulate Einstein's
> brain that "I" will have Einstein's beliefs. But I will have Einstein
> computability power. And also, by emulating Einstein's brain, I can have a
> genuine conversation with Einstein (not with myself).
> Once universal, all machine can emulate any other universal machine, yet
> they will have different and non equivalent provability abilities, and
> believability abilities.
> It is useful to compare (<) theories in term of the portion of arithmetical
> truth that they can prove.
> RA < PA < ZF = ZFC < ZF+K
> Note that ZF and ZFC have different beliefs on sets, but the same beliefs
> on numbers!
> ZF+K knows much more about numbers than all the other theories.
> RA is the only one not rich enough (in provability) to be Löbian, but PA,
> ZF, ZFC, ZF+K, are Lobian numbers, and RA can emulate all of them. The key
> point is that RA cannot believe in general what they say. RA cannot prove
> its own consistency, but PA can already prove that RA is consistent, and RA
> *can* prove that PA can prove that RA is consistent. But that does not help
> RA, except if it feels alone and want to talk with someone richer than
> itself.
> Only computation has such a remarkable invariance for change of systems,
> and that is a consequence of Church thesis. There is no such invariance for
> provability power. All theories (Löbian numbers) grasp only a tiny part of
> the Arithmetical truth, and all grasp a different parts (except ZF and ZFC).
> But they all compute the same computable functions.
It's not clear to me the role provability plays.  Is the simple access to
information within the state of a mind not sufficient?

> That is why, also, ontologically, it is absolutely undecidable if there is
> anything more than sigma_1 (turing accessible) arithmetical truth. All the
> other arithmetical truth can be believed or not by such or such reasoner.
> The UD emulate (like RA proves) all the (conscious) beliefs of all machines,
> including ZF, ZF+K, etc. Consciousness is related to those
> computation/emulation of beliefs, not to the computations themselves. In a
> sense, a machine or a brain is never conscious: a relative machine, or a
> relative brain, just correlate consciousness experience relatively to
> plausible computation.
> > No. The running of a program does NOT create a mind. It just makes it
> possible for a mind to manifest itself relatively to you.
> > The mind is already related to the platonic relations between the numbers
> which exist in an infinity of exemplars in Platonia.
> If a single program does not create a mind, how does an infinite number of
> programs in the UDA create one?  Perhaps I am unclear what you mean by mind.
> Russell has given the correct answer. Here by mind I mean the conscious
> first person mind. By UDA-8 (MGA), consciousness is not attached to the
> physical running of a computer, but is attached to the logical
> number-theoretical relations describing that computation ... and all similar
> (with respect to the relevant levels) computations which exist in Sigma_1
> (computational) arithmetical truth (and which might bear on beliefs and
> proofs which extends far beyond the computable).
> Of course this is a delicate point. The notion of "a single program" is
> ambiguous. If it is a concrete physical instantiation of a program, then
> with digital mechanism, but also already quantum mechanism, it is already
> unclear if we speak about real infinities of indistinguishable
> histories/computations or of something unique (by taking some quotient of
> some equivalence relation).
> Consciousness is never created. Consciousness comes from the fact that
> universal numbers can develop true (relative) beliefs, and that such true
> beliefs appears to be stable with respect of infinities of shared
> computational histories. From our point of view this consciousness *seems*
> to be related to our bodies, but this is a deformation-from-inside. Programs
> only makes possible for some *content* of consciousness to be correlated
> with those histories, and with the content of consciousness as lived by
> entities with which we share computational histories. It is, and has to be,
> counterintuitive. From "outside arithmetical truth" physical realities are
> "just" the intersubjective correlation of infinities of universal numbers
> beliefs. That is why I can understand very well Rex's first person feeling
> that consciousness is fundamental or basic. But numbers explains that
> feeling can be justified by the numbers relations, and have to, if we accept
> the existence of the substitution level.
> Hope this helps.
> Bruno
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>  --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.
> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com<everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com>
> .
> For more options, visit this group at
> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
For more options, visit this group at 

Reply via email to