On Oct 4, 2:59 pm, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
> This goes by the name "causal completeness"; the idea that the 3-p observable
> state at t
> is sufficient to predict the state at t+dt. Craig wants add to this that
> there is
> additional information which is not 3-p observable and which makes a
> difference, so that
> the state at t+dt depends not just on the 3-p observables at t, but also on
> additional "sensorimotive" variables. If you assume these variables are not
> of the 3-p observables, then this is just panpsychic version of consciousness
> on the 3-p states. They are redundant in the informational sense. If you
> assume they
> are independent of the 3-p variables and yet make a difference in the time
> evolution of
> the state then it means the predictions based on the 3-p observables will
> fail, i.e. the
> laws of physics and chemistry will be violated.
Why would they have to be either completely dependent or independent?
I've given several examples demonstrating how we routinely exercise
voluntary control over parts of our minds, bodies, and environment
while at the same time being involuntarily controlled by those same
influences, often at the same time. This isn't a theory, this is the
raw data set.
If it were the case that the 3p and 1p were completely independent,
then you would have ghosts jumping around into aluminum cans and
walking around singing, and if they were completely dependent then
there would be no point in being able to differentiate between
voluntary and involuntary control of our mind, body, and environment.
Such an illusory distinction would not only be redundant but it would
have no ontological basis to even be able to come into being or be
conceivable. It would be like an elephant growing a TV set out of it's
trunk to distract it from being an elephant.
Since neither of those two cases is possible, I propose, as I have
repeatedly proposed, that the 3p and 1p are in fact part of the same
essential reality in which they overlap, but that they each extent in
different topological directions; specifically, 3p into matter, public
space, electromagnetism, entropy, and relativity, and 1p into energy,
private time, sensorimotive, significance, and perception.
No laws of physics are broken by consciousness, but it is very
confusing because our only example of consciousness is human
consciousness, which is a multi-trillion cell awareness. The trick is
to realize that you cannot directly correlate our experience of
consciousness with the 3-p cellular phenomenology, but to only
correlate it with the 3-p behavior of the brain as a whole. That's the
starting point. If you are going to try to understand what a movie is
about, you have to look at the whole images of the movie, and not
focus on the pixels of the screen or the mechanics of pixel
illumination to guide your interpretation. There is no human
consciousness at that low level. There may be sensorimotive 1-p
phenomenology there, and I think that there is, but we can't prove it
now. What we can prove is there in 3-p would only relate to that low
level 1-p which is unknown to us.
My proposition is that our 1-p consciousness builds from lower level 1-
p awareness and higher level 1-p semantic environmental influences,
like cultural ideas, family traditions, etc. It is not predictable
from 3-p appearances alone, but not because it breaks the laws of
physics. Physics has nothing to say about what particular patterns
occur in the brain as a whole. There is no relevant biochemical
difference between a one thought and another that could make it
impossible physically, just as there is no sequence of illuminated
pixels that is preferred by a TV screen, or electronics, or physics.
> Of course this violation maybe hard to detect in something very complicated
> like a brain;
> but Craig's theory doesn't seem to assume the brain is special in that
> respect and even a
> single electron supposedly has these extra, unobservable variables, i.e. a
> mind of its
No. I have never said that a particle has a mind of it's own, I only
say that it may have a sensorimotive quality which is primitive like
charge or spin, but that this quality scales up in a different way
than quantitative properties. The brain is very special *to us* and I
suspect that it is pretty special relatively speaking as far as
processes in the Cosmos. It's not special because it has awareness
though, it's just the degree to which that awareness is elaborated and
>The problem with electrons or other simple systems is that while we have
> access to their 3-p variables, we don't have access to their hypothetical
> other variables;
> the ones we call 1-p when referring to humans. So when all the silver atoms
> in a
> Stern-Gerlach do just as we predict, it can be claimed that they all had the
> same 1-p
> variables and that's why the 3-p variables were sufficient to predict their
Why is that a problem?
> So the only way I see to test this theory, even in principle, would be to
> observe Craig's
> brain at a very low level while having him report his experiences (at least
> to himself)
> and show that his experiences and his brain states were not one-to-one.
No, I'm not saying that 1-p and 3-p are not synchronized, they are
synchronized, but that doesn't mean that voluntary choices supervene
on default neurological processes. Look at how our diaphragm works. We
can voluntarily control our breathing to a certain extent, but there
are involuntary default behaviors as well. This does not mean that we
can't decide to hold our breath or that it can only be our body which
is doing the deciding. How do you explain the appearance of voluntary
control of our body?
>Of course this is
> probably impossible with current technology. Observing the brain at a coarse
> level leaves open the possibility that one is just missing the 3-p variables
> that you show
> the relationship to be one-to-one.
> So I'd say that until someone thinks of an empirical test for this "soul
> discussing it is a waste of bandwidth.
Way to argue from authority. "Your thoughts are a waste of everyone's
time unless I think that they can be proved to my satisfaction".
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