Re: Bruno List continued
On Tue, Oct 4, 2011 at 2:30 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: The neurons are firing in my brain as I'm thinking, but if you could go down to the microscopic level you would see that they are firing due to the various physical factors that make neurons fire, eg. fluxes of calcium and potassium caused by ion channels opening due to neurotransmitter molecules binding to the receptors and changing their conformation. If you take each neuron in the brain in turn at any given time it will always be the case that it is doing what it is doing due to these factors. You will never find a ligand-activated ion channel opening in the absence of a ligand, for example. That would be like a door opening in the absence of any force. Just because doors and protein molecules are different sizes doesn't mean that one can do magical things and the other not. You will also never find a ligand activated ion channel that is associated with a particular subjective experience fire in the absence of that subjective experience (that would be a zombie, right?), so why privilege the pixels of the thing as the determining factor when the overall image is just as much dictating which pixels are lit and how brightly? Again, every time you mention magic it just means that you don't understand my point. Every time you mention it, I am going to give you the same response. I understand your position completely, but you are just throwing dirt clods in the general direction of mine while closing your eyes. The ion channel only opens when the ligand binds. The ligand only binds if it is present in the synapse. It is only present in the synapse when the presynaptic neuron fires. And so on. This whole process is associated with an experience, but it is a completely mechanical process. The equivalent is my example of the door: it opens because someone turns the key and pushes it. If it had qualia it may also be accurate to say that it opens because it wants to open, but since we can't see the qualia they can't have a causal effect on the door. If they could we would see the door opening by itself and we would be amazed. It's the same with the neuron: if the associated qualia had a causal effect on matter we would see neurons firing in the absence of stimuli, which would be amazing. Again, it's not that it's wrong to say that the neurons fired in the amygdala because the person thought about gambling, it's that the third person observable behaviour of the neurons can be entirely explained and predicted without any reference to qualia. If the neurons responded directly to qualia they would be observed to do miraculous things and it may not be possible to predict or model their behaviour. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Bruno List continued
On Oct 4, 2:11 am, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: The ion channel only opens when the ligand binds. The ligand only binds if it is present in the synapse. It is only present in the synapse when the presynaptic neuron fires. And so on. It's the 'and so on' where your explanation breaks down. You are arbitrarily denying the top down, semantic, subjective participation as a cause. There is no presynaptic neuron prior to the introduction of the thought of gambling. The thought is the firing of many neurons. They are the same thing, except that the reason they are firing is because of the subject choosing to realize a particular motivation (to think about something or move a mouse, etc). There is no neurological reason why those neurons would fire. They would not otherwise fire at that particular time. This whole process is associated with an experience, but it is a completely mechanical process. Starting a car initiates a mechanical process, and driving a car executes a mechanical process, but without the driver choosing to start the car and use the steering wheel and pedals to correspond with their subjective perception and motivation, the car doesn't do anything but idle. You cannot predict where a car is going to go based on an auto mechanics examination of the car. I can argue this point all day, every day. I can give you different examples, describe it in different ways, but I can't make you see what you are missing. I know exactly your position. You think that if you look at atoms they cannot do anything except what we expect any generic atom to do, and since everything is made of atoms, then everything can only be an elaboration of those probabilities. I get that. You don't need to restate your position to me ever again. You are quite clear in what you are saying. I'm telling you that it's medieval compared to what I'm talking about. You aren't seeing that atoms respond to their environment - they have charge and make bonds, and that the environment can change on a macro scale for macro scale reasons just as well as the macro scale can be changed for microcosmic reasons. They are the same thing. Just as I am choosing these letters to make up these words because I have a sentence in mind that I want to write, not because my fingers have no choice but to hit these keys to satisfy some chemical or physical law. The equivalent is my example of the door: it opens because someone turns the key and pushes it. If it had qualia it may also be accurate to say that it opens because it wants to open, but since we can't see the qualia they can't have a causal effect on the door. Someone turns the key and pushes it because they want to. It is their qualia that has a causal effect on the door and *nothing else*. The intentionality of the subject *uses* the neurons of the brain, which use the afferent nerves down the spine, which uses the muscle tissue to contract, which moves the arm connected to the hand that holds the key and articulates the turning and opens the door which satisfies the sensorymotivemotivemotormotormotorsensory chain of custody. The door opens because the person sees the door (visual sense), understands how it works and that they have the key (cognitive sense), wants to unlock it (motive intent, emotional sense), is able to use their brain, spinal cord, arm, hand, and key as a single coordinated instrument (motivemotivemotorfine motormotor extension) to satisfy their desire to feel and see that the door is open (sensory) and to pass through the door (motor). Yes, I understand that you can look at it the other way and say that since it it the brain that stimulates and coordinates the arm, and it is the brain's activity that causes that, and that the neurons in the brain cause that, and that the ion channels, membrane potentials, neurotransmitter molecules, and atoms that cause all of that, then you should be able to calculate from the positions of all of that microcosmic phenomana that the door will open. But it doesn't work that way. The microcosmos doesn't know what a door is. It has a very complex job to do already in it's own biochemical level of the universe. Just as we have no direct awareness of what our DNA is doing, our tissues don't know who we are or why we want to open the door. Only we know that. If they could we would see the door opening by itself and we would be amazed. It's the same with the neuron: if the associated qualia had a causal effect on matter we would see neurons firing in the absence of stimuli, which would be amazing. The qualia is the stimuli. Why else do you think it's there? What would be the point of qualia if not to exert an influence on the choices we make? Again, it's not that it's wrong to say that the neurons fired in the amygdala because the person thought about gambling, it's that the third person observable behaviour of the neurons can be entirely explained and predicted without any reference to qualia. They
Re: Bruno List continued
2011/10/4 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com On Oct 4, 2:11 am, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: The ion channel only opens when the ligand binds. The ligand only binds if it is present in the synapse. It is only present in the synapse when the presynaptic neuron fires. And so on. It's the 'and so on' where your explanation breaks down. You are arbitrarily denying the top down, semantic, subjective participation as a cause. There is no presynaptic neuron prior to the introduction of the thought of gambling. And where is the thought then ? Reading you, it exists outside of the brain matter... If it is the brain matter, then all the external observable is all there is to it, reproducing the external behaviours will reproduce qualia. The thought is the firing of many neurons. They are the same thing, except that the reason they are firing is because of the subject choosing to realize a particular motivation (to think about something or move a mouse, etc). There is no neurological reason why those neurons would fire. They would not otherwise fire at that particular time. This whole process is associated with an experience, but it is a completely mechanical process. Starting a car initiates a mechanical process, and driving a car executes a mechanical process, but without the driver choosing to start the car and use the steering wheel and pedals to correspond with their subjective perception and motivation, the car doesn't do anything but idle. You cannot predict where a car is going to go based on an auto mechanics examination of the car. No, but I can build a copy of the car which will do the same as the car provided a driver drives it... I can argue this point all day, every day. I can give you different examples, describe it in different ways, but I can't make you see what you are missing. I know exactly your position. You think that if you look at atoms they cannot do anything except what we expect any generic atom to do, and since everything is made of atoms, then everything can only be an elaboration of those probabilities. I get that. You don't need to restate your position to me ever again. You are quite clear in what you are saying. I'm telling you that it's medieval compared to what I'm talking about. You aren't seeing that atoms respond to their environment - they have charge and make bonds, and that the environment can change on a macro scale for macro scale reasons just as well as the macro scale can be changed for microcosmic reasons. They are the same thing. Just as I am choosing these letters to make up these words because I have a sentence in mind that I want to write, not because my fingers have no choice but to hit these keys to satisfy some chemical or physical law. The equivalent is my example of the door: it opens because someone turns the key and pushes it. If it had qualia it may also be accurate to say that it opens because it wants to open, but since we can't see the qualia they can't have a causal effect on the door. Someone turns the key and pushes it because they want to. It is their qualia that has a causal effect on the door and *nothing else*. The intentionality of the subject *uses* the neurons of the brain, which use the afferent nerves down the spine, which uses the muscle tissue to contract, which moves the arm connected to the hand that holds the key and articulates the turning and opens the door which satisfies the sensorymotivemotivemotormotormotorsensory chain of custody. The door opens because the person sees the door (visual sense), understands how it works and that they have the key (cognitive sense), wants to unlock it (motive intent, emotional sense), is able to use their brain, spinal cord, arm, hand, and key as a single coordinated instrument (motivemotivemotorfine motormotor extension) to satisfy their desire to feel and see that the door is open (sensory) and to pass through the door (motor). Yes, I understand that you can look at it the other way and say that since it it the brain that stimulates and coordinates the arm, and it is the brain's activity that causes that, and that the neurons in the brain cause that, and that the ion channels, membrane potentials, neurotransmitter molecules, and atoms that cause all of that, then you should be able to calculate from the positions of all of that microcosmic phenomana that the door will open. But it doesn't work that way. The microcosmos doesn't know what a door is. It has a very complex job to do already in it's own biochemical level of the universe. Just as we have no direct awareness of what our DNA is doing, our tissues don't know who we are or why we want to open the door. Only we know that. If they could we would see the door opening by itself and we would be amazed. It's the same with the neuron: if the associated qualia had a causal effect on matter we would see neurons firing in the
Re: Bruno List continued
On Oct 4, 8:54 am, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2011/10/4 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com On Oct 4, 2:11 am, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: The ion channel only opens when the ligand binds. The ligand only binds if it is present in the synapse. It is only present in the synapse when the presynaptic neuron fires. And so on. It's the 'and so on' where your explanation breaks down. You are arbitrarily denying the top down, semantic, subjective participation as a cause. There is no presynaptic neuron prior to the introduction of the thought of gambling. And where is the thought then ? Reading you, it exists outside of the brain matter... If it is the brain matter, then all the external observable is all there is to it, reproducing the external behaviours will reproduce qualia. It's inside (and 'throughside') of matter. It doesn't ex-ist, it insists. Reproducing the external behaviors won't help, any more than attaching marionette strings to a cadaver would bring a person back to life. I think that all change has an experience associated with it. This is in fact what energy is; an experience of perception over time. The ability to experience change first hand carries with it, by extension, the ability to experience certain kinds of change second hand. We are made of matter, so we can relate to physical changes - a bowling ball striking pins, a bomb going off, etc. We are made of biological cells so we can relate to biological changes, but non-biological matter cannot experience biological changes. Bowling balls don't feel like they are alive. The thought is the firing of many neurons. They are the same thing, except that the reason they are firing is because of the subject choosing to realize a particular motivation (to think about something or move a mouse, etc). There is no neurological reason why those neurons would fire. They would not otherwise fire at that particular time. This whole process is associated with an experience, but it is a completely mechanical process. Starting a car initiates a mechanical process, and driving a car executes a mechanical process, but without the driver choosing to start the car and use the steering wheel and pedals to correspond with their subjective perception and motivation, the car doesn't do anything but idle. You cannot predict where a car is going to go based on an auto mechanics examination of the car. No, but I can build a copy of the car which will do the same as the car provided a driver drives it... Do the same thing meaning idle in the driveway, sure. To copy a driver is something else entirely. You still can't predict where either driver is going to take the car from looking that the mechanics of the car. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Bruno List continued
On 04 Oct 2011, at 02:29, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Tue, Oct 4, 2011 at 4:09 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: I agree with Craig, although the way he presents it might seems a bit uncomputationalist, (if I can say(*)). Thoughts act on matter all the time. It is a selection of histories + a sharing. Like when a sculptor isolates an art form from a rock, and then send it in a museum. If mind did not act on matter, we would not have been able to fly to the moon, and I am not sure even birds could fly. It asks for relative works and time, and numerous deep computations. When you prepare coffee, mind acts on matter. When you drink coffee, matter acts on mind. No problem here (with comp). And we can learn to control computer at a distance, but there is no reason to suppose that computers can't do that. Mind acts on matter in a manner of speaking, but matter will not do anything that cannot be explained in terms of the underlying physics. Locally, you are right. But the physics itself arise from the arithmetical computation structures on which consciousness supervene on (to be short). So I am not sure if the expression of consciousness duration for very short emulation time makes sense. In fact, between any two sequential computational states *at some level of description*, there exist an infinity of computational states belonging to computations generated by the UD going through them *at some more refined level, and this participates in the first person experience generation (as in its material constitution). An alien scientist could give a complete description of why humans behave as they do and make a computational model that accurately simulates human behaviour while remaining ignorant about human consciousness. But the alien could not do this if he were ignorant about protein chemistry, for example. OK. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Interesting paper on consciousness, computation and MWI
On 04 Oct 2011, at 05:33, Brian Tenneson wrote: From page 17 It is my contention that the only way out of this dilemma is to deny the initial assumption that a classical computer running a particular program can generate conscious awareness in the first place. What about the possibility of allowing for a large number of conscious moments that would, in a limit of some sort, approximate continuous, conscious awareness? In my mind, I liken the comparison to that of a radioactive substance and half-life decay formulas. In truth, there are finitely many atoms decaying but the half-life decay formulas never acknowledge that at some point the predicted mass of what's left measures less than one atom. So I'm talking about a massive number of calculated conscious moments so that for all intents and purposes, continuous conscious awareness is the observed result. Earlier on page 17... its program must only generate a finite sequence of conscious moments. I think I agree with you. I think that such a view is the only compatible with Digital Mechanism, but also with QM (without collapse). Consciousness is never generated by the running of a particular computer. If we can survive with a digital brain, this is related to the fact that we already belong to an infinity of computations, and the artificial brain just preserve that infinity, in a way such that I can survive in my usual normal (Gaussian) neighborhoods. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: David Eagleman on CHOICE
On 04 Oct 2011, at 02:27, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote: Ok, so this is where I would disagree. It only seems that to define a computation you need to look at the time evolution, because a snapshot doesn't contain enough information about the dynamics of the system. But here one considers all of the enormous amount of information stored in the brain, and that is a mistake, as we are only ever aware of a small fraction of this information. So, the OM has to be defined as some properly coarse grained picture of the full information content of the entire brain. In the MWI picture, the full brain-enviroment state is in state of the form: Sum over i of |brain_i|environment_i where all the |brain_i define the same macrostate. This state contains also the information about how the brain has computed the output from the input, so it is a valid computatonal state. If you were to observe exactly which of the many microstates the brain is in, then you would lose this information. But no human can ever observe this informainion in another brain (obviously it wouldn't fit in his brain). So, the simplistic picture of some machine being in a precisely defined bit state is misleading. That would only be accessible to a superobserver who has much more memory than that machine. The machine's subjective world should be thought as a set of paralllel worlds each having a slightly different information content entangled with the environment. I agree. Even without QM, and just DM, once we get the many dreams interpretation of arithmetic (to be short). Bruno Saibal Citeren meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net: My point is not that a snapshot brain (or computer) state lacks content, but that if it is an emulation of a brain (or a real brain) the snapshot cannot be an observer moment or a thought. The latter must have much longer duration and overlap one another in time. I think there has been a casual, but wrong, implicit identification of the discrete states of a Turing machine emulating a brain with some rather loosely defined observer moments. That's why I thought Eagleman's talk was interesting. Brent On 10/3/2011 8:01 AM, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote: I can't answer for Brent, but my take in this is that what matters is whether the state of the system at any time represents a computation being performed. So, this whole duration requirment is not necessary, a snapshot of the system contains information about what program is being run. So, it is a mistake to think that OMs lack content and are therefore not computational states. Saibal Citeren Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com: On Mon, Oct 3, 2011 at 9:47 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: But this doesn't change the argument that, to the extent that the physics allows it, the machine states may be arbitrarily divided. It then becomes a matter of definition whether we say the conscious states can also be arbitrarily divided. If stream of consciousness A-B-C supervenes on machine state a-b-c where A-B, B-C, A-B-C, but not A, B or C alone are of sufficient duration to count as consciousness should we say the observer moments are A-B, B-C and A-B-C, or should we say that the observer moments are A, B, C? I think it's simpler to say that the atomic observer moments are A, B, C even though individually they lack content. I think we've discussed this before. It you define them as A, B, C then the lack of content means they don't have inherent order; where as AB, BC, CD,... do have inherent order because they overlap. I don't think this affects the argument except to note that OMs are not the same as computational states. Do you think that if you insert pauses between a, b and c so that there is no overlap you create a zombie? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com . To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en .
Re: David Eagleman on CHOICE
On 03 Oct 2011, at 19:12, meekerdb wrote: On 10/3/2011 9:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 03 Oct 2011, at 00:47, meekerdb wrote: On 10/2/2011 7:13 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Sun, Oct 2, 2011 at 3:01 AM, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote: It's a strange, almost paradoxical result but I think observer moments can be sub-conscious. If we say the minimum duration of a conscious moment is 100ms then 99ms and the remaining 1ms of this can occur at different times, perhaps billions of years of real time apart, perhaps simultaneously or in the reverse order. You would have the experience provided only that the full 100ms even if broken up into infinitesimal intervals occurs somewhere, sometime. That sounds like a temporal homunculus. :-) Note that on a nanosecond scale there is no state of the brain. Relativity applies to brains too and so the time order of events on opposite sides of your head only defined to within about a nanosecond. The brain is limited for technical reasons, relativity being the least of them. Sure. Action potentials are only few hundred meters/sec. It isn't possible to stop it for a microsecond and restart it at exactly the same state. With a computer you can do this although you are limited to discrete digital states: you can't save the state as logic circuits are transitioning from 1 to 0. But you can do it, and in fact it's implicit in a Turing machine, i.e. an abstract computation. So I'm wondering what consequences this has for Bruno's idea that you are a bundle of computations that are passing through your current state? Some care has to be taken on the wording. With the computational supervenience thesis, you are not a bundle of computations that are passing through your current state, you (1-you) are a person, with referential and self-referential means I thought you were trying to explain what a person is in terms of arithmetic and computations. Now you seem to be invoking person as a separate entity. I am not sure to understand you. Both in UDA and AUDA I define notion of person. In UDA I use the notion of personal diary or memory being annihilated and reconstituted, and in AUDA I use the theory of machine's self-reference. This relates that separate entity to arithmetic, even if the relation are less trivial than assuming some link between mind and instantiation of computation. and that 1-you only supervene on that bundle of computations. Your actions and decisions, through the computational state of the self- referential programs, can select among quite different bundles of computations . You put select in scare quotes. So are you saying that you select (via free will?) which bundles of computations you supervene on? or which are your most probable continuation? Both. You choose between being duplicated in Washington/Moscow or Sidney/Beijing. That choice influence your future? If you choose Sidney/Beijing, you will still select Sidney or Beijing, but this you cannot influence. Of course a sort of God could see all what happened in your brain, and determine you choice, but that God is not available to you, and your choice remains a free choice, in the compatibilist approach to free- will. You are a living conscious person with partial free will and taxes, and gravitational constraints, and things like that apparently, you can memorize them, make planning, scheduling, etc. As UM knowing we are UMs (like any LUMs) we know we can change ourselves, it is part of our first personhood. The computational states are sharp, discrete things. The brains states are fuzzy distributed things. Brain states are computational states. Just take a Turing machine emulating a brain (at the right level). A crisp computational state can represent a fuzzy brain state, and also can belong to a fuzzy set of crisp state, which is relevant for the 1-p statistics. Fuzzy Turing machine are Turing emulable, like quantum computer are Turing emulable too, despite the extravagant relative slow down that we can suspect. Yes, I understand that. But brain states are not states of consciousness, i.e. thoughts or observer moments. I think that I will abandon the notion of OMs. At least for awhile. It is quite misleading in the context of the comp-supervenience thesis. I thought that I could use it by distinguishing 3-OMs (computational states) and 1-OMs (the subjectivity of someone going through that states). But the subjectivity is related to the whole set arithmetical neighborhoods which makes that state an element of many computations. I think that I have to dig deeper on the semantics of the X1* logics (the true (driven by G*) logic of Bp Dt p), to see if some sense can be retrieved for Bostrom (first person) OMs. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List
Re: Existence and Properties
On 03 Oct 2011, at 19:41, meekerdb wrote: On 10/3/2011 8:43 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: [SPK] Let me try to be sure that I understand this comment. When you write: they will all see the same laws are you referring to those invariant quantities and relations/functions with respect to transformations of reference frames/coordinate systems (which has become the de facto definition of physical laws) or are you referring to our collective human idea of physical laws? Why does it seem to me that you assume that the physical laws that we observe are the only possible ones? To badly echo Leibniz: How these and not some others? It seems to me that we observe exactly the physical laws that are consistent with our existence as observers within this universe, a universe where we can communicate representations of the contents of our 1p to each other. Communication requires a plurality of possible 1p for each and every separate observer in one universe to act as the template from which signal is distinguished from noise, plurality is insufficient to communications between observers. One needs something like the Hennessy-Milner property for a coherent notion of communication. There seems to be no a priori reason why we do not experience a universe that contains only a single conscious entity or a universe with completely different laws along with completely different physicality for the observers wherein. IMHO, There is something to the self-selection that Nick Bostrom tedand others have writen about that needs to be included in this discussion in addition to the contraints that communications between many separate entities generates. The conservation laws come from the requirement that we want our laws to be the same for everyone at every time and place. This is our idea of laws. I'm sure you're familiar with Noether's theorem and how she showed that conservation of moment comes from the requirement of invariance under spatial shifts, etc. That is beautiful and rather convincing. My friend Vic Stenger has written a book, The Comprehesible Cosmos, which shows how this idea extends to general relativity, the standard model, gauge theories, etc. and provides a unified view of physics. I recommend it. The part of physics is interesting, but if he would take more seriously the mind-body problem, I think he would appreciated the comp new form of invariance for the physical laws: that is, that the laws of physics do not depend on the initial universal theory. It does not depend on the choice of the computation-coordinates (the phi_i). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 03 Oct 2011, at 20:51, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 30 Sep 2011, at 17:26, benjayk wrote: COMP is the attempt to solve the mind-body problem with basing everything on computations. This is not correct. Comp is the assumption that the brain functions without extra magic, or that the brain is just a natural machine, like the heart or the liver. It might be false, but still is a widespread belief among rationalist since many centuries, and there are no sign that it might be refuted. Materialists are often using comp as a method to hide the mind-body problem. My own works shows that attempt to be incorrect, and I use comp to formulate precisely the mind body problem. Comp reduces indeed the mind-body problem to a purely mathematical body problem, and this makes comp a scientific (testable, refutable) hypothesis. I wanted to express what you said with the words Comp reduces indeed the mind-body problem to a purely mathematical body problem. OK. And mind is already (almost by definition, assuming comp, reduced to computer science/mathematical logic). For example, the quanta/qualia gap is explained by the ability of machine to get immediate truth impossible to prove to others, etc.) Bruno Marchal wrote: But then one 3-thing remains uncomputable, and undefined, namely the very foundation of computations. We can define computations in terms of numbers relations, and we can define number relations in terms of +,*,N. But what is N? It is 0 and all it's successors. But what is 0? What are successors? They have to remain undefined. If we define 0 as a natural number, natural number remains undefined. If we define 0 as having no successor, successor remains undefined. All theories are build on unprovable axioms. Just all theories. Most scientific theories assumes the numbers, also. But this makes not them undefinable. 0 can be defined as the least natural numbers, and in all models this defines it precisely. But natural *numbers* just make sense relative to 0 and it's successors, because just these are the *numbers*. If you define 0 in terms of natural numbers, and least (which just makes sense relative to numbers), you defined them from something undefined. So I ask you: What are natural numbers without presupposing 0 and its successors? This is a bit a technical question, which involves logic. With enough logic, 0 and s can be defined from the laws of addition and multiplication. It is not really easy. But to get the comp point, you don't need to decide what numbers are, you need only to agree with or just assume some principle, like 0 is not a successor of any natural numbers, if x ≠ y then s(x) ≠ s(y), things like that. Bruno Marchal wrote: But if the very foundation is undefined, it can mean anything, and anything derived from it can mean anything. Then all the scientific endeavor is ruined, including the one done by the brains. This would mean that nothing can have any sense. This is an argument against all science, not just mechanism. No. It is an argument against science based on rationality. We can use it based on our intuition. That is something else. Science is build from intuition, always. Rationality is shared intuition. Choice of axioms are done by intuition. And comp explains the key role of intuition and first person in the very fabric of reality. I don't see the link with what you are saying above. It seems on the contrary that you are the one asking for precise foundation, where rationality says that there are none, and which is something intuition can grasp. Bruno Marchal wrote: One might argue that even though 0 and successor can not be defined it is a specific thing that has a specific meaning. But really, it doesn't. 0 just signifies the absence of something, It might be intepreted like that. But that use extra-metaphysical assumptions. OK. But what else is 0? Nobody knows. But everybody agrees on some axioms, like above, and we start from that. Bruno Marchal wrote: which makes sense if we count things, but as a foundation for a TOE, it is just meaningless (absence of anything at all?), or could mean anything (the absence of anything in particular). Successor signifies that there is one more of something, which makes sense with concrete object, but what is one more of the absence of something (which could mean anything). 1 is the successor of 0. You are confusing the number 0 and its cardinal denotation. OK. But what else is 1? The successor of zero. The predecessor of 2. The only number which divides all other numbers, ... (I don't see your point). Bruno Marchal wrote: So even if we assume that COMP is correct, it is essentially empty, It is not empty to say yes to a doctor, for any operation proposed. OK, this isn't empty. I did not mean COMP as just saying yes doctor, but the (supposed) metaphysical consequences of it. It is a big
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 03 Oct 2011, at 21:00, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Just a little correction. I wrote (on 30 Sep 2011) : On 30 Sep 2011, at 17:26, benjayk wrote: snip The only thing that COMP does is to propose a complicated thought construct which essentially reveals its own emptiness. What can COMP possibly mean? For it to have any use we have to make a bet grounded on pure faith... So we could just as well believe in God, Why not if you make it enough precise so that people can see the scientific problem. usually God is used as an empty (indeed) answer. But with comp, both comp and God is a question, not an answer. or - better -just take the stance of observing whatever happens! Maybe that we have to bet on an substitution level for COMP to have any meaning, and our inability to know any substitution level should lead us to conclude that there probably is no substitution level, or it is undefined, which would just make sense, given that apparently COMP is undefined in its very foundations. So how would react if your daughter want to say yes to a digitalist doctor? Or what if your doctor says that this is the only chance for her to survive some disease? You are using a machine to send this post, which would not even exist if comp did not make sense. I mean ... if comp did not make sense for the reason you gave above. Obviously computer makes sense even if comp is false. But computer would not have appeared if we did not grasp the elementary arithmetical ideas. But we did grasp the elementary ideas. My point is just that it makes no sense to treat arithmetics as something that is meaningful without concrete objects. I don't see why. Concrete objects can be helpful to grasp elementary ideas about numbers for *some* people, but they might be embarrassing for others. The diophantine equation x^2 = 2y^2 has no solution. That fact does not seem to me to depend on any concreteness, and I would say that concreteness is something relative. You seem to admit that naive materialism might be false, so why would little concrete pieces on stuff, or time, helps in understanding that no matter what: there are no natural numbers, different from 0, capable to satisfy the simple equation x^2 = 2y^2. If it isn't, the whole idea of an abstract machine as an independent existing entity goes down the drain, and with it the consequences of COMP. Yes. But this too me seems senseless. It like saying that we cannot prove that 17 is really prime, we have just prove that the fiollowing line . cannot be broken in equal non trivial parts (the trivial parts being the tiny . and the big . itself). But we have no yet verify this for each of the following: . . . . . . . . . . . etc. On the contrary: to understand arithmetic, is quasi-equivalent with the understanding that a statement like 17 is prime, is independent of all concrete situation, in which 17 might be represented. 1, 2, 3,... make only sense in terms of one of something, two of something,... OK, we could say it makes sense to have one of nothing, two of nothing, etc, but in this case numbers are superfluous, and all numbers, and all computations are equivalent. I think that 0, 1, 2, and many others are far more simple conceptually than any something you can multiply them by. But comp needs only that you belief that the elementary arithmetical truth does not depend on you or us (little ego). Are you thinking that if an asteroid rips of humanity from the cosmos, the number 17 would get a non trivial divisor? That does not make sense, I think. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Existence and Properties
On 10/4/2011 10:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 03 Oct 2011, at 19:41, meekerdb wrote: On 10/3/2011 8:43 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: [SPK] Let me try to be sure that I understand this comment. When you write: they will all see the same laws are you referring to those invariant quantities and relations/functions with respect to transformations of reference frames/coordinate systems (which has become the de facto definition of physical laws) or are you referring to our collective human idea of physical laws? Why does it seem to me that you assume that the physical laws that we observe are the only possible ones? To badly echo Leibniz: How these and not some others? It seems to me that we observe exactly the physical laws that are consistent with our existence as observers within this universe, a universe where we can communicate representations of the contents of our 1p to each other. Communication requires a plurality of possible 1p for each and every separate observer in one universe to act as the template from which signal is distinguished from noise, plurality is insufficient to communications between observers. One needs something like the Hennessy-Milner property http://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=hennessy-milner+propertyhl=enas_sdt=0as_vis=1oi=scholart for a coherent notion of communication. There seems to be no a priori reason why we do not experience a universe that contains only a single conscious entity or a universe with completely different laws along with completely different physicality for the observers wherein. IMHO, There is something to the self-selection that Nick Bostrom tedand others have writen about that needs to be included in this discussion in addition to the contraints that communications between many separate entities generates. The conservation laws come from the requirement that we want our laws to be the same for everyone at every time and place. This is our idea of laws. I'm sure you're familiar with Noether's theorem and how she showed that conservation of moment comes from the requirement of invariance under spatial shifts, etc. That is beautiful and rather convincing. My friend Vic Stenger has written a book, The Comprehesible Cosmos, which shows how this idea extends to general relativity, the standard model, gauge theories, etc. and provides a unified view of physics. I recommend it. The part of physics is interesting, but if he would take more seriously the mind-body problem, I think he would appreciated the comp new form of invariance for the physical laws: that is, that the laws of physics do not depend on the initial universal theory. It does not depend on the choice of the computation-coordinates (the phi_i). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/ -- Hi Brent, I am taking Noether's theorems into account. Furthermore, you might note that those theorems collapse if there does not exist spatial and/or temporal manifold. Hi Bruno, Did you happen to have any comment on the rest of my post? It seems that you are intentionally avoiding my argument. Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Bruno List continued
On 10/3/2011 11:11 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Tue, Oct 4, 2011 at 2:30 PM, Craig Weinbergwhatsons...@gmail.com wrote: The neurons are firing in my brain as I'm thinking, but if you could go down to the microscopic level you would see that they are firing due to the various physical factors that make neurons fire, eg. fluxes of calcium and potassium caused by ion channels opening due to neurotransmitter molecules binding to the receptors and changing their conformation. If you take each neuron in the brain in turn at any given time it will always be the case that it is doing what it is doing due to these factors. You will never find a ligand-activated ion channel opening in the absence of a ligand, for example. That would be like a door opening in the absence of any force. Just because doors and protein molecules are different sizes doesn't mean that one can do magical things and the other not. You will also never find a ligand activated ion channel that is associated with a particular subjective experience fire in the absence of that subjective experience (that would be a zombie, right?), so why privilege the pixels of the thing as the determining factor when the overall image is just as much dictating which pixels are lit and how brightly? Again, every time you mention magic it just means that you don't understand my point. Every time you mention it, I am going to give you the same response. I understand your position completely, but you are just throwing dirt clods in the general direction of mine while closing your eyes. The ion channel only opens when the ligand binds. The ligand only binds if it is present in the synapse. It is only present in the synapse when the presynaptic neuron fires. And so on. This whole process is associated with an experience, but it is a completely mechanical process. The equivalent is my example of the door: it opens because someone turns the key and pushes it. If it had qualia it may also be accurate to say that it opens because it wants to open, but since we can't see the qualia they can't have a causal effect on the door. If they could we would see the door opening by itself and we would be amazed. It's the same with the neuron: if the associated qualia had a causal effect on matter we would see neurons firing in the absence of stimuli, which would be amazing. This goes by the name causal completeness; the idea that the 3-p observable state at t is sufficient to predict the state at t+dt. Craig wants add to this that there is additional information which is not 3-p observable and which makes a difference, so that the state at t+dt depends not just on the 3-p observables at t, but also on some additional sensorimotive variables. If you assume these variables are not independent of the 3-p observables, then this is just panpsychic version of consciousness supervening on the 3-p states. They are redundant in the informational sense. If you assume they are independent of the 3-p variables and yet make a difference in the time evolution of the state then it means the predictions based on the 3-p observables will fail, i.e. the laws of physics and chemistry will be violated. Of course this violation maybe hard to detect in something very complicated like a brain; but Craig's theory doesn't seem to assume the brain is special in that respect and even a single electron supposedly has these extra, unobservable variables, i.e. a mind of its own. The problem with electrons or other simple systems is that while we have complete access to their 3-p variables, we don't have access to their hypothetical other variables; the ones we call 1-p when referring to humans. So when all the silver atoms in a Stern-Gerlach do just as we predict, it can be claimed that they all had the same 1-p variables and that's why the 3-p variables were sufficient to predict their behavior. So the only way I see to test this theory, even in principle, would be to observe Craig's brain at a very low level while having him report his experiences (at least to himself) and show that his experiences and his brain states were not one-to-one. Of course this is probably impossible with current technology. Observing the brain at a coarse grained level leaves open the possibility that one is just missing the 3-p variables that you show the relationship to be one-to-one. So I'd say that until someone thinks of an empirical test for this soul theory, discussing it is a waste of bandwidth. Brent Again, it's not that it's wrong to say that the neurons fired in the amygdala because the person thought about gambling, it's that the third person observable behaviour of the neurons can be entirely explained and predicted without any reference to qualia. If the neurons responded directly to qualia they would be observed to do miraculous things and it may not be possible to predict or model their behaviour. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to
Re: COMP is empty(?)
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 03 Oct 2011, at 21:00, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Just a little correction. I wrote (on 30 Sep 2011) : On 30 Sep 2011, at 17:26, benjayk wrote: snip The only thing that COMP does is to propose a complicated thought construct which essentially reveals its own emptiness. What can COMP possibly mean? For it to have any use we have to make a bet grounded on pure faith... So we could just as well believe in God, Why not if you make it enough precise so that people can see the scientific problem. usually God is used as an empty (indeed) answer. But with comp, both comp and God is a question, not an answer. or - better -just take the stance of observing whatever happens! Maybe that we have to bet on an substitution level for COMP to have any meaning, and our inability to know any substitution level should lead us to conclude that there probably is no substitution level, or it is undefined, which would just make sense, given that apparently COMP is undefined in its very foundations. So how would react if your daughter want to say yes to a digitalist doctor? Or what if your doctor says that this is the only chance for her to survive some disease? You are using a machine to send this post, which would not even exist if comp did not make sense. I mean ... if comp did not make sense for the reason you gave above. Obviously computer makes sense even if comp is false. But computer would not have appeared if we did not grasp the elementary arithmetical ideas. But we did grasp the elementary ideas. My point is just that it makes no sense to treat arithmetics as something that is meaningful without concrete objects. I don't see why. Concrete objects can be helpful to grasp elementary ideas about numbers for *some* people, but they might be embarrassing for others. Well, we don't need concrete *physical* objects, necessarily, but concrete mental objects, for example measurement. What do numbers mean without any concrete object, or measurement? What does 1+1=2 mean if there nothing to measure or count about the object in question? Bruno Marchal wrote: The diophantine equation x^2 = 2y^2 has no solution. That fact does not seem to me to depend on any concreteness, and I would say that concreteness is something relative. You seem to admit that naive materialism might be false, so why would little concrete pieces on stuff, or time, helps in understanding that no matter what: there are no natural numbers, different from 0, capable to satisfy the simple equation x^2 = 2y^2. This is just a consequence of using our definitions consistently. Of course we can say 1+2=3 is 3 just because we defined numbers in the way that this is true, without resorting to any concreteness. My point is that we can't derive something about the fundamental nature of things just by adhering to our own definitions of what numbers are, since these ultimately are just a bunch of definitions, whereas the actual thing they rely on (what numbers, or 0 and succesor actually are), remains totally undefined. So whatever we derive from it is just as mysterious as consciousness, or matter, or whatever else, since the basis is totally undefined. Bruno Marchal wrote: If it isn't, the whole idea of an abstract machine as an independent existing entity goes down the drain, and with it the consequences of COMP. Yes. But this too me seems senseless. It like saying that we cannot prove that 17 is really prime, we have just prove that the fiollowing line . cannot be broken in equal non trivial parts (the trivial parts being the tiny . and the big . itself). But we have no yet verify this for each of the following: . . . . . . . . . . . etc. On the contrary: to understand arithmetic, is quasi-equivalent with the understanding that a statement like 17 is prime, is independent of all concrete situation, in which 17 might be represented. Lol, the funny thing is that in your explantion you used concrete things, namely .. Of course concrete is relative. It's concreteness is not really relevant, the point is that numbers just apply to countable or measurable things. Without being countable natural numbers don't even make sense. In order for COMP to be applicable to reality, reality had to be countable, but it doesn't seem to me to be countable. Abstract machines might exist, but just as ideas. Show that they exist beyond that, and then the further reasoning can be taken more seriously. If numbers, and abstract machines exist just as ideas, everything derived from them will be further ideas. You can't unambigously conclude from some idea something about reality. Bruno Marchal wrote:
Re: Existence and Properties
On 10/4/2011 10:25 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: The conservation laws come from the requirement that we want our laws to be the same for everyone at every time and place. This is our idea of laws. I'm sure you're familiar with Noether's theorem and how she showed that conservation of moment comes from the requirement of invariance under spatial shifts, etc. That is beautiful and rather convincing. My friend Vic Stenger has written a book, The Comprehesible Cosmos, which shows how this idea extends to general relativity, the standard model, gauge theories, etc. and provides a unified view of physics. I recommend it. The part of physics is interesting, but if he would take more seriously the mind-body problem, I think he would appreciated the comp new form of invariance for the physical laws: that is, that the laws of physics do not depend on the initial universal theory. It does not depend on the choice of the computation-coordinates (the phi_i). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/ -- Hi Brent, I am taking Noether's theorems into account. Furthermore, you might note that those theorems collapse if there does not exist spatial and/or temporal manifold. The manifold doesn't need to be spatial or temporal. Gauge theories are built on rotations in an abstract space. But my point was just that the answer to the question of where do the laws of physics come from is that We make them up. That answer isn't a surrender to solipism or mysticism because we make them up so that everybody will agree on them at every place and time. And as every time and place is expanded by our use of instruments to extend our range of perceptions it becomes a very strong constraint indeed. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: But then one 3-thing remains uncomputable, and undefined, namely the very foundation of computations. We can define computations in terms of numbers relations, and we can define number relations in terms of +,*,N. But what is N? It is 0 and all it's successors. But what is 0? What are successors? They have to remain undefined. If we define 0 as a natural number, natural number remains undefined. If we define 0 as having no successor, successor remains undefined. All theories are build on unprovable axioms. Just all theories. Most scientific theories assumes the numbers, also. But this makes not them undefinable. 0 can be defined as the least natural numbers, and in all models this defines it precisely. But natural *numbers* just make sense relative to 0 and it's successors, because just these are the *numbers*. If you define 0 in terms of natural numbers, and least (which just makes sense relative to numbers), you defined them from something undefined. So I ask you: What are natural numbers without presupposing 0 and its successors? This is a bit a technical question, which involves logic. With enough logic, 0 and s can be defined from the laws of addition and multiplication. It is not really easy. It is not technical at all. If you can't even explain to me what the fundamental object of your theory is, your whole theory is meaningless to me. I'd be very interested in you attempt to explain addition and multplication without using numbers, though. Bruno Marchal wrote: But to get the comp point, you don't need to decide what numbers are, you need only to agree with or just assume some principle, like 0 is not a successor of any natural numbers, if x ≠ y then s(x) ≠ s(y), things like that. I agree that it is sometimes useful to assume this principle, just as it sometimes useful to assume that Harry Potter uses a wand. Just because we can usefully assume some things in some contexts, do not make them universal truth. So if you want it this way, 1+1=2 is not always true, because there might be other definition of natural numbers, were 1+1=. So you might say that you mean the usual natural numbers. But usual is relative. Maybe for me 1+1= is more usual. Usual is just another word anyway. You fix the definition of natural numbers and use this to defend the absolute truths of the statements about natural numbers. This is just dogmatism. Of course you are going to get this result if you cling to your definition of natural numbers. Anyway, even if I completely agree on these principles, and you derive something interesting from it, if you ultimately are unable to define what numbers are, you effectively just use your imagination to interpret something into the undefinedness of numbers, which you could as well interpret into the undefinedess of consciousness. Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: But if the very foundation is undefined, it can mean anything, and anything derived from it can mean anything. Then all the scientific endeavor is ruined, including the one done by the brains. This would mean that nothing can have any sense. This is an argument against all science, not just mechanism. No. It is an argument against science based on rationality. We can use it based on our intuition. That is something else. Science is build from intuition, always. Rationality is shared intuition. Choice of axioms are done by intuition. And comp explains the key role of intuition and first person in the very fabric of reality. I don't see the link with what you are saying above. It seems on the contrary that you are the one asking for precise foundation, where rationality says that there are none, and which is something intuition can grasp. OK. I don't see how from the foundation being undefined, and possibly meaning anything, ruins the scientific endavour. If anything, it makes it more inclusive. Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: One might argue that even though 0 and successor can not be defined it is a specific thing that has a specific meaning. But really, it doesn't. 0 just signifies the absence of something, It might be intepreted like that. But that use extra-metaphysical assumptions. OK. But what else is 0? Nobody knows. But everybody agrees on some axioms, like above, and we start from that. So why is it better to start with nobody knows-0 and derive something from that than just start with nobody knows-consciousness and just interpet what consciousness means to us? Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: which makes sense if we count things, but as a foundation for a TOE, it is just meaningless (absence of anything at all?), or could mean anything (the absence of anything in particular). Successor signifies that there is one more of something, which makes sense with concrete object, but what is one more of the absence
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 10/4/2011 1:44 PM, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: But then one 3-thing remains uncomputable, and undefined, namely the very foundation of computations. We can define computations in terms of numbers relations, and we can define number relations in terms of +,*,N. But what is N? It is 0 and all it's successors. But what is 0? What are successors? They have to remain undefined. If we define 0 as a natural number, natural number remains undefined. If we define 0 as having no successor, successor remains undefined. All theories are build on unprovable axioms. Just all theories. Most scientific theories assumes the numbers, also. But this makes not them undefinable. 0 can be defined as the least natural numbers, and in all models this defines it precisely. But natural *numbers* just make sense relative to 0 and it's successors, because just these are the *numbers*. If you define 0 in terms of natural numbers, and least (which just makes sense relative to numbers), you defined them from something undefined. So I ask you: What are natural numbers without presupposing 0 and its successors? This is a bit a technical question, which involves logic. With enough logic, 0 and s can be defined from the laws of addition and multiplication. It is not really easy. It is not technical at all. If you can't even explain to me what the fundamental object of your theory is, your whole theory is meaningless to me. I'd be very interested in you attempt to explain addition and multplication without using numbers, though. It's easy. It's the way you explain it to children: Take those red blocks over there and ad them to the green blocks in this box. That's addition. Now make all possible different pairs of one green block and one red block. That's multiplication. Bruno Marchal wrote: But to get the comp point, you don't need to decide what numbers are, you need only to agree with or just assume some principle, like 0 is not a successor of any natural numbers, if x ≠ y then s(x) ≠ s(y), things like that. I agree that it is sometimes useful to assume this principle, just as it sometimes useful to assume that Harry Potter uses a wand. Just because we can usefully assume some things in some contexts, do not make them universal truth. So if you want it this way, 1+1=2 is not always true, because there might be other definition of natural numbers, were 1+1=. It's always true in Platonia, where true just means satisfying the axioms. In real life it's not always true because of things like: This business is so small we just have one owner and one employee and 1+1=1. Brent So you might say that you mean the usual natural numbers. But usual is relative. Maybe for me 1+1= is more usual. Usual is just another word anyway. You fix the definition of natural numbers and use this to defend the absolute truths of the statements about natural numbers. This is just dogmatism. Of course you are going to get this result if you cling to your definition of natural numbers. Anyway, even if I completely agree on these principles, and you derive something interesting from it, if you ultimately are unable to define what numbers are, you effectively just use your imagination to interpret something into the undefinedness of numbers, which you could as well interpret into the undefinedess of consciousness. Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: But if the very foundation is undefined, it can mean anything, and anything derived from it can mean anything. Then all the scientific endeavor is ruined, including the one done by the brains. This would mean that nothing can have any sense. This is an argument against all science, not just mechanism. No. It is an argument against science based on rationality. We can use it based on our intuition. That is something else. Science is build from intuition, always. Rationality is shared intuition. Choice of axioms are done by intuition. And comp explains the key role of intuition and first person in the very fabric of reality. I don't see the link with what you are saying above. It seems on the contrary that you are the one asking for precise foundation, where rationality says that there are none, and which is something intuition can grasp. OK. I don't see how from the foundation being undefined, and possibly meaning anything, ruins the scientific endavour. If anything, it makes it more inclusive. Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: One might argue that even though 0 and successor can not be defined it is a specific thing that has a specific meaning. But really, it doesn't. 0 just signifies the absence of something, It might be intepreted like that. But that use extra-metaphysical assumptions. OK. But what else is 0? Nobody knows. But everybody agrees on some axioms, like above, and we start from that. So why is it better to start with nobody knows-0 and derive something from that than just start with nobody knows-consciousness and
Re: Interesting paper on consciousness, computation and MWI
Hmm... Unfortunately there are several terms there I don't understand. Digital brain. What's a brain? I ask because I'm betting it doesn't mean a pile of gray and white matter. Then you mention artificial brain. That's different from digital? Is digital more nonphysical than artificial? On Tue, Oct 4, 2011 at 7:31 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 04 Oct 2011, at 05:33, Brian Tenneson wrote: From page 17 It is my contention that the only way out of this dilemma is to deny the initial assumption that a classical computer running a particular program can generate conscious awareness in the first place. What about the possibility of allowing for a large number of conscious moments that would, in a limit of some sort, approximate continuous, conscious awareness? In my mind, I liken the comparison to that of a radioactive substance and half-life decay formulas. In truth, there are finitely many atoms decaying but the half-life decay formulas never acknowledge that at some point the predicted mass of what's left measures less than one atom. So I'm talking about a massive number of calculated conscious moments so that for all intents and purposes, continuous conscious awareness is the observed result. Earlier on page 17... its program must only generate a finite sequence of conscious moments. I think I agree with you. I think that such a view is the only compatible with Digital Mechanism, but also with QM (without collapse). Consciousness is never generated by the running of a particular computer. If we can survive with a digital brain, this is related to the fact that we already belong to an infinity of computations, and the artificial brain just preserve that infinity, in a way such that I can survive in my usual normal (Gaussian) neighborhoods. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Existence and Properties
On 10/4/2011 4:20 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 10/4/2011 10:25 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: The conservation laws come from the requirement that we want our laws to be the same for everyone at every time and place. This is our idea of laws. I'm sure you're familiar with Noether's theorem and how she showed that conservation of moment comes from the requirement of invariance under spatial shifts, etc. That is beautiful and rather convincing. My friend Vic Stenger has written a book, The Comprehesible Cosmos, which shows how this idea extends to general relativity, the standard model, gauge theories, etc. and provides a unified view of physics. I recommend it. The part of physics is interesting, but if he would take more seriously the mind-body problem, I think he would appreciated the comp new form of invariance for the physical laws: that is, that the laws of physics do not depend on the initial universal theory. It does not depend on the choice of the computation-coordinates (the phi_i). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/ -- Hi Brent, I am taking Noether's theorems into account. Furthermore, you might note that those theorems collapse if there does not exist spatial and/or temporal manifold. The manifold doesn't need to be spatial or temporal. Gauge theories are built on rotations in an abstract space. But my point was just that the answer to the question of where do the laws of physics come from is that We make them up. That answer isn't a surrender to solipism or mysticism because we make them up so that everybody will agree on them at every place and time. And as every time and place is expanded by our use of instruments to extend our range of perceptions it becomes a very strong constraint indeed. -- Hi, Yes, gauge theories are built on transformations in an abstract space but if you examine those theories carefully you will find that not only is there some form of continuity and smoothness allowing the construction of analytical solutions, but also there exists a mapping between behaviors in those abstract spaces and observable phenomena. If this later mapping did not exist then the theories could not be claimed to be physics, at best they would merely be abstract math and might be considered to be just patterns of abstract games played by imaginative entities. It is mathematics that needs to be careful not to fall into solipsism, for if it has no relation at all with the physical then how does one even consider notions of knowledge of it! Idealism is a very seductive ontological model but it suffers from a very simple but fatal flaw: it reduces all aspects of physicality, such as space, time, solidity, etc. , to mere epiphenomenal descriptions and thus removes any possibility of a coherent notion of causality, time and location. Witness how mathematical entities are claimed to exist independent of physicality, is this not a claim that they have a completely separate existence. How then does one propose the ability to know of the properties of such mathematical entities? If you examine Platonism carefully you will find that it assumes a crude form of substance dualism. Study Plato's writings about noesis http://books.google.com/books?id=N9IMz_YP5IkCpg=PA37lpg=PA37dq=plato+noesissource=blots=kb9xdzTCwysig=g3mJl3BpVyn6t3irKwiNtPArn_ohl=enei=Gn6LTtiDDMO-twfjv8SgAwsa=Xoi=book_resultct=resultresnum=8sqi=2ved=0CFcQ6AEwBw#v=onepageq=plato%20noesisf=false and the allegory of the cave... I demand that our explanatory models be observationally falsifiable and self-consistent, thus avoiding the pitfalls of mystisism, but when one is looking into ontological models then one must be careful to have some form of continuance between the ontological aspects of the model and some connection to observability (by many independent observers). My interest in in ontology and cosmogony models, thus my membership to this List. :-) Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Bruno List continued
On Oct 4, 2:59 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: This goes by the name causal completeness; the idea that the 3-p observable state at t is sufficient to predict the state at t+dt. Craig wants add to this that there is additional information which is not 3-p observable and which makes a difference, so that the state at t+dt depends not just on the 3-p observables at t, but also on some additional sensorimotive variables. If you assume these variables are not independent of the 3-p observables, then this is just panpsychic version of consciousness supervening on the 3-p states. They are redundant in the informational sense. If you assume they are independent of the 3-p variables and yet make a difference in the time evolution of the state then it means the predictions based on the 3-p observables will fail, i.e. the laws of physics and chemistry will be violated. Why would they have to be either completely dependent or independent? I've given several examples demonstrating how we routinely exercise voluntary control over parts of our minds, bodies, and environment while at the same time being involuntarily controlled by those same influences, often at the same time. This isn't a theory, this is the raw data set. If it were the case that the 3p and 1p were completely independent, then you would have ghosts jumping around into aluminum cans and walking around singing, and if they were completely dependent then there would be no point in being able to differentiate between voluntary and involuntary control of our mind, body, and environment. Such an illusory distinction would not only be redundant but it would have no ontological basis to even be able to come into being or be conceivable. It would be like an elephant growing a TV set out of it's trunk to distract it from being an elephant. Since neither of those two cases is possible, I propose, as I have repeatedly proposed, that the 3p and 1p are in fact part of the same essential reality in which they overlap, but that they each extent in different topological directions; specifically, 3p into matter, public space, electromagnetism, entropy, and relativity, and 1p into energy, private time, sensorimotive, significance, and perception. No laws of physics are broken by consciousness, but it is very confusing because our only example of consciousness is human consciousness, which is a multi-trillion cell awareness. The trick is to realize that you cannot directly correlate our experience of consciousness with the 3-p cellular phenomenology, but to only correlate it with the 3-p behavior of the brain as a whole. That's the starting point. If you are going to try to understand what a movie is about, you have to look at the whole images of the movie, and not focus on the pixels of the screen or the mechanics of pixel illumination to guide your interpretation. There is no human consciousness at that low level. There may be sensorimotive 1-p phenomenology there, and I think that there is, but we can't prove it now. What we can prove is there in 3-p would only relate to that low level 1-p which is unknown to us. My proposition is that our 1-p consciousness builds from lower level 1- p awareness and higher level 1-p semantic environmental influences, like cultural ideas, family traditions, etc. It is not predictable from 3-p appearances alone, but not because it breaks the laws of physics. Physics has nothing to say about what particular patterns occur in the brain as a whole. There is no relevant biochemical difference between a one thought and another that could make it impossible physically, just as there is no sequence of illuminated pixels that is preferred by a TV screen, or electronics, or physics. Of course this violation maybe hard to detect in something very complicated like a brain; but Craig's theory doesn't seem to assume the brain is special in that respect and even a single electron supposedly has these extra, unobservable variables, i.e. a mind of its own. No. I have never said that a particle has a mind of it's own, I only say that it may have a sensorimotive quality which is primitive like charge or spin, but that this quality scales up in a different way than quantitative properties. The brain is very special *to us* and I suspect that it is pretty special relatively speaking as far as processes in the Cosmos. It's not special because it has awareness though, it's just the degree to which that awareness is elaborated and concentrated. The problem with electrons or other simple systems is that while we have complete access to their 3-p variables, we don't have access to their hypothetical other variables; the ones we call 1-p when referring to humans. So when all the silver atoms in a Stern-Gerlach do just as we predict, it can be claimed that they all had the same 1-p variables and that's why the 3-p variables were sufficient to predict their behavior. Why is that a
Re: Bruno List continued
On 10/4/2011 5:15 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Oct 4, 2:59 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote: This goes by the name causal completeness; the idea that the 3-p observable state at t is sufficient to predict the state at t+dt. Craig wants add to this that there is additional information which is not 3-p observable and which makes a difference, so that the state at t+dt depends not just on the 3-p observables at t, but also on some additional sensorimotive variables. If you assume these variables are not independent of the 3-p observables, then this is just panpsychic version of consciousness supervening on the 3-p states. They are redundant in the informational sense. If you assume they are independent of the 3-p variables and yet make a difference in the time evolution of the state then it means the predictions based on the 3-p observables will fail, i.e. the laws of physics and chemistry will be violated. Why would they have to be either completely dependent or independent? Did I use the word completely? I've given several examples demonstrating how we routinely exercise voluntary control over parts of our minds, bodies, and environment while at the same time being involuntarily controlled by those same influences, often at the same time. This isn't a theory, this is the raw data set. No it's not. In your examples of voluntary control you don't know what your brain is doing. So you can't know whether you voluntary action was entirely caused by physical precursors or whether their was some effect from libertarian free-will. If it were the case that the 3p and 1p were completely independent, then you would have ghosts jumping around into aluminum cans and walking around singing, and if they were completely dependent then there would be no point in being able to differentiate between voluntary and involuntary control of our mind, body, and environment. Exactly the point of compatibilist free-will. Such an illusory distinction would not only be redundant but it would have no ontological basis to even be able to come into being or be conceivable. It would be like an elephant growing a TV set out of it's trunk to distract it from being an elephant. Or pulling another meaningless example out of the nether regions. Since neither of those two cases is possible, I propose, as I have repeatedly proposed, that the 3p and 1p are in fact part of the same essential reality in which they overlap, but that they each extent in different topological directions; What's a topological direction? specifically, 3p into matter, public space, electromagnetism, entropy, and relativity, and 1p into energy, private time, sensorimotive, significance, and perception. 3p overlaps into entropy!? Reads like gibberish to me. No laws of physics are broken by consciousness, but it is very confusing because our only example of consciousness is human consciousness, which is a multi-trillion cell awareness. Exactly what I said. In fact one's only example of consciousness is their own. The consciousness of other humans is an inference. The trick is to realize that you cannot directly correlate our experience of consciousness with the 3-p cellular phenomenology, but to only correlate it with the 3-p behavior of the brain as a whole. That's the experimental question, and you don't know the answer. That's the starting point. If you are going to try to understand what a movie is about, you have to look at the whole images of the movie, and not focus on the pixels of the screen or the mechanics of pixel illumination to guide your interpretation. There is no human consciousness at that low level. There may be sensorimotive 1-p phenomenology there, and I think that there is, but we can't prove it now. What we can prove is there in 3-p would only relate to that low level 1-p which is unknown to us. My proposition is that our 1-p consciousness builds from lower level 1- p awareness and higher level 1-p semantic environmental influences, like cultural ideas, family traditions, etc. But that is entirely untestable since we have no access to those 1-p consciousnesses. Cultural ideas, family traditions are 3-p observables. It is not predictable from 3-p appearances alone, but not because it breaks the laws of physics. Physics has nothing to say about what particular patterns occur in the brain as a whole. Sure it does - unless magic happens. There is no relevant biochemical difference between a one thought and another that could make it impossible physically, So you say. But I think there is. If you think of an elephant there is something biochemical happening that makes it not a thought about a giraffe. So when you read elephant it is impossible to think of a giraffe at that moment. just as there is no sequence of illuminated pixels that is preferred by a TV screen, or electronics, or physics. Of course this violation maybe hard to detect in something very
Re: Bruno List continued
On Wed, Oct 5, 2011 at 5:59 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: This goes by the name causal completeness; the idea that the 3-p observable state at t is sufficient to predict the state at t+dt. Craig wants add to this that there is additional information which is not 3-p observable and which makes a difference, so that the state at t+dt depends not just on the 3-p observables at t, but also on some additional sensorimotive variables. If you assume these variables are not independent of the 3-p observables, then this is just panpsychic version of consciousness supervening on the 3-p states. They are redundant in the informational sense. If you assume they are independent of the 3-p variables and yet make a difference in the time evolution of the state then it means the predictions based on the 3-p observables will fail, i.e. the laws of physics and chemistry will be violated. Of course this violation maybe hard to detect in something very complicated like a brain; but Craig's theory doesn't seem to assume the brain is special in that respect and even a single electron supposedly has these extra, unobservable variables, i.e. a mind of its own. The problem with electrons or other simple systems is that while we have complete access to their 3-p variables, we don't have access to their hypothetical other variables; the ones we call 1-p when referring to humans. So when all the silver atoms in a Stern-Gerlach do just as we predict, it can be claimed that they all had the same 1-p variables and that's why the 3-p variables were sufficient to predict their behavior. That's a bit like saying there are fairies at the bottom of the garden but they hide whenever we look for them. According to Craig, the 1-p influence (which is equivalent to an immaterial soul) is ubiquitous in living things, and possibly in other things as well. I think if no scientist has ever seen evidence of this ubiquitous influence that is good reason to say that it doesn't exist. In fact, Craig himself denies that his theory would manifest as violation of physical law, and is therefore inconsistent. So the only way I see to test this theory, even in principle, would be to observe Craig's brain at a very low level while having him report his experiences (at least to himself) and show that his experiences and his brain states were not one-to-one. Of course this is probably impossible with current technology. Observing the brain at a coarse grained level leaves open the possibility that one is just missing the 3-p variables that you show the relationship to be one-to-one. So I'd say that until someone thinks of an empirical test for this soul theory, discussing it is a waste of bandwidth. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Bruno List continued
On Oct 4, 8:46 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 10/4/2011 5:15 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Oct 4, 2:59 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote: This goes by the name causal completeness; the idea that the 3-p observable state at t is sufficient to predict the state at t+dt. Craig wants add to this that there is additional information which is not 3-p observable and which makes a difference, so that the state at t+dt depends not just on the 3-p observables at t, but also on some additional sensorimotive variables. If you assume these variables are not independent of the 3-p observables, then this is just panpsychic version of consciousness supervening on the 3-p states. They are redundant in the informational sense. If you assume they are independent of the 3-p variables and yet make a difference in the time evolution of the state then it means the predictions based on the 3-p observables will fail, i.e. the laws of physics and chemistry will be violated. Why would they have to be either completely dependent or independent? Did I use the word completely? You're reducing the possibilities to two mutually exclusive impossible options, so if 'completely' is not implied then you aren't really saying anything. I've given several examples demonstrating how we routinely exercise voluntary control over parts of our minds, bodies, and environment while at the same time being involuntarily controlled by those same influences, often at the same time. This isn't a theory, this is the raw data set. No it's not. In your examples of voluntary control you don't know what your brain is doing. So you can't know whether you voluntary action was entirely caused by physical precursors or whether their was some effect from libertarian free-will. What difference does it make what your brain is doing to be able to say that you are voluntarily controlling the words that you type here? If it were the case that the 3p and 1p were completely independent, then you would have ghosts jumping around into aluminum cans and walking around singing, and if they were completely dependent then there would be no point in being able to differentiate between voluntary and involuntary control of our mind, body, and environment. Exactly the point of compatibilist free-will. What does that label add to this conversation? Such an illusory distinction would not only be redundant but it would have no ontological basis to even be able to come into being or be conceivable. It would be like an elephant growing a TV set out of it's trunk to distract it from being an elephant. Or pulling another meaningless example out of the nether regions. Why meaningless? I'm pointing out that the illusion of free will in a deterministic universe would be not merely puzzling but fantastically absurd. Your criticism is arbitrary. Since neither of those two cases is possible, I propose, as I have repeatedly proposed, that the 3p and 1p are in fact part of the same essential reality in which they overlap, but that they each extent in different topological directions; What's a topological direction? matter elaborates discretely across space, energy elaborates cumulatively through time. specifically, 3p into matter, public space, electromagnetism, entropy, and relativity, and 1p into energy, private time, sensorimotive, significance, and perception. 3p overlaps into entropy!? Reads like gibberish to me. 3-p doesn't overlap entropy, 3-p is entropic. 1-p is syntropic. The overlap is the 'here and now'. I'm not sure that it matters what I say though, you're mainly just auditing my responses for technicalities so that you can get a feeling of 'winning' a debate. It's a sensorimotive circuit. A feeling that you are seeking which requires a particular kind of experience to satisfy it. If I could offer you a drug instead that would stimulate the precise neural pathways involved in feeling that you had proved me wrong in an objective way, would that be satisfying to you? Would there be no difference in being right versus having your physical precursors to feeling right get tweaked? Isn't that what you are saying, that in fact this discussion is nothing but brain drugs with no free will determining our opinions? Isn't being right or wrong just a matter of biochemistry? No laws of physics are broken by consciousness, but it is very confusing because our only example of consciousness is human consciousness, which is a multi-trillion cell awareness. Exactly what I said. In fact one's only example of consciousness is their own. The consciousness of other humans is an inference. I agree. Although I would qualify the inference. It's more of an educated inference. I'm making a different point with it though. I'm saying there is a problem with our default assumptions about micro brain mechanisms correlating with macro
Re: Bruno List continued
On Oct 4, 9:32 pm, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On Wed, Oct 5, 2011 at 5:59 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: This goes by the name causal completeness; the idea that the 3-p observable state at t is sufficient to predict the state at t+dt. Craig wants add to this that there is additional information which is not 3-p observable and which makes a difference, so that the state at t+dt depends not just on the 3-p observables at t, but also on some additional sensorimotive variables. If you assume these variables are not independent of the 3-p observables, then this is just panpsychic version of consciousness supervening on the 3-p states. They are redundant in the informational sense. If you assume they are independent of the 3-p variables and yet make a difference in the time evolution of the state then it means the predictions based on the 3-p observables will fail, i.e. the laws of physics and chemistry will be violated. Of course this violation maybe hard to detect in something very complicated like a brain; but Craig's theory doesn't seem to assume the brain is special in that respect and even a single electron supposedly has these extra, unobservable variables, i.e. a mind of its own. The problem with electrons or other simple systems is that while we have complete access to their 3-p variables, we don't have access to their hypothetical other variables; the ones we call 1-p when referring to humans. So when all the silver atoms in a Stern-Gerlach do just as we predict, it can be claimed that they all had the same 1-p variables and that's why the 3-p variables were sufficient to predict their behavior. That's a bit like saying there are fairies at the bottom of the garden but they hide whenever we look for them. According to Craig, the 1-p influence (which is equivalent to an immaterial soul) Wrong. I have been very consistent in my position that it is a category error to conceive of the 1-p influence as a pseudo-substance. It is not a 'stuff' that's in everything, any more than volts are a stuff that's in everything. it's the opposite of a stuff - it is what it's like to be stuff and to be surrounded by stuff. is ubiquitous in living things, and possibly in other things as well. I think if no scientist has ever seen evidence of this ubiquitous influence that is good reason to say that it doesn't exist. No scientist has ever seen anything other than evidence of sensorimotive perception. That is all that we or anything can ever see. I agree that it doesn't exist in the sense of it occupying space like matter does, it insists and it occupies matter though time. In fact, Craig himself denies that his theory would manifest as violation of physical law, and is therefore inconsistent. There is no inconsistency. You're just not understanding what I'm saying because you are only willing to think in terms of reactive strategies for neutralizing the threat to your common sense (which is a cumulative entanglement of autobiographical experiences and understandings, interpretations of cultural traditions and perspectives, etc). Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Bruno List continued
On 10/4/2011 8:14 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Oct 4, 8:46 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 10/4/2011 5:15 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Oct 4, 2:59 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote: This goes by the name causal completeness; the idea that the 3-p observable state at t is sufficient to predict the state at t+dt. Craig wants add to this that there is additional information which is not 3-p observable and which makes a difference, so that the state at t+dt depends not just on the 3-p observables at t, but also on some additional sensorimotive variables. If you assume these variables are not independent of the 3-p observables, then this is just panpsychic version of consciousness supervening on the 3-p states. They are redundant in the informational sense. If you assume they are independent of the 3-p variables and yet make a difference in the time evolution of the state then it means the predictions based on the 3-p observables will fail, i.e. the laws of physics and chemistry will be violated. Why would they have to be either completely dependent or independent? Did I use the word completely? You're reducing the possibilities to two mutually exclusive impossible options, so if 'completely' is not implied then you aren't really saying anything. I wrote not independent and independent. Those are mutually exclusive in any logic I know of. But not independent is not the same as completely dependent. Try reading what is written. I've given several examples demonstrating how we routinely exercise voluntary control over parts of our minds, bodies, and environment while at the same time being involuntarily controlled by those same influences, often at the same time. This isn't a theory, this is the raw data set. No it's not. In your examples of voluntary control you don't know what your brain is doing. So you can't know whether you voluntary action was entirely caused by physical precursors or whether their was some effect from libertarian free-will. What difference does it make what your brain is doing to be able to say that you are voluntarily controlling the words that you type here? If it were the case that the 3p and 1p were completely independent, then you would have ghosts jumping around into aluminum cans and walking around singing, and if they were completely dependent then there would be no point in being able to differentiate between voluntary and involuntary control of our mind, body, and environment. Exactly the point of compatibilist free-will. What does that label add to this conversation? It makes the discussion precise; instead of wandering around analogies and metaphors. Such an illusory distinction would not only be redundant but it would have no ontological basis to even be able to come into being or be conceivable. It would be like an elephant growing a TV set out of it's trunk to distract it from being an elephant. Or pulling another meaningless example out of the nether regions. Why meaningless? I'm pointing out that the illusion of free will in a deterministic universe would be not merely puzzling but fantastically absurd. Your criticism is arbitrary. You're pointing out the very thing that is in dispute. Your assertion that is absurd is not a substitute for saying how it could be tested and found false. Since neither of those two cases is possible, I propose, as I have repeatedly proposed, that the 3p and 1p are in fact part of the same essential reality in which they overlap, but that they each extent in different topological directions; What's a topological direction? matter elaborates discretely across space, energy elaborates cumulatively through time. A creative use of elaboratesdoes not parse. specifically, 3p into matter, public space, electromagnetism, entropy, and relativity, and 1p into energy, private time, sensorimotive, significance, and perception. 3p overlaps into entropy!? Reads like gibberish to me. 3-p doesn't overlap entropy, 3-p is entropic. 1-p is syntropic. The overlap is the 'here and now'. I'm not sure that it matters what I say though, you're mainly just auditing my responses for technicalities so that you can get a feeling of 'winning' a debate. It's a sensorimotive circuit. A feeling that you are seeking which requires a particular kind of experience to satisfy it. If I could offer you a drug instead that would stimulate the precise neural pathways involved in feeling that you had proved me wrong in an objective way, would that be satisfying to you? Would there be no difference in being right versus having your physical precursors to feeling right get tweaked? Isn't that what you are saying, that in fact this discussion is nothing but brain drugs with no free will determining our opinions? Isn't being right or wrong just a matter of biochemistry? No, it's a matter of passing an empirical test. No laws of physics are broken by consciousness, but it is very
Re: Bruno List continued
On 10/4/2011 6:32 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Wed, Oct 5, 2011 at 5:59 AM, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote: This goes by the name causal completeness; the idea that the 3-p observable state at t is sufficient to predict the state at t+dt. Craig wants add to this that there is additional information which is not 3-p observable and which makes a difference, so that the state at t+dt depends not just on the 3-p observables at t, but also on some additional sensorimotive variables. If you assume these variables are not independent of the 3-p observables, then this is just panpsychic version of consciousness supervening on the 3-p states. They are redundant in the informational sense. If you assume they are independent of the 3-p variables and yet make a difference in the time evolution of the state then it means the predictions based on the 3-p observables will fail, i.e. the laws of physics and chemistry will be violated. Of course this violation maybe hard to detect in something very complicated like a brain; but Craig's theory doesn't seem to assume the brain is special in that respect and even a single electron supposedly has these extra, unobservable variables, i.e. a mind of its own. The problem with electrons or other simple systems is that while we have complete access to their 3-p variables, we don't have access to their hypothetical other variables; the ones we call 1-p when referring to humans. So when all the silver atoms in a Stern-Gerlach do just as we predict, it can be claimed that they all had the same 1-p variables and that's why the 3-p variables were sufficient to predict their behavior. That's a bit like saying there are fairies at the bottom of the garden but they hide whenever we look for them. Right. According to Craig, the 1-p influence (which is equivalent to an immaterial soul) is ubiquitous in living things, and possibly in other things as well. But he doesn't say what effect is has. It could be anything and hence could explain any experimental result. Brent I think if no scientist has ever seen evidence of this ubiquitous influence that is good reason to say that it doesn't exist. In fact, Craig himself denies that his theory would manifest as violation of physical law, and is therefore inconsistent. So the only way I see to test this theory, even in principle, would be to observe Craig's brain at a very low level while having him report his experiences (at least to himself) and show that his experiences and his brain states were not one-to-one. Of course this is probably impossible with current technology. Observing the brain at a coarse grained level leaves open the possibility that one is just missing the 3-p variables that you show the relationship to be one-to-one. So I'd say that until someone thinks of an empirical test for this soul theory, discussing it is a waste of bandwidth. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
