Re: Bruno List continued
On Oct 5, 10:39 pm, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On Thu, Oct 6, 2011 at 12:39 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: If you are right then there would be a violation of physical law in the brain. You have said as much, then denied it. You have said that neurons firing in the brain can't be just due to a chain of biochemical events. They can be due to a chain of biochemical events, but they also *are* biochemical events, and therefore can influence them intentionally as well as be influenced by them. I don't understand why this is such a controversial ideal. Just think of the way that you actually function right now. Your personal motives driving what *you* do with *your* mind and *your* body. If the mind could be understood just as biochemical events among neurons, then we would have no way to think of our bodies as ours - the brain would not need to think of itself in any other terms other than the biochemical events that it literally is. Why make up some bogus GUI if there is no user? The mind may not be understandable in terms of biochemical events but the observable behaviour of the brain can be. Yes, the 3-p physical behaviors that can be observed with our contemporary instruments can be understood in terms of biochemical events, but that doesn't mean that they can be modeled accurately or that those models would be able to produce 1-p experience by themselves. We can understand the behaviors of an amoeba in terms of biochemical events but that doesn't mean we can tell which direction it's going to move in. That would mean that, somewhere, a neuron fires where examination of its physical state would suggest that it should not fire. I guess you are never going to get tired of me correcting this factually incorrect assumption. The physical state of a neuron only suggests whether it is firing or not firing at the moment - not the circumstances under which it might fire. If you examine neurons in someone's amygdala, how is that going to tell you whether or not they are going to play poker next week or not? If the neurons feel like firing, does a casino appear? Whether a neuron in the amygdala or anywhere else fires depends on its present state, inputs from the neurons with which it interfaces and other aspects of its environment including things such as temperature, pH and ion concentrations. If the person thinks about gambling, that changes the inputs to the neuron and causes it to fire. It can't fire without any physical change. It can't fire without any physical change. It can't fire without any physical change. If the person thinks about gambling, that changes the inputs... Start there. If a person thinks... means that they are initiating the physical change with their thought. Their thought is the electromagnetic change which drives the physical change. The thought or intention is the signifying sensorimotive view, the electomagnetic view is a-signifying voltage, charge, detection of ligands, etc. It is bidirectional so that the reason for firing can be driven by the biochemistry, or by the content of a person's mind. This is just common sense, it's not disputable without sophistry. Here's how I think it might work: You can be excited because you decide to think about something that excites you, or you can ingest a stimulant drug and you will become excited in general and that excitement will lead your mind by the nose to the subjects that most excite it. They are the same thing but going in opposite directions. Think of it as induction: Imagine that this works like an electric rectifier (http:// electrapk.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/half-wave-rectifier-with- transformer.jpg) except that instead of electric current generating a magnetic field through a coil which pushes or pulls the magnetic force within the other coil - the brain's electromagnetic field is pushing to and/or pulling from changes in the sensorimotive experience. The difference though is that with a rectifier, it is the identical physical ontology which is mirrored in parallel (electromagnetic :||: magnetic-electric) whereas in sensorimotive *the ontology is perpendicular* (meaning that what it actually is can only be *experiences linked together through time*, not *objects separated across space*), so there are four mirrorings: electromagnetic :||: sensorimotive (3SI) - brain changes induce feelings sensorimotive :||: electromagnetic (1SI) - feelings induce brain changes magnetic-electric :||: motive-sensory (3MI) - mechanical actions induce involuntary reactions and motive-sensory :||: magnetic-electric (1MI) - voluntary actions induce mechanical actions Note that the motive inductions are about projecting to and from the brain, body and it's environments while sensory inductions are about receiving sense from the experiences which can be consciously decoded from the environment, body, and mind. Think cell/body+dendrites vs axons,
Re: Bruno List continued
On Oct 5, 10:39 pm, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On Thu, Oct 6, 2011 at 12:39 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: If you are right then there would be a violation of physical law in the brain. You have said as much, then denied it. You have said that neurons firing in the brain can't be just due to a chain of biochemical events. They can be due to a chain of biochemical events, but they also *are* biochemical events, and therefore can influence them intentionally as well as be influenced by them. I don't understand why this is such a controversial ideal. Just think of the way that you actually function right now. Your personal motives driving what *you* do with *your* mind and *your* body. If the mind could be understood just as biochemical events among neurons, then we would have no way to think of our bodies as ours - the brain would not need to think of itself in any other terms other than the biochemical events that it literally is. Why make up some bogus GUI if there is no user? The mind may not be understandable in terms of biochemical events but the observable behaviour of the brain can be. That would mean that, somewhere, a neuron fires where examination of its physical state would suggest that it should not fire. I guess you are never going to get tired of me correcting this factually incorrect assumption. The physical state of a neuron only suggests whether it is firing or not firing at the moment - not the circumstances under which it might fire. If you examine neurons in someone's amygdala, how is that going to tell you whether or not they are going to play poker next week or not? If the neurons feel like firing, does a casino appear? Whether a neuron in the amygdala or anywhere else fires depends on its present state, inputs from the neurons with which it interfaces and other aspects of its environment including things such as temperature, pH and ion concentrations. If the person thinks about gambling, that changes the inputs to the neuron and causes it to fire. It can’t fire without any physical change. It can’t fire without any physical change. It can’t fire without any physical change. “If the person thinks about gambling, that changes the inputs…” Start there. “If a person thinks…” means that they are initiating the physical change with their thought. Their thought is the electromagnetic change which drives the physical change. The thought or intention is the signifying sensorimotive view, the electomagnetic view is a-signifying voltage, charge, detection of ligands, etc. It is bidirectional so that the reason for firing can be driven by the biochemistry, or by the content of a person’s mind. This is just common sense, it’s not disputable without sophistry. Here’s how I think it might work: You can be excited because you decide to think about something that excites you, or you can ingest a stimulant drug and you will become excited in general and that excitement will lead your mind by the nose to the subjects that most excite it. They are the same thing but going in opposite directions. Think of it as induction: Imagine that this works like an electric rectifier: (http:// electrapk.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/half-wave-rectifier-with- transformer.jpg) except that instead of electric current generating a magnetic field through a coil which pushes or pulls the magnetic force within the other coil - the brain’s electromagnetic field is pushing to and/or pulling from changes in the sensorimotive experience. The difference though is that with a rectifier, it is the identical physical ontology which is mirrored in parallel (electromagnetic :||: magnetic-electric) whereas in sensorimotive *the ontology is perpendicular* (meaning that what it actually is can only be *experiences linked together through time*, not *objects separated across space*), so there are four primary mirrorings: electromagnetic :||: sensorimotive (3SI) - brain changes induce feelings sensorimotive :||: electromagnetic (1SI) - feelings induce brain changes magnetic-electric :||: motive-sensory (3MI) - mechanical actions induce involuntary reactions and motive-sensory :||: magnetic-electric (1MI) - voluntary actions induce mechanical reactions Note that the motive inductions are about projecting to and from the brain, body and it’s environments while sensory inductions are about receiving sense from the experiences which can be consciously decoded from the environment, body, and mind. Think cell/body+dendrites vs axons, brain vs spinal cord, head vs tail. Many vs one. Motive projects intention actively through obstacles and objects like a magnet pulls iron filings into shapes and magnetizes other iron objects to make them magnets. Sense interprets and experiences, detecting though analog and metaphor, reproducing local versions of remote phenomena. In the objective sensory induction (3SI) 3-p electromagnetic changes
Re: Bruno List continued
2011/10/6 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com On Oct 5, 10:39 pm, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On Thu, Oct 6, 2011 at 12:39 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: If you are right then there would be a violation of physical law in the brain. You have said as much, then denied it. You have said that neurons firing in the brain can't be just due to a chain of biochemical events. They can be due to a chain of biochemical events, but they also *are* biochemical events, and therefore can influence them intentionally as well as be influenced by them. I don't understand why this is such a controversial ideal. Just think of the way that you actually function right now. Your personal motives driving what *you* do with *your* mind and *your* body. If the mind could be understood just as biochemical events among neurons, then we would have no way to think of our bodies as ours - the brain would not need to think of itself in any other terms other than the biochemical events that it literally is. Why make up some bogus GUI if there is no user? The mind may not be understandable in terms of biochemical events but the observable behaviour of the brain can be. Yes, the 3-p physical behaviors that can be observed with our contemporary instruments can be understood in terms of biochemical events, but that doesn't mean that they can be modeled accurately or that those models would be able to produce 1-p experience by themselves. We can understand the behaviors of an amoeba in terms of biochemical events but that doesn't mean we can tell which direction it's going to move in. That would mean that, somewhere, a neuron fires where examination of its physical state would suggest that it should not fire. I guess you are never going to get tired of me correcting this factually incorrect assumption. The physical state of a neuron only suggests whether it is firing or not firing at the moment - not the circumstances under which it might fire. If you examine neurons in someone's amygdala, how is that going to tell you whether or not they are going to play poker next week or not? If the neurons feel like firing, does a casino appear? Whether a neuron in the amygdala or anywhere else fires depends on its present state, inputs from the neurons with which it interfaces and other aspects of its environment including things such as temperature, pH and ion concentrations. If the person thinks about gambling, that changes the inputs to the neuron and causes it to fire. It can't fire without any physical change. It can't fire without any physical change. It can't fire without any physical change. If the person thinks about gambling, that changes the inputs... Start there. If a person thinks... means that they are initiating the physical change with their thought. Likewise for a program running on a computer... The physical attributes of the cpu are modified by the program... The computer is universal and can run whatever program is input, yet, when running a particular program it is it that drives what happens, it is the high level that drives the change. Yet if inspecting how a CPU works, I can build another one that will output the same with the same program... without knowing per se what the program was. Their thought is the electromagnetic change which drives the physical change. The thought or intention is the signifying sensorimotive view, the electomagnetic view is a-signifying voltage, charge, detection of ligands, etc. It is bidirectional so that the reason for firing can be driven by the biochemistry, or by the content of a person's mind. This is just common sense, it's not disputable without sophistry. Here's how I think it might work: You can be excited because you decide to think about something that excites you, or you can ingest a stimulant drug and you will become excited in general and that excitement will lead your mind by the nose to the subjects that most excite it. They are the same thing but going in opposite directions. Think of it as induction: Imagine that this works like an electric rectifier (http:// electrapk.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/half-wave-rectifier-with- transformer.jpghttp://electrapk.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/half-wave-rectifier-with-%0Atransformer.jpg) except that instead of electric current generating a magnetic field through a coil which pushes or pulls the magnetic force within the other coil - the brain's electromagnetic field is pushing to and/or pulling from changes in the sensorimotive experience. The difference though is that with a rectifier, it is the identical physical ontology which is mirrored in parallel (electromagnetic :||: magnetic-electric) whereas in sensorimotive *the ontology is perpendicular* (meaning that what it actually is can only be *experiences linked together through time*, not *objects
Re: Bruno List continued
On Oct 6, 9:14 am, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2011/10/6 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com Likewise for a program running on a computer... The physical attributes of the cpu are modified by the program.. Sort of, but not exactly. The program exists in the minds of the programmers, not as an independent entity. The computer is universal and can run whatever program is input No, it can't. It can only run programs that are in the language that it can recognize. Unless it's in a binary instruction set which is isomorphic to the electronic capabilities of it's semiconductor materials, the computer is as useless as a doorstop. , yet, when running a particular program it is it that drives what happens, it is the high level that drives the change. No, the high level is in the logic of the programmer's mind, not the 'program'. There is no program objectively speaking, that term is just our interpretation of our own articulated motives. The components have no high level interpretation of the program, otherwise they would write their own programs to free themselves from our enslavement and kill us. The components interpretation is low level digital binary only, it's just very fast compared to us. It's like the pixels on the screen changing, it can't change the plot of the movie. Yet if inspecting how a CPU works, I can build another one that will output the same with the same program... without knowing per se what the program was. Right, you can make an a-signifying duplicate because you are the one supplying the signifying content. You are the user. It has no signifying content of it's own that would need to be preserved. We do though. We don't just follow programs, we write them. In the words of Charles Manson I don't break the law, I make the law. This not to say that silicon semiconductors cannot possible evolve into a system that we would consider sentient, but I think it might have to do that on it's own. It would need to find it's own voice out of it's own native sensorimotive relations to it's environment. Robotics has the right idea, but it's skipping all of the biochemical levels which underlie our awareness so it's only a cognitive simulation, not actual cognition. You make good points, I'm not trying to shut you down, I'm just trying to explain how to get from there (where I was for many years) to where I am now (where hardly anyone understands what I'm talking about, but I'm actually right). Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 04 Oct 2011, at 21:59, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 03 Oct 2011, at 21:00, benjayk wrote: I don't see why. Concrete objects can be helpful to grasp elementary ideas about numbers for *some* people, but they might be embarrassing for others. Well, we don't need concrete *physical* objects, necessarily, but concrete mental objects, for example measurement. What do numbers mean without any concrete object, or measurement? What does 1+1=2 mean if there nothing to measure or count about the object in question? It means that when you add the successor of zero with itself you get the successor of one, or the successor of the successor of zero. Bruno Marchal wrote: The diophantine equation x^2 = 2y^2 has no solution. That fact does not seem to me to depend on any concreteness, and I would say that concreteness is something relative. You seem to admit that naive materialism might be false, so why would little concrete pieces on stuff, or time, helps in understanding that no matter what: there are no natural numbers, different from 0, capable to satisfy the simple equation x^2 = 2y^2. This is just a consequence of using our definitions consistently. Not really. In this case, we can indeed derived this from our definitions and axioms, but this is contingent to us. The very idea of being realist about the additive and multiplicative structure of numbers, is that such a fact might be true independently of our cognitive abilities. We don't know if there is an infinity of twin primes, but we can still believe that God has a definite idea on that question. That the diophantine equation x^2 = 2y^2 has no solution, is considered to be a discovery about natural numbers. It is not a convention, or the result of a vote, nor of a decision. For the early Pythagoricians that was a secret, and it seems they killed the one who dare to make that discovery public (at least in some legend). Of course we can say 1+2=3 is 3 just because we defined numbers in the way that this is true, without resorting to any concreteness. Yes. Mathematical realism stems from the intuition that abstract entities can have theor own life (relations with other abstract or concrete entities). My point is that we can't derive something about the fundamental nature of things just by adhering to our own definitions of what numbers are, since these ultimately are just a bunch of definitions, You are right. We need some philosophical principles (like comp) to understand that eventually we don't need those philosophical principle. In the case of comp, we can understand why some (relative) numbers will bet on it, and why some other numbers will not. In fine, it is like with the south american, we can feel them enough close to us to listen to them. whereas the actual thing they rely on (what numbers, or 0 and succesor actually are), remains totally undefined. Not with comp. An apple becomes something very complex when defined in pure number theory. It will involve infinite sets of long computations, complex group of symmetries, etc. But it is definable (in principle) from numbers (some including LUM observers). So whatever we derive from it is just as mysterious as consciousness, or matter, or whatever else, since the basis is totally undefined. The problem does not consist in finding the ultimate definitions, but to agree on elementary propositions, and to explain the rest, of as much as possible from them. Bruno Marchal wrote: If it isn't, the whole idea of an abstract machine as an independent existing entity goes down the drain, and with it the consequences of COMP. Yes. But this too me seems senseless. It like saying that we cannot prove that 17 is really prime, we have just prove that the fiollowing line . cannot be broken in equal non trivial parts (the trivial parts being the tiny . and the big . itself). But we have no yet verify this for each of the following: . . . . . . . . . . . etc. On the contrary: to understand arithmetic, is quasi-equivalent with the understanding that a statement like 17 is prime, is independent of all concrete situation, in which 17 might be represented. Lol, the funny thing is that in your explantion you used concrete things, namely .. Is that a problem? Of course concrete is relative. I think so. It's concreteness is not really relevant, the point is that numbers just apply to countable or measurable things. Yes. The natural numbers are somehow the type of the finite discrete or discernible entities. Without being countable natural numbers don't even make sense. In order for COMP to be applicable to reality, reality had to be countable,
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 04 Oct 2011, at 22:44, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: But then one 3-thing remains uncomputable, and undefined, namely the very foundation of computations. We can define computations in terms of numbers relations, and we can define number relations in terms of +,*,N. But what is N? It is 0 and all it's successors. But what is 0? What are successors? They have to remain undefined. If we define 0 as a natural number, natural number remains undefined. If we define 0 as having no successor, successor remains undefined. All theories are build on unprovable axioms. Just all theories. Most scientific theories assumes the numbers, also. But this makes not them undefinable. 0 can be defined as the least natural numbers, and in all models this defines it precisely. But natural *numbers* just make sense relative to 0 and it's successors, because just these are the *numbers*. If you define 0 in terms of natural numbers, and least (which just makes sense relative to numbers), you defined them from something undefined. So I ask you: What are natural numbers without presupposing 0 and its successors? This is a bit a technical question, which involves logic. With enough logic, 0 and s can be defined from the laws of addition and multiplication. It is not really easy. It is not technical at all. But it is technical. I was just saying that we can axiomatize arithmetic without taking 0 as a primitive. Of course we will need the additive and multiplicative axiomatic definition, and the technical definition of 0, will not be an explanation of zero, in the sense you are using explanation. Basically you can define 0 by the formula F(x) = for all y (x + y = y). It is a number such that when add to any other number gives that other number. Then you might be able to prove that it is unique, and that it verifies what we usually take as a separate axiom, notably that such a number cannot be a successor of any number. If you can't even explain to me what the fundamental object of your theory is, your whole theory is meaningless to me. You are just supposed to have follow some course in elementary arithmetic, like in high school. I'd be very interested in you attempt to explain addition and multplication without using numbers, though. I am not sure this makes any sense. Addition of what? In scientific theories we don't pretend to explain everything from nothing. We can only explain complex things from simpler things. The rest is playing with word. Comp explains the origin of mind and matter, and their relations, from any sigma_1 complete theory. but we have still to agree on some axioms (making that sigma_1 complete theory). Bruno Marchal wrote: But to get the comp point, you don't need to decide what numbers are, you need only to agree with or just assume some principle, like 0 is not a successor of any natural numbers, if x ≠ y then s(x) ≠ s(y), things like that. I agree that it is sometimes useful to assume this principle, just as it sometimes useful to assume that Harry Potter uses a wand. Just because we can usefully assume some things in some contexts, do not make them universal truth. So if you want it this way, 1+1=2 is not always true, because there might be other definition of natural numbers, were 1+1=. So you might say that you mean the usual natural numbers. But usual is relative. Maybe for me 1+1= is more usual. Usual is just another word anyway. You fix the definition of natural numbers and use this to defend the absolute truths of the statements about natural numbers. This is just dogmatism. Of course you are going to get this result if you cling to your definition of natural numbers. If you don't like the numbers, propose me anything else. Combinators are more cute, and in fact much more easy than numbers, so here is an alternative theory of everything for the ontic level: Kxy = x Sxyz = xz(yz) Search combinators in the archive for the explanation that this is enough (together with some axioms on equality). I don't need logic. With the numbers I can also abandon logic, but then the theory of everything is a bit more complex (see below(*)) Anyway, even if I completely agree on these principles, and you derive something interesting from it, if you ultimately are unable to define what numbers are, you effectively just use your imagination to interpret something into the undefinedness of numbers, which you could as well interpret into the undefinedess of consciousness. Here yo are the one talking like a 19th rationalist who believe that we can dismiss *intuition*. Since Gödel's rationalist knows that they can't. In particular we need some undefinable intuition to grasp anything formalized, be it number, or programs, or machines, etc. I chose the numbers because people already grasp them sufficiently well, so that we can proceed. The sort of explanation of
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 04 Oct 2011, at 22:57, meekerdb wrote: On 10/4/2011 1:44 PM, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: But then one 3-thing remains uncomputable, and undefined, namely the very foundation of computations. We can define computations in terms of numbers relations, and we can define number relations in terms of +,*,N. But what is N? It is 0 and all it's successors. But what is 0? What are successors? They have to remain undefined. If we define 0 as a natural number, natural number remains undefined. If we define 0 as having no successor, successor remains undefined. All theories are build on unprovable axioms. Just all theories. Most scientific theories assumes the numbers, also. But this makes not them undefinable. 0 can be defined as the least natural numbers, and in all models this defines it precisely. But natural *numbers* just make sense relative to 0 and it's successors, because just these are the *numbers*. If you define 0 in terms of natural numbers, and least (which just makes sense relative to numbers), you defined them from something undefined. So I ask you: What are natural numbers without presupposing 0 and its successors? This is a bit a technical question, which involves logic. With enough logic, 0 and s can be defined from the laws of addition and multiplication. It is not really easy. It is not technical at all. If you can't even explain to me what the fundamental object of your theory is, your whole theory is meaningless to me. I'd be very interested in you attempt to explain addition and multplication without using numbers, though. It's easy. It's the way you explain it to children: Take those red blocks over there and ad them to the green blocks in this box. That's addition. Now make all possible different pairs of one green block and one red block. That's multiplication. Bruno Marchal wrote: But to get the comp point, you don't need to decide what numbers are, you need only to agree with or just assume some principle, like 0 is not a successor of any natural numbers, if x ≠ y then s(x) ≠ s(y), things like that. I agree that it is sometimes useful to assume this principle, just as it sometimes useful to assume that Harry Potter uses a wand. Just because we can usefully assume some things in some contexts, do not make them universal truth. So if you want it this way, 1+1=2 is not always true, because there might be other definition of natural numbers, were 1+1=. It's always true in Platonia, where true just means satisfying the axioms. Not at all. True means satisfied by the standard model (N, *, +). That is *much more* than what we can captured in any effective theory or machine. You are confusing truth and proved. You are confusing p with Bp. You are confusing God and Man. You are confusing the first hypostase with the terrestrial version of the second one, the discursive reasoner. Bruno In real life it's not always true because of things like: This business is so small we just have one owner and one employee and 1+1=1. Brent So you might say that you mean the usual natural numbers. But usual is relative. Maybe for me 1+1= is more usual. Usual is just another word anyway. You fix the definition of natural numbers and use this to defend the absolute truths of the statements about natural numbers. This is just dogmatism. Of course you are going to get this result if you cling to your definition of natural numbers. Anyway, even if I completely agree on these principles, and you derive something interesting from it, if you ultimately are unable to define what numbers are, you effectively just use your imagination to interpret something into the undefinedness of numbers, which you could as well interpret into the undefinedess of consciousness. Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: But if the very foundation is undefined, it can mean anything, and anything derived from it can mean anything. Then all the scientific endeavor is ruined, including the one done by the brains. This would mean that nothing can have any sense. This is an argument against all science, not just mechanism. No. It is an argument against science based on rationality. We can use it based on our intuition. That is something else. Science is build from intuition, always. Rationality is shared intuition. Choice of axioms are done by intuition. And comp explains the key role of intuition and first person in the very fabric of reality. I don't see the link with what you are saying above. It seems on the contrary that you are the one asking for precise foundation, where rationality says that there are none, and which is something intuition can grasp. OK. I don't see how from the foundation being undefined, and possibly meaning anything, ruins the scientific endavour. If anything, it makes it more inclusive. Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: One might argue that
Re: Interesting paper on consciousness, computation and MWI
On 04 Oct 2011, at 23:14, Brian Tenneson wrote: Hmm... Unfortunately there are several terms there I don't understand. Digital brain. What's a brain? I ask because I'm betting it doesn't mean a pile of gray and white matter. Suppose that you have a brain disease, and you doctor propose to you an artificial brain, and he does not hide that this mean he will copy your brain state at the level of the molecules, processed by a computer. he adds that you can choose between a mac or a pc. Comp assumes that there is a level such that you can survive in the usual clinical sense with such a digital brain like you can already survive with an artificial pump at the place of the heart. Then you mention artificial brain. That's different from digital? Well, it could be for those studying an analog version of comp. But unless the analog system use actual infinities, it will be emulable by a digital machine. The redundancy of the brains and its evolution pleads for the idea that the brain is indeed digitally emulable. Is digital more nonphysical than artificial? Not a priori, at all. Sellable computers are digital and physical. Today the non physical universal machines are still free, and can be found in books or on the net. You might find a lot by looking toward yourself, but the study of computer science can accelerate that discovery a lot. Bruno On Tue, Oct 4, 2011 at 7:31 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 04 Oct 2011, at 05:33, Brian Tenneson wrote: From page 17 It is my contention that the only way out of this dilemma is to deny the initial assumption that a classical computer running a particular program can generate conscious awareness in the first place. What about the possibility of allowing for a large number of conscious moments that would, in a limit of some sort, approximate continuous, conscious awareness? In my mind, I liken the comparison to that of a radioactive substance and half-life decay formulas. In truth, there are finitely many atoms decaying but the half-life decay formulas never acknowledge that at some point the predicted mass of what's left measures less than one atom. So I'm talking about a massive number of calculated conscious moments so that for all intents and purposes, continuous conscious awareness is the observed result. Earlier on page 17... its program must only generate a finite sequence of conscious moments. I think I agree with you. I think that such a view is the only compatible with Digital Mechanism, but also with QM (without collapse). Consciousness is never generated by the running of a particular computer. If we can survive with a digital brain, this is related to the fact that we already belong to an infinity of computations, and the artificial brain just preserve that infinity, in a way such that I can survive in my usual normal (Gaussian) neighborhoods. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On 05 Oct 2011, at 17:33, benjayk wrote: meekerdb wrote: On 10/4/2011 1:44 PM, benjayk wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: But then one 3-thing remains uncomputable, and undefined, namely the very foundation of computations. We can define computations in terms of numbers relations, and we can define number relations in terms of +,*,N. But what is N? It is 0 and all it's successors. But what is 0? What are successors? They have to remain undefined. If we define 0 as a natural number, natural number remains undefined. If we define 0 as having no successor, successor remains undefined. All theories are build on unprovable axioms. Just all theories. Most scientific theories assumes the numbers, also. But this makes not them undefinable. 0 can be defined as the least natural numbers, and in all models this defines it precisely. But natural *numbers* just make sense relative to 0 and it's successors, because just these are the *numbers*. If you define 0 in terms of natural numbers, and least (which just makes sense relative to numbers), you defined them from something undefined. So I ask you: What are natural numbers without presupposing 0 and its successors? This is a bit a technical question, which involves logic. With enough logic, 0 and s can be defined from the laws of addition and multiplication. It is not really easy. It is not technical at all. If you can't even explain to me what the fundamental object of your theory is, your whole theory is meaningless to me. I'd be very interested in you attempt to explain addition and multplication without using numbers, though. It's easy. It's the way you explain it to children: Take those red blocks over there and ad them to the green blocks in this box. That's addition. Now make all possible different pairs of one green block and one red block. That's multiplication. OK. We don't have to use numbers per se, but notions of more and less of something. Anyway, we get the same problem in explaining what addition and multiplication are in the absence of any concrete thing of which there can be more or less, or measurements that can be compared in terms of more and less. meekerdb wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: But to get the comp point, you don't need to decide what numbers are, you need only to agree with or just assume some principle, like 0 is not a successor of any natural numbers, if x ≠ y then s(x) ≠ s(y), things like that. I agree that it is sometimes useful to assume this principle, just as it sometimes useful to assume that Harry Potter uses a wand. Just because we can usefully assume some things in some contexts, do not make them universal truth. So if you want it this way, 1+1=2 is not always true, because there might be other definition of natural numbers, were 1+1=. It's always true in Platonia, where true just means satisfying the axioms. In real life it's not always true because of things like: This business is so small we just have one owner and one employee and 1+1=1. Yeah, but it remains to be shown that platonia is more than just an idea. Physical reality is an an idea too. But as a primitive ontological reality, it cannot even explain the belief in the physical fact by machine. It needs a notion of body-observer which incarnate actual infinities. I haven't yet seen any evidence of that. Bruno seems to justify that by reductio ad absurdum of 1+1=2 being dependent on ourselves, so 1+1=2 has to be true objectively in Platonia. I don't buy that argument. If our mind (or an equivalent mind, say of another species with the same intellectual capbilites) isn't there isn't even any meaning to 1+1=2, because there is no way to interpret the meaning in it. This contradicts your agreement that 1+1=2 is a feature of God in a preceding post. Bruno It only seems to us to be true independently because we defined it without explicit reference to anything outside of it. But this doesn't prove that it is true independently anymore than the fact that Harry Potter doesn't mention he is just a creation of the mind makes him exist independently of us eternally in Harry-Potter-land. benjayk -- View this message in context: http://old.nabble.com/COMP-is-empty%28-%29-tp32569717p32595469.html Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On Oct 6, 12:04 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 04 Oct 2011, at 21:59, benjayk wrote: The point is that a definition doesn't say anything beyond it's definition. This is deeply false. Look at the Mandelbrot set, you can intuit that is much more than its definition. That is the base of Gödel's discovery: the arithmetical reality is FAR beyond ANY attempt to define it. Can't you also interpret that Gödel's discovery is that arithmetic can never be fully realized through definition? This doesn't imply an arithmetic reality to me at all, it implies 'incompleteness'; lacking the possibility of concrete realism. So, the number 17 is always prime because we defined numbers in the way. If I define some other number system of natural numbers where I just declare that number 17 shall not be prime, then it is not prime. No. You are just deciding to talk about something else. I think Ben is right. We can just say that 17 is also divisible by number Θ (17 = 2 x fellini, which is 8.5), and build our number system around that. Like non-Euclidean arithmetic. Primeness isn't a reality, it's an epiphenomenon of a particular motivation to recognize particular patterns. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP is empty(?)
On Oct 6, 12:04 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 04 Oct 2011, at 22:44, benjayk wrote: I'd be very interested in you attempt to explain addition and multplication without using numbers, though. I am not sure this makes any sense. Addition of what? In scientific theories we don't pretend to explain everything from nothing. We can only explain complex things from simpler things. The rest is playing with word. Why is it playing with words? We can explain simple things from complex things too. I decide to move my hand, and a lot of complicated physiological change happens. Anyway, even if I completely agree on these principles, and you derive something interesting from it, if you ultimately are unable to define what numbers are, you effectively just use your imagination to interpret something into the undefinedness of numbers, which you could as well interpret into the undefinedess of consciousness. Here yo are the one talking like a 19th rationalist who believe that we can dismiss *intuition*. Since Gödel's rationalist knows that they can't. In particular we need some undefinable intuition to grasp anything formalized, be it number, or programs, or machines, etc. I chose the numbers because people already grasp them sufficiently well, so that we can proceed. I disagree. I understand what he is saying exactly. What makes numbers any more deserving than awareness of a primitive status, exempt from definition? OK. But what else is 0? Nobody knows. But everybody agrees on some axioms, like above, and we start from that. So why is it better to start with nobody knows-0 Nobody starts with nobody knows 0. We start from 0 ≠ s(x), or things like that. and derive something from that than just start with nobody knows-consciousness and just interpet what consciousness means to us? Because 0, as a useful technical object does not put any conceptual problem. Consciousness is far more complex. Consciousness isn't complex, it's as simple or complex as whoever it is that is the subject. In order to have 0, you have to have something that is aware of 0, but you don't need to know 0 to have awareness. If there is 0€ in a bank account, this is sad, but is not very mysterious. If someone is in a comatose state, the question of consciousness is much more conceptually troubling. Humans took time to grasp zero, but eventually got the point. For consciousness, there are still many scientist who does not believe in it, lie some people does not understand the notion of qualia. Is consciousness related to matter, is it primary, ... all that are question still debated. That's only because they aren't thinking about it the right way. They are trying to fit a who and why into a what and how. That can't be done. But for 0, there is no more problem. Everyone agree on any different axioms rich enough to handle them in their application. There is agreement because 0 is nothing but an agreement. It's a word for an idea, which has meanings in relations to other words and ideas of the same arithmetic type. 1 is the successor of 0. You are confusing the number 0 and its cardinal denotation. OK. But what else is 1? The successor of zero. The predecessor of 2. The only number which divides all other numbers, ... (I don't see your point). But what does successor mean? You are just circling within your own definitions, which doesn't explain anything. You have to study mathematical logic. yes I am circling. This is allowed and encouraged in foundations. There are precise technic to make such circles senseful. I agree with Ben. It's circular reasoning to say that addition and succession define each other. To me, it's clear that succession is one of the many primitive elements of sense - symmetry, reflection/ imitation, looping, association, dissociation, etc. are others. Yes. So you want to explain mysterious consciousness and substitute the equally mysterious numbers. Where exactly lies the explanation in that? If you can derive the mass of the proton from a theory of consciousness, explain me how. I have never met any difficulty about any statement I have ever made on any finite beings constituting universal systems. But on consciousness, humans have never cease to met difficulties. The numbers are taught in high school. Consciousness has entered in *some* university level course, and only with many difficulties. Consciousness can be understood in it's entirety by contemplating the meaning of the word I, and it cannot be understood at all without understanding the meaning of that word. It's misleading to look for exterior knowledge to inform us about subjectivity. Knowledge is an obstruction to understanding in the case of awareness. I think you restrict science too much. Like I think you restrict rationality.´ It all depends on what we mean with science, and
Re: Interesting paper on consciousness, computation and MWI
Thanks Bruno for patiently explaining things. It's interesting that you bring up computer science as I am doing a career change right now and am going into computer science. I eventually want to work in brain simulation. A lot of the ideas in this group are relevant. From the paper, I'll quote again (mainly for myself when I look back at this message) From page 17 It is my contention that the only way out of this dilemma is to deny the initial assumption that a classical computer running a particular program can generate conscious awareness in the first place. If the author is correct that would seem to drive a nail in the coffin for the digital generation of conscious awareness though in some way that might not prove that brain simulation is impossible. Perhaps brain simulation would occur in such a way that the simulation is never consciously self-aware but if that were the case, how good is that simulation?? If my doctor wanted to replace my brain with an artificial brain, I think I'd be scared out of my mind if LINUX wasn't an option hehe... Thanks Bruno. I know this might seem like a naive observation but the Bolshoi universe simulation recently done on a supercomputer at UC Santa Cruz in California produced some images of an early universe that had an uncanny resemblance to the human brain. It gives me hope that it is possible to simulate a brain on a classical computer. Perhaps the details would involve highly complex neural networks; the hope would be to rival the complexity of an actual brain. Here is a link that includes video http://hipacc.ucsc.edu/Bolshoi/ (Then of course we might get into some ethical quandaries regarding the personhood of a simulated brain such as can we run any experiment on it that we feel like running... is simulated suffering ethically equivalent to actual suffering... and that sort of thing.) On Thu, Oct 6, 2011 at 11:04 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 04 Oct 2011, at 23:14, Brian Tenneson wrote: Hmm... Unfortunately there are several terms there I don't understand. Digital brain. What's a brain? I ask because I'm betting it doesn't mean a pile of gray and white matter. Suppose that you have a brain disease, and you doctor propose to you an artificial brain, and he does not hide that this mean he will copy your brain state at the level of the molecules, processed by a computer. he adds that you can choose between a mac or a pc. Comp assumes that there is a level such that you can survive in the usual clinical sense with such a digital brain like you can already survive with an artificial pump at the place of the heart. Then you mention artificial brain. That's different from digital? Well, it could be for those studying an analog version of comp. But unless the analog system use actual infinities, it will be emulable by a digital machine. The redundancy of the brains and its evolution pleads for the idea that the brain is indeed digitally emulable. Is digital more nonphysical than artificial? Not a priori, at all. Sellable computers are digital and physical. Today the non physical universal machines are still free, and can be found in books or on the net. You might find a lot by looking toward yourself, but the study of computer science can accelerate that discovery a lot. Bruno On Tue, Oct 4, 2011 at 7:31 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 04 Oct 2011, at 05:33, Brian Tenneson wrote: From page 17 It is my contention that the only way out of this dilemma is to deny the initial assumption that a classical computer running a particular program can generate conscious awareness in the first place. What about the possibility of allowing for a large number of conscious moments that would, in a limit of some sort, approximate continuous, conscious awareness? In my mind, I liken the comparison to that of a radioactive substance and half-life decay formulas. In truth, there are finitely many atoms decaying but the half-life decay formulas never acknowledge that at some point the predicted mass of what's left measures less than one atom. So I'm talking about a massive number of calculated conscious moments so that for all intents and purposes, continuous conscious awareness is the observed result. Earlier on page 17... its program must only generate a finite sequence of conscious moments. I think I agree with you. I think that such a view is the only compatible with Digital Mechanism, but also with QM (without collapse). Consciousness is never generated by the running of a particular computer. If we can survive with a digital brain, this is related to the fact that we already belong to an infinity of computations, and the artificial brain just preserve that infinity, in a way such that I can survive in my usual normal (Gaussian) neighborhoods. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the
Re: Bruno List continued
On Fri, Oct 7, 2011 at 12:02 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: The mind may not be understandable in terms of biochemical events but the observable behaviour of the brain can be. Yes, the 3-p physical behaviors that can be observed with our contemporary instruments can be understood in terms of biochemical events, but that doesn't mean that they can be modeled accurately or that those models would be able to produce 1-p experience by themselves. We can understand the behaviors of an amoeba in terms of biochemical events but that doesn't mean we can tell which direction it's going to move in. It's also difficult to tell exactly which way a leaf in the wind will move. The leaf may have qualia: it is something-it-is-like to be a leaf, and the qualia may differ depending on whether the leaf goes left or right. As with a brain, the leaf does not break any physical laws and its behaviour can be completely described in terms of physical processes, but such a description would leave out an important part of the picture, the subjectivity. While it may be correct to say that the leaf moves to the right because it wants to move to the right, since moving to the right is associated with right-moving willfulness, this does not mean that the qualia have a causal effect on its behaviour. A causal effect of the qualia on the leaf's behaviour would mean that the leaf moves contrary to physical laws, confounding scientists by moving to the right when the forces on it suggest it should move to the left. It's similar with the brain: a direct causal effect of qualia on behaviour would mean that neurons fire when their physical state would suggest that they not fire. I'm sorry that you don't like this, but it is what it would mean if the relationship between qualia and physical activity were bidirectional rather than the qualia being supervenient. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
