Physical Church-Turing thesis and QM
http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/1102/1102.1612v1.pdf Any comments? Ronald -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Physical Church-Turing thesis and QM
Hi Ronald, -Original Message- From: ronaldheld Sent: Wednesday, February 09, 2011 7:15 AM To: Everything List Subject: Physical Church-Turing thesis and QM http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/1102/1102.1612v1.pdf Any comments? Ronald *** A very cool paper! One thing I noticed is that one could use this to examine the difficulties that manifest when trying to reconcile GR with QM. For one thing, any (non-Ricci?) curvature would disrupt the homogeneity of space and time that are required of the PCTT. Accelerations are known to induce phase shifts in the wave functions that can easily break quiescence... The problem of Locality is also a difficulty. Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?
On Feb 8, 6:08 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Peter, you say that you are a formalist. I gave you the definition of realism which works for the understanding of the reasoning. It is the acceptation of (P v ~P) when P is intended on the domain of the natural numbers. I can accept that as a *formal* rule that doens't mean anything ontologically, just like I can accept that some but not all Snarks are Boojums. You cannot come to ontological conclusions just by writing down an axiom. Worse, the decision to use the Law of the Exclude Middle or not (it can of course be dropped without incurring a contradiction) is typically motivated by ontological considerations. We think LEM applies to past events because we think they either happened or they didn't. We doubt that it applies to future events. That's all. By standard use of numbers I mean the element (N, +, *) as taught by mathematicians. I show that comp makes *some* theology as part of the discourse of machine. This should not give any trouble, *especially* to a formalist. The idea that a hypothetical machine would give certain hypothetical responses wouldn't, but of course, you are saying more than that: you are saying that *I* am an immaterial machine. And that's an ontological claim which cannot be supported by a merely formal premise. A mathematical anti-realist is an ambiguous expression. How could them believe in Church thesis which is equivalent with the assertion that a universal number exist in arithmetic. In the way that I have explained to you a thousand times: the assertion that certain entities exist is just taken as part of the game. If it is formal game playing, just play the game. If I just play the game I am never going to conclude that I *am* a dreaming machine, any more than I am going to conclude I am Supermario The theory is enough precise to allow that. Do you have a definition of formalism which does not rely on arithmetical realism. Yes: formalism is the claim that no mathematical entities actually exist, that mathematics is just the exploration of the consequences of various rules and axioms, and that mathematical truth is contextual to the system employed and has no wider significance. AR is the weakest assumption on which all mathematician agree (except ulrafinitist). Formalists think it is true as well,,,but it is not a truth about anything outside the game. By works done by Glivenko, Gödel and Heyting we know that intuitionist arithmetic (typically anti- realist) and classical arithmetic are essentially identical, and process the same ontology. You mean the same model. Ontology cannot be proven by mathematical argument, it is meta-mathematical and metaphysical. Real math (and formal) differences appears only in analysis and set theory (on which I tend to be not realist, although the work is neutral on this). Formalists do not differ on which parts of maths are true and false, they differ on its epistemology and ontology. Could you define *formally* 'real existence'? There is no reason I should, and at least one reason I shouldn't: I have stated that real existence cannot be established by formal arguments. Formalists do not think everything is merely formal game playing, they think maths is *as opposed to* other things which are not. Could you define formally 'primitively material', so that we can continue to agree or disagree on something. Or you might try to get my point, after all. It only shows the difficulty with such notions. All philosophical problems are difficult, and that is no excuse for pretending that there is nothing to a notion such a real existence Obviously, as Chalmers rightly insists, no formal characterization of consciousness can be given. But comp makes it possible to retrieve formality as the meta- level. That's the S4Grz1 formalism. It makes its possible to work on a purely formal account of what machine cannot formalize, and it shows that machine can, like us, build meta-formal account of those things. Once and for all, keep it mind that when I utter that a number exist, I am just like PA proving a sentence of the form ExP(x), and everything will flow easily (well with some effort). Nope. The claim that I am, ontologically, an immaterial dreaming machine does not follow from PA. Adding unnecessary metaphysics just add noise. The conclusion is metaphysical, therefore the argument must be or the conclusion is a non-sequitur. Therefore metaphysics is a necessity for you. Study the proof, and criticize it. You might be adding an interpretative layer which exists only in your mind, I'm afraid. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more
Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?
On Feb 8, 6:17 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 07 Feb 2011, at 23:58, 1Z wrote: On Feb 7, 6:29 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Peter, Everything is fine. You should understand the reasoning by using only the formal definition of arithmetical realism, You reasoning *cannot* be both valid and ontologically neutral because it has ontological conclusions. Wrong. Wrong about what? .It is enough it has ontological premise. .which is that a machine is arithmetical realist if she believes in the axiom of elementary arithmetic *with* (the realist part) the principle of the third excluded middle (allowing non constructive reasoning, as usual). What machine? Show me one! See my papers. That is just what I am criticising. You need the ontological premise that mathematical entities have real existence, and it is a separate premise from comp. That is my response to your writings. Read a book on logic and computability. Read a book on philosophy, on the limitations of apriori reasoning, on the contentious nature of mathematical ontology. Boolos and Jeffrey, or Mendelson, or the Dover book by Martin Davis are excellent. It is a traditional exercise to define those machine in arithmetic. I have no doubt, but you don't get real minds and universes out of hypothetical machines. Recently Brent Meeker sent an excellent reference by Calude illustrating how PA can prove the existence of universal machine (or number). Oh good griefit can only prove the *mathematical* existence. If mathematical existence is not real existence, I am not an immaterial machine. I will search it. And I encourage you to interpret all this, including my thesis in purely formal term. AUDA shows, notably, that this is possible. You might also read the book by Judson Webb, which has been recently republished and which shows the positive impact of Gödel on both formalism and mechanism. Actually Webb argues that formalism and mechanism are basically the same philosophy, or the same type of philosophy. As ever, it is not the mechanisability aspect of formalism which is at issue; what is at is the side of formalism that says maths is ontologically non-commital game playing. And I do follow him on that. A machine is before all a form. A digital machine is a form which can be described locally (relatively to a universal number) by a number. Webb call the kind of AR used here: finitism. And with AUDA you get a conversation with a machine, and a quasi correct explanation why she is not a machine? How could a formalist not love that Gödel is not just the discovery of the provability limitations of formalisms and machines, Godel has no impact on game playing formalism. ? Because GPF is about ontology, not mechanisability. (Well the more usual critic in our context is that Gödel has *only* impact on game playing formalism). I was just saying that Gödel's second incompleteness theorem is a theorem in Peano arithmetic, about Peano arithmetic. Or by Peano Arithmetic, about Peano arithmetic. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?
1Z, How do you define existence? For something to exist must it be something you can see and feel, or would you say it has to be something that can be studied objectively? Would you agree that for something to have objective properties, it must exist? Clearly there are things humans have discovered which we can't see or feel, but we think they exist because we see their effects: wind, dark matter, black holes, etc. Or theories suggest their existence: extra-solar life, strings, and so on. I would argue that mathematical objects exist because this universe's existence does not make sense in isolation. Imagine you were in a windowless bathroom. Should you doubt the existence of the rest of the world because you cannot see it, or would there be clues to support the existence of things outside that room? The finely tuned physical constants, laws, dimensions, etc. of this universe suggest that this universe is one of many, perhaps one among all possible structures. Just as we see the affects of wind and know it exists, one can look at the fine tuning of this universe and believe in the existence of all possible structures. Every such structure is a mathematical entity. If you doubt the existence of mathematical objects, how do you explain fine tuning? ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fine-tuned_Universe ) Jason On Mon, Feb 7, 2011 at 4:55 PM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: On Feb 7, 4:06 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 06 Feb 2011, at 22:20, 1Z wrote: On Feb 5, 7:43 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Computationalism needs Church thesis which needs AR (Arithmetical Realism). Nope, just AT (arithmetic truth). Actually, comp needs only, for the ontology, the quite tiny complete Sigma_1 truth. As I have stated many times, it doesn;t matter in the least how many or few immaterial objects you attribute existence to. It's like saying pixies exist, but only a few What? It is always better to make a theory precise. The theory that some precise number of pixies exist is just as wrong as the theory that some indeterminate number exists. Mathematical anti realists hold that *no* mathematical objects exist. And they still accept CT and all the rest. Please don't put metaphysics where there is only religion Believing in what is not proven is religion. I can argue for anti realism. I argue in favor of nothing. You argue that some subset of mathematics has immaterial existence. That's philosophy. You force me to be explicit on this; I do science. I am a logician, and I show that rational agent believing in comp believe that ... etc. I don't know about the truth. (saying yes to the admittedly betting doctor). Saying yes to the doctor will not guarantee your immaterial existence if there is no immaterial existence. But there is immaterial existence. To be fair, that's an unargued claim, not an argument. I recall you that I say in the ontological context that something exist if Ex (bla-bla-bla x) is true in the standard model of arithmetic. Utterly wrong. In the *mathematical* context something exists if there is a true backwards-E statement asserting it, but the whole point of anti realism is that that is merely game playing and does NOT imply RITSIAR ontological existence. I use the standard meaning of existence of numbers, etc. As I have told you many times, there is no standard meaning. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_mathematics AR/Platonism is a separate assumption to yes Dr. I have drop out AR. You need AR (in which everyone believes except the ultrafinitists and the bad faith philosophers) to understand the term digital used by the doctor. No you don't. Mathematical anti realists can understand digital computer And with comp, it is math, indeed, even (full, above Sigma_1 arithmetic. Arithmetical realism is what you need to apply the excluded middle in computer science and in arithmetic. The excluded middle is a much of a formal rule as anthing else. Formalists can apply it, so it is compatible with anti realism. The theory admits a formal study. You don't act like a formalist at all. The term Formalism makes not an atom of sense without arithmetical realism. Formalism is a major variety kind of anti realism. In philosophy arithmetical realism is the weaker of all possible realism, except again for the ultrafinitists. The weakest kind is NONE WHATSOEVERno pixies. Zip. Nada. If you are formalist and anti realist on the numbers you are in contradiction, What contradiction? or, once and for all, just replace numbers by the following formal expression 0, s(0), s(s(0)), etc. + the axioms I just sent to Andrew, etc. Yep. Formalism says you have rules, and you manipulate them and certain things seem to move around a change, and we call those sets and numbersand they
Re: The relative point of view
On 08 Feb 2011, at 21:08, Brent Meeker wrote: On 2/8/2011 8:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 07 Feb 2011, at 20:52, Andrew Soltau wrote: (Is the 'intensional' referred to here the 'attach' you used in another email?) Not really, although it is related. Intensional refers to the fact that if you define a provable(x) by beweisbar(x) and x', where x' denote the proposition which has x as Gôdel number, you define a probability predicate, You mean provability predicate don't you? Yes I mean provability. It is unfortunate that the v and b are so close on my keyboard. I also apologies for my many spelling mistakes and my style which can go very bad when I have to answer many posts, at time where time is a bit missing ... Given that you are defining 8 basic points of view in the abstract, applied to intensional variants of the current provability predicate of the machine with or without some oracle, it sounds a bit, well, abstract. Could you be a bit more specific? I try to be more specific in sane04. May be we should start from that. Or search hypostasis or hypostases in the archive, or guardian angel, etc. Read the book by Smullyan, and Boolos 1979 (simpler than Boolos 1993). Read perhaps the Theaetetus by Plato. In short you can say that I model belief or opinion by formal probability (Bp). You mean formal provability? Mind your ps and vs. :-) You mean my bs and vs, I guess :-) Yes, again I meant formal provability. That error is annoying because, if Bp, is a shorthand for provability(p), Bp Dp plays the role of a formal probability (yes, with a b), indeed probability 1, or maximal credibility. I'm really sorry. I define then knowledge, following Theaetetus by the true opinion (Bp p), You've never said what your answer is to Gettier's example. I did it, the saturday 29 Jan 2011, according to my computer. Let me paste it again. It is probably too short. I have a full chapter on this in Conscience et Mécanisme. Tell me if you see the point, or if I should make it clearer: quote: Apes fetus can dream climbing trees but they do that with ancestors climbing the most probable trees of their most probable neighborhoods since a long period. With classical mechanism, I would say, that to know is to believe p when luckily p is true, So what is your response to Gettier's problem? [Brent Meeker] The answer is that, with comp, we cannot distinguish reality from dream. We can know that we are dreaming (sometimes), but we cannot ever know for sure in a public way that we are awaken. Another fact related to this is that knowledge, consciousness and truth are not machine-definable. If we are machine, we can use those notion in theoretical context only. In practice, as real life illustrates very often, we never know as such that we know. We belief we know, until we know better. The SAGrz logics is a logical tour de force. Here Gödel's theorem gives sense to Theaetetus. S4Grz, the logic of (Bp p) formalizes a notion which is not even nameable by the machine, unless she postulates comp and relies explicitly on that postulate, or better, relies on the study of a simpler than herself machine. In science, or in public, we never know, as such. Knowing is a pure first person notion. But this does not mean that we cannot make 3- theory on such pure first person notion, as S4Grz illustrates particularly well. Same remarks for feelings (Bp Dt p). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?
On 09 Feb 2011, at 15:20, 1Z wrote: On Feb 8, 6:08 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Peter, you say that you are a formalist. I gave you the definition of realism which works for the understanding of the reasoning. It is the acceptation of (P v ~P) when P is intended on the domain of the natural numbers. I can accept that as a *formal* rule that doens't mean anything ontologically, just like I can accept that some but not all Snarks are Boojums. Yes, please, do that. You cannot come to ontological conclusions just by writing down an axiom. I don't do that. But I disagree with your point. here is a counterexample: Theory: God and Mary ontologically exist. Conclusion: Mary ontologically exist. Worse, the decision to use the Law of the Exclude Middle or not (it can of course be dropped without incurring a contradiction) is typically motivated by ontological considerations. We think LEM applies to past events because we think they either happened or they didn't. We doubt that it applies to future events. I use LEM only in arithmetic. That's all. By standard use of numbers I mean the element (N, +, *) as taught by mathematicians. I show that comp makes *some* theology as part of the discourse of machine. This should not give any trouble, *especially* to a formalist. The idea that a hypothetical machine would give certain hypothetical responses wouldn't, but of course, you are saying more than that: you are saying that *I* am an immaterial machine. And that's an ontological claim which cannot be supported by a merely formal premise. It is not more ontological that the premise that I could survive with a digital brain. The rest is reasoning. It is up to you to find the mistake, if you believe there is one. Please study the reasoning, because it makes clear what is used and meant in the hypotheses. The point is mainly epistemological, although we might argue on this too. The point is that physics is a branch of arithmetic, and that it can be extracted (formally) from computability theory + the self- reference logic (provability theory). A mathematical anti-realist is an ambiguous expression. How could them believe in Church thesis which is equivalent with the assertion that a universal number exist in arithmetic. In the way that I have explained to you a thousand times: the assertion that certain entities exist is just taken as part of the game. No. You insist that there is primary matter. I am neutral on this. But I do show we don't need that hypothesis to undersatnd why the universal numbers develop beliefs and discourse on primary matters and physical laws. If it is formal game playing, just play the game. If I just play the game I am never going to conclude that I *am* a dreaming machine, any more than I am going to conclude I am Supermario You forget the yes doctor part of comp, which plays a crucial role in the reasoning. I don't want to argue if it is ontological or not. That is not needed to understand that physics is no more the fundamental science once comp is assumed. The theory is enough precise to allow that. Do you have a definition of formalism which does not rely on arithmetical realism. Yes: formalism is the claim that no mathematical entities actually exist, Well, that is you own physicalist definition. A general formalist believes the same for any theory, and never assume things like primary matter. You are not a formalist in math, but a conventionalist. But then I think you have missed the failure of formalism and logicism in math due to incompleteness. that mathematics is just the exploration of the consequences of various rules and axioms, and that mathematical truth is contextual to the system employed and has no wider significance. That has been refuted by Gödel a long time ago, and is not what mathematician call formalism, after Gödel. AR is the weakest assumption on which all mathematician agree (except ulrafinitist). Formalists think it is true as well,,,but it is not a truth about anything outside the game. Then stay in the game. Of course, if you ever say yes to the digital doctor, then the consequence are no more purely formal. By works done by Glivenko, Gödel and Heyting we know that intuitionist arithmetic (typically anti- realist) and classical arithmetic are essentially identical, and process the same ontology. You mean the same model. Ontology cannot be proven by mathematical argument, it is meta-mathematical and metaphysical. Yes the same model. It is OK to see it that way. Real math (and formal) differences appears only in analysis and set theory (on which I tend to be not realist, although the work is neutral on this). Formalists do not differ on which parts of maths are true and false, they differ on its epistemology and ontology. OK. No problem. Could you define *formally* 'real existence'? There is no
Re: Physical Church-Turing thesis and QM
I will take a look asap. At first sight the authors do not use the David Deutsch physical Church-Turing thesis. OK? Bruno On 09 Feb 2011, at 13:15, ronaldheld wrote: http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/1102/1102.1612v1.pdf Any comments? Ronald -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Multisolipsism
On 08 Feb 2011, at 21:28, Brent Meeker wrote: On 2/8/2011 9:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Answer precisely my question in my last post. I recall it: Could you explain to me how you predict what you will see (qualia) when you abandon an apple free in the air, in a big universe with a running UD in it? How do you predict your experience? If you agree with step 1-6, you don't have much choice, and you will understand the reversal. ?? Obviously I would predict seeing the apple fall. This is a consequence of my inference from past experience and even my evolutoinary ancestry. Even babies expect unsupported objects to fall. Do you claim you can predict that apples should be seen to fall from comp+arithimetic alone? Not really. My claim is far more modest, albeit radical. I claim that IF comp is true THEN we HAVE TO derive from comp +arithmetic alone any physics allowing the apple to get its usual falling behavior. More precisely, if you have no objection with UDA steps 1-6, then to predict the behavior of the apple in UDA-Step 7, you have to consider all the computations made by the UD, and going through you current first person mental state, (of seeing your hand with the apple), and take into account the first person indeterminacy on all those computations. If this contradicts the usual prediction then comp is false. Comp might seem to contradict the usual prediction, due to the many aberrant dreams, the white noise, the white rabbits ..., but the space of computations is highly structured, even more so when we take into account the many possible person views, so that we just cannot conclude that the usual predictions refute comp. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?
On Feb 9, 3:57 pm, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: 1Z, How do you define existence? 1. I am real 2. Anything I can interact with is real 3. Anything that provides a good explanation of 12 is probably real For something to exist must it be something you can see and feel, or would you say it has to be something that can be studied objectively? Would you agree that for something to have objective properties, it must exist? Clearly there are things humans have discovered which we can't see or feel, but we think they exist because we see their effects: wind, dark matter, black holes, etc. Or theories suggest their existence: extra-solar life, strings, and so on. Sure. But I don't need to posit numbers, etc, as having any kind of causal or even nomological significance. They aren't required by (3). (And, contra the indispensability argument, numbers aren't *posited* by science, just used). I would argue that mathematical objects exist because this universe's existence does not make sense in isolation. Imagine you were in a windowless bathroom. Should you doubt the existence of the rest of the world because you cannot see it, or would there be clues to support the existence of things outside that room? The finely tuned physical constants, laws, dimensions, etc. of this universe suggest that this universe is one of many, perhaps one among all possible structures. Just as we see the affects of wind and know it exists, one can look at the fine tuning of this universe and believe in the existence of all possible structures. Every such structure is a mathematical entity. If you doubt the existence of mathematical objects, how do you explain fine tuning? (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fine-tuned_Universe) Jason On Mon, Feb 7, 2011 at 4:55 PM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: On Feb 7, 4:06 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 06 Feb 2011, at 22:20, 1Z wrote: On Feb 5, 7:43 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Computationalism needs Church thesis which needs AR (Arithmetical Realism). Nope, just AT (arithmetic truth). Actually, comp needs only, for the ontology, the quite tiny complete Sigma_1 truth. As I have stated many times, it doesn;t matter in the least how many or few immaterial objects you attribute existence to. It's like saying pixies exist, but only a few What? It is always better to make a theory precise. The theory that some precise number of pixies exist is just as wrong as the theory that some indeterminate number exists. Mathematical anti realists hold that *no* mathematical objects exist. And they still accept CT and all the rest. Please don't put metaphysics where there is only religion Believing in what is not proven is religion. I can argue for anti realism. I argue in favor of nothing. You argue that some subset of mathematics has immaterial existence. That's philosophy. You force me to be explicit on this; I do science. I am a logician, and I show that rational agent believing in comp believe that ... etc. I don't know about the truth. (saying yes to the admittedly betting doctor). Saying yes to the doctor will not guarantee your immaterial existence if there is no immaterial existence. But there is immaterial existence. To be fair, that's an unargued claim, not an argument. I recall you that I say in the ontological context that something exist if Ex (bla-bla-bla x) is true in the standard model of arithmetic. Utterly wrong. In the *mathematical* context something exists if there is a true backwards-E statement asserting it, but the whole point of anti realism is that that is merely game playing and does NOT imply RITSIAR ontological existence. I use the standard meaning of existence of numbers, etc. As I have told you many times, there is no standard meaning. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_mathematics AR/Platonism is a separate assumption to yes Dr. I have drop out AR. You need AR (in which everyone believes except the ultrafinitists and the bad faith philosophers) to understand the term digital used by the doctor. No you don't. Mathematical anti realists can understand digital computer And with comp, it is math, indeed, even (full, above Sigma_1 arithmetic. Arithmetical realism is what you need to apply the excluded middle in computer science and in arithmetic. The excluded middle is a much of a formal rule as anthing else. Formalists can apply it, so it is compatible with anti realism. The theory admits a formal study. You don't act like a formalist at all. The term Formalism makes not an atom of sense without arithmetical realism. Formalism is a major variety kind of anti realism. In philosophy arithmetical realism is the weaker of all possible realism, except again for the ultrafinitists. The
Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?
On Feb 9, 4:35 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 09 Feb 2011, at 15:20, 1Z wrote: On Feb 8, 6:08 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Peter, you say that you are a formalist. I gave you the definition of realism which works for the understanding of the reasoning. It is the acceptation of (P v ~P) when P is intended on the domain of the natural numbers. I can accept that as a *formal* rule that doens't mean anything ontologically, just like I can accept that some but not all Snarks are Boojums. Yes, please, do that. I already am You cannot come to ontological conclusions just by writing down an axiom. I don't do that. But I disagree with your point. here is a counterexample: Theory: God and Mary ontologically exist. Conclusion: Mary ontologically exist. Sigh...You cannot come to ontological conclusions just by writing down a logical or mathematical axiom. Worse, the decision to use the Law of the Exclude Middle or not (it can of course be dropped without incurring a contradiction) is typically motivated by ontological considerations. We think LEM applies to past events because we think they either happened or they didn't. We doubt that it applies to future events. I use LEM only in arithmetic. Pure arithmetic cannot reach ontological conclusions That's all. By standard use of numbers I mean the element (N, +, *) as taught by mathematicians. I show that comp makes *some* theology as part of the discourse of machine. This should not give any trouble, *especially* to a formalist. The idea that a hypothetical machine would give certain hypothetical responses wouldn't, but of course, you are saying more than that: you are saying that *I* am an immaterial machine. And that's an ontological claim which cannot be supported by a merely formal premise. It is not more ontological that the premise that I could survive with a digital brain. What does digital mean here? Made of silicon or made of numbers? There is a bait and switch going on here. The guy goes into the doctor, agrees to the digital brain, and walks out thinking the doctor is going to laboriously build a machine or write a programme. Instead, the doctor sits back confident that a digital brain already exists as an immaterial number The rest is reasoning. It is up to you to find the mistake, if you believe there is one. Please study the reasoning, because it makes clear what is used and meant in the hypotheses. The point is mainly epistemological, although we might argue on this too. The point is that physics is a branch of arithmetic, If there is no reality to numbers, arithmetic cannot even produce the appearance of physics. Illusions have a real basis. Again, you need an ontological premise. and that it can be extracted (formally) from computability theory + the self- reference logic (provability theory). A mathematical anti-realist is an ambiguous expression. How could them believe in Church thesis which is equivalent with the assertion that a universal number exist in arithmetic. In the way that I have explained to you a thousand times: the assertion that certain entities exist is just taken as part of the game. No. You insist that there is primary matter. Whether I do or not has no bearing on how formalists interpret mathematical existence postulates. I am neutral on this. But I do show we don't need that hypothesis to undersatnd why the universal numbers develop beliefs and discourse on primary matters and physical laws. We need the postulate that numbers exist, because non existing things have existing beliefs. If it is formal game playing, just play the game. If I just play the game I am never going to conclude that I *am* a dreaming machine, any more than I am going to conclude I am Supermario You forget the yes doctor part of comp, which plays a crucial role in the reasoning. I don't want to argue if it is ontological or not. Well, you should. That is not needed to understand that physics is no more the fundamental science once comp is assumed Comp alone does not do it. The theory is enough precise to allow that. Do you have a definition of formalism which does not rely on arithmetical realism. Yes: formalism is the claim that no mathematical entities actually exist, Well, that is you own physicalist definition. A general formalist believes the same for any theory, and never assume things like primary matter. You are not a formalist in math, but a conventionalist. Conventionalism: This is also called formalism. In Kantian terms this is the view that mathematics is analytical a priori. In other words, that all mathematical statements are true by definition or convention. http://www.blacksacademy.net/content/2964.html But then I think you have missed the failure of formalism and logicism in math due to
Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?
On 2/9/2011 7:57 AM, Jason Resch wrote: 1Z, How do you define existence? For something to exist must it be something you can see and feel, or would you say it has to be something that can be studied objectively? Would you agree that for something to have objective properties, it must exist? Clearly there are things humans have discovered which we can't see or feel, but we think they exist because we see their effects: wind, dark matter, black holes, etc. Or theories suggest their existence: extra-solar life, strings, and so on. I would argue that mathematical objects exist because this universe's existence does not make sense in isolation. Imagine you were in a windowless bathroom. Should you doubt the existence of the rest of the world because you cannot see it, or would there be clues to support the existence of things outside that room? The finely tuned physical constants, laws, dimensions, etc. of this universe suggest that this universe is one of many, perhaps one among all possible structures. Just as we see the affects of wind and know it exists, one can look at the fine tuning of this universe and believe in the existence of all possible structures. Every such structure is a mathematical entity. If you doubt the existence of mathematical objects, how do you explain fine tuning? ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fine-tuned_Universe ) Jason Fine-tuning is a very speculative and poorly supported peg to hang existence on: http://www.colorado.edu/philosophy/vstenger/Fallacy/FTCosmo.pdf Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The relative point of view
On 2/9/2011 8:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Feb 2011, at 21:08, Brent Meeker wrote: On 2/8/2011 8:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 07 Feb 2011, at 20:52, Andrew Soltau wrote: (Is the 'intensional' referred to here the 'attach' you used in another email?) Not really, although it is related. Intensional refers to the fact that if you define a provable(x) by beweisbar(x) and x', where x' denote the proposition which has x as Gôdel number, you define a probability predicate, You mean provability predicate don't you? Yes I mean provability. It is unfortunate that the v and b are so close on my keyboard. I also apologies for my many spelling mistakes and my style which can go very bad when I have to answer many posts, at time where time is a bit missing ... Given that you are defining 8 basic points of view in the abstract, applied to intensional variants of the current provability predicate of the machine with or without some oracle, it sounds a bit, well, abstract. Could you be a bit more specific? I try to be more specific in sane04. May be we should start from that. Or search hypostasis or hypostases in the archive, or guardian angel, etc. Read the book by Smullyan, and Boolos 1979 (simpler than Boolos 1993). Read perhaps the Theaetetus by Plato. In short you can say that I model belief or opinion by formal probability (Bp). You mean formal provability? Mind your ps and vs. :-) You mean my bs and vs, I guess :-) Yes, again I meant formal provability. That error is annoying because, if Bp, is a shorthand for provability(p), Bp Dp plays the role of a formal probability (yes, with a b), indeed probability 1, or maximal credibility. I'm really sorry. I define then knowledge, following Theaetetus by the true opinion (Bp p), You've never said what your answer is to Gettier's example. I did it, the saturday 29 Jan 2011, according to my computer. Let me paste it again. It is probably too short. I have a full chapter on this in Conscience et Mécanisme. Tell me if you see the point, or if I should make it clearer: quote: Apes fetus can dream climbing trees but they do that with ancestors climbing the most probable trees of their most probable neighborhoods since a long period. With classical mechanism, I would say, that to know is to believe p when luckily p is true, So what is your response to Gettier's problem? [Brent Meeker] The answer is that, with comp, we cannot distinguish reality from dream. We can know that we are dreaming (sometimes), but we cannot ever know for sure in a public way that we are awaken. Another fact related to this is that knowledge, consciousness and truth are not machine-definable. If we are machine, we can use those notion in theoretical context only. In practice, as real life illustrates very often, we never know as such that we know. We belief we know, until we know better. The SAGrz logics is a logical tour de force. Here Gödel's theorem gives sense to Theaetetus. S4Grz, the logic of (Bp p) formalizes a notion which is not even nameable by the machine, unless she postulates comp and relies explicitly on that postulate, or better, relies on the study of a simpler than herself machine. In science, or in public, we never know, as such. Knowing is a pure first person notion. But this does not mean that we cannot make 3-theory on such pure first person notion, as S4Grz illustrates particularly well. Same remarks for feelings (Bp Dt p). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/ Hmmm? I guess I thought you hadn't answered because I don't grasp the relevance of your answer. Gettier points out that one can believe a true statement for reasons that have nothing to do with what makes the statement true. In his example Bob buys a new car which is blue, but while waiting for the car to be delivered he borrows a car which also happens to be blue. Jim sees Bob driving this car and believes that Bob has bought a new car which is blue. It is a true belief, but only by accident. So it seems that there is a difference between true belief and knowledge. Gettier proposes that the true belief must be causally connected to the fact that makes it true in order to count as knowledge. The analogy in arithmetic would be to believe something, like Goldbach's conjecture, which may be true but is unprovable. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Multisolipsism
On 2/9/2011 8:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Feb 2011, at 21:28, Brent Meeker wrote: On 2/8/2011 9:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Answer precisely my question in my last post. I recall it: Could you explain to me how you predict what you will see (qualia) when you abandon an apple free in the air, in a big universe with a running UD in it? How do you predict your experience? If you agree with step 1-6, you don't have much choice, and you will understand the reversal. ?? Obviously I would predict seeing the apple fall. This is a consequence of my inference from past experience and even my evolutoinary ancestry. Even babies expect unsupported objects to fall. Do you claim you can predict that apples should be seen to fall from comp+arithimetic alone? Not really. My claim is far more modest, albeit radical. I claim that IF comp is true THEN we HAVE TO derive from comp+arithmetic alone any physics allowing the apple to get its usual falling behavior. More precisely, if you have no objection with UDA steps 1-6, then to predict the behavior of the apple in UDA-Step 7, you have to consider all the computations made by the UD, and going through you current first person mental state, (of seeing your hand with the apple), How is my first person mental state instantiated in the computations made by the UD? It can't be a single step of one or more computations. It must be some kind of equivalence class. Brent and take into account the first person indeterminacy on all those computations. If this contradicts the usual prediction then comp is false. Comp might seem to contradict the usual prediction, due to the many aberrant dreams, the white noise, the white rabbits ..., but the space of computations is highly structured, even more so when we take into account the many possible person views, so that we just cannot conclude that the usual predictions refute comp. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Are our brains in that VAT? Yep.
Stathis, I like your implications: *... I assume you think that such an attempt would fail, that although some processes in the brain such as chemistry and the behaviour of electric fields can be modelled, there are other processes that can't be modelled. What processes are these, and what evidence do you have that they exist?* I am speaking about processes we don't (yet?) know at all, like some centuries ago electricity etc. etc. and in due course we learn about phenomena not fitting into our existing 'models'. I don't volunteer to describe such processes before we learn about them (how stupid of me) - netiher do I have evidence for the existence and behavior of such unkown/able processes. Our cultural induction allows a widening of models, processes, phenomena, mechanisms. We even advanced from the Geocentric vision. Have a prosperous day John M On Mon, Feb 7, 2011 at 6:46 PM, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.comwrote: On Tue, Feb 8, 2011 at 3:40 AM, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote: Stathis, my imagination does not run that high. If I imagine myself as an alien scientist, I would be self centered (pretentious?) enough to imagine that I know more about those stupid humans and don't have to experiment on computer - THEN on the real stuff, to LEARN how they are. I would know. I don't 'imagine' myself such a stupid alien scientist (ha ha). The fact that such an 'alien scientist' (a-sc) LEARNED about humans - and we just imagine such (a-sc) - is proof enough that THEY are above us in mental capabilities. So it sounds weird to me to 'imagine' a smarter mind for ourselves how it would appraise us. The alien scientist example was to eliminate any preconceptions about mind. The scientist is technically competent and is merely attempting to model the behaviour of the brain - the trajectories of the atoms within it. I assume you think that such an attempt would fail, that although some processes in the brain such as chemistry and the behaviour of electric fields can be modelled, there are other processes that can't be modelled. What processes are these, and what evidence do you have that they exist? ANother question: do you find it reasonable that such (a-sc) will condone all those figments of our human existence which we live with (e.g. food, human logical questions/answers, etc.)? even our material-figmented physical world? They may or they may not. I am assuming for the sake of this example that they do not consider such questions at all, but only the mechanics of human behaviour. Like us trying to understand the behaviour of a cyclone, which is separate from the question of whether the cyclone has good or bad effects or indeed whether the cyclone has some sort of mind. We, humans, are a peculiar kind, in our so far evolved mini-solipsism of the world we are even less informed that possible, closed in into our 'mindset' of yesterday (I think we agreed on that on this list) and our imagination can work also only WITHIN. (With few very slowly achievable extensions/expansions that will be added to 'yesterday's' inventory.) Even if we pretend to free-up and step beyond - as in 'fantastic' sci-fi. John M -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Are our brains in that VAT? Yep.
On Thu, Feb 10, 2011 at 10:03 AM, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote: Stathis, I like your implications: ... I assume you think that such an attempt would fail, that although some processes in the brain such as chemistry and the behaviour of electric fields can be modelled, there are other processes that can't be modelled. What processes are these, and what evidence do you have that they exist? I am speaking about processes we don't (yet?) know at all, like some centuries ago electricity etc. etc. and in due course we learn about phenomena not fitting into our existing 'models'. I don't volunteer to describe such processes before we learn about them (how stupid of me) - netiher do I have evidence for the existence and behavior of such unkown/able processes. Our cultural induction allows a widening of models, processes, phenomena, mechanisms. We even advanced from the Geocentric vision. One thing that we have found with all new physical phenomena is that they follow physical laws that can be described algorithmically. You're postulating that not only does the brain use processes that we have not yet discovered, but that these processes, unlike everything else we have ever discovered, are non-algorithmic. What reason have you for postulating this? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Are our brains in that VAT? Yep.
On 2/9/2011 3:35 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Thu, Feb 10, 2011 at 10:03 AM, John Mikesjami...@gmail.com wrote: Stathis, I like your implications: ... I assume you think that such an attempt would fail, that although some processes in the brain such as chemistry and the behaviour of electric fields can be modelled, there are other processes that can't be modelled. What processes are these, and what evidence do you have that they exist? I am speaking about processes we don't (yet?) know at all, like some centuries ago electricity etc. etc. and in due course we learn about phenomena not fitting into our existing 'models'. I don't volunteer to describe such processes before we learn about them (how stupid of me) - netiher do I have evidence for the existence and behavior of such unkown/able processes. Our cultural induction allows a widening of models, processes, phenomena, mechanisms. We even advanced from the Geocentric vision. One thing that we have found with all new physical phenomena is that they follow physical laws that can be described algorithmically. Physical laws aren't out there. They are models we invent. So of course we like to invent algorithmic ones because they are more usable. People used to invent non-algorithmic ones, like Zeus does that when he's angry. but they were hard to apply. QM is entirely algorithmic since it includes inherent randomness. However this is probably not important for the function of brains. Brent You're postulating that not only does the brain use processes that we have not yet discovered, but that these processes, unlike everything else we have ever discovered, are non-algorithmic. What reason have you for postulating this? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Are our brains in that VAT? Yep.
On Thu, Feb 10, 2011 at 11:19 AM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Physical laws aren't out there. They are models we invent. So of course we like to invent algorithmic ones because they are more usable. People used to invent non-algorithmic ones, like Zeus does that when he's angry. but they were hard to apply. QM is entirely algorithmic since it includes inherent randomness. However this is probably not important for the function of brains. Did you mean to say QM is *not* entirely algorithmic? If randomness is important in the brain it is then a further step to show that true randomness, rather than pseudorandomness, is necessary. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Are our brains in that VAT? Yep.
On Feb 10, 12:19 am, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: On 2/9/2011 3:35 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Thu, Feb 10, 2011 at 10:03 AM, John Mikesjami...@gmail.com wrote: Stathis, I like your implications: ... I assume you think that such an attempt would fail, that although some processes in the brain such as chemistry and the behaviour of electric fields can be modelled, there are other processes that can't be modelled. What processes are these, and what evidence do you have that they exist? I am speaking about processes we don't (yet?) know at all, like some centuries ago electricity etc. etc. and in due course we learn about phenomena not fitting into our existing 'models'. I don't volunteer to describe such processes before we learn about them (how stupid of me) - netiher do I have evidence for the existence and behavior of such unkown/able processes. Our cultural induction allows a widening of models, processes, phenomena, mechanisms. We even advanced from the Geocentric vision. One thing that we have found with all new physical phenomena is that they follow physical laws that can be described algorithmically. Physical laws aren't out there. They are models we invent. It's not satisfactory to say that there is no lawfulness to the universe at all. Is there no reason the sun will rise tomorrow? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Are our brains in that VAT? Yep.
On 2/9/2011 4:54 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Thu, Feb 10, 2011 at 11:19 AM, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Physical laws aren't out there. They are models we invent. So of course we like to invent algorithmic ones because they are more usable. People used to invent non-algorithmic ones, like Zeus does that when he's angry. but they were hard to apply. QM is entirely algorithmic since it includes inherent randomness. However this is probably not important for the function of brains. Did you mean to say QM is *not* entirely algorithmic? Right. If randomness is important in the brain it is then a further step to show that true randomness, rather than pseudorandomness, is necessary. Of course any finite amount of true randomness can be reproduced by pseudorandomness, so the challenge to show true randomness is a mug's game. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Are our brains in that VAT? Yep.
On 2/9/2011 5:02 PM, 1Z wrote: On Feb 10, 12:19 am, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: On 2/9/2011 3:35 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Thu, Feb 10, 2011 at 10:03 AM, John Mikesjami...@gmail.comwrote: Stathis, I like your implications: ... I assume you think that such an attempt would fail, that although some processes in the brain such as chemistry and the behaviour of electric fields can be modelled, there are other processes that can't be modelled. What processes are these, and what evidence do you have that they exist? I am speaking about processes we don't (yet?) know at all, like some centuries ago electricity etc. etc. and in due course we learn about phenomena not fitting into our existing 'models'. I don't volunteer to describe such processes before we learn about them (how stupid of me) - netiher do I have evidence for the existence and behavior of such unkown/able processes. Our cultural induction allows a widening of models, processes, phenomena, mechanisms. We even advanced from the Geocentric vision. One thing that we have found with all new physical phenomena is that they follow physical laws that can be described algorithmically. Physical laws aren't out there. They are models we invent. It's not satisfactory to say that there is no lawfulness to the universe at all. Is there no reason the sun will rise tomorrow? That's the model. I don't know how to define a reason except in terms of some model. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?
Brent and 1Z, The paper you referenced says the following: No doubt life, as we know it, depends sensitively on the parameters of our universe. However, other forms of life might exist under different conditions. I agree with that statement. Certainly there are other arrangements of laws which would permit life to exist. The question is how often is it, among all possible structures, that intelligent life is possible? It does not appear easy. Try inventing your own set of physical laws which if followed from the beginning to the end which would permit life to evolve and exist. It takes a lot of consideration and thought for people to design virtual realities which support artificial life (alife), even when it is very simple compared to the life we know. Consider what is necessary just to support evolution: 1. An chemistry rich enough to construct self-replicating machines 2. The ability for life to reliably encode, read and copy information (necessary to record results of natural experiments, as DNA does for us) 3. Unreachable entities (in our case stars) which provide limited energy/resources at a fixed rate for life forms to compete over during the course of trillions of generations 4. This energy source must not easily attainable or duplicated by life (if fusion were biologically possible life would consume all the potential energy long before it could evolve intelligence) 5. No easy shortcut to get an unlimited or infinite amount of energy (Something like the laws of thermodynamics, otherwise life has no incentive to increase in complexity once it discovers such a trick) 6. Re-usability or resupply of materials used by life (If biological material or waste can't be broken down to be reused by other life forms then such material or resources would run out) 7. Long term stability of environment and constancy of physical laws, otherwise life would be quickly wiped out or the validity of the information recorded from natural experiments becomes invalidated I think the above rules are necessary not just for life as we know it in this universe, but life anywhere. Our own universe seems just complex enough, but no more complex than is necessary, to provide each of these requirements. What do you think the chances are that any random object in Plato's heaven, or any random Turing machine will support intelligent life? 1 in 10, 1 in 1000, 1 in a billion? I think the universe's apparent Fine-Tuning is controversial only to a few general types of audiences: 1. Physicists who believe in a grand theory of everything which will explain logically why this universe has to have the physical laws it does, and why no other physical laws are possible. 2. Those who consider the idea that there are multiple universes to be ridiculous or unscientific. 3. Those who consider it only as a justification for intelligent design theories. Fine-tuning is a direct consequence of the anthropic principle once one assumes multiple universes. Say you were completely agnostic on the question of there being other universes, but you decided the probability of any random universe having those seven necessary properties necessary for life was 1 in 1000. You must then decide between there being only one universe (the one you see) and wonder why we were fortunate enough to hit the 1 in 1000 chance to be alive, or you conclude multiple universes exist, and there is no mystery or luck involved. One's confidence that there is only 1 universe should be roughly proportional to the likelihood that life exists in any randomly selected possible universe. That the Anthropic Principle + Mathematical Realism explains the appearance of Fine Tuning is just one of its many attractions. Among the other appeals of mathematical realism are that it answers some longstanding questions: Eugene Wigner's The miracle of the appropriateness of the language of mathematics for the formulation of the laws of physics is a wonderful gift which we neither understand nor deserve. Einstein's The most incomprehensible thing about the world is that it is at all comprehensible. John Wheeler's Why these particular equations, not others? If mathematical reality is taken as true the appearance of a physical reality is a direct consequence. If one starts with a physical reality, however, one I am curious to know at what point do you consider the items in this progression to no longer be real and what point you begin to apply the label of immaterial or abstract: 1. The matter and space beyond our cosmological horizon which we can neither see nor interact with 2. Other theorized cosmic inflation events (new big bangs) happening elsewhere or very far away 3. Events or people which exist in the distant past 4. Other branches of the multiverse as postulated by Everett 5. Other solutions to string theory which define other possible physics 6. Altogether different physical laws and universes, defined by the equations completely unlike those of string theory 7.
Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?
On Wed, Feb 9, 2011 at 10:18 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Brent and 1Z, The paper you referenced says the following: No doubt life, as we know it, depends sensitively on the parameters of our universe. However, other forms of life might exist under different conditions. I agree with that statement. Certainly there are other arrangements of laws which would permit life to exist. The question is how often is it, among all possible structures, that intelligent life is possible? It does not appear easy. Try inventing your own set of physical laws which if followed from the beginning to the end which would permit life to evolve and exist. It takes a lot of consideration and thought for people to design virtual realities which support artificial life (alife), even when it is very simple compared to the life we know. Consider what is necessary just to support evolution: Why does life have to evolve? Rather than fine-tune the laws, why not fine-tune the initial conditions? Life could be present in the first instant...no need for evolution. 1. An chemistry rich enough to construct self-replicating machines Why does life need to replicate? It's present in the first instant. Just arrange things so that it stays safe. Mating, children, alimony, child support payments...all unnecessary. 2. The ability for life to reliably encode, read and copy information (necessary to record results of natural experiments, as DNA does for us) Why experiment? You got your life in the initial conditions. Also arrange things so that our new life believes that it has interesting, meaningful, fulfilling stuff to do. 3. Unreachable entities (in our case stars) which provide limited energy/resources at a fixed rate for life forms to compete over during the course of trillions of generations Competition. That's for losers. Just build an unlimited energy store into the initial conditions. 4. This energy source must not easily attainable or duplicated by life (if fusion were biologically possible life would consume all the potential energy long before it could evolve intelligence) Evolution is for losers. Initial conditions or bust. 5. No easy shortcut to get an unlimited or infinite amount of energy (Something like the laws of thermodynamics, otherwise life has no incentive to increase in complexity once it discovers such a trick) Build incentive and complexity into the life-form's initial configuration. No need to evolve it via fine-tuned incentive and complexity increasing laws. Hey, we're fine-tuning either way. Go for broke. 6. Re-usability or resupply of materials used by life (If biological material or waste can't be broken down to be reused by other life forms then such material or resources would run out) Screw other life forms. 7. Long term stability of environment and constancy of physical laws, otherwise life would be quickly wiped out or the validity of the information recorded from natural experiments becomes invalidated Okay. Stability is good. We'll keep that. I think the above rules are necessary not just for life as we know it in this universe, but life anywhere. Our own universe seems just complex enough, but no more complex than is necessary, to provide each of these requirements. What do you think the chances are that any random object in Plato's heaven, or any random Turing machine will support intelligent life? 1 in 10, 1 in 1000, 1 in a billion? We can make the laws much less complex if we make the initial state more complex. And why shouldn't we? Why are you prejudiced against initial states? I think the universe's apparent Fine-Tuning is controversial only to a few general types of audiences: 1. Physicists who believe in a grand theory of everything which will explain logically why this universe has to have the physical laws it does, and why no other physical laws are possible A necessary being who creates only the best of all possible worlds should do the trick. That the Anthropic Principle + Mathematical Realism explains the appearance of Fine Tuning is just one of its many attractions. Among the other appeals of mathematical realism are that it answers some longstanding questions: Eugene Wigner's The miracle of the appropriateness of the language of mathematics for the formulation of the laws of physics is a wonderful gift which we neither understand nor deserve. If I were a materialist I'd say that math is related to our evolved ability to detect causal patterns and extrapolate from those to predict future events. Once you have that a well developed form of that ability, then any rule-following system would seem to be, in theory, comprehensible. Einstein's The most incomprehensible thing about the world is that it is at all comprehensible. I like Wittgenstein's version better: It is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists. John Wheeler's Why these
Re: Maudlin How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?
On 2/9/2011 7:18 PM, Jason Resch wrote: Brent and 1Z, The paper you referenced says the following: No doubt life, as we know it, depends sensitively on the parameters of our universe. However, other forms of life might exist under different conditions. I agree with that statement. Certainly there are other arrangements of laws which would permit life to exist. The question is how often is it, among all possible structures, that intelligent life is possible? It does not appear easy. Try inventing your own set of physical laws which if followed from the beginning to the end which would permit life to evolve and exist. It takes a lot of consideration and thought for people to design virtual realities which support artificial life (alife), even when it is very simple compared to the life we know. Consider what is necessary just to support evolution: 1. An chemistry rich enough to construct self-replicating machines 2. The ability for life to reliably encode, read and copy information (necessary to record results of natural experiments, as DNA does for us) 3. Unreachable entities (in our case stars) which provide limited energy/resources at a fixed rate for life forms to compete over during the course of trillions of generations 4. This energy source must not easily attainable or duplicated by life (if fusion were biologically possible life would consume all the potential energy long before it could evolve intelligence) 5. No easy shortcut to get an unlimited or infinite amount of energy (Something like the laws of thermodynamics, otherwise life has no incentive to increase in complexity once it discovers such a trick) 6. Re-usability or resupply of materials used by life (If biological material or waste can't be broken down to be reused by other life forms then such material or resources would run out) 7. Long term stability of environment and constancy of physical laws, otherwise life would be quickly wiped out or the validity of the information recorded from natural experiments becomes invalidated I think the above rules are necessary not just for life as we know it in this universe, but life anywhere. Our own universe seems just complex enough, but no more complex than is necessary, to provide each of these requirements. What do you think the chances are that any random object in Plato's heaven, or any random Turing machine will support intelligent life? 1 in 10, 1 in 1000, 1 in a billion? You kind of jumped categories there. Life doesn't take place in Platonia and it isn't computed on random Turing machines. For all you know 1-7 supra are each practically inevitable. Just because you can talk about universes with different parameter values doesn't show they exist or that they are more probable than the one universe we know to exist. I think the universe's apparent Fine-Tuning is controversial only to a few general types of audiences: 1. Physicists who believe in a grand theory of everything which will explain logically why this universe has to have the physical laws it does, and why no other physical laws are possible. 2. Those who consider the idea that there are multiple universes to be ridiculous or unscientific. 3. Those who consider it only as a justification for intelligent design theories. You apparently didn't read Vic's paper. He considers each parameter claimed to be fine-tuned and shows that it either is merely a convention or that it could take a significant range of values without precluding life. Fine-tuning is a direct consequence of the anthropic principle once one assumes multiple universes. Say you were completely agnostic on the question of there being other universes, but you decided the probability of any random universe having those seven necessary properties necessary for life was 1 in 1000. You must then decide between there being only one universe (the one you see) and wonder why we were fortunate enough to hit the 1 in 1000 chance to be alive, or you conclude multiple universes exist, and there is no mystery or luck involved. One's confidence that there is only 1 universe should be roughly proportional to the likelihood that life exists in any randomly selected possible universe. Unlikely things happen all the time. By your argument there must be many Jason Resch's. That the Anthropic Principle + Mathematical Realism explains the appearance of Fine Tuning is just one of its many attractions. Among the other appeals of mathematical realism are that it answers some longstanding questions: That it could explain anything is one of it's flaws. Eugene Wigner's The miracle of the appropriateness of the language of mathematics for the formulation of the laws of physics is a wonderful gift which we neither understand nor deserve. Einstein's The most incomprehensible thing about the world is that it is at all comprehensible. John Wheeler's Why these particular equations, not others?
